Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
kib
2af41575f2 Add missed dependency.
Submitted by:	gcooper
MFC after:	1 week
2010-08-15 15:33:01 +00:00
rwatson
03b90e8d62 Remove opt_mac.h generation for various kernel modules that no longer
require it.

Submitted by:	pjd
2009-06-06 17:01:44 +00:00
jhb
411d068395 Rework the lifetime management of the kernel implementation of POSIX
semaphores.  Specifically, semaphores are now represented as new file
descriptor type that is set to close on exec.  This removes the need for
all of the manual process reference counting (and fork, exec, and exit
event handlers) as the normal file descriptor operations handle all of
that for us nicely.  It is also suggested as one possible implementation
in the spec and at least one other OS (OS X) uses this approach.

Some bugs that were fixed as a result include:
- References to a named semaphore whose name is removed still work after
  the sem_unlink() operation.  Prior to this patch, if a semaphore's name
  was removed, valid handles from sem_open() would get EINVAL errors from
  sem_getvalue(), sem_post(), etc.  This fixes that.
- Unnamed semaphores created with sem_init() were not cleaned up when a
  process exited or exec'd.  They were only cleaned up if the process
  did an explicit sem_destroy().  This could result in a leak of semaphore
  objects that could never be cleaned up.
- On the other hand, if another process guessed the id (kernel pointer to
  'struct ksem' of an unnamed semaphore (created via sem_init)) and had
  write access to the semaphore based on UID/GID checks, then that other
  process could manipulate the semaphore via sem_destroy(), sem_post(),
  sem_wait(), etc.
- As part of the permission check (UID/GID), the umask of the proces
  creating the semaphore was not honored.  Thus if your umask denied group
  read/write access but the explicit mode in the sem_init() call allowed
  it, the semaphore would be readable/writable by other users in the
  same group, for example.  This includes access via the previous bug.
- If the module refused to unload because there were active semaphores,
  then it might have deregistered one or more of the semaphore system
  calls before it noticed that there was a problem.  I'm not sure if
  this actually happened as the order that modules are discovered by the
  kernel linker depends on how the actual .ko file is linked.  One can
  make the order deterministic by using a single module with a mod_event
  handler that explicitly registers syscalls (and deregisters during
  unload after any checks).  This also fixes a race where even if the
  sem_module unloaded first it would have destroyed locks