Commit Graph

139 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ed
28b4a002d6 Remove direct access to si_name.
Code should just use the devtoname() function to obtain the name of a
character device. Also add const keywords to pieces of code that need it
to build properly.

MFC after:	2 weeks
2012-02-10 12:35:57 +00:00
ed
0c56cf839d Mark all SYSCTL_NODEs static that have no corresponding SYSCTL_DECLs.
The SYSCTL_NODE macro defines a list that stores all child-elements of
that node. If there's no SYSCTL_DECL macro anywhere else, there's no
reason why it shouldn't be static.
2011-11-07 15:43:11 +00:00
rwatson
3c6157dcec Correct several issues in the integration of POSIX shared memory objects
and the new setmode and setowner fileops in FreeBSD 9.0:

- Add new MAC Framework entry point mac_posixshm_check_create() to allow
  MAC policies to authorise shared memory use.  Provide a stub policy and
  test policy templates.

- Add missing Biba and MLS implementations of mac_posixshm_check_setmode()
  and mac_posixshm_check_setowner().

- Add 'accmode' argument to mac_posixshm_check_open() -- unlike the
  mac_posixsem_check_open() entry point it was modeled on, the access mode
  is required as shared memory access can be read-only as well as writable;
  this isn't true of POSIX semaphores.

- Implement full range of POSIX shared memory entry points for Biba and MLS.

Sponsored by:   Google Inc.
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Approved by:    re (kib)
2011-09-02 17:40:39 +00:00
rwatson
787cf8d03f Update device-labeling logic for Biba, LOMAC, and MLS to recognize new-style
pts devices when various policy ptys_equal flags are enabled.

Submitted by:	Estella Mystagic <estella at mystagic.com>
MFC after:	1 week
2010-03-02 15:05:48 +00:00
kib
fa686c638e Implement global and per-uid accounting of the anonymous memory. Add
rlimit RLIMIT_SWAP that limits the amount of swap that may be reserved
for the uid.

The accounting information (charge) is associated with either map entry,
or vm object backing the entry, assuming the object is the first one
in the shadow chain and entry does not require COW. Charge is moved
from entry to object on allocation of the object, e.g. during the mmap,
assuming the object is allocated, or on the first page fault on the
entry. It moves back to the entry on forks due to COW setup.

The per-entry granularity of accounting makes the charge process fair
for processes that change uid during lifetime, and decrements charge
for proper uid when region is unmapped.

The interface of vm_pager_allocate(9) is extended by adding struct ucred *,
that is used to charge appropriate uid when allocation if performed by
kernel, e.g. md(4).

Several syscalls, among them is fork(2), may now return ENOMEM when
global or per-uid limits are enforced.

In collaboration with:	pho
Reviewed by:	alc
Approved by:	re (kensmith)
2009-06-23 20:45:22 +00:00
ed
902364f29d Chase the removal of PRIV_TTY_PRISON in the mac(9) modules.
Reported by:	kib
Pointy hat to:	me
2009-06-20 15:54:35 +00:00
rwatson
849a8ce20b Continue work to optimize performance of "options MAC" when no MAC policy
modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't
loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and
avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded:

- Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC
  Framework entry points.  We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC
  policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf
  header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other
  m_tag consumers are in use).

- Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and
  events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are
  only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label.
  This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local
  domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be
  held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple
  sockets.  Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it
  no longer avoids locking.

- Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network
  interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect
  ifnet labels.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 18:46:28 +00:00
rwatson
086e835650 By default, label all network interfaces as biba/equal on attach. This
makes it easier for first-time users to configure and work with biba as
remote acess is still allowed.  Effectively, this means that, by default,
only local security properties, not distributed ones, are enforced.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2009-06-03 08:49:44 +00:00
trasz
048abafaf9 Get rid of VSTAT and replace it with VSTAT_PERMS, which is somewhat
better defined.

Approved by:	rwatson (mentor)
2009-03-29 17:45:48 +00:00
rwatson
ae492d67e0 Remove 'uio' argument from MAC Framework and MAC policy entry points for
extended attribute get/set; in the case of get an uninitialized user
buffer was passed before the EA was retrieved, making it of relatively
little use; the latter was simply unused by any policies.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	Google, Inc.
2009-03-08 12:32:06 +00:00
rwatson
5743072acf Rather than having MAC policies explicitly declare what object types
they label, derive that information implicitly from the set of label
initializers in their policy operations set.  This avoids a possible
class of programmer errors, while retaining the structure that
allows us to avoid allocating labels for objects that don't need
them.  As before, we regenerate a global mask of labeled objects
each time a policy is loaded or unloaded, stored in mac_labeled.

