ufs_vnops.c:
1) i_ino was confused with i_number, so the inode number passed to
VFS_VGET() was usually wrong (usually 0U).
2) ip was dereferenced after vgone() freed it, so the inode number
passed to VFS_VGET() was sometimes not even wrong.
Bug (1) was usually fatal in ext2_mknod(), since ext2fs doesn't have
space for inode 0 on the disk; ino_to_fsba() subtracts 1 from the
inode number, so inode number 0U gives a way out of bounds array
index. Bug(1) was usually harmless in ufs_mknod(); ino_to_fsba()
doesn't subtract 1, and VFS_VGET() reads suitable garbage (all 0's?)
from the disk for the invalid inode number 0U; ufs_mknod() returns
a wrong vnode, but most callers just vput() it; the correct vnode is
eventually obtained by an implicit VFS_VGET() just like it used to be.
Bug (2) usually doesn't happen.
<sys/proc.h> to <sys/systm.h>.
Correctly document the #includes needed in the manpage.
Add one now needed #include of <sys/systm.h>.
Remove the consequent 48 unused #includes of <sys/proc.h>.
the offending inline function (BUF_KERNPROC) on it being #included
already.
I'm not sure BUF_KERNPROC() is even the right thing to do or in the
right place or implemented the right way (inline vs normal function).
Remove consequently unneeded #includes of <sys/proc.h>
"administrative" authorization checks. In most cases, the VADMIN test
checks to make sure the credential effective uid is the same as the file
owner.
o Modify vaccess() to set VADMIN as an available right if the uid is
appropriate.
o Modify references to uid-based access control operations such that they
now always invoke VOP_ACCESS() instead of using hard-coded policy checks.
o This allows alternative UFS policies to be implemented by replacing only
ufs_access() (such as mandatory system policies).
o VOP_ACCESS() requires the caller to hold an exclusive vnode lock on the
vnode: I believe that new invocations of VOP_ACCESS() are always called
with the lock held.
o Some direct checks of the uid remain, largely associated with the QUOTA
and SUIDDIR code.
Reviewed by: eivind
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
description:
How it works:
--
Basically ifs is a copy of ffs, overriding some vfs/vnops. (Yes, hack.)
I didn't see the need in duplicating all of sys/ufs/ffs to get this
off the ground.
File creation is done through a special file - 'newfile' . When newfile
is called, the system allocates and returns an inode. Note that newfile
is done in a cloning fashion:
fd = open("newfile", O_CREAT|O_RDWR, 0644);
fstat(fd, &st);
printf("new file is %d\n", (int)st.st_ino);
Once you have created a file, you can open() and unlink() it by its returned
inode number retrieved from the stat call, ie:
fd = open("5", O_RDWR);
The creation permissions depend entirely if you have write access to the
root directory of the filesystem.
To get the list of currently allocated inodes, VOP_READDIR has been added
which returns a directory listing of those currently allocated.
--
What this entails:
* patching conf/files and conf/options to include IFS as a new compile
option (and since ifs depends upon FFS, include the FFS routines)
* An entry in i386/conf/NOTES indicating IFS exists and where to go for
an explanation
* Unstaticize a couple of routines in src/sys/ufs/ffs/ which the IFS
routines require (ffs_mount() and ffs_reload())
* a new bunch of routines in src/sys/ufs/ifs/ which implement the IFS
routines. IFS replaces some of the vfsops, and a handful of vnops -
most notably are VFS_VGET(), VOP_LOOKUP(), VOP_UNLINK() and VOP_READDIR().
Any other directory operation is marked as invalid.
What this results in:
* an IFS partition's create permissions are controlled by the perm/ownership of
the root mount point, just like a normal directory
* Each inode has perm and ownership too
* IFS does *NOT* mean an FFS partition can be opened per inode. This is a
completely seperate filesystem here
* Softupdates doesn't work with IFS, and really I don't think it needs it.
Besides, fsck's are FAST. (Try it :-)
* Inodes 0 and 1 aren't allocatable because they are special (dump/swap IIRC).
