type, rather than "object_label" as the first argument. This reduces
complexity a little for the consumer, and also makes it easier for
use to rename the underlying entry points in struct mac_policy_obj.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Include src/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h in kern_mac.c.
Remove redundant defines from the include: SYSCTL_DECL(), debug macros,
composition macros.
Unstaticize various bits now exposed to the remainder of the kernel:
mac_init_label(), mac_destroy_label().
Remove all the functions now implemented in mac_process/mac_vfs/mac_net/
mac_pipe. Also remove debug counters, sysctls exporting debug
counters, enforcement flags, sysctls exporting enforcement flags.
Leave module declaration, sysctl nodes, mactemp malloc type, system
calls.
This should conclude MAC/LINT/NOTES breakage from the break-out process,
but I'm running builds now to make sure I caught everything.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Unstaticize mac_late.
Remove ea_warn_once, now in mac_vfs.c.
Unstaticisize mac_policy_list, mac_static_policy_list, use
struct mac_policy_list_head instead of LIST_HEAD() directly.
Unstaticize and un-inline MAC policy locking functions so they can
be referenced from mac_*.c.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Extended attribute transaction warning flag if transactions aren't
supported on the EA implementation being used.
Debug fallback flag to permit a less conservative fallback if reading
an on-disk label fails.
Enforce_fs toggle to enforce file systme access control.
Debugging counters for file system objects: mounts, vnodes, devfs_dirents.
Object initialization, destruction, copying, internalization,
externalization, relabeling for file system objects.
Life cycle operations for devfs entries.
Generic extended attribute label implementation for use by UFS, UFS2 in
multilabel mode.
Generic single-level label implementation for use by all file systems
when in singlelabel mode.
Exec-time transition based on file label entry points.
Vnode operation access control checks (many).
Mount operation access control checks (few).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Pipe enforcement flag.
Pipe object debugging counters.
MALLOC type for MAC label storage.
Pipe MAC label management routines, externalize/internalization/change
routines.
Pipe MAC access control checks.
Un-staticize functions called from mac_set_fd() when operating on a
pipe. Abstraction improvements in this space seem likely.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Network and socket enforcement toggles.
Counters for network objects (mbufs, ifnets, bpfdecs, sockets, and ipqs).
Label management routines for network objects.
Life cycle events for network objects.
Label internalization/externalization/relabel for ifnets, sockets,
including ioctl implementations for sockets, ifnets.
Access control checks relating to network obejcts.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
in mac_internal.h:
Sysctl tree declarations.
Policy list structure definition.
Policy list variables (static, dynamic).
mac_late flag.
Enforcement flags for process, vm, which have checks in multiple files.
mac_labelmbufs variable to drive conditional mbuf labeling.
M_MACTEMP malloc type.
Debugging counter macros.
MAC Framework infrastructure primitives, including policy locking
primitives, kernel label initialization/destruction, userland
label consistency checks, policy slot allocation.
Per-object interfaces for objects that are internalized and externalized
using system calls that will remain centrally defined: credentials,
pipes, vnodes.
MAC policy composition macros: MAC_CHECK, MAC_BOOLEAN, MAC_EXTERNALIZE,
MAC_INTERNALIZE, MAC_PERFORM.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
line up the function names in an earlier generation of the API when
some of the functions returned structure pointers.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
mac_reflect_mbuf_icmp()
mac_reflect_mbuf_tcp()
These entry points permit MAC policies to do "update in place"
changes to the labels on ICMP and TCP mbuf headers when an ICMP or
TCP response is generated to a packet outside of the context of
an existing socket. For example, in respond to a ping or a RST
packet to a SYN on a closed port.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
explicit access control checks to delete and list extended attributes
on a vnode, rather than implicitly combining with the setextattr and
getextattr checks. This reflects EA API changes in the kernel made
recently, including the move to explicit VOP's for both of these
operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD PRoject
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC() and MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC() to maintain
debugging counter values rather than #ifdef'ing the atomic
operations to MAC_DEBUG.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
the MAC policy modules to improve robustness against C string
bugs and vulnerabilities. Following these revisions, all
string construction of labels for export to userspace (or
elsewhere) is performed using the sbuf API, which prevents
the consumer from having to perform laborious and intricate
pointer and buffer checks. This substantially simplifies
the externalization logic, both at the MAC Framework level,
and in individual policies; this becomes especially useful
when policies export more complex label data, such as with
compartments in Biba and MLS.