Discussed with:   csjp
Suggested by:     Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple.com>
Obtained from:    TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:     Apple, Inc.
2009-01-10 10:58:41 +00:00
rwatson
aeaccdebe1 Use MPC_OBJECT_IP6Q to indicate labeling of struct ip6q rather than
MPC_OBJECT_IPQ; it was already defined, just not used.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	Apple, Inc.
2009-01-10 09:17:16 +00:00
trasz
0ad8692247 Introduce accmode_t. This is required for NFSv4 ACLs - it will be neccessary
to add more V* constants, and the variables changed by this patch were often
being assigned to mode_t variables, which is 16 bit.

Approved by:	rwatson (mentor)
2008-10-28 13:44:11 +00:00
rwatson
a2129bd144 Rename three MAC entry points from _proc_ to _cred_ to reflect the fact
that they operate directly on credentials: mac_proc_create_swapper(),
mac_proc_create_init(), and mac_proc_associate_nfsd().  Update policies.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2008-10-28 11:33:06 +00:00
rwatson
432d006bae Implement MAC policy support for IPv6 fragment reassembly queues,
modeled on IPv4 fragment reassembly queue support.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2008-10-26 22:46:37 +00:00
bz
def7b5012b Add a mac_inpcb_check_visible implementation to all MAC policies
that handle mac_socket_check_visible.

Reviewed by:	rwatson
MFC after:	3 months (set timer; decide then)
2008-10-17 15:11:12 +00:00
rwatson
78a117e6fa Introduce two related changes to the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:
(1) Abstract interpreter vnode labeling in execve(2) and mac_execve(2)
    so that the general exec code isn't aware of the details of
    allocating, copying, and freeing labels, rather, simply passes in
    a void pointer to start and stop functions that will be used by
    the framework.  This change will be MFC'd.

(2) Introduce a new flags field to the MAC_POLICY_SET(9) interface
    allowing policies to declare which types of objects require label
    allocation, initialization, and destruction, and define a set of
    flags covering various supported object types (MPC_OBJECT_PROC,
    MPC_OBJECT_VNODE, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB, ...).  This change reduces the
    overhead of compiling the MAC Framework into the kernel if policies
    aren't loaded, or if policies require labels on only a small number
    or even no object types.  Each time a policy is loaded or unloaded,
    we recalculate a mask of labeled object types across all policies
    present in the system.  Eliminate MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF option as it
    is no longer required.

MFC after:	1 week ((1) only)
Reviewed by:	csjp
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	Apple, Inc.
2008-08-23 15:26:36 +00:00
rwatson
e6f6fc88e2 Minor style tweaks. 2008-08-02 22:30:51 +00:00
jhb
411d068395 Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX
semaphores.  Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file
descriptor type that is set to close on exec.  This removes the need for
all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit
event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of
that for us nicely.  It is also suggested as one possible implementation
in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach.

Some bugs that were fixed as a result include:
- References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after
  the sem_unlink() operation.  Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name
  was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from
  sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc.  This fixes that.
- Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a
  process exited or exec'd.  They were only cleaned up if the process
  did an explicit sem_destroy().  This could result in a leak of semaphore
  objects that could never be cleaned up.
- On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to
  'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had
  write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other
  process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(),
  sem_wait(), etc.
- As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces
  creating the semaphore was not honored.  Thus if your umask denied group
  read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed
  it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the
  same group, for example.  This includes access via the previous bug.
- If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores,
  then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system
  calls before it noticed that there was a problem.  I'm not sure if
  this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the
  kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked.  One can
  make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event
  handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during
  unload after any checks).  This also fixes a race where even if the
  sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the
  syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when
  they are unloaded.

  XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking
  to drain any threads from the calls.
- Some minor fixes to errno values on error.  For example, sem_init()
  isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores
  the way that sem_open() can.  Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that
  case.

