Use hhook(9) framework to achieve ability of loading and unloading
if_enc(4) kernel module. INET and INET6 code on initialization registers
two helper hooks points in the kernel. if_enc(4) module uses these helper
hook points and registers its hooks. IPSEC code uses these hhook points
to call helper hooks implemented in if_enc(4).
Set zero ivsize for enc_xform_null and remove special handling from
xform_esp.c.
Reviewed by: gnn
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1503
degradation (7%) for host host TCP connections over 10Gbps links,
even when there were no secuirty policies in place. There is no
change in performance on 1Gbps network links. Testing GENERIC vs.
GENERIC-NOIPSEC vs. GENERIC with this change shows that the new
code removes any overhead introduced by having IPSEC always in the
kernel.
Differential Revision: D3993
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Rubicon Communications (Netgate)
Currently we perform crypto requests for IPSEC synchronous for most of
crypto providers (software, aesni) and only VIA padlock calls crypto
callback asynchronous. In synchronous mode it is possible, that security
policy will be removed during the processing crypto request. And crypto
callback will release the last reference to SP. Then upon return into
ipsec[46]_process_packet() IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK() will be called to already
freed request. To prevent this we will take extra reference to SP.
PR: 201876
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
defines the keys differently than NIST does, so we have to muck with
key lengths and nonce/IVs to be standard compliant...
Remove the iv from secasvar as it was unused...
Add a counter protected by a mutex to ensure that the counter for GCM
and ICM will never be repeated.. This is a requirement for security..
I would use atomics, but we don't have a 64bit one on all platforms..
Fix a bug where IPsec was depending upon the OCF to ensure that the
blocksize was always at least 4 bytes to maintain alignment... Move
this logic into IPsec so changes to OCF won't break IPsec...
In one place, espx was always non-NULL, so don't test that it's
non-NULL before doing work..
minor style cleanups...
drop setting key and klen as they were not used...
Enforce that OCF won't pass invalid key lengths to AES that would
panic the machine...
This was has been tested by others too... I tested this against
NetBSD 6.1.5 using mini-test suite in
https://github.com/jmgurney/ipseccfgs and the only things that don't
pass are keyed md5 and sha1, and 3des-deriv (setkey syntax error),
all other modes listed in setkey's man page... The nice thing is
that NetBSD uses setkey, so same config files were used on both...
Reviewed by: gnn
use CTASSERTs now that we have them...
Replace a draft w/ RFC that's over 10 years old.
Note that _AALG and _EALG do not need to match what the IKE daemons
think they should be.. This is part of the KABI... I decided to
renumber AESCTR, but since we've never had working AESCTR mode, I'm
not really breaking anything.. and it shortens a loop by quite
a bit..
remove SKIPJACK IPsec support... SKIPJACK never made it out of draft
(in 1999), only has 80bit key, NIST recommended it stop being used
after 2010, and setkey nor any of the IKE daemons I checked supported
it...
jmgurney/ipsecgcm: a357a33, c75808b, e008669, b27b6d6
Reviewed by: gnn (earlier version)
The IPsec SA statistic keeping is used even for decision making on expiry/rekeying SAs.
When there are multiple transformations being done the statistic keeping might be wrong.
This mostly impacts multiple encapsulations on IPsec since the usual scenario it is not noticed due to the code path not taken.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3239
Reviewed by: ae, gnn
Approved by: gnn(mentor)
problems that was introduced in r285336... I have verified that
HMAC-SHA2-256 both ah only and w/ AES-CBC interoperate w/ a NetBSD
6.1.5 vm...
Reviewed by: gnn
mode and with hardware support on systems that have AESNI instructions.
Differential Revision: D2936
Reviewed by: jmg, eri, cognet
Sponsored by: Rubicon Communications (Netgate)
When IPSEC is enabled on the kernel the forwarding path has an optimization to not enter the code paths
for checking security policies but first checks if there is any security policy active at all.