Bundled in here are some other minor fixes associated with
externalization: including avoiding malloc while holding the
process mutex in mac_lomac, and hence avoid a failure mode
when printing labels during a downgrade operation due to
the removal of the M_NOWAIT case.
This has been running in the MAC development tree for about
three weeks without problems.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
policy definition structure; this permits policies to reduce their
number of gratuitous includes for required for entry points they
don't implement. This also facilitates building the MAC Framework
on Darwin.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Several of the subtypes have an associated vnode which is used for
stuff like the f*() functions.
By giving the vnode a speparate field, a number of checks for the specific
subtype can be replaced simply with a check for f_vnode != NULL, and
we can later free f_data up to subtype specific use.
At this point in time, f_data still points to the vnode, so any code I
might have overlooked will still work.
constants in question refer to the number of label slots, not the
maximum number of policies that may be loaded. This should reduce
confusion regarding an element in the MAC sysctl MIB, as well as
make it more clear what the affect of changing the compile-time
constants is.
Approved by: re (jhb)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
(1) Accept that we're now going to use mutexes, so don't attempt
to avoid treating them as mutexes. This cleans up locking
accessor function names some.
(2) Rename variables to _mtx, _cv, _count, simplifying the naming.
(3) Add a new form of the _busy() primitive that conditionally
makes the list busy: if there are entries on the list, bump
the busy count. If there are no entries, don't bump the busy
count. Return a boolean indicating whether or not the busy
count was bumped.
(4) Break mac_policy_list into two lists: one with the same name
holding dynamic policies, and a new list, mac_static_policy_list,
which holds policies loaded before mac_late and without the
unload flag set. The static list may be accessed without
holding the busy count, since it can't change at run-time.
(5) In general, prefer making the list busy conditionally, meaning
we pay only one mutex lock per entry point if all modules are
on the static list, rather than two (since we don't have to
lower the busy count when we're done with the framework). For
systems running just Biba or MLS, this will halve the mutex
accesses in the network stack, and may offer a substantial
performance benefits.
(6) Lay the groundwork for a dynamic-free kernel option which
eliminates all locking associated with dynamically loaded or
unloaded policies, for pre-configured systems requiring
maximum performance but less run-time flexibility.
These changes have been running for a few weeks on MAC development
branch systems.
Approved by: re (jhb)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
- Add a parameter to vm_pageout_flush() that tells vm_pageout_flush()
whether its caller has locked the vm_object. (This is a temporary
measure to bootstrap vm_object locking.)
don't try and convert the argument flags to malloc flags, or we risk
implicitly requesting blocking and generating witness warnings.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
returning some additional room in the first mbuf in a chain, and
avoiding feature-specific contents in the mbuf header. To do this:
- Modify mbuf_to_label() to extract the tag, returning NULL if not
found.
- Introduce mac_init_mbuf_tag() which does most of the work
mac_init_mbuf() used to do, except on an m_tag rather than an
mbuf.
- Scale back mac_init_mbuf() to perform m_tag allocation and invoke
mac_init_mbuf_tag().
- Replace mac_destroy_mbuf() with mac_destroy_mbuf_tag(), since
m_tag's are now GC'd deep in the m_tag/mbuf code rather than
at a higher level when mbufs are directly free()'d.
- Add mac_copy_mbuf_tag() to support m_copy_pkthdr() and related
notions.
- Generally change all references to mbuf labels so that they use
mbuf_to_label() rather than &mbuf->m_pkthdr.label. This
required no changes in the MAC policies (yay!).
- Tweak mbuf release routines to not call mac_destroy_mbuf(),
tag destruction takes care of it for us now.
- Remove MAC magic from m_copy_pkthdr() and m_move_pkthdr() --
the existing m_tag support does all this for us. Note that
we can no longer just zero the m_tag list on the target mbuf,
rather, we have to delete the chain because m_tag's will
already be hung off freshly allocated mbuf's.
- Tweak m_tag copying routines so that if we're copying a MAC
m_tag, we don't do a binary copy, rather, we initialize the
new storage and do a deep copy of the label.
- Remove use of MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED in a few bizarre places
having to do with mbuf header copies previously.
- When an mbuf is copied in ip_input(), we no longer need to
explicitly copy the label because it will get handled by the
m_tag code now.
- No longer any weird handling of MAC labels in if_loop.c during
header copies.
- Add MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS flag to Biba, MLS, mac_test.
In mac_test, handle the label==NULL case, since it can be
dynamically loaded.
In order to improve performance with this change, introduce the notion
of "lazy MAC label allocation" -- only allocate m_tag storage for MAC
labels if we're running with a policy that uses MAC labels on mbufs.
