pam_exec(8) now accepts a new option "return_prog_exit_status". When
set, the program exit status is used as the pam_exec return code. It
allows the program to tell why the step failed (eg. user unknown).
However, if it exits with a code not allowed by the calling PAM service
module function (see $PAM_SM_FUNC below), a warning is logged and
PAM_SERVICE_ERR is returned.
The following changes are related to this new feature but they apply no
matter if the "return_prog_exit_status" option is set or not.
The environment passed to the program is extended:
o $PAM_SM_FUNC contains the name of the PAM service module function
(eg. pam_sm_authenticate).
o All valid PAM return codes' numerical values are available
through variables named after the return code name. For instance,
$PAM_SUCCESS, $PAM_USER_UNKNOWN or $PAM_PERM_DENIED.
pam_exec return code better reflects what went on:
o If the program exits with !0, the return code is now
PAM_PERM_DENIED, not PAM_SYSTEM_ERR.
o If the program fails because of a signal (WIFSIGNALED) or doesn't
terminate normally (!WIFEXITED), the return code is now
PAM_SERVICE_ERR, not PAM_SYSTEM_ERR.
o If a syscall in pam_exec fails, the return code remains
PAM_SYSTEM_ERR.
waitpid(2) is called in a loop. If it returns because of EINTR, do it
again. Before, it would return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR without waiting for the
child to exit.
Several log messages now include the PAM service module function name.
The man page is updated accordingly.
Reviewed by: gleb@, des@
Sponsored by: Yakaz (http://www.yakaz.com)
MFC after: 2 weeks
- Rename pmc.mips to pmc.mips24k since it covers just one CPU,
no whole architecture
- Add documetnations for Octeon's PMC counters
- Remove CAVEATS section from pmc.mips24k page: PMC for MIPS supports
sampling now.
Because the utmpx interface is generally not required to be thread-safe,
but it is nice to have, if easy to do so. Therefore don't make a mess
out of the code and only use it if __NO_TLS is not defined.
several new kerberos related libraries and applications to FreeBSD:
o kgetcred(1) allows one to manually get a ticket for a particular service.
o kf(1) securily forwards ticket to another host through an authenticated
and encrypted stream.
o kcc(1) is an umbrella program around klist(1), kswitch(1), kgetcred(1)
and other user kerberos operations. klist and kswitch are just symlinks
to kcc(1) now.
o kswitch(1) allows you to easily switch between kerberos credentials if
you're running KCM.
o hxtool(1) is a certificate management tool to use with PKINIT.
o string2key(1) maps a password into key.
o kdigest(8) is a userland tool to access the KDC's digest interface.
o kimpersonate(8) creates a "fake" ticket for a service.
We also now install manpages for some lirbaries that were not installed
before, libheimntlm and libhx509.
- The new HEIMDAL version no longer supports Kerberos 4. All users are
recommended to switch to Kerberos 5.
- Weak ciphers are now disabled by default. To enable DES support (used
by telnet(8)), use "allow_weak_crypto" option in krb5.conf.
- libtelnet, pam_ksu and pam_krb5 are now compiled with error on warnings
disabled due to the function they use (krb5_get_err_text(3)) being
deprecated. I plan to work on this next.
- Heimdal's KDC now require sqlite to operate. We use the bundled version
and install it as libheimsqlite. If some other FreeBSD components will
require it in the future we can rename it to libbsdsqlite and use for these
components as well.
- This is not a latest Heimdal version, the new one was released while I was
working on the update. I will update it to 1.5.2 soon, as it fixes some
important bugs and security issues.
no waiters, we still increase and decrease count in user mode without
entering kernel, once there is a waiter, sem_post will enter kernel to
increase count and wake thread up, this is atomicy and allow us to
gracefully destroy semaphore after sem_wait returned.
pathnames.
With the current API (no *at functions), FTS_NOCHDIR requires that the
fts_accpath start with the original path passed to fts_open(); therefore,
the depth that can be reached is limited by the {PATH_MAX} constraint on
this pathname.
MFC after: 1 week
example, it uses a serialization point like following:
pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&muetx);
They think a previous lock holder should have already left the mutex and
is no longer referencing it, so they destroy it. To be maximum compatible
with such code, we use IA64 version to unlock the mutex in kernel, remove
the two steps unlocking code.
Just like kill(2), it is impossible for killpg(0, ...) to fail with
ESRCH, as a process always has a process group.
Discussed on: arch@
MFC after: 1 week