Other changes:
- Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of
  named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory
  object file descriptors.  Kernel semaphores can now also have names
  longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories
  in their pathname.
- The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now
  done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks.
- Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various
  MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an
  active credential.  There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it
  is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor.
- A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present
  in src/tools/regression/posixsem.

Reported by:	kris (1)
Tested by:	kris
Reviewed by:	rwatson (lightly)
MFC after:	1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
jhb
437891381c Remove the posixsem_check_destroy() MAC check. It is semantically identical
to doing a MAC check for close(), but no other types of close() (including
close(2) and ksem_close(2)) have MAC checks.

Discussed with:	rwatson
2008-06-23 21:37:53 +00:00
rwatson
f07c38e84a The TrustedBSD MAC Framework named struct ipq instances 'ipq', which is the
same as the global variable defined in ip_input.c.  Instead, adopt the name
'q' as found in about 1/2 of uses in ip_input.c, preventing a collision on
the name.  This is non-harmful, but means that search and replace on the
global works less well (as in the virtualization work), as well as indexing
tools.

MFC after:	1 week
Reported by:	julian
2008-06-13 22:14:15 +00:00
rwatson
a426571905 Resort TrustedBSD MAC Framework policy entry point implementations and
declarations to match the object, operation sort order in the framework
itself.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-29 13:33:06 +00:00
rwatson
54102acdd3 Garbage collect mac_mbuf_create_multicast_encap TrustedBSD MAC Framework
entry point, which is no longer required now that we don't support
old-style multicast tunnels.  This removes the last mbuf object class
entry point that isn't init/copy/destroy.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 17:55:57 +00:00
rwatson
369fd04f48 Continue to move from generic network entry points in the TrustedBSD MAC
Framework by moving from mac_mbuf_create_netlayer() to more specific
entry points for specific network services:

- mac_netinet_firewall_reply() to be used when replying to in-bound TCP
  segments in pf and ipfw (etc).

- Rename mac_netinet_icmp_reply() to mac_netinet_icmp_replyinplace() and
  add mac_netinet_icmp_reply(), reflecting that in some cases we overwrite
  a label in place, but in others we apply the label to a new mbuf.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 17:12:48 +00:00
rwatson
2bca3d4001 Move towards more explicit support for various network protocol stacks
in the TrustedBSD MAC Framework:

- Add mac_atalk.c and add explicit entry point mac_netatalk_aarp_send()
  for AARP packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer
  entry point.

- Add mac_inet6.c and add explicit entry point mac_netinet6_nd6_send()
  for ND6 packet labeling, rather than using a generic link layer entry
  point.

- Add expliict entry point mac_netinet_arp_send() for ARP packet
  labeling, and mac_netinet_igmp_send() for IGMP packet labeling,
  rather than using a generic link layer entry point.

- Remove previous genering link layer entry point,
  mac_mbuf_create_linklayer() as it is no longer used.

- Add implementations of new entry points to various policies, largely
  by replicating the existing link layer entry point for them; remove
  old link layer entry point implementation.

- Make MAC_IFNET_LOCK(), MAC_IFNET_UNLOCK(), and mac_ifnet_mtx global
  to the MAC Framework rather than static to mac_net.c as it is now
  needed outside of mac_net.c.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-28 15:55:23 +00:00
rwatson
a3b8fc4866 Rename 'mac_mbuf_create_from_firewall' to 'mac_netinet_firewall_send' as
we move towards netinet as a pseudo-object for the MAC Framework.

Rename 'mac_create_mbuf_linklayer' to 'mac_mbuf_create_linklayer' to
reflect general object-first ordering preference.

Sponsored by:	SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-26 13:18:38 +00:00
rwatson
ad62572aa2 Normalize TCP syncache-related MAC Framework entry points to match most
other entry points in the form mac_<object>_method().

Discussed with:	csjp
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 14:37:37 +00:00
rwatson
8756317538 Rename mac_associate_nfsd_label() to mac_proc_associate_nfsd(), and move
from mac_vfs.c to mac_process.c to join other functions that setup up
process labels for specific purposes.  Unlike the two proc create calls,
this call is intended to run after creation when a process registers as
the NFS daemon, so remains an _associate_ call..

