2) Move incomplete check for / in locale name from env section to
loadlocale(), add check for "." and ".." too.
It allows to check any argument, not env only.
3) Redesing LOAD_CATEGORY macro to eliminate code duplication.
4) Try harder in fallback code: if old locale can't be restored,
load "C" locale
5) White space formatting, long lines, etc.
missed the pmap_kenter/kremove in this file, which leads to read()/write()
of /dev/mem using stale TLB entries. (gah!) Fortunately, mmap of /dev/mem
wasn't affected, so it wasn't as bad as it could have been. This throws
some light on the 'X server affects stability' thread....
Pointed out by: bde
cards. Since the firmware is hard coded into the kernel, I've made it
a kernel option (WI_SYMBOL_FIRMWARE).
Note: This only downloads into the RAM of these cards. It doesn't
download into FLASH, and is somewhat limited. There needs to be a
better way to deal, but this works for now. My Symbol LA4132 CF card
works now.
Obtained from: NetBSD
kernel access control.
Extensions to libc to provide basic MAC label manipulation facilities
for userland. These interface will be replaced in the next month
or two with more flexible interfaces, but provide sufficient support
to allow use of the Biba and MLS policies for user applications.
libc_r wrappers to follow.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
linker_load_module() instead.
This fixes a bug where the kernel was unable to properly locate and
load a kernel module in vfs_mount() (and probably in the netgraph
code as well since it was using the same function). This is because
the linker_load_file() does not properly search the module path.
Problem found by: peter
Reviewed by: peter
Thanks to: peter
kernel access control.
When generating nd6 output on an interface, label the packet
appropriately.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
case, also preserve the MAC label. Note that this mbuf allocation
is fairly non-optimal, but not my fault.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
TARGET_ARCH and TARGET. This is problematic when one has the =
(unconditional) type of assigment for CPUTYPE in /etc/make.conf.
(This would override what was set on the command line to "make
buildworld".)
Add a (horrible) kludge to Makefile.inc1 to check the type of
assignment for CPUTYPE (only for those who attempts to set it to
a different value). Fix an example make.conf. Fix the kernel's
build-tools target (aicasm only at the moment) to catch up with
bsd.cpu.mk,v 1.15 (BOOTSTRAPPING replaced with NO_CPU_CFLAGS in
Makefile.inc1's BMAKE).
Reviewed by: jhb
kernel access control.
Provide ugidfw, a utility to manage the ruleset provided by
mac_bsdextended. Similar to ipfw, only for uids/gids and files.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Provide a library to manage user file system firewall-like rules
supported by the mac_bsdextended.ko security model. The kernel
module exports the current rule set using sysctl, and this
library provides a front end that includes support for retrieving
and setting rules, as well as printing and parsing them.
Note: as with other userland components, this is a WIP. However,
when used in combination with the soon-to-be-committed ugidfw,
it can actually be quite useful in multi-user environments to
allow the administrator to limit inter-user file operations without
resorting to heavier weight labeled security policies.
Obtained form: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Teach mount(8) to understand the MNT_MULTILABEL flag, which is used
to determine whether a file system operates with individual per-vnode
labels, or treats the entire file system as a single object with a
single (mount) label. The behavior here will probably evolve some
now that nmount(2) is available and can more flexibly support mount
options.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
embedded into their file_entry descriptor. This is more for
correctness, since these files cannot be bmap'ed/mmap'ed anyways.
Enforce this restriction.
Submitted by: tes@sgi.com
