connect. This check was added as part of the defense against the "land"
attack, to prevent attacks which guess the ISS from going into ESTABLISHED.
The "src == dst" check will still prevent the single-homed case of the
"land" attack, and guessing ISS's should be hard anyway.
Submitted by: David Borman <dab@bsdi.com>
since there might be permanent entries still left after
calls to DeleteLink (it will be nullified by DeleteLink
if all entries are deleted, won't it ?)
2) in PacketAliasSetAddress, set the aliasing address
even when PKT_ALIAS_RESET_ON_ADDR_CHANGE is in effect.
Just don't clean up links in this case.
Submitted by: Ari Suutari <ari@suutari.iki.fi>
via: Charles Mott <cmott@srv.net>
PR: 5041
It controls if the system is to accept source routed packets.
It used to be such that, no matter if the setting of net.inet.ip.sourceroute,
source routed packets destined at us would be accepted. Now it is
controllable with eth default set to NOT accept those.
offset is non-zero:
- Do not match fragmented packets if the rule specifies a port or
TCP flags
- Match fragmented packets if the rule does not specify a port and
TCP flags
Since ipfw cannot examine port numbers or TCP flags for such packets,
it is now illegal to specify the 'frag' option with either ports or
tcpflags. Both kernel and ipfw userland utility will reject rules
containing a combination of these options.
BEWARE: packets that were previously passed may now be rejected, and
vice versa.
Reviewed by: Archie Cobbs <archie@whistle.com>
This means that a FreeBSD will only forward source routed packets
when both net.inet.ip.forwarding and net.inet.ip.sourceroute are set
to 1.
You can hit me now ;-)
Submitted by: Thomas Ptacek
TCP and UDP port numbers in fragmented packets when IP offset != 0.
2.2.6 candidate.
Discovered by: Marc Slemko <marcs@znep.com>
Submitted by: Archie Cobbs <archie@whistle.com> w/fix from me
a hashed port list. In the new scheme, in_pcblookup() goes away and is
replaced by a new routine, in_pcblookup_local() for doing the local port
check. Note that this implementation is space inefficient in that the PCB
struct is now too large to fit into 128 bytes. I might deal with this in the
future by using the new zone allocator, but I wanted these changes to be
extensively tested in their current form first.
Also:
1) Fixed off-by-one errors in the port lookup loops in in_pcbbind().
2) Got rid of some unneeded rehashing. Adding a new routine, in_pcbinshash()
to do the initialial hash insertion.
3) Renamed in_pcblookuphash() to in_pcblookup_hash() for easier readability.
4) Added a new routine, in_pcbremlists() to remove the PCB from the various
hash lists.
5) Added/deleted comments where appropriate.
6) Removed unnecessary splnet() locking. In general, the PCB functions should
be called at splnet()...there are unfortunately a few exceptions, however.
7) Reorganized a few structs for better cache line behavior.
8) Killed my TCP_ACK_HACK kludge. It may come back in a different form in
the future, however.
These changes have been tested on wcarchive for more than a month. In tests
done here, connection establishment overhead is reduced by more than 50
times, thus getting rid of one of the major networking scalability problems.
Still to do: make tcp_fastimo/tcp_slowtimo scale well for systems with a
large number of connections. tcp_fastimo is easy; tcp_slowtimo is difficult.
WARNING: Anything that knows about inpcb and tcpcb structs will have to be
recompiled; at the very least, this includes netstat(1).
rev 1.66. This fix contains both belt and suspenders.
Belt: ignore packets where src == dst and srcport == dstport in TCPS_LISTEN.
These packets can only legitimately occur when connecting a socket to itself,
which doesn't go through TCPS_LISTEN (it goes CLOSED->SYN_SENT->SYN_RCVD->
ESTABLISHED). This prevents the "standard" "land" attack, although doesn't
prevent the multi-homed variation.
Suspenders: send a RST in response to a SYN/ACK in SYN_RECEIVED state.
The only packets we should get in SYN_RECEIVED are
1. A retransmitted SYN, or
2. An ack of our SYN/ACK.
The "land" attack depends on us accepting our own SYN/ACK as an ACK;
in SYN_RECEIVED state; this should prevent all "land" attacks.
We also move up the sequence number check for the ACK in SYN_RECEIVED.
This neither helps nor hurts with respect to the "land" attack, but
puts more of the validation checking in one spot.
PR: kern/5103
This will not make any of object files that LINT create change; there
might be differences with INET disabled, but hardly anything compiled
before without INET anyway. Now the 'obvious' things will give a
proper error if compiled without inet - ipx_ip, ipfw, tcp_debug. The
only thing that _should_ work (but can't be made to compile reasonably
easily) is sppp :-(
This commit move struct arpcom from <netinet/if_ether.h> to
<net/if_arp.h>.
consequence, ipfw's list command now adjusts its output at runtime
based on the largest packet/byte counter values.
NOTE:
o The ipfw struct has changed requiring a recompile of both kernel
and userland ipfw utility.
o This probably should not be brought into 2.2.
PR: 3738
fix PR#3618 weren't sufficient since malloc() can block - allowing the
net interrupts in and leading to the same problem mentioned in the
PR (a panic). The order of operations has been changed so that this
is no longer a problem.
Needs to be brought into the 2.2.x branch.
PR: 3618
