The vectx API, computes the hash for verifying a file as it is read.
This avoids the overhead of reading files twice - once to verify, then
again to load.
For doing an install via loader, avoiding the need to rewind
large files is critical.
This API is only used for modules, kernel and mdimage as these are the
biggest files read by the loader.
The reduction in boot time depends on how expensive the I/O is
on any given platform. On a fast VM we see 6% improvement.
For install via loader the first file to be verified is likely to be the
kernel, so some of the prep work (finding manifest etc) done by
verify_file() needs to be factored so it can be reused for
vectx_open().
For missing or unrecognized fingerprint entries, we fail
in vectx_open() unless verifying is disabled.
Otherwise fingerprint check happens in vectx_close() and
since this API is only used for files which must be verified
(VE_MUST) we panic if we get an incorrect hash.
Reviewed by: imp,tsoome
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D23827
This adds some new commands to loader :
- pnpmatch
This takes a pnpinfo string as argument and tries to find a kernel module
associated with it. -v and -d option are available and are the same as in
devmatch (v is verbose, d dumps the hints).
- pnpload
This takes a pnpinfo string as argument and tries to load a kernel module
associated with it.
- pnpautoload
This will attempt to load every kernel module for each buses. Each buses are
probed, the probe function will generate pnpinfo string and load kernel module
associated with it if it exists.
Only simplebus for FDT system is implemented for now.
Since we need the dtb and overlays to be applied before searching the tree
fdt_devmatch_next will load and apply the dtb + overlays.
All the pnp parsing code comes from devmatch and is the same at 99%.
Reviewed by: imp, kevans
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19498
file_loadraw():
check for file_alloc() and strdup() results.
we leak 'name'.
mod_load() does leak 'filename'.
mod_loadkld() does not need to check fp, file_discard() does check.
346002 did miss the fact that we do not only undo the loadaddr, but also
we need to remove the inserted module. Implement file_remove() to do the job.
MFC after: 1w
The last_file variable is used to reset the loadaddr variable back to original
value; however, it is possible the last_file is NULL, so we can not blindly
trust it. But then again, we can just save the original loadaddr and use
the saved value for recovery.
MFC after: 1w
The current approach of injecting manifest into mac_veriexec is to
verify the integrity of it in userspace (veriexec (8)) and pass its
entries into kernel using a char device (/dev/veriexec).
This requires verifying root partition integrity in loader,
for example by using memory disk and checking its hash.
Otherwise if rootfs is compromised an attacker could inject their own data.
This patch introduces an option to parse manifest in kernel based on envs.
The loader sets manifest path and digest.
EVENTHANDLER is used to launch the module right after the rootfs is mounted.
It has to be done this way, since one might want to verify integrity of the init file.
This means that manifest is required to be present on the root partition.
Note that the envs have to be set right before boot to make sure that no one can spoof them.
Submitted by: Kornel Duleba <mindal@semihalf.com>
Reviewed by: sjg
Obtained from: Semihalf
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19281
This relies on libbearssl and libsecureboot
to verify files read by loader in a maner equivalent
to how mac_veriexec
Note: disabled by default.
Use is initially expected to be by embeded vendors
Reviewed by: emaste, imp
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks
Differential Revision: D16336
