loop was sloppily written, taking advantage of a default for argument
handling which few are probably aware of rather than stating its purpose
more explicitly. Can't also help but notice that the fd* entry also contains
far more comment lines than actual statements - can we please clean that
up? The wt* entry could use a bit of the same.
dkminor(). Use $((1 << 29)) instead of a mysterious decimal number for
$scisctl. Use dkminor() instead of repeating part of it for special cases.
Shortened some long lines.
This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
I've added an installation from optical disk drive facility.
This enables FreeBSD to be installed from an optical disk, which
may be formatted in "super floppy" style or sliced into MSDOS-FS
and UFS partitions.
Note: ncr.c should be reviewed by Stefan Esser <se@freebsd.org>
and cd.c by Joerg Wunsch <joerg@freebsd.org> before bringing this
into 2.2.
Submitted-By: Shunsuke Akiyama <akiyama@kme.mei.co.jp>
Fixed some style bugs for cua* and tty*.
Removed superfluous chmod for consolectl.
FIxed a tiny security bug for perfmon and changed the style for
perfmon to match the style of the non-std devices.
create the PC-CARD devices.
Note: The APM character special device is named /dev/apm and not apm0 as
was prvioiusly since only one APM device can exist in a system at a time
according to the the APM specifications.
tape_umask=017 for all tapes. This has a significant effect only
for ft and st (they were created with the wrong umask 002 and then
chmod'ed to mode 640; now they are created with mode 660).
Chmod the st control devices (mode 3) to 600. These need to be
more secure than the st i/o devices, but were less secure.
Use the default umask of 077 for joy0. 002 gave mode 664, which
is insecure.
Use umask 037 for ch*. Cosmetic.
Removed redundant chmod's.
Sorted case lists for disks.
rest of the memory group - std. Also correct the permissions so as not
to force a security hole. If /dev/*random have the permission 640 and
ownership bin.kmem, it forces applications that need random numbers
to be at least SGID. Picture the scene of a SGID PGP being able to
read /dev/kmem!