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 12:34:14 +00:00
rwatson
2fd98af619 Consistently name functions for mac_<policy> as <policy>_whatever rather
than mac_<policy>_whatever, as this shortens the names and makes the code
a bit easier to read.

When dealing with label structures, name variables 'mb', 'ml', 'mm rather
than the longer 'mac_biba', 'mac_lomac', and 'mac_mls', likewise making
the code a little easier to read.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-25 11:31:11 +00:00
rwatson
60570a92bf Merge first in a series of TrustedBSD MAC Framework KPI changes
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:

  mac_<object>_<method/action>
  mac_<object>_check_<method/action>

The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme.  Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier.  Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods.  Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.

All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.

Sponsored by:	SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
2007-10-24 19:04:04 +00:00
rwatson
9916bac030 Canonicalize naming of local variables for struct ksem and associated
labels to 'ks' and 'kslabel' to reflect the convention in posix_sem.c.

MFC after:	3 days
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-10-21 11:11:07 +00:00
rwatson
198c38400a Rename mac_check_vnode_delete() MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry
point to mac_check_vnode_unlink(), reflecting UNIX naming conventions.

This is the first of several commits to synchronize the MAC Framework
in FreeBSD 7.0 with the MAC Framework as it will appear in Mac OS X
Leopard.

Reveiwed by:    csjp, Samy Bahra <sbahra at gwu dot edu>
Submitted by:   Jacques Vidrine <nectar at apple dot com>
Obtained from:  Apple Computer, Inc.
Sponsored by:   SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by:    re (bmah)
2007-09-10 00:00:18 +00:00
rwatson
62d2d15116 Rename mac*devfsdirent*() to mac*devfs*() to synchronize with SEDarwin,
where similar data structures exist to support devfs and the MAC
Framework, but are named differently.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-23 13:36:54 +00:00
rwatson
7ffc2492ae Apply variable name normalization to MAC policies: adopt global conventions
for the naming of variables associated with specific data structures.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-23 13:15:23 +00:00
rwatson
1c94b6d3ee In the MAC Framework implementation, file systems have two per-mountpoint
labels: the mount label (label of the mountpoint) and the fs label (label
of the file system).  In practice, policies appear to only ever use one,
and the distinction is not helpful.

Combine mnt_mntlabel and mnt_fslabel into a single mnt_label, and
eliminate extra machinery required to maintain the additional label.
Update policies to reflect removal of extra entry points and label.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-22 16:18:10 +00:00
rwatson
d1196975a0 Remove MAC Framework access control check entry points made redundant with
the introduction of priv(9) and MAC Framework entry points for privilege
checking/granting.  These entry points exactly aligned with privileges and
provided no additional security context:

- mac_check_sysarch_ioperm()
- mac_check_kld_unload()
- mac_check_settime()
- mac_check_system_nfsd()

Add mpo_priv_check() implementations to Biba and LOMAC policies, which,
for each privilege, determine if they can be granted to processes
considered unprivileged by those two policies.  These mostly, but not
entirely, align with the set of privileges granted in jails.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-04-22 15:31:22 +00:00
rwatson
9792022e80 Allow MAC policy modules to control access to audit configuration system
calls.  Add MAC Framework entry points and MAC policy entry points for
audit(), auditctl(), auditon(), setaudit(), aud setauid().

MAC Framework entry points are only added for audit system calls where
additional argument context may be useful for policy decision-making; other
audit system calls without arguments may be controlled via the priv(9)
entry points.

Update various policy modules to implement audit-related checks, and in
some cases, other missing system-related checks.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by:	SPARTA, Inc.
2007-04-21 22:08:48 +00:00
rwatson
a29076f446 More unnecessary include reduction. 2007-02-23 14:39:04 +00:00
rwatson
8f30a62d60 In mac_biba_check_system_swapoff(), don't extract the object label since
it isn't used in the access control decision.  This became visible to
Coverity with the change to a function call retrieving label values.

Coverity CID:	1723
2007-02-10 08:59:39 +00:00
rwatson
19777f0802 Introduce accessor functions mac_label_get() and mac_label_set() to replace
LABEL_TO_SLOT() macro used by policy modules to query and set label data
in struct label.  Instead of using a union, store an intptr_t, simplifying
the API.

Update policies: in most cases this required only small tweaks to current
wrapper macros.  In two cases, a single wrapper macros had to be split into
separate get and set macros.