Inode 2 isn't allocatable since UFS/FFS locks all inodes in the system against
this particular inode, and unravelling THAT code isn't trivial. Therefore,
useful inodes start at 3.
Enjoy, and feedback is definitely appreciated!
it is defined whenm used in ufs_extattr_uepm_destroy(), fixing a panic
due to a NULL pointer dereference.
Submitted by: Wesley Morgan <morganw@chemicals.tacorp.com>
up lock on extattrs.
o Get for free a comment indicating where auto-starting of extended
attributes will eventually occur, as it was in my commit tree also.
No implementation change here, only a comment.
call, which should be the last thing down to a per-mount extattr
management structure, after ufs_extattr_stop() on the file system.
This currently has the effect only of destroying the per-mount lock
on extended attributes, and clearing appropriate flags.
o Remove inappropriate invocation in ufs_extattr_vnode_inactive().
Add lockdestroy() and appropriate invocations, which corresponds to
lockinit() and must be called to clean up after a lockmgr lock is no
longer needed.
separately (nfs, cd9660 etc) or keept as a first element of structure
referenced by v_data pointer(ffs). Such organization leads to known problems
with stacked filesystems.
From this point vop_no*lock*() functions maintain only interlock lock.
vop_std*lock*() functions maintain built-in v_lock structure using lockmgr().
vop_sharedlock() is compatible with vop_stdunlock(), but maintains a shared
lock on vnode.
If filesystem wishes to export lockmgr compatible lock, it can put an address
of this lock to v_vnlock field. This indicates that the upper filesystem
can take advantage of it and use single lock structure for entire (or part)
of stack of vnodes. This field shouldn't be examined or modified by VFS code
except for initialization purposes.
Reviewed in general by: mckusick
on directories.
o Allow privileged processes in jail() to create inodes with the
setgid bit set even if they are not a member of the group denoted
by the file creation gid. This occurs due to inherited gid's from
parent directories on file creation, allowing a user to create a
file with a gid that is not in the creating process's credentials.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
and UFS file flags. Here's what the comment says, for reference:
Privileged processes in jail() are permitted to modify
arbitrary user flags on files, but are not permitted
to modify system flags.
In other words, privilege does allow a process in jail to modify user
flags for objects that the process does not own, but privilege will
not permit the setting of system flags on the file.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
remove the setuid/setgid bits by virtue of a change to a file with those
bits set, even if the process doesn't own the file, or isn't a group
member of the file's gid.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
safe as suser() no longer sets ASU.
o Note that in some cases, the PRISON_ROOT flag is used even though no
process structure is passed, to indicate that if a process structure
(and hence jail) was available, it would be ok. In the long run,
the jail identifier should probably be moved to ucred, as the uidinfo
information was.
o Some uid 0 checks remain relating to the quota code, which I'll leave
for another day.
Reviewed by: phk, eivind
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
filesystem lookup() routine if it unlocks parent directory. This flag should
be carefully tracked by filesystems if they want to work properly with nullfs
and other stacked filesystems.
VFS takes advantage of this flag to perform symantically correct usage
of vrele() instead of vput() if parent directory already unlocked.
If filesystem fails to track this flag then previous codepath in VFS left
unchanged.
Convert UFS code to set PDIRUNLOCK flag if necessary. Other filesystmes will
be changed after some period of testing.
Reviewed in general by: mckusick, dillon, adrian
Obtained from: NetBSD
- In ufs_extattr_enable(), return EEXIST instead of EOPNOTSUPP
if the caller tries to configure an attribute name that is
already configured
- Throughout, add IO_NODELOCKED to VOP_{READ,WRITE} calls to
indicate lock status of passed vnode. Apparently not a
problem, but worth fixing.
- For all writes, make use of IO_SYNC consistent. Really,
IO_UNIT and combining of VOP_WRITE's should happen, but I
don't have that tested. At least with this, it's
consistent usage. (pointed out by: bde)
- In ufs_extattr_get(), fixed nested locking of backing
vnode (fine due to recursive lock support, but make it
more consistent with other code)
- In ufs_extattr_get(), clean up return code to set uio_resid
more consistently with other pieces of code (worked fine,
this is just a cleanup)
- Fix ufs_extattr_rm(), which was broken--effectively a nop.
