The script written and used originally by msmith has been lost.
This version takes the Boemler and Heckenbach lists and produces merged
output. It defaults to ignoring any entries from Heckenbach already
found in Boemler but the -l option causes it to take the entry with the
longest description where an entry appears in both lists.
If this script is replaced, care should be taken to
1) Always use upper-case hexidecimal tokens in device ids.
2) Always keep device lists sorted within vendor lists, which must also
be sorted.
3) Do not try to include input from the previous pci_vendors file, since
bogus ids seem to be removed from both the Boemler and Heckenbach
lists from time to time.
test by default, as setugid() is now part of the base kernel (assuming
(options REGRESSION) has been enabled for the running kernel).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
This test utility attempts to evaluate the current kernel policy
for authorization inter-process activities, currently ptrace(),
kill(, SIGHUP), getpriority(), and setpriority(). The utility creates
pairs of processes, initializes their credential sets to useful
cases, and reports on whether the results are in keeping with hard-coded
safety expectations.
o Currently, this utility relies on the availability of __setugid(),
an uncomitted system call used for managing the P_SUGID bit. Due to
continuing discussion of optional regression testing kernel components
("options REGRESSION") I'll hold off on committing that until the
discussion has reached its natural termination.
o A number of additional testing factors should be taken into account
in the testing, including tests for different classes of signals,
interactions with process session characteristics, I/O signalling,
broadcast activities such as broadcast signalling, mass priority
setting, and to take into group-related aspects of credentials.
Additional operations should also be taken into account, such as ktrace,
debugging attach using procfs, and so on.
o This testing suite is intended to prevent the introduction of bugs
in the upcoming sets of authorization changes associated with the
introduction of process capabilities and mandatory access control.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
are ignored and the remaining is passed on to cp(1). This allows
a build to be run as non-root without forcing any user/group
setting and also prevents setting any file flags.
This may not be the right place for buildtools.