Policies declare this intent by setting the MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS
flag in their load-time flags field during declaration. Note: this
opens up the possibility of post-boot policy modules getting back NULL
slot entries even though they have policy invariants of non-NULL slot
entries, as the policy might have been loaded after the mbuf was
allocated, leaving the mbuf without label storage. Policies that cannot
handle this case must be declared as NOTLATE, or must be modified.
- mac_labelmbufs holds the current cumulative status as to whether
any policies require mbuf labeling or not. This is updated whenever
the active policy set changes by the function mac_policy_updateflags().
The function iterates the list and checks whether any have the
flag set. Write access to this variable is protected by the policy
list; read access is currently not protected for performance reasons.
This might change if it causes problems.
- Add MAC_POLICY_LIST_ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE() to permit the flags update
function to assert appropriate locks.
- This makes allocation in mac_init_mbuf() conditional on the flag.
Reviewed by: sam
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
mbuf_to_label(). This permits the vast majority of entry point code
to be unaware that labels are stored in m->m_pkthdr.label, such that
we can experiment storage of labels elsewhere (such as in m_tags).
Reviewed by: sam
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
of asserting that an mbuf has a packet header. Use it instead of hand-
rolled versions wherever applicable.
Submitted by: Hiten Pandya <hiten@unixdaemons.com>
additional flags argument to indicate blocking disposition, and
pass in M_NOWAIT from the IP reassembly code to indicate that
blocking is not OK when labeling a new IP fragment reassembly
queue. This should eliminate some of the WITNESS warnings that
have started popping up since fine-grained IP stack locking
started going in; if memory allocation fails, the creation of
the fragment queue will be aborted.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
which are no longer required now that we have UFS2 with extended
attribute transactions.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
check, mac_check_sysarch_ioperm(), permitting MAC security policy
modules to control access to these interfaces. Currently, they
protect access to IOPL on i386, and setting HAE on Alpha.
Additional checks might be required on other platforms to prevent
bypass of kernel security protections by unauthorized processes.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
modules to authorize disabling of swap against a particular vnode.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
pointer types, and remove a huge number of casts from code using it.
Change struct xfile xf_data to xun_data (ABI is still compatible).
If we need to add a #define for f_data and xf_data we can, but I don't
think it will be necessary. There are no operational changes in this
commit.
unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount
that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC
Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the
pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile
out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support.
Approved by: re (murray)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This
is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the
struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient
storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to
be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other
label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies
to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that
a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This
permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such
as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update
process properties even when many existing locks are held without
violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use
of this label storage.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting
kld operations. This permits policies to limit access to kld operations
based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks
on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc).
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt.
We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should
be fairly deadlock-safe. Because of the cv model and busy
count, it's possible for a cv waiter waiting for exclusive
access to the policy list to be starved by active and
long-lived access control/labeling events. For now, we
accept that as a necessary tradeoff.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We
now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure,
rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the
image activator instance structure.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic
with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the
SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without
MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system
calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules,
rather than the framework.
(2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode
being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell
script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both
vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label.
SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning
via shell script executables. Other policies might want to
take both labels into account during an integrity or
confidentiality decision at execve()-time.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement
flags, although at some point this should probably be its own flag.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach.
Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiality
of accounting data, limit the ability to turn on or off accounting,
as well as to prevent inappropriately labeled threads from becoming nfs
server threads.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:
(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy
with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
a few hundred NULL function pointers.
(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
entry point set.
Both of these no longer apply:
(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.
(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going
rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
complexity.