- Minor comment and whitespace fixes.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
include:
* Mutual exclusion is used instead of spl*(). See mutex(9). (Note: The
alpha port is still in transition and currently uses both.)
* Per-CPU idle processes.
* Interrupts are run in their own separate kernel threads and can be
preempted (i386 only).
Partially contributed by: BSDi (BSD/OS)
Submissions by (at least): cp, dfr, dillon, grog, jake, jhb, sheldonh
attribute namespace and DAC protection on file:
- Attribute names beginning with '$' are in the system namespace
- The attribute name "$" is reserved
- System namespace attributes may only be read/set by suser()
or by kernel (cred == NULL)
- Other attribute names are in the application namespace
- The attribute name "" is reserved
- Application namespace attributes are protected in the manner
of the target file permission
o Kernel changes
- Add ufs_extattr_valid_attrname() to check whether the requested
attribute "set" or "enable" is appropriate (i.e., non-reserved)
- Modify ufs_extattr_credcheck() to accept target file vnode, not
to take inode uid
- Modify ufs_extattr_credcheck() to check namespace, then enforce
either kernel/suser for system namespace, or vaccess() for
application namespace
o EA backing file format changes
- Remove permission fields from extended attribute backing file
header
- Bump extended attribute backing file header version to 3
o Update extattrctl.c and extattrctl.8
- Remove now deprecated -r and -w arguments to initattr, as
permissions are now implicit
- (unrelated) fix error reporting and unlinking during failed
initattr to remove duplicate/inaccurate error messages, and to
only unlink if the failure wasn't in the backing file open()
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
object before falling back on privilege. Make vaccess() accept an
additional optional argument, privused, to determine whether
privilege was required for vaccess() to return 0. Add commented
out capability checks for reference. Rename some variables to make
it more clear which modes/uids/etc are associated with the object,
and which with the access mode.
o Update file system use of vaccess() to pass NULL as the optional
privused argument. Once additional patches are applied, suser()
will no longer set ASU, so privused will permit passing of
privilege information up the stack to the caller.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, -security, others
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Remove old DEVFS support fields from dev_t.
Make uid, gid & mode members of dev_t and set them in make_dev().
Use correct uid, gid & mode in make_dev in disk minilayer.
Add support for registering alias names for a dev_t using the
new function make_dev_alias(). These will show up as symlinks
in DEVFS.
Use makedev() rather than make_dev() for MFSs magic devices to prevent
DEVFS from noticing this abuse.
Add a field for DEVFS inode number in dev_t.
Add new DEVFS in fs/devfs.
Add devfs cloning to:
disk minilayer (ie: ad(4), sd(4), cd(4) etc etc)
md(4), tun(4), bpf(4), fd(4)
If DEVFS add -d flag to /sbin/inits args to make it mount devfs.
Add commented out DEVFS to GENERIC
This allows ffs_fsync() to break out of a loop that might otherwise
be infinite on kernels compiled without the SOFTUPDATES option.
The observed symptom was a system hang at the first unmount attempt.
the SF_IMMUTABLE flag to prevent writing. Instead put in explicit
checking for the SF_SNAPSHOT flag in the appropriate places. With
this change, it is now possible to rename and link to snapshot files.
It is also possible to set or clear any of the owner, group, or
other read bits on the file, though none of the write or execute
bits can be set. There is also an explicit test to prevent the
setting or clearing of the SF_SNAPSHOT flag via chflags() or
fchflags(). Note also that the modify time cannot be changed as
it needs to accurately reflect the time that the snapshot was taken.
Submitted by: Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>
with the new snapshot code.
Update addaliasu to correctly implement the semantics of the old
checkalias function. When a device vnode first comes into existence,
check to see if an anonymous vnode for the same device was created
at boot time by bdevvp(). If so, adopt the bdevvp vnode rather than
creating a new vnode for the device. This corrects a problem which
caused the kernel to panic when taking a snapshot of the root
filesystem.
Change the calling convention of vn_write_suspend_wait() to be the
same as vn_start_write().