Move struct label definition from _label.h to mac_internal.h and remove
_label.h.  With this change, policies may now treat struct label * as
opaque, allowing us to change the layout of struct label without breaking
the policy module ABI.  For example, we could make the maximum number of
policies with labels modifiable at boot-time rather than just at
compile-time.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-02-06 14:19:25 +00:00
rwatson
d945a8c499 Continue 7-CURRENT MAC Framework rearrangement and cleanup:
Don't perform a nested include of _label.h in mac.h, as mac.h now
describes only  the user API to MAC, and _label.h defines the in-kernel
representation of MAC labels.

Remove mac.h includes from policies and MAC framework components that do
not use userspace MAC API definitions.

Add _KERNEL inclusion checks to mac_internal.h and mac_policy.h, as these
are kernel-only include files

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2007-02-06 10:59:23 +00:00
rwatson
ae9ef07995 Move src/sys/sys/mac_policy.h, the kernel interface between the MAC
Framework and security modules, to src/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h,
completing the removal of kernel-only MAC Framework include files from
src/sys/sys.  Update the MAC Framework and MAC policy modules.  Delete
the old mac_policy.h.

Third party policy modules will need similar updating.

Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2006-12-22 23:34:47 +00:00
csjp
3193aa5601 Teach the MAC policies which utilize mbuf labeling the new syncache
entry points.  Properly initialize the mbuf label based on the label
we copy from the PCB. This fixes an LOR between the PCB and syncache
code.
2006-12-13 06:03:22 +00:00
trhodes
58cca8458a Merge posix4/* into normal kernel hierarchy.
Reviewed by:	glanced at by jhb
Approved by:	silence on -arch@ and -standards@
2006-11-11 16:26:58 +00:00
csjp
63e89c05d2 Introduce a new entry point, mac_create_mbuf_from_firewall. This entry point
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.

This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.

[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
    introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
    equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
    mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
    an example being icmp_error()

    This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC

Submitted by:	mlaier [1]
MFC after:	1 week

This is a RELENG_6 candidate
2006-09-12 04:25:13 +00:00
rwatson
2e4df4a141 Make mpo_associate_nfsd_label() return void, not int, to match
mac_associate_nfsd_label().

Head nod:	csjp
2006-08-06 16:56:15 +00:00
csjp
0baddf7a5b Implement mpo_associate_nfsd_label entry point for the BIBA security policy,
we will initialize the label to biba/low for files that have been created
through an NFS RPC. This is a safe default given the default nature of our
NFS implementation, there is not a whole lot of data integrity there by
default. This also fixes kernel panics associated with file creation over NFS
while creating files on filesystems which have multilabel enabled with BIBA
enabled.

MFC after:	2 weeks
Discussed with:	rwatson
2006-07-10 19:13:32 +00:00
csjp
8db1bd7411 Introduce a new sysctl variable:
security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal

If non-zero, all network interfaces be created with the label:

biba/equal(equal-equal)

This is useful where programs which initialize network interfaces
do not have any labeling support. This includes dhclient and ppp. A
long term solution is to add labeling support into dhclient(8)
and ppp(8), and remove this variable.

It should be noted that this behavior is different then setting the:

security.mac.biba.trust_all_interfaces

sysctl variable, as this will create interfaces with a biba/high label.
Lower integrity processes are not able to write to the interface in this
event. The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal will override
trust_all_interfaces.

The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal variable will be set to zero
or disabled by default.

MFC after:	2 weeks
2005-12-31 05:06:59 +00:00
phk
59a2d96944 Add #include <sys/sx.h>, devfs is going to require this shortly. 2005-09-19 18:52:51 +00:00
rwatson
583b25a64f Remove mac_create_root_mount() and mpo_create_root_mount(), which
provided access to the root file system before the start of the
init process.  This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about
preloading data in the loader, and using that method to gain
access to data earlier results in fewer inconsistencies in the
approach.  Policy modules still have access to the root file system
creation event through the mac_create_mount() entry point.

Removed now, and will be removed from RELENG_6, in order to gain
third party policy dependencies on the entry point for the lifetime
of the 6.x branch.

MFC after:	3 days
Submitted by:	Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
Sponsored by:	SPARTA
2005-09-19 13:59:57 +00:00