from all low-level bus space support functions. There's no need
to actually force the read/write to be accepted by the platform
before we can do anything else. We still have the mf instruction
there, which forces ordering. This too is not required given the
semantices of the bus space I/O functions, but it's not at all
clear to me if there are any poorly written device drivers that
depend on the strict ordering by the processor. The motto here is
to take small steps...
o Properly set the pointer to the counter for each interrupt and
update the intrnames table.
o Remove Alpha cruft from intrcnt.h.
o Create INTRNAME_LEN as the single entity that defines the width
of the names in the intrnames table (incl. terminatinf '\0').
whether a named utility should behave in FreeBSD 4.x-compatible mode
or in a standard mode (default standard). The configuration is done
malloc(3)-style, with either an environment variable or a symlink.
Update expr(1) to use this new interface.
missed. This bug has been present since the vn_start_write() and
vn_finished_write() calls were first added in revision 1.159. When
the case is triggered, any attempts to create snapshots on the
filesystem will deadlock and also prevent further write activity
on that filesystem.
This guarantees that loads and stores emitted before the fence are
made visible before the IPI becomes pended.
Remove the mf.a instruction after initiating the IPI. There's no
guarantee that the IPI becomes pended prior to subsequent reads or
writes. Even if there was a guarantee, it would mostly be without
any benefit.
to conform to 1003.1-2001. Make it possible for applications to actually
tell whether or not asynchronous I/O is supported.
Since FreeBSD's aio implementation works on all descriptor types, don't
call down into file or vnode ops when [f]pathconf() is asked about
_PC_ASYNC_IO; this avoids the need for every file and vnode op to know about
it.
Implement new sysconf keys. Change the implenentation of
_SC_ASYNCHRONOUS_IO in preparation for the next set of changes.
Move some limits which had been in <sys/syslimits.h> to <limits.h> where
they belong. They had only ever been in syslimits.h to provide for the
kernel implementation of the CTL_USER MIB branch, which went away with
newsysctl years ago. (There is a #error in <sys/syslimits.h> which I
will downgrade in the next commit.)
for sparc64 from trap #9 to trap #65. This is one of the ABI "blessed"
system call vectors and is different from any other system that we might
want to emulate, making the emulation easier by reducing the number of
code paths that need to be shared. Compatibility with old applications
is provided with COMPAT_FREEBSD4.
Add defines for a few special traps that we may need to implement for
compatibility with 32bit applications, and add comments on which vectors
are used for what in other systems, and which are available.
Pass magic flags to trap() for deprecated or unimplemented system call
vectors so they will deliver SIGSYS instead of SIGILL.
This piggy backs nicely with the recent sigaction(2) system call number
change, and provided the rules are followed for upgrading past it, this
change should not be noticed.
error, only report an error if no data was read at all (unless len was
0 to start with). Otherwise, the final read of practically any transfer
will end in a fatal error.
the SSL case, it is no different from the old _fetch_write(), but in the
non-SSL case it uses writev(2) to send the entire vector as a single
packet (provided it can fit in one packet). Implement _fetch_write()
and _fetch_putln() in terms of _fetch_writev().
This should improve performance in the non-SSL case (by reducing protocol
overhead) and solve the problem where too-smart-for-their-own-good
firewalls reject FTP packets that do not end in CRLF.
PR: bin/44123
Submitted by: fenner
mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
not initialized before use, and _http_growbuf() did not return a value
on success.
Reported by: Peter Edwards <pmedwards@eircom.net>
MFC after: 2 weeks
Re-add alarm(2) calls around the calls to fetchStat(3) and fetchXGet(3),
since these calls can still time out on DNS lookups or TCP connect(2).
Remove the alarm(2) calls in the main loop, since all methods properly
handle transfer timeouts (as opposed to connection timeouts).
Set the sigalrm flag if a timeout occurs in the main loop.
Move the signal: label up a little so we still set the atime and mtime
when the transfer times out or is interrupted, so that restarted transfers
will work as expected (as long as the file still exists).
MFC after: 2 weeks
symptoms: make timeouts and short transfers fatal, and set errno to an
appropriate value (ETIMEDOUT for a timeout, EPIPE for a short transfer).
MFC after: 2 weeks
permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl()
operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we
only have access to the MIB of the target sysctl entry, rather than
the more useful entry name, but this is sufficient for policies
like Biba that wish to use their notions of privilege or integrity
to prevent inappropriate sysctl modification. Affects MAC kernels
only. Since SYSCTL_LOCK isn't in sysctl.h, just kern_sysctl.c,
we can't assert the SYSCTL subsystem lockin the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding
the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary
object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather
than just the vnode. We'll drop additional checks of this
class into the same check namespace, including reboot(),
sysctl(), et al.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