Split out softdep_flushworklist() from softdep_flushfiles() so that
it can be used to clear the work queue when suspending filesystem
operations.
Access to buffers becomes recursive so that snapshots can recursively
traverse their indirect blocks using ffs_copyonwrite() when checking
for the need for copy on write when flushing one of their own indirect
blocks. This eliminates a deadlock between the syncer daemon and a
process taking a snapshot.
Ensure that softdep_process_worklist() can never block because of a
snapshot being taken. This eliminates a problem with buffer starvation.
Cleanup change in ffs_sync() which did not synchronously wait when
MNT_WAIT was specified. The result was an unclean filesystem panic
when doing forcible unmount with heavy filesystem I/O in progress.
Return a zero'ed block when reading a block that was not in use at
the time that a snapshot was taken. Normally, these blocks should
never be read. However, the readahead code will occationally read
them which can cause unexpected behavior.
Clean up the debugging code that ensures that no blocks be written
on a filesystem while it is suspended. Snapshots must explicitly
label the blocks that they are writing during the suspension so that
they do not cause a `write on suspended filesystem' panic.
Reorganize ffs_copyonwrite() to eliminate a deadlock and also to
prevent a race condition that would permit the same block to be
copied twice. This change eliminates an unexpected soft updates
inconsistency in fsck caused by the double allocation.
Use bqrelse rather than brelse for buffers that will be needed
soon again by the snapshot code. This improves snapshot performance.
attribute data size.
o Fortunately it turned out to be an unused constant left over from an
earlier implementation, and is therefore being removed so as not to
confuse casual observers.
Submitted by: mbendiks@eunet.no
the gating of system calls that cause modifications to the underlying
filesystem. The gating can be enabled by any filesystem that needs
to consistently suspend operations by adding the vop_stdgetwritemount
to their set of vnops. Once gating is enabled, the function
vfs_write_suspend stops all new write operations to a filesystem,
allows any filesystem modifying system calls already in progress
to complete, then sync's the filesystem to disk and returns. The
function vfs_write_resume allows the suspended write operations to
begin again. Gating is not added by default for all filesystems as
for SMP systems it adds two extra locks to such critical kernel
paths as the write system call. Thus, gating should only be added
as needed.
Details on the use and current status of snapshots in FFS can be
found in /sys/ufs/ffs/README.snapshot so for brevity and timelyness
is not included here. Unless and until you create a snapshot file,
these changes should have no effect on your system (famous last words).
in mount.h instead of ffs_extern.h. The correct solution is to use
an indirect function pointer so that the kernel does not have to be
built with options FFS, but that will be left for another day.
advance preparation for them to get migrated into place so that
subsequent changes in utilities will not fail to compile for lack
of up-to-date header files in /usr/include.
after the acquisition of any advisory locks. This fix corrects a case
in which a process tries to open a file with a non-blocking exclusive
lock. Even if it fails to get the lock it would still truncate the
file even though its open failed. With this change, the truncation
is done only after the lock is successfully acquired.
Obtained from: BSD/OS
the system would panic when a user's inode quota was exceeded (see
PR 18959 for details). This fixes that problem.
PR: 18959
Submitted by: Jason Godsey <jason@unixguy.fidalgo.net>
check to see if it has been committed to disk. If it has never
been written, it can be freed immediately. For short lived files
this change allows the same inode to be reused repeatedly.
Similarly, when upgrading a fragment to a larger size, if it
has never been claimed by an inode on disk, it too can be freed
immediately making it available for reuse often in the next slowly
growing block of the same file.
if an FFS partition returns EOPNOTSUPP, as it just means extended
attributes weren't enabled on that partition. Prevents spurious
warning per-partition at shutdown.
<sys/bio.h>.
<sys/bio.h> is now a prerequisite for <sys/buf.h> but it shall
not be made a nested include according to bdes teachings on the
subject of nested includes.
Diskdrivers and similar stuff below specfs::strategy() should no
longer need to include <sys/buf.> unless they need caching of data.
Still a few bogus uses of struct buf to track down.
