Don't check the auth algorithm for GCM.
The upstream OpenSSL changes only set the cipher for GCM since the authentication is redundant, and changes to OCF will soon remove the GCM authentication algorithm constants entirely for the same reason. In addition, ktls_create_session() already validates these fields and wouldn't pass down an invalid auth_algorithm value to any drivers or ktls backends. Reviewed by: hselasky Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23671
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@ -339,10 +339,6 @@ mlx5e_tls_snd_tag_alloc(struct ifnet *ifp,
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case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
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switch (en->cipher_key_len) {
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case 128 / 8:
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if (en->auth_algorithm != CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto failure;
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}
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if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) {
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if (MLX5_CAP_TLS(priv->mdev, tls_1_2_aes_gcm_128) == 0) {
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error = EPROTONOSUPPORT;
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@ -360,10 +356,6 @@ mlx5e_tls_snd_tag_alloc(struct ifnet *ifp,
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break;
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case 256 / 8:
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if (en->auth_algorithm != CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto failure;
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}
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if (en->tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO) {
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if (MLX5_CAP_TLS(priv->mdev, tls_1_2_aes_gcm_256) == 0) {
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error = EPROTONOSUPPORT;
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