The patch introduces the same optimization but for traffic generated from the host itself.
This reduces the overhead by 50% on my tests for generated host traffic without and SP active.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2980
Reviewed by: ae, gnn
Approved by: gnn(mentor)
years for head. However, it is continuously misused as the mpsafe argument
for callout_init(9). Deprecate the flag and clean up callout_init() calls
to make them more consistent.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2613
Reviewed by: jhb
MFC after: 2 weeks
extension header type. The key_flush_sad() now will send SADB_EXPIRE
message when HARD lifetime expires. This is required by RFC 2367 and some
keying daemons rely on these messages. HARD lifetime messages have
precedence over SOFT lifetime messages, so now they will be checked first.
Also now SADB_EXPIRE messages will be send even the SA has not been used,
because keying daemons might want to rekey such SA.
PR: 200282, 200283
Submitted by: Tobias Brunner <tobias at strongswan dot org>
MFC after: 2 weeks
When we are passing mbuf to IPSec processing via ipsec[46]_process_packet(),
we hold one reference to security policy and release it just after return
from this function. But IPSec processing can be deffered and when we release
reference to security policy after ipsec[46]_process_packet(), user can
delete this security policy from SPDB. And when IPSec processing will be
done, xform's callback function will do access to already freed memory.
To fix this move KEY_FREESP() into callback function. Now IPSec code will
release reference to SP after processing will be finished.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2324
No objections from: #network
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
additional arguments - buffer and size of this buffer.
ipsec_address() is used to convert sockaddr structure to presentation
format. The IPv6 part of this function returns pointer to the on-stack
buffer and at the moment when it will be used by caller, it becames
invalid. IPv4 version uses 4 static buffers and returns pointer to
new buffer each time when it called. But anyway it is still possible
to get corrupted data when several threads will use this function.
ipsec_logsastr() is used to format string about SA entry. It also
uses static buffer and has the same problem with concurrent threads.
To fix these problems add the buffer pointer and size of this
buffer to arguments. Now each caller will pass buffer and its size
to these functions. Also convert all places where these functions
are used (except disabled code).
And now ipsec_address() uses inet_ntop() function from libkern.
PR: 185996
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2321
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
ipsec6_common_input_cb() uses partial copy of ip6_input() to parse
headers. But this isn't correct, when we use tunnel mode IPSec.
When we stripped outer IPv6 header from the decrypted packet, it
can become IPv4 packet and should be handled by ip_input. Also when
we use tunnel mode IPSec with IPv6 traffic, we should pass decrypted
packet with inner IPv6 header to ip6_input, it will correctly handle
it and also can decide to forward it.
The "skip" variable points to offset where payload starts. In tunnel
mode we reset it to zero after stripping the outer header. So, when
it is zero, we should requeue mbuf via netisr.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2306
Reviewed by: adrian, gnn
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
* in ipsec_encap() embed scope zone ids into link-local addresses
in the new IPv6 header, this helps ip6_output() disambiguate the
scope;
* teach key_ismyaddr6() use in6_localip(). in6_localip() is less
strict than key_sockaddrcmp(). It doesn't compare all fileds of
struct sockaddr_in6, but it is faster and it should be safe,
because all SA's data was checked for correctness. Also, since
IPv6 link-local addresses in the &V_in6_ifaddrhead are stored in
kernel-internal form, we need to embed scope zone id from SA into
the address before calling in6_localip.
* in ipsec_common_input() take scope zone id embedded in the address
and use it to initialize sin6_scope_id, then use this sockaddr
structure to lookup SA, because we keep addresses in the SADB without
embedded scope zone id.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2304
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
The only thing is used from this code is ipip_output() function, that does
IPIP encapsulation. Other parts of XF_IP4 code were removed in r275133.
Also it isn't possible to configure the use of XF_IP4, nor from userland
via setkey(8), nor from the kernel.
Simplify the ipip_output() function and rename it to ipsec_encap().
