a temporary array to store struct buf pointers if the list doesn't
fit in a local array. Usually it frees the array when finished,
but if it jumps to the 'again' label and the new list does fit in
the local array then it can forget to free a previously malloc'd
M_TEMP memory.
Move the free() up a line so that it frees any previously allocated
memory whether or not it needs to malloc a new array.
Reviewed by: dillon
should not use a `%' in examples.
I don't know if this is the consensus of doc@, or just a unilateral decision
of committer that corrected my following of this example. Maybe a docs
person could review these files and see if they still show current guidelines.
defined to 0 in the non-SMP case, which very much makes sense as it
permits its usage in per-CPU initialization loops (for an example, check
out subr_mbuf.c).
Further, on a UP system, make mb_alloc always use the first per-CPU
container, regardless of cpuid (i.e. remove reliability on cpuid in the
UP case).
Requested by: alfred
asleep() and await() functions split the functionality of msleep() up into
two halves. Only the asleep() half (which is what puts the process on the
sleep queue) actually needs the lock usually passed to msleep() held to
prevent lost wakeups. await() does not need the lock held, so the lock
can be released prior to calling await() and does not need to be passed in
to the await() function. Typical usage of these functions would be as
follows:
mtx_lock(&foo_mtx);
... do stuff ...
asleep(&foo_cond, PRIxx, "foowt", hz);
...
mtx_unlock&foo_mtx);
...
await(-1, -1);
Inspired by: dillon on the couch at Usenix
When encryption (MPPE) is enabled, WindowsME and Windows98 both
fail because of the extra byte, suggesting that they autheticated
successfully in their log and then dropping the connection, telling
the user that the peer doesn't support compatible encryption
options.
MFC after: 1 week
the first sector of the emulated floppy to contain a valid MS-DOS BPB that
it can modify. Since boot1 is the first sector of boot.flp, this resulted
in the BIOS overwriting part of boot1: specifically the function used to
read in sectors from the disk.
Submitted by: Mark Peek <mark@whistle.com>
Submitted by: Doug Ambrisko <ambrisko@ambrisko.com>
PR: i386/26382
Obtained from: NetBSD, OpenBSD (the example BPB)
MFC after: 1 month
of debugging the current process when that is in conflict with other
restrictions (such as jail, unprivileged_procdebug_permitted, etc).
o This corrects anomolies in the behavior of
kern.security.unprivileged_procdebug_permitted when using truss and
ktrace. The theory goes that this is now safe to use.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MIB entries.
o Relocate kern.suser_permitted to kern.security.suser_permitted.
o Introduce new kern.security.unprivileged_procdebug_permitted, which
(when set to 0) prevents processes without privilege from performing
a variety of inter-process debugging activities. The default is 1,
to provide current behavior.
This feature allows "hardened" systems to disable access to debugging
facilities, which have been associated with a number of past security
vulnerabilities. Previously, while procfs could be unmounted, other
in-kernel facilities (such as ptrace()) were still available. This
setting should not be modified on normal development systems, as it
will result in frustration. Some utilities respond poorly to
failing to get the debugging access they require, and error response
by these utilities may be improved in the future in the name of
beautification.
Note that there are currently some odd interactions with some
facilities, which will need to be resolved before this should be used
in production, including odd interactions with truss and ktrace.
Note also that currently, tracing is permitted on the current process
regardless of this flag, for compatibility with previous
authorization code in various facilities, but that will probably
change (and resolve the odd interactions).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
byte of the packet to contain '\0'.
Windows 98 gets this wrong, dropping garbage into the last byte and
failing authentication.
Now, we notice this and whinge to our log file that we're compensating
for the corrupt data.
approximately the amount of memory allocated from the mbuf maps
and sitting in the mbuf allocator's cache containers, and display
in parantheses the percentage of said memory that is actually
in use at the given time `netstat -m' is executed.
Suggested by: mjacob
This is to be friendly with non-IPv6 peer (If the peer complains due to
lack of IPv6CP, drop IPv6CP). This basically implements "RXJ+" state
transition in the RFC.
Obtained from: NetBSD
