- clobbering of jsp's $Id$ by FreeBSD's old $Id$.
- lost Berkeley id in procfs_dbregs.c
- long lines in recent KSE changes.
- various gratuitous differences between procfs_*regs.c.
this is a low-functionality change that changes the kernel to access the main
thread of a process via the linked list of threads rather than
assuming that it is embedded in the process. It IS still embeded there
but remove all teh code that assumes that in preparation for the next commit
which will actually move it out.
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, gallatin@cs.duke.edu, benno rice,
Until now, the ptrace syscall was implemented as a wrapper that called
various functions in procfs depending on which ptrace operation was
requested. Most of these functions were themselves wrappers around
procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs(), with only some extra error checks,
which weren't necessary in the ptrace case anyway.
This commit moves procfs_rwmem() from procfs_mem.c into sys_process.c
(renaming it to proc_rwmem() in the process), and implements ptrace()
directly in terms of procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs() instead of
having it fake up a struct uio and then call procfs_do{,db,fp}regs().
It also moves the prototypes for procfs_{read,write}_{,db,fp}regs()
and proc_rwmem() from proc.h to ptrace.h, and marks all procfs files
except procfs_machdep.c as "optional procfs" instead of "standard".
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out,
awkward) abstraction. The individual calls to p_canxxx() better
reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks,
such as differing checks based on the type of signal. This has
a side effect of improving code readability.
o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with
invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case
check of KTR_ROOT. This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely"
with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its
authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class"
checks.
o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the
caller to determine if privilege was required for successful
evaluation of the access control check. This primitive is currently
unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API.
Approved by: ({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
systems were repo-copied from sys/miscfs to sys/fs.
- Renamed the following file systems and their modules:
fdesc -> fdescfs, portal -> portalfs, union -> unionfs.
- Renamed corresponding kernel options:
FDESC -> FDESCFS, PORTAL -> PORTALFS, UNION -> UNIONFS.
- Install header files for the above file systems.
- Removed bogus -I${.CURDIR}/../../sys CFLAGS from userland
Makefiles.
other "system" header files.
Also help the deprecation of lockmgr.h by making it a sub-include of
sys/lock.h and removing sys/lockmgr.h form kernel .c files.
Sort sys/*.h includes where possible in affected files.
OK'ed by: bde (with reservations)
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
p_trespass(struct proc *p1, struct proc *p2)
which returns zero or an errno depending on the legality of p1 trespassing
on p2.
Replace kern_sig.c:CANSIGNAL() with call to p_trespass() and one
extra signal related check.
Replace procfs.h:CHECKIO() macros with calls to p_trespass().
Only show command lines to process which can trespass on the target
process.