* move IP_DF handling from ipsec4_process_packet() into ipsec_encap();
* since ipsec_encap() called from ipsec[64]_process_packet(), it
is safe to assume that mbuf is contiguous at least to IP header
for used IP version. Remove all unneeded m_pullup(), m_copydata
and related checks.
* use V_ip_defttl and V_ip6_defhlim for outer headers;
* use V_ip4_ipsec_ecn and V_ip6_ipsec_ecn for outer headers;
* move all diagnostic messages to the ipsec_encap() callers;
* simplify handling of ipsec_encap() results: if it returns non zero
value, print diagnostic message and free mbuf.
* some style(9) fixes.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2303
Reviewed by: glebius
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
where we want to create a new IP datagram.
o Add support for RFC6864, which allows to set IP ID for atomic IP
datagrams to any value, to improve performance. The behaviour is
controlled by net.inet.ip.rfc6864 sysctl knob, which is enabled by
default.
o In case if we generate IP ID, use counter(9) to improve performance.
o Gather all code related to IP ID into ip_id.c.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2177
Reviewed by: adrian, cy, rpaulo
Tested by: Emeric POUPON <emeric.poupon stormshield.eu>
Sponsored by: Netflix
Sponsored by: Nginx, Inc.
Relnotes: yes
code.
Resurrect the state field in the struct secpolicy, it has
IPSEC_SPSTATE_ALIVE value when security policy linked in the chain,
and IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD value in all other cases. This field protects
from trying to unlink one security policy several times from the different
threads.
Take additional reference in the key_flush_spd() to be sure that policy
won't be freed from the different thread while we are sending SPDEXPIRE message.
Add KEY_FREESP() call to the key_unlink() to release additional reference
that we take when use key_getsp*() functions.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1914
Tested by: Emeric POUPON <emeric.poupon at stormshield dot eu>
Reviewed by: hrs
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
socket-buffer implementations, introduce a return value for MCLGET()
(and m_cljget() that underlies it) to allow the caller to avoid testing
M_EXT itself. Update all callers to use the return value.
With this change, very few network device drivers remain aware of
M_EXT; the primary exceptions lie in mbuf-chain pretty printers for
debugging, and in a few cases, custom mbuf and cluster allocation
implementations.
NB: This is a difficult-to-test change as it touches many drivers for
which I don't have physical devices. Instead we've gone for intensive
review, but further post-commit review would definitely be appreciated
to spot errors where changes could not easily be made mechanically,
but were largely mechanical in nature.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1440
Reviewed by: adrian, bz, gnn
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division
IPv6. Initialize it only once in def_policy_init(). Remove its
initialization from key_init() and make it static.
Remove several fields from struct secpolicy:
* lock - it isn't so useful having mutex in the structure, but the only
thing we do with it is initialization and destroying.
* state - it has only two values - DEAD and ALIVE. Instead of take a lock
and change the state to DEAD, then take lock again in GC function and
delete policy from the chain - keep in the chain only ALIVE policies.
* scangen - it was used in GC function to protect from sending several
SADB_SPDEXPIRE messages for one SPD entry. Now we don't keep DEAD entries
in the chain and there is no need to have scangen variable.
Use TAILQ to implement SPD entries chain. Use rmlock to protect access
to SPD entries chain. Protect all SP lookup with RLOCK, and use WLOCK
when we are inserting (or removing) SP entry in the chain.
Instead of using pattern "LOCK(); refcnt++; UNLOCK();", use refcount(9)
API to implement refcounting in SPD. Merge code from key_delsp() and
_key_delsp() into _key_freesp(). And use KEY_FREESP() macro in all cases
when we want to release reference or just delete SP entry.
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
ipsec_getpolicybyaddr()
ipsec4_checkpolicy()
ip_ipsec_output()
ip6_ipsec_output()
The only flag used here was IP_FORWARDING.
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
and make its prototype similar to ipsec6_process_packet.
The flags argument isn't used here, tunalready is always zero.
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