Repocopy by: peter
provide locking over extended attribute operations, requiring that
individual operations be atomic. Allowing non-zero starting offsets
permits applications/etc to put themselves at risk for inconsistent
behavior. As VOP_SETEXTATTR already prohibited non-zero write offsets,
this makes sense.
Suggested by: Andreas Gruenbacher <a.gruenbacher@bestbits.at>
reset their grace timer as their ownership crossed the soft limit
threshhold. Thus if they had been over their limit in the past,
they were suddenly penalized as if they had been over their limit
ever since. The fix is to check when root gives away files, that
when the receiving user crosses their soft limit, their grace timer
is reset. See the PR report for a detailed method of reproducing
the bug.
PR: kern/17128
Submitted by: Andre Albsmeier <andre.albsmeier@mchp.siemens.de>
Reviewed by: Kirk McKusick <mckusick@mckusick.com>
chances of consistency with other file/directory meta-data in a
write. In the current set of extended attribute applications,
this does not hurt much. This should be discussed again later when
it comes time to optimize performance of attributes.
o Include an inode generation number in the per-attribute header
information. This allows consistency verification to catch when
a crash occurs, or an inode is recycled while attributes are not
properly configured. For now, an irritating error message is
displayed when an inconsistency occurs. At some point, may introduce
an ``extattrctl check ...'' which catches these before attributes
are enabled. Not today. If you get this message, it means you
somehow managed to get your attribute backing file out of synch
with the file system. When this occurs, attribute not found is
returned (== undefined). Writes will overwrite the value there
correcting the problem. Might want to think about introducing
a new errno or two to handle this kind of situation.
Discussed with: kris
o Put back in {} removed during over-zealous cleanup of gratuitous
debugging output during preparation for the commit. Due to the
missing {}, writes on extended attributes always silently failed.
Doh.
o Don't unlock the target vnode if it's the backing vnode, as we
don't lock the target vnode if it's the backing vnode.
Exceptions:
Vinum untouched. This means that it cannot be compiled.
Greg Lehey is on the case.
CCD not converted yet, casts to struct buf (still safe)
atapi-cd casts to struct buf to examine B_PHYS
(name, value) pairs to be associated with inodes. This support is
used for ACLs, MAC labels, and Capabilities in the TrustedBSD
security extensions, which are currently under development.
In this implementation, attributes are backed to data vnodes in the
style of the quota support in FFS. Support for FFS extended
attributes may be enabled using the FFS_EXTATTR kernel option
(disabled by default). Userland utilities and man pages will be
committed in the next batch. VFS interfaces and man pages have
been in the repo since 4.0-RELEASE and are unchanged.
o ufs/ufs/extattr.h: UFS-specific extattr defines
o ufs/ufs/ufs_extattr.c: bulk of support routines
o ufs/{ufs,ffs,mfs}/*.[ch]: hooks and extattr.h includes
o contrib/softupdates/ffs_softdep.c: extattr.h includes
o conf/options, conf/files, i386/conf/LINT: added FFS_EXTATTR
o coda/coda_vfsops.c: XXX required extattr.h due to ufsmount.h
(This should not be the case, and will be fixed in a future commit)
Currently attributes are not supported in MFS. This will be fixed.
Reviewed by: adrian, bp, freebsd-fs, other unthanked souls
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
devstat_end_transaction_bio()
bioq_* versions of bufq_* incl bioqdisksort()
the corresponding "buf" versions will disappear when no longer used.
Move b_offset, b_data and b_bcount to struct bio.
Add BIO_FORMAT as a hack for fd.c etc.
We are now largely ready to start converting drivers to use struct
bio instead of struct buf.
(Much of this done by script)
Move B_ORDERED flag to b_ioflags and call it BIO_ORDERED.
Move b_pblkno and b_iodone_chain to struct bio while we transition, they
will be obsoleted once bio structs chain/stack.
Add bio_queue field for struct bio aware disksort.
Address a lot of stylistic issues brought up by bde.
async I/O's. The sequential read heuristic has been extended to
cover writes as well. We continue to call cluster_write() normally,
thus blocks in the file will still be reallocated for large (but still
random) I/O's, but I/O will only be initiated for truely sequential
writes.
