8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
bde
40847d6be1 Fixed disordering in previous commit. 1998-11-29 10:08:27 +00:00
wosch
d13a028d3d Added a sort option to find(1).
The sort option make it possible to build the locate
database without large (usually 20-100MB) temp files.
1998-11-29 00:54:21 +00:00
jb
76bf3c3e0e A partial frontal lobotomy for find if using the NetBSD libc which
doesn't know about getvfsbyname() and the vfsconf structure. This
disables the -fstype option if compiled with a pre-processor that
defines __NetBSD__. With the FreeBSD built pre-processor, find can only
be built with the FreeBSD libc. So when running with a NetBSD kernel,
FreeBSD's libc will have to return ENOSYS for things that NetBSD
doesn't support. That's life in a hybrid world.
1998-01-10 21:36:34 +00:00
wosch
167c2cb9c3 Add the primaries -mmin, -amin, -cmin to find, similar to the GNU find. 1997-10-13 21:06:22 +00:00
imp
56b404f656 Add -execdir which will execute the exec command in the dir of the file
in question.  This change and the fts changes should be merged into 2.2-stable
as soon as they are vetted in -current.  This should allow cleaning of files
in /tmp to be reneabled.
Obtained from: OpenBSD
1997-08-29 23:09:45 +00:00
peter
342c1e0794 Implement a -delete option to find. The code is extremely paranoid and
goes to a fair degree of trouble to enable something like this to
be safe:  cd /tmp && find . -mtime +7 -delete

It removes both files and directories.  It does not attempt to remove
immutable files (an earlier version I showed to a few people did a chflags
and tried to blow away even immutable files.  Too risky..)

It is thought to be safe because it forces the fts(3) driven descent to
only do "minimal risk" stuff.  specifically, -follow is disabled, it does
checking to see that it chdir'ed to the directory it thought it was
going to, it will *not* pass a pathname with a '/' character in it to
unlink(), so it should be totally immune to symlink tree races.  If it runs
into something "fishy", it bails out rather than blunder ahead.. It's better
to do that if somebody is trying to compromise security rather than risk
giving them an opportunity.  Since the unlink()/rmdir() is being called
from within the current working directory during the tree descent, there
are no fork/exec overheads or races.

As a side effect of this paranoia, you cannot do a
"find /somewhere/dir -delete", as the last argument to rmdir() is
"/somewhere/dir", and the checking won't allow it.  Besides, one would use
rm -rf for that case anyway. :-)

Reviewed by: pst (some time ago, but I've removed the immutable file
deletion code that he complained about since he last saw it)
1996-10-04 12:54:07 +00:00
wollman
715c2b0756 Add GNU-style `-print0' primary. This exists so that one can safely
do `find some-nasty-expression -print0 | perl -n0e unlink' and have all
the files actuallly get deleted.  (Using `xargs' and `rm' is not safe.)
1995-05-09 19:02:06 +00:00
rgrimes
f9ab90d9d6 BSD 4.4 Lite Usr.bin Sources 1994-05-27 12:33:43 +00:00