- Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling
a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin
were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing
ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc
lock.
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
bind() call on IPv4 sockets:
Currently, if one tries to bind a socket using INADDR_LOOPBACK inside a
jail, it will fail because prison_ip() does not take this possibility
into account. On the other hand, when one tries to connect(), for
example, to localhost, prison_remote_ip() will silently convert
INADDR_LOOPBACK to the jail's IP address. Therefore, it is desirable to
make bind() to do this implicit conversion as well.
Apart from this, the patch also replaces 0x7f000001 in
prison_remote_ip() to a more correct INADDR_LOOPBACK.
This is a 4.4-RELEASE "during the freeze, thanks" MFC candidate.
Submitted by: Anton Berezin <tobez@FreeBSD.org>
Discussed with at some point: phk
MFC after: 3 days
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
current implementation, jail neither virtualizes the Sys V IPC namespace,
nor provides inter-jail protections on IPC objects.
o Support for System V IPC can be enabled by setting jail.sysvipc_allowed=1
using sysctl.
o This is not the "real fix" which involves virtualizing the System V
IPC namespace, but prevents processes within jail from influencing those
outside of jail when not approved by the administrator.
Reported by: Paulo Fragoso <paulo@nlink.com.br>
TCP/IP (v4) sockets, and routing sockets. Previously, interaction
with IPv6 was not well-defined, and might be inappropriate for some
environments. Similarly, sysctl MIB entries providing interface
information also give out only addresses from those protocol domains.
For the time being, this functionality is enabled by default, and
toggleable using the sysctl variable jail.socket_unixiproute_only.
In the future, protocol domains will be able to determine whether or
not they are ``jail aware''.
o Further limitations on process use of getpriority() and setpriority()
by jailed processes. Addresses problem described in kern/17878.
Reviewed by: phk, jmg
``jail'', and move the set_hostname_allowed sysctl there, as well as
fixing a bug in the sysctl that resulted in jails being over-limited
(preventing them from reading as well as writing the hostname). Also,
correct some formatting issues, courtesy bde :-).
Reviewed by: phk
Approved by: jkh
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
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