This solves a number of annoying situations, especially with DBM (hash
method) writes, and also has the side effect of fixing a number of
(stupid) benchmarks.
Reviewed-by: mckusick
substitute BUF_WRITE(foo) for VOP_BWRITE(foo->b_vp, foo)
substitute BUF_STRATEGY(foo) for VOP_STRATEGY(foo->b_vp, foo)
This patch is machine generated except for the ccd.c and buf.h parts.
field in struct buf: b_iocmd. The b_iocmd is enforced to have
exactly one bit set.
B_WRITE was bogusly defined as zero giving rise to obvious coding
mistakes.
Also eliminate the redundant struct buf flag B_CALL, it can just
as efficiently be done by comparing b_iodone to NULL.
Should you get a panic or drop into the debugger, complaining about
"b_iocmd", don't continue. It is likely to write on your disk
where it should have been reading.
This change is a step in the direction towards a stackable BIO capability.
A lot of this patch were machine generated (Thanks to style(9) compliance!)
Vinum users: Greg has not had time to test this yet, be careful.
the unwary if the code were called in slightly different ways.
1) In ufs_bmaparray() the code for calculating 'runb' will stop one block
short of the first entry in an indirect block. i.e. if an indirect block
contains N block numbers b[0]..b[N-1] then the code will never check if
b[0] and b[1] are sequential. For reference, compare with the equivalent
code that deals with direct blocks.
2) In ufs_lookup() there is an off-by-one error in the test that checks
if dp->i_diroff is outside the range of the the current directory size.
This is completely harmless, since the following while-loop condition
'dp->i_offset < endsearch' is never met, so the code immediately
does a second pass starting at dp->i_offset = 0.
3) Again in ufs_lookup(), the condition in a sanity check is wrong
for directories that are longer than one block. This bug means that
the sanity check is only effective for small directories.
Submitted by: Ian Dowse <iedowse@maths.tcd.ie>
being accessed after the bp had been releaed. A simple move of the
brelse() solves the problem.
Approved by: jkh
Submitted by: Ian Dowse <iedowse@maths.tcd.ie>
filesystem fills up. If the first indirect block exists and FFS is able
to allocate deeper indirect blocks, but is not able to allocate the
data block, FFS improperly unwinds the indirect blocks and leaves a
block pointer hanging to a freed block. This will cause a panic later
when the file is removed. The solution is to properly account for the
first block-pointer-to-an-indirect-block we had to create in a balloc
operation and then unwind it if a failure occurs.
Detective work by: Ian Dowse <iedowse@maths.tcd.ie>
Reviewed by: mckusick, Ian Dowse <iedowse@maths.tcd.ie>
Approved by: jkh
to the current jail/chflags interactions. This fix conditionalizes ``root
behavior'' in the chflags() case on not being in jail, so attempts to
perform a chflags in a jail are limited to what a normal user could do.
For example, this does allow setting of user flags as appropriate, but
prohibits changing of system flags.
Reviewed by: bde
a mess in securelevel environments. Results in one warning during
/etc/rc as it attempts to remove file flags, but this is harmless.
Approved by: High Lord Hubbard
have a write in progress. Otherwise one can get in an infinite loop
trying to get them all flushed.
Submitted by: Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com>
set of restrictions for cancelling an inode dependency (inodedep)
is somewhat stronger than originally coded. Since this check appears
in two places, we codify it into the function check_inode_unwritten
which we then call from the two sites, one freeing blocks and the
other freeing directory entries.
Submitted by: Steinar Haug via Matthew Dillon
so that they never try to lock an inode corresponding to ".." as this
can lead to deadlock. We observe that any inode with an updated link count
is always pushed into its buffer at the time of the link count change, so
we do not need to do a VOP_UPDATE, but merely find its buffer and write it.
The only time we need to get the inode itself is from the result of a
mkdir whose name will never be ".." and hence locking such an inode will
never request a lock above us in the filesystem tree. Thanks to Brian
Fundakowski Feldman for providing the test program that tickled soft updates
into hanging in "inode" sleep.
Submitted by: Brian Fundakowski Feldman <green@FreeBSD.org>