This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type
where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument
throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
with the new VFS/EA semantics in the MAC framework. Move the per-policy
structures out to per-policy include files, removing all policy-specific
defines and structures out of the base framework includes and
implementation, making mac_biba and mac_mls entirely self-contained.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl()
operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we
only have access to the MIB of the target sysctl entry, rather than
the more useful entry name, but this is sufficient for policies
like Biba that wish to use their notions of privilege or integrity
to prevent inappropriate sysctl modification. Affects MAC kernels
only. Since SYSCTL_LOCK isn't in sysctl.h, just kern_sysctl.c,
we can't assert the SYSCTL subsystem lockin the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding
the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary
object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather
than just the vnode. We'll drop additional checks of this
class into the same check namespace, including reboot(),
sysctl(), et al.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
"refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label
right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label
in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems,
leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means
reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is
pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes
frequently during operations later, improving performance. This
also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not
previously present in the system. This chances the cache
coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in
an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition
during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present
with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode
inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
to merge mac_te, since the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK provides a much
more mature Type Enforcement implementation. This changes the size
of the on-disk 'struct oldmac' EA labels, which may require regeneration.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
perform authorization checks during swapon() events; policies
might choose to enforce protections based on the credential
requesting the swap configuration, the target of the swap operation,
or other factors such as internal policy state.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
to use a modified notion of 'struct mac', and flesh out the new variation
system calls (almost identical to existing ones except that they permit
a pid to be specified for process label retrieval, and don't follow
symlinks). This generalizes the label API so that the framework is
now almost entirely policy-agnostic.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
on all label parsing occuring in userland, and knowledge of the loaded
policies in the user libraries. This revision of the API pushes that
parsing into the kernel, avoiding the need for shared library support
of policies in userland, permitting statically linked binaries (such
as ls, ps, and ifconfig) to use MAC labels. In these API revisions,
high level parsing of the MAC label is done in the MAC Framework,
and interpretation of label elements is delegated to the MAC policy
modules. This permits modules to export zero or more label elements
to user space if desired, and support them in the manner they want
and with the semantics they want. This is believed to be the final
revision of this interface: from the perspective of user applications,
the API has actually not changed, although the ABI has.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
policies remains the same: subjects and objects are labeled for
integrity or sensitivity, and a dominance operator determines whether
or not subject/object accesses are permitted to limit inappropriate
information flow. Compartments are a non-hierarchal component to
the label, so add a bitfield to the label element for each, and a
set check as part of the dominance operator. This permits the
implementation of "need to know" elements of MLS.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
compile fail. MAC_MAX_POLICIES should always be defined, or we have
bigger problems at hand.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
unregister. Under some obscure (perhaps demented) circumstances,
this can result in a panic if a policy is unregistered, and then someone
foolishly unregisters it again.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
checks from the MAC tree: allow policies to perform access control
for the ability of a process to send and receive data via a socket.
At some point, we might also pass in additional address information
if an explicit address is requested on send.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
seperate entry points for each occasion:
mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping
mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change
mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade
should take place following
subject relabel.
Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode
policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the
VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency
of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding
limiting access to vnode mmaping.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding
potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncache code.
Similar to the existing support for mbuf label allocation: if we can't
allocate all the necessary label store in each policy, we back out
the label allocation and fail the socket creation. Sync from MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
devfs VOP symlink creation by introducing a new entry point to determine
the label of the devfs_dirent prior to allocation of a vnode for the
symlink.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
point that instruments the creation of hard links. Policy implementations
to follow.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
to mbuf label initialization, that functionality was never merged to
the main tree. Go ahead and merge that functionality now. Note that
this requires policy modules to accept the case where the label
element may be destroyed even if init has not succeeded on it (in
the event that policy failed the init). This will shortly also
apply to sockets.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
order used in mac_policy.h and elsewhere. Sort order is basically
"by operation category", then "alphabetically by object". Sync to
MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
externalization, and cred label life cycle events to entirely above
devfs and vnode events. Sync from MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
entry points to better match the entry point ordering in mac_policy.h.
Big diff, no functional change; merge from the MAC tree.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
- If a policy isn't registered when a policy module unloads, silently
succeed.
- Hold the policy list lock across more of the validity tests to avoid
races.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
modules to perform MAC-related events when a thread returns to user
space. This is required for policies that have floating process labels,
as it's not always possible to acquire the process lock at arbitrary
points in the stack during system call processing; process labels might
represent traditional authentication data, process history information,
or other data.
LOMAC will use this entry point to perform the process label update
prior to the thread returning to userspace, when plugged into the MAC
framework.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
(1) Where previously the pipe mutex was selectively grabbed during
pipe_ioctl(), now always grab it and then release if if not
needed. This protects the call to mac_check_pipe_ioctl() to
make sure the label remains consistent. (Note: it looks
like sigio locking may be incorrect for fgetown() since we
call it not-by-reference and sigio locking assumes call by
reference).
(2) In pipe_stat(), lock the pipe if MAC is compiled in so that
the call to mac_check_pipe_stat() gets a locked pipe to
protect label consistency. We still release the lock before
returning actual stat() data, risking inconsistency, but
apparently our pipe locking model accepts that risk.
(3) In various pipe MAC authorization checks, assert that the pipe
lock is held.
(4) Grab the lock when performing a pipe relabel operation, and
assert it a little deeper in the stack.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories