subevalvar() incorrectly assumed that CTLESC bytes were present iff the
expansion was quoted. However, they are present iff various processing such
as word splitting is to be done later on.
Example:
v=@$e@$e@$e@
y="${v##*"$e"}"
echo "$y"
failed if $e contained the magic CTLESC byte.
Exp-run done by: pav (with some other sh(1) changes)
The code is inspired by NetBSD sh somewhat, but different because we
preserve the old Almquist/Bourne/Korn ability to have an unquoted part in a
quoted ${v+word}. For example, "${v-"*"}" expands to $v as a single field if
v is set, but generates filenames otherwise.
Note that this is the only place where we split text literally from the
script (the similar ${v=word} assigns to v and then expands $v). The parser
must now add additional markers to allow the expansion code to know whether
arbitrary characters in substitutions are quoted.
Example:
for i in ${$+a b c}; do echo $i; done
Exp-run done by: pav (with some other sh(1) changes)
If double-quote state does not match, treat the '}' literally.
This ensures double-quote state remains the same before and after a
${v+-=?...} which helps with expand.c.
It makes things like
${foo+"\${bar}"}
which I have seen in the wild work as expected.
Exp-run done by: pav (with some other sh(1) changes)
This is a syntax error.
POSIX does not say explicitly whether defining a function with the same name
as a special builtin is allowed, but it does say that it is impossible to
call such a function.
A special builtin can still be overridden with an alias.
This commit is part of a set of changes that will ensure that when
something looks like a special builtin to the parser, it is one. (Not the
other way around, as it remains possible to call a special builtin named
by a variable or other substitution.)
Exp-run done by: pav (with some other sh(1) changes)
Add some conservative checks on function names:
- Disallow expansions or quoting characters; these can only be called via
strange control characters
- Disallow '/'; these functions cannot be called anyway, as exec.c assumes
they are pathnames
- Make the CTL* bytes work properly in function names.
These are syntax errors.
POSIX does not require us to support more than names (letters, digits and
underscores, not starting with a digit), but I do not want to restrict it
that much at this time.
Exp-run done by: pav (with some other sh(1) changes)
This is how ksh93 treats ! within a pipeline and makes the ! in
a | ! b | c
negate the exit status of the pipeline, as if it were
a | { ! b | c; }
Side effect: something like
f() ! a
is now a syntax error, because a function definition takes a command,
not a pipeline.
Exp-run done by: pav (with some other sh(1) changes)
For multi-command pipelines,
1. all commands are direct children of the shell (unlike the original
Bourne shell)
2. all commands are executed in a subshell (unlike the real Korn shell)
MFC after: 1 week
immediately written into the stack after the call. Instead let the caller
manage the "space left".
Previously, growstackstr()'s assumption causes problems with STACKSTRNUL()
where we want to be able to turn a stack into a C string, and later
pretend the NUL is not there.
This fixes a bug in STACKSTRNUL() (that grew the stack) where:
1. STADJUST() called after a STACKSTRNUL() results in an improper adjust.
This can be seen in ${var%pattern} and ${var%%pattern} evaluation.
2. Memory leak in STPUTC() called after a STACKSTRNUL().
Reviewed by: jilles
- Use %t to print ptrdiff_t values.
- Cast a ptrdiff_t value explicitly to int for a field width specifier.
While here, sort includes.
Submitted by: Garrett Cooper
frobbing CFLAGS directly. DEBUG_FLAGS is something that can be specified
on the make command line without having to edit the Makefile directly.
Submitted by: Garrett Cooper
Add directory names directly and sort at the end.
Include bsd.arch.inc.mk so we can, in the future, more easily make arch
dependent changes in /bin (unlikely, but is needed for symmetry).
expr(1) should usually not be used as various forms of parameter expansion
and arithmetic expansion replicate most of its functionality in an easier
way.
getopt(1) should not be used at all in new code. Instead, getopts(1) or
entirely manual parsing should be used.
MFC after: 1 week
The three examples are better done using sh(1) itself these days.
The example
expr -- "$a" : ".*"
is incorrect in the general case, as "$a" may be an operator.
MFC after: 2 weeks
This makes it impossible to use locale-specific characters in variable
names.
Names containing locale-specific characters make scripts only work with the
correct locale setting. Also, they did not even work in many practical cases
because multibyte character sets such as utf-8 are not supported.
This also avoids weirdness if LC_CTYPE is changed in the middle of a script.
are too long. Filenames escaping this test are caught later on,
so the bug doesn't cause any breakage.
Document the correct ustar limitations in pax. As I have no access
to the IEEE 1003.2 spec, I can only assume that the limitations
imposed are in fact correct.
Add regression tests for the filename limitations imposed by pax.
MFC after: 3 weeks
This Almquist extension was disabled long ago.
In pathname generation, components starting with '!!' were treated as
containing wildcards, causing unnecessary readdir (which could fail, causing
pathname generation to fail while it should not).
In our implementation and most others, a break or continue in a dot script
can break or continue a loop outside the dot script. This should cause all
further commands in the dot script to be skipped. However, cmdloop() did not
know about this and continued to parse and execute commands from the dot
script.
As described in the man page, a return in a dot script in a function returns
from the function, not only from the dot script. There was a similar issue
as with break and continue. In various other shells, the return appears to
return from the dot script, but POSIX seems not very clear about this.
The buffer for generated pathnames could be too small in some cases. It
happened to be always at least PATH_MAX long, so there was never an overflow
if the resulting pathnames would be usable.
This bug may be abused if a script subjects input from an untrusted source
to pathname generation, which a bad idea anyhow. Most shell scripts do not
work on untrusted data. secteam@ says no advisory is necessary.
PR: bin/148733
Reported by: Changming Sun snnn119 at gmail com
MFC after: 10 days
