This paniced my one of my machines one time too many :-( and there is
no sign of a solution in the pipeline. The deltas are still easily
available in cvs. The problem is that if the parent has been swapped
out, the child process cannot grope around in the parent's UPAGES to
see the sigact[] array or it will fault. This probably is a showstopper
for this implementation anyway.
defined to 0 in the non-SMP case, which very much makes sense as it
permits its usage in per-CPU initialization loops (for an example, check
out subr_mbuf.c).
Further, on a UP system, make mb_alloc always use the first per-CPU
container, regardless of cpuid (i.e. remove reliability on cpuid in the
UP case).
Requested by: alfred
asleep() and await() functions split the functionality of msleep() up into
two halves. Only the asleep() half (which is what puts the process on the
sleep queue) actually needs the lock usually passed to msleep() held to
prevent lost wakeups. await() does not need the lock held, so the lock
can be released prior to calling await() and does not need to be passed in
to the await() function. Typical usage of these functions would be as
follows:
mtx_lock(&foo_mtx);
... do stuff ...
asleep(&foo_cond, PRIxx, "foowt", hz);
...
mtx_unlock&foo_mtx);
...
await(-1, -1);
Inspired by: dillon on the couch at Usenix
of debugging the current process when that is in conflict with other
restrictions (such as jail, unprivileged_procdebug_permitted, etc).
o This corrects anomolies in the behavior of
kern.security.unprivileged_procdebug_permitted when using truss and
ktrace. The theory goes that this is now safe to use.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MIB entries.
o Relocate kern.suser_permitted to kern.security.suser_permitted.
o Introduce new kern.security.unprivileged_procdebug_permitted, which
(when set to 0) prevents processes without privilege from performing
a variety of inter-process debugging activities. The default is 1,
to provide current behavior.
This feature allows "hardened" systems to disable access to debugging
facilities, which have been associated with a number of past security
vulnerabilities. Previously, while procfs could be unmounted, other
in-kernel facilities (such as ptrace()) were still available. This
setting should not be modified on normal development systems, as it
will result in frustration. Some utilities respond poorly to
failing to get the debugging access they require, and error response
by these utilities may be improved in the future in the name of
beautification.
Note that there are currently some odd interactions with some
facilities, which will need to be resolved before this should be used
in production, including odd interactions with truss and ktrace.
Note also that currently, tracing is permitted on the current process
regardless of this flag, for compatibility with previous
authorization code in various facilities, but that will probably
change (and resolve the odd interactions).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
dynamic symbol table buckets and chains. The sparc64 toolchain uses 32
bit .hash entries, unlike other 64 bits architectures (alpha), which use
64 bit entries.
Discussed with: dfr, jdp
FreeBSD _does_ define ENOMSG, so no need for checking if we support it.
Inspired by PR: 22470
Which was submitted by: Bjorn Tornqvist <bjorn@west.se>
MFC after: 1 week
VM caching of disks through mmap() and stopping syncing of open files
that had their last reference in the fs removed (ie: their unsync'ed
pages get discarded on close already, so I made it stop syncing too).
initialize in the right order to make derivative settings work right.
eg: at compile time, nmbufs was double nmbclusters. For POLA this should
work the same at runtime.
Tunables are now derived at boot time from maxusers. ie: change maxusers
via a tunable and all the derivative settings change. You can change
the other tunables individually as well. Even hz etc is tunable.
were indices in a dense array. The cpuids are a sparse set and treat
them as such, setting up containers only for CPUs activated during
mb_init().
- Fix netstat(1) and systat(1) to treat the per-CPU stats area as a sparse
map, in accordance with the above.
This allows us to properly boot with certain CPUs disactivated. However, if
we later decide to re-activate said CPUs, we will barf until we decide to
implement CPU spinon/spinoff callback hooks to allow for said CPUs' per-CPU
containers to get configured on their activation.
Reported by: mjacob
Partially (sys/ diffs) Submitted by: mjacob
static entries with oid's over 100, and defining enough dynamic entries
causes an overlap.
Move the "magic" value 0x100 into <sys/sysctl.h> where it belongs.
PR: 29131
Submitted by: "Alexander N. Kabaev" <kabaev@mail.ru>
Reviewed by: -arch, -audit
MFC after: 2 weeks
an unexpected user-visible side effect with the sigaction flags. Also cleanup
a minor union issue.
Submitted by: Rudolf Cejka <cejkar@dcse.fee.vutbr.cz>
MFC addendum: MFC will be combined w/ original commit
MFC after: 3 days
support. Trying to fix the merged set where dynamic overrode
static was getting more and more complicated by the day.
This should fix the duplicate atkbd, psm, fd* etc in GENERIC. (which
paniced the alpha, but not the i386)
The p_can(...) construct was a premature (and, it turns out,
awkward) abstraction. The individual calls to p_canxxx() better
reflect differences between the inter-process authorization checks,
such as differing checks based on the type of signal. This has
a side effect of improving code readability.
o Replace direct credential authorization checks in ktrace() with
invocation of p_candebug(), while maintaining the special case
check of KTR_ROOT. This allows ktrace() to "play more nicely"
with new mandatory access control schemes, as well as making its
authorization checks consistent with other "debugging class"
checks.
o Eliminate "privused" construct for p_can*() calls which allowed the
caller to determine if privilege was required for successful
evaluation of the access control check. This primitive is currently
unused, and as such, serves only to complicate the API.
Approved by: ({procfs,linprocfs} changes) des
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
(this commit is just the first stage). Also add various GIANT_ macros to
formalize the removal of Giant, making it easy to test in a more piecemeal
fashion. These macros will allow us to test fine-grained locks to a degree
before removing Giant, and also after, and to remove Giant in a piecemeal
fashion via sysctl's on those subsystems which the authors believe can
operate without Giant.
These take an additional mutex argument, which is dropped before any
processes are made runnable. This can avoid contention on the mutex
if the processes would immediately acquire it, and is done in such a
way that wakeups will not be lost.
Reviewed by: jhb
We already did this in the SMP case, and it is now maintained in the UP
case as well, and makes the code slightly more readable. Note that
curproc is always executing, thus the p != curproc test does not need to
be performed if the p_oncpu check is made.
