This is a minor follow-up to r297422, prompted by a Coverity warning. (It's
not a real defect, just a code smell.) OSD slot array reservations are an
array of pointers (void **) but were cast to void* and back unnecessarily.
Keep the correct type from reservation to use.
osd.9 is updated to match, along with a few trivial igor fixes.
Reported by: Coverity
CID: 1353811
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division
1. Limit secs to INT32_MAX / 2 to avoid errors from kern_setitimer().
Assert that kern_setitimer() returns 0.
Remove bogus cast of secs.
Fix style(9) issues.
2. Increment the return value if the remaining tv_usec value more than 500000 as a Linux does.
Pointed out by: [1] Bruce Evans
MFC after: 1 week
is always successfull.
So, ignore any errors and return 0 as a Linux do.
XXX. Unlike POSIX, Linux in case when the invalid seconds value specified
always return 0, so in that case Linux does not return proper remining time.
MFC after: 1 week
need to include it explicitly when <vm/vm_param.h> is already included.
Suggested by: alc
Reviewed by: alc
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5379
and replace crcopysafe by crcopy as crcopysafe is is not intended to be
safe in a threaded environment, it drops PROC_LOCK() in while() that
can lead to unexpected results, such as overwrite kernel memory.
In my POV crcopysafe() needs special attention. For now I do not see
any problems with this function, but who knows.
Submitted by: dchagin
Found by: trinity
Security: SA-16:04.linux
The set_robust_list system call request the kernel to record the head
of the list of robust futexes owned by the calling thread. The head
argument is the list head to record.
The get_robust_list system call should return the head of the robust
list of the thread whose thread id is specified in pid argument.
The list head should be stored in the location pointed to by head
argument.
In contrast, our implemenattion of get_robust_list system call copies
the known portion of memory pointed by recorded in set_robust_list
system call pointer to the head of the robust list to the location
pointed by head argument.
So, it is possible for a local attacker to read portions of kernel
memory, which may result in a privilege escalation.
Submitted by: mjg
Security: SA-16:03.linux
- Use SDT_PROBE<N>() instead of SDT_PROBE(). This has no functional effect
at the moment, but will be needed for some future changes.
- Don't hardcode the module component of the probe identifier. This is
set automatically by the SDT framework.
MFC after: 1 week
r161611 added some of the code from sys_vfork() directly into the Linux
module wrappers since they use RFSTOPPED. In r232240, the RFFPWAIT handling
was moved to syscallret(), thus this code in the Linux module is no longer
needed as it will be called later.
This also allows the Linux wrappers to benefit from the fix in r275616 for
threads not getting suspended if their vforked child is stopped while they
wait on them.
Reviewed by: jhb, kib
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3828
SDT_PROBE requires 5 parameters whereas SDT_PROBE<n> requires n parameters
where n is typically smaller than 5.
Perhaps SDT_PROBE should be made a private implementation detail.
MFC after: 20 days
On CloudABI we want to create file descriptors with just the minimal set
of Capsicum rights in place. The reason for this is that it makes it
easier to obtain uniform behaviour across different operating systems.
By explicitly whitelisting the operations, we can return consistent
error codes, but also prevent applications from depending OS-specific
behaviour.
Extend kern_kqueue() to take an additional struct filecaps that is
passed on to falloc_caps(). Update the existing consumers to pass in
NULL.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3259
On CloudABI, the rights bits returned by cap_rights_get() match up with
the operations that you can actually perform on the file descriptor.
Limiting the rights is good, because it makes it easier to get uniform
behaviour across different operating systems. If process descriptors on
FreeBSD would suddenly gain support for any new file operation, this
wouldn't become exposed to CloudABI processes without first extending
the rights.
Extend fork1() to gain a 'struct filecaps' argument that allows you to
construct process descriptors with custom rights. Use this in
cloudabi_sys_proc_fork() to limit the rights to just fstat() and
pdwait().
Obtained from: https://github.com/NuxiNL/freebsd
Summary:
Pipes in CloudABI are unidirectional. The reason for this is that
CloudABI attempts to provide a uniform runtime environment across
different flavours of UNIX.
Instead of implementing a custom pipe that is unidirectional, we can
simply reuse Capsicum permission bits to support this. This is nice,
because CloudABI already attempts to restrict permission bits to
correspond with the operations that apply to a certain file descriptor.
Replace kern_pipe() and kern_pipe2() by a single kern_pipe() that takes
a pair of filecaps. These filecaps are passed to the newly introduced
falloc_caps() function that creates the descriptors with rights in
place.
Test Plan:
CloudABI pipes seem to be created with proper rights in place:
https://github.com/NuxiNL/cloudlibc/blob/master/src/libc/unistd/pipe_test.c#L44
Reviewers: jilles, mjg
Reviewed By: mjg
Subscribers: imp
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3236
SIGCHLD signal, should keep full 32 bits of the status passed to the
_exit(2).
Split the combined p_xstat of the struct proc into the separate exit
status p_xexit for normal process exit, and signalled termination
information p_xsig. Kernel-visible macro KW_EXITCODE() reconstructs
old p_xstat from p_xexit and p_xsig. p_xexit contains complete status
and copied out into si_status.
Requested by: Joerg Schilling
Reviewed by: jilles (previous version), pho
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Use the same scheme implemented to manage credentials.
Code needing to look at process's credentials (as opposed to thred's) is
provided with *_proc variants of relevant functions.
Places which possibly had to take the proc lock anyway still use the proc
pointer to access limits.
