handling is that fd = open(foo) is -1. This bug is harmless since
close(-1) just returns an error (which the code ignores).
Found by: Coverity Prevent(tm)
CID: 1503 (in userland test run)
Not because I admit they are technically wrong and not because of bug
reports (I receive nothing). But because I surprisingly meets so
strong opposition and resistance so lost any desire to continue that.
Anyone who interested in POSIX can dig out what changes and how
through cvs diffs.
1) Under POSIX unsetenv("foo=bar") is explicit error and not equal
to unsetenv("foo")
2) Prepare for upcomig POSIXed putenv() rewrite: make putenv() calls
portable and conforming to standard.
Before this fix the -h flag was ignored (i.e. setfacl
always set the ACL on the file pointed to by the symbolic
link even when the -h flag requested that the ACL be set
on the symbolic link itself).
either -v or -V) if a file with a slash in the name doesn't exist (if there is
no slash we already did that).
Additionally, suppress the error message for command -v for files with a slash.
PR: 107674
Submitted by: Martin Kammerhofer
This allows script compatibility with Linux, whose
"hostname" is the same as BSD "hostname -s".
With this change, "hostname -f" is the same on
both systems.
MFC after: 7 days
issue a syntax error immediately but save the information that it is erroneous
for later when the parameter expansion is actually done. This means eg. "false
&& ${}" will not generate an error which seems to be required by POSIX.
Include the invalid parameter expansion in the error message (sometimes
abbreviated with ... because recovering it would require a lot of code).
PR: 105078
Submitted by: emaste
instead of removing the file and issue a warning about
the removal, do not do any operation at all in case -P
is specified when the dinode has hard links.
With -f and -P specified together, we assume that the
user wants rm to overwrite the contents of the file
and remove it (destroy the contents of file but leave
its hard links as is).
The reason of doing it this way is that, in case where
a hard link is created by a malicious user (currently
this is permitted even if the user has no access to the
file). Losing the link can potentially mean that the
actual owner would lose control completely to the user
who wants to obtain access in a future day.
Discussed with: Peter Jermey
is hard links. Overwritting when links > 1 would cause data
loss, which is usually undesired.
Inspired by: discussion on -hackers@
Suggested by: elessar at bsdforen de
Obtained from: OpenBSD
compatible with old -r behavior with regards to -L. You can now copy fifos
and other special files with -r.
Reviewed by: -standards (long ago), das, bde
Approved by: bde (recently)
process leader for each job. Now the last specified option for the output
format (-l, -p or -s) wins, previously -s trumped -l.
PR: 99926
Submitted by: Ed Schouten and novel (patches modified by me)
