[ARM] Fix for PR36577
Don't PerformSHLSimplify if the given node is used by a node that
also uses a constant because we may get stuck in an infinite combine
loop.
bugzilla: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36577
Patch by Sam Parker.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D44097
This fixes a hang when compiling one particular file in java/openjdk8
for armv6 and armv7.
Reported by: swills
PR: 226388
POSIX explicitly states that the application must declare union semun.
This makes no sense, but it is what it is. This brings us into line
with Linux, MacOS/Darwin, and NetBSD.
In a ports exp-run a moderate number of ports fail due to a lack of
approprate autotools-like discovery mechanisms or local patches. A
commit to address them will follow shortly.
PR: 224300, 224443 (exp-run)
Reviewed by: emaste, jhb, kib
Exp-run by: antoine
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14492
We don't support float in the boot loaders, so don't include
interfaces for float or double in systems headers. In addition, take
the unusual step of spiking double and float to prevent any more
accidental seepage.
or double so ifdef that code out when the numbers aren't float at all.
There's still references in the lmathlib.c, but we don't compile that
for the loader yet.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14472
sbt is the time in the future that the tsleep_sbt() is expected to be completed
at. sbtt is the current time. Depending on the precision with sysctl
kern.timecounter.alloweddeviation the start time may be incremented by
tc_tick_sbt. The same increment is needed for the current time of sbtt before
calculating the difference. The impact of missing this increment is that rmtp
may increase by one tc_tick_sbt on every early [EINTR] return. If the same
struct is passed in for rqtp as rmtp this can result in rqtp effectively
incrementing by tc_tick_sbt and sleeping longer than originally intended.
This problem was introduced in r247797.
Reviewed by: kib, markj, vangyzen (all on an older version of the test)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Dell EMC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14362
PR36157: When injecting an implicit function declaration in C89, find
the right DeclContext rather than injecting it wherever we happen to
be.
This avoids creating functions whose DeclContext is a struct or
similar.
This fixes assertion failures when parsing certain not-completely-valid
struct declarations.
Reported by: ae
PR: 225862
MFC after: 3 months
X-MFC-With: r327952
Fix for #31362 - ms_abi is implemented incorrectly for values >=16
bytes.
Summary:
This patch is a fix for following issue:
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=31362 The problem was caused by
front end lowering C calling conventions without taking into account
calling conventions enforced by attribute. In this case win64cc was
no correctly lowered on targets other than Windows.
Reviewed By: rnk (Reid Kleckner)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D43016
Author: belickim <mateusz.belicki@intel.com>
This fixes clang 6.0.0 assertions when building the emulators/wine and
emulators/wine-devel ports, and should also make it use the correct
Windows calling conventions. Bump __FreeBSD_version to make the fix
easy to detect.
PR: 224863
MFC after: 3 months
X-MFC-With: r327952
The MIPS assembly parser treats forward-declared local symbols as global
symbols. This results in CALL16 relocations being used against local
(private) symbols which then fail to resolve when linking binaries.
Add .local to force the init and fini functions to be treated as local as
a workaround.
Submitted by: sbruno
Sponsored by: DARPA / AFRL
has been switched to libedit long ago, libreadline was built as an
internallib for a while and kept only for gdbtui which was broken using
libreadline.
Since gdb has been mostly deorbitted in all arches, gdbtui was only installed
on arm and sparc64, given it has been removed, gdb has been switched to use
libedit, no consumers are left for libreadline. Thus this removal
Don't declare some types that FreeBSD incorrectly declares.
Fix an incorrect call to open() (missing mode).
ANSIfy prototypes.
Enable SysV message queue, semaphore, and shared memory tests.
With exception of the workaround for union semun, these fixes have been
committed to NetBSD.
Reviewed by: asomers
Approved by: CheriBSD
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13471
Use 'pfctl -k' when blocking a site to kill active tcp connections
from the blocked address.
Fix 'purge' operation for pf, which must dynamically determine which
filters have been created, so the filters can be flushed by name.
MFC after: 2 weeks
6.0.0 (branches/release_60 r324090).
This introduces retpoline support, with the -mretpoline flag. The
upstream initial commit message (r323155 by Chandler Carruth) contains
quite a bit of explanation. Quoting:
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of
the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today,
specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection",
and is one of the two halves to Spectre.
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that
this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero
blog post for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative
execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by
poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of
that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a
side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a
load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then
a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing
of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took
*in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the
loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and
the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to
leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel)
back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In
many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches
and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering
switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable
jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite
explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a
trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures
the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known
location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto
the stack by the call with the desired target of the original
indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next
instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative
execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to
an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this
device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register
and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a
scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to
otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target
address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the
retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users
want them. These are particularly useful in environments like
kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch
their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom
thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to
`-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are
from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we
have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on
them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z
retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker).
