- buffer expansions were not working right due to a return code botch.
- signed types instead of size_t's meant somebody else went and put
casts in, I've changed the types to what they should have been.
Added $Id$'s to files that were lacking them (gpalmer), made some
cosmetic changes to conform to style guidelines (bde) and checked
against NetBSD and Lite2 to remove unnecessary divergences (hsu, bde)
One last code cleanup:-
Removed spurious casts in fseek.c and stdio.c.
Added missing function argument in fwalk.c.
Added missing header include in flags.c and rget.c.
Put in casts where int's were being passed as size_t's.
Put in missing prototypes for static functions.
Changed second args of __sflags() inflags.c and writehook() in vasprintf.c
from char * to const char * to conform to prototypes.
This directory now compiles with no warnings with -Wall under
gcc-2.6.3 and with considerably less warnings than before with the
ultra-pedantic script I used for testing. (Most of the remaining ones
are due to const poisoning).
The usual stuff, adding missing function prototypes, argument types,
return values, etc.
This directory now compiles with no warnings with -Wall on gcc2.6.3!
The usual stuff, adding missing function prototypes, argument types,
return values, etc. In mktemp.c, convert pid from u_int to pid_t, and
get rid of "extern int errno".
not based on gpl'ed code, just prototype and usage. I'm not 100% certain
they behave the same while the system is in trouble (eg: malloc() failing)
but in those circumstances all bets would be off anyway.
These routines work like sprintf() and vsprintf(), except that instead of
using a fixed buffer, they allocate memory and return it to the user
and it's the user's responsibility to free() it. They have allocate as
much memory as they need (and can get), so the size of strings it can deal
with is limited only by the amount of memory it can malloc() on your
behalf.
There are a few gpl'ed programs starting to use this interface, and it's
becoming more common with the scares about security risks with sprintf().
I dont like the look of the code that the various programs (including
cvs, gdb, libg++, etc) provide if configure can't find it on the system.
It should be possible to modify the stdio core code to provide this
interface more efficiently, I was more worried about having something
that worked and was secure. :-) (I noticed that there was once intended
to be a smprintf() routine when our stdio was written for 4.4BSD, but it
looks pretty stillborn, and it's intended interface is not clear). Since
Linux and gnu libc have this interface, it seemed silly to bring yet
another one onto the scene.
nonstandard normal version and the standard threaded version.
Removed a bogus L in a constant. fpos_t's aren't longs, and casting to
fpos_t would be verbose.
the precision; ANSI X3J11 is not crystal clear but certainly says
that the precision specifies the number of /digits/, and signs
and "0x" aren't really digits.
NetBSD already has a similar patch.
resides in read-only memory is going to cause the program to core dump,
and this is commmon with older pre-ANSI C programs.
(I've scratched my head over this one at 3 in the morning before
while trying to port some ancient program)
Suggested by: Gary Kline <kline@tera.com>
commit by bde.
Fix bugs in floating point formatting. The 4.4lite version is similar
to revision 1.3 in old-cvs and is missing all of jtc's fixes in revision
1.4 in old-cvs. Revision 1.2 in ncvs fixed one of the old bugs but
introduced at least one new one (for %.0e).
old-cvs log:
revision 1.4
date: 1993/11/04 19:38:22; author: jtc; state: Exp; lines: +33 -20
My work from NetBSD to make printf() & friends ANSI C compliant.
Fixes several bugs in floating point formatting:
1. Trailing zeros were being stripped with %e format.
2. %g/%G formats incorrect.
3. Lots of other nits.
From: Chris Torek <torek@bsdi.com>
Here is a semi-official patch (apply to /usr/src/lib/libc/stdio/fseek.c,
rebuild libc, install). The current code fails when the seek:
- is optimized, and
- is to just past the end of the block currently in the buffer, and
- is followed by another seek with no intervening read operation, and
- the destination of subsequent seek is within the block left in the
buffer (seeking to the beginning of a block does not force a read,
so the buffer still contains the previous block)
so it is indeed rather obscure.
I may have a different `final' fix, as this one `loses' the buffer
contents on a seek that goes just past the end of the current block.
[Footnote: seeks are optimized only on read-only opens of regular
files that are buffered by the file's optimal I/O size. This is
what you get with fopen(path, "r") and no call to setvbuf().]
Obtained from: [ BSDI mailing list ]
