credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
of explicit calls to lockmgr. Also provides macros for the flags
pased to specify shared, exclusive or release which map to the
lockmgr flags. This is so that the use of lockmgr can be easily
replaced with optimized reader-writer locks.
- Add some locking that I missed the first time.
because it only takes a struct tag which makes it impossible to
use unions, typedefs etc.
Define __offsetof() in <machine/ansi.h>
Define offsetof() in terms of __offsetof() in <stddef.h> and <sys/types.h>
Remove myriad of local offsetof() definitions.
Remove includes of <stddef.h> in kernel code.
NB: Kernelcode should *never* include from /usr/include !
Make <sys/queue.h> include <machine/ansi.h> to avoid polluting the API.
Deprecate <struct.h> with a warning. The warning turns into an error on
01-12-2000 and the file gets removed entirely on 01-01-2001.
Paritials reviews by: various.
Significant brucifications by: bde
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
the gating of system calls that cause modifications to the underlying
filesystem. The gating can be enabled by any filesystem that needs
to consistently suspend operations by adding the vop_stdgetwritemount
to their set of vnops. Once gating is enabled, the function
vfs_write_suspend stops all new write operations to a filesystem,
allows any filesystem modifying system calls already in progress
to complete, then sync's the filesystem to disk and returns. The
function vfs_write_resume allows the suspended write operations to
begin again. Gating is not added by default for all filesystems as
for SMP systems it adds two extra locks to such critical kernel
paths as the write system call. Thus, gating should only be added
as needed.
Details on the use and current status of snapshots in FFS can be
found in /sys/ufs/ffs/README.snapshot so for brevity and timelyness
is not included here. Unless and until you create a snapshot file,
these changes should have no effect on your system (famous last words).
after the acquisition of any advisory locks. This fix corrects a case
in which a process tries to open a file with a non-blocking exclusive
lock. Even if it fails to get the lock it would still truncate the
file even though its open failed. With this change, the truncation
is done only after the lock is successfully acquired.
Obtained from: BSD/OS
instead of a struct iovec * array and int len. Get rid of stupidly trying
to allocate all of the memory and copyin()ing the entire iovec[], and
instead just do the proper VOP_WRITE() in ktrwrite() using a copy of
the struct uio that the syscall originally used.
This solves the DoS which could easily be performed; to work around the
DoS, one could also remove "options KTRACE" from the kernel. This is
a very strong MFC candidate for 4.1.
Found by: art@OpenBSD.org
Alot of the code in sys/kern directly accesses the *Q_HEAD and *Q_ENTRY
structures for list operations. This patch makes all list operations
in sys/kern use the queue(3) macros, rather than directly accessing the
*Q_{HEAD,ENTRY} structures.
This batch of changes compile to the same object files.
Reviewed by: phk
Submitted by: Jake Burkholder <jake@checker.org>
PR: 14914
-----------------------------
The core of the signalling code has been rewritten to operate
on the new sigset_t. No methodological changes have been made.
Most references to a sigset_t object are through macros (see
signalvar.h) to create a level of abstraction and to provide
a basis for further improvements.
The NSIG constant has not been changed to reflect the maximum
number of signals possible. The reason is that it breaks
programs (especially shells) which assume that all signals
have a non-null name in sys_signame. See src/bin/sh/trap.c
for an example. Instead _SIG_MAXSIG has been introduced to
hold the maximum signal possible with the new sigset_t.
struct sigprop has been moved from signalvar.h to kern_sig.c
because a) it is only used there, and b) access must be done
though function sigprop(). The latter because the table doesn't
holds properties for all signals, but only for the first NSIG
signals.
signal.h has been reorganized to make reading easier and to
add the new and/or modified structures. The "old" structures
are moved to signalvar.h to prevent namespace polution.
Especially the coda filesystem suffers from the change, because
it contained lines like (p->p_sigmask == SIGIO), which is easy
to do for integral types, but not for compound types.
NOTE: kdump (and port linux_kdump) must be recompiled.
Thanks to Garrett Wollman and Daniel Eischen for pressing the
importance of changing sigreturn as well.
the terminating zero by copying MAXCOMLEN + 1 bytes. This fixes the garbage
that occasionally appeared behind the programname when it is at least MAXCOMLEN
bytes long (such as communicator-4.61-bin).
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
it in struct proc instead.
This fixes a boatload of compiler warning, and removes a lot of cruft
from the sources.
I have not removed the /*ARGSUSED*/, they will require some looking at.
libkvm, ps and other userland struct proc frobbing programs will need
recompiled.
Distribute all but the most fundamental malloc types. This time I also
remembered the trick to making things static: Put "static" in front of
them.
A couple of finer points by: bde
changes, so don't expect to be able to run the kernel as-is (very well)
without the appropriate Lite/2 userland changes.
The system boots and can mount UFS filesystems.
Untested: ext2fs, msdosfs, NFS
Known problems: Incorrect Berkeley ID strings in some files.
Mount_std mounts will not work until the getfsent
library routine is changed.
Reviewed by: various people
Submitted by: Jeffery Hsu <hsu@freebsd.org>
This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
data pointed at in a ktrace file, if this process is being ktrace'ed.
I'm using this to profile malloc usage.
The advantage is that there is no context around this call, ie, no
open file or socket, so it will work in any process, and you can
decide if you want it to collect data or not.
structs and prototypes for syscalls.
Ifdefed duplicated decentralized declarations of args structs. It's
convenient to have this visible but they are hard to maintain. Some
are already different from the central declarations. 4.4lite2 puts
them in comments in the function headers but I wanted to avoid the
large changes for that.
- Delete redundant declarations.
- Add -Wredundant-declarations to Makefile.i386 so they don't come back.
- Delete sloppy COMMON-style declarations of uninitialized data in
header files.
- Add a few prototypes.
- Clean up warnings resulting from the above.
NB: ioconf.c will still generate a redundant-declaration warning, which
is unavoidable unless somebody volunteers to make `config' smarter.