We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows
the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typic al workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately
2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely
due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in
performance sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications,
especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more
dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch,
indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from
10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically
reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting
them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to
lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++
applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call
targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both
PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw
5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality
available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd
really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for
obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0
release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked
ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month:
Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit
due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to
backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and
everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft
this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM
contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
MFC after: 3 months
X-MFC-With: r327952
PR: 224669
sparc64 and riscv do not support 10 arguments, but MIPS now does.
While here, combine clauses for architectures that support the same
number of arguments to reduce duplication.
Sponsored by: DARPA / AFRL
The test was marked as an expected failure in r320414 after r319971's import
of a newer jemalloc removed an essential feature (opt.redzone) for
reproducing the behavior it was testing. Since then, no way has been found
or demonstrated to reliably test the behavior, so remove the test.
PR: 220309
The root problem is that we were creating a PT_LOAD just for the header.
That was technically valid, but inconvenient: we should not be making
the ELF discontinuous.
The solution is to allow a section with LMAExpr to be added to a PT_LOAD
if that PT_LOAD doesn't already have a LMAExpr.
LLVM PR: 36017
Obtained from: LLVM r323625 by Rafael Espindola
If two sections are in the same PT_LOAD, their relatives offsets,
virtual address and physical addresses are all the same.
[Rafael] initially wanted to have a single global LMAOffset, on the
assumption that every ELF file was in practiced loaded contiguously in
both physical and virtual memory.
Unfortunately that is not the case. The linux kernel has:
LOAD 0x200000 0xffffffff81000000 0x0000000001000000 0xced000 0xced000 R E 0x200000
LOAD 0x1000000 0xffffffff81e00000 0x0000000001e00000 0x15f000 0x15f000 RW 0x200000
LOAD 0x1200000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000001f5f000 0x01b198 0x01b198 RW 0x200000
LOAD 0x137b000 0xffffffff81f7b000 0x0000000001f7b000 0x116000 0x1ec000 RWE 0x200000
The delta for all but the third PT_LOAD is the same:
0xffffffff80000000. [Rafael] thinks the 3rd one is a hack for implementing
per cpu data, but we can't break that.
Obtained from: LLVM r323456 by Rafael Espindola
This fixes the crash reported at [LLVM] PR36083.
The issue is that we were trying to put all the sections in the same
PT_LOAD and crashing trying to write past the end of the file.
This also adds accounting for used space in LMARegion, without it all
3 PT_LOADs would have the same physical address.
Obtained from: LLVM r323449 by Rafael Espindola
[X86] Make -mavx512f imply -mfma and -mf16c in the frontend like it
does in the backend.
Similarly, make -mno-fma and -mno-f16c imply -mno-avx512f.
Withou this "-mno-sse -mavx512f" ends up with avx512f being enabled
in the frontend but disabled in the backend.
Reported by: pawel
PR: 225488
"Fix gcc80 -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess warning."
The warning is bogus: GCC8 only looks at the size of the destination.
We shouldn't be fixing imaginary problems, so perhaps its better to deal
with this later on by disabling such warnings.
Pointed out by: ed, bde
larger than or equal to 32 bytes. For smaller probe packets, keep using
SHUTDOWN-ACK chunks, possibly bundled with a PAD chunk.
Packets with INIT chunks more likely pass through firewalls. Therefore,
use them when possible.
MFC after: 1 week
type is int64. While lua is setup for the representation, it's not
setup to properly print the numbers as ints. This is the least-gross
way around that, and won't affect the bootloader where we do this.
The man page is years out of date regarding errors. Our implementation _does_
allow unaligned addresses, and it _does_not_ check for negative lengths,
because the length is unsigned. It checks for overflow instead.
Update the tests accordingly.
Reviewed by: bcr
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13826
different access rights.
By default there are two community strings with index 1 and 2, one for
read-only access and second for read-write access:
begemotSnmpdCommunityString.0.1 = $(read)
begemotSnmpdCommunityString.0.2 = $(write)
Now it is possible to define additional community strings using different
indexes:
begemotSnmpdCommunityString.0.3 = "SomeString1"
begemotSnmpdCommunityPermission.0.3 = 1
begemotSnmpdCommunityString.0.4 = "SomeString2"
begemotSnmpdCommunityPermission.0.4 = 2
begemotSnmpdCommunityString.0.5 = "SomeString3"
begemotSnmpdCommunityString.0.6 = "SomeString4"
New attribute begemotSnmpdCommunityPermission can be used to specify access
rights: 1 means "read-only" access, 2 means "read-write" access. If
attribute is not specified for some index this means "read-only" rights.
Community strings must be unique, i.e. must not be the same for different
indexes.
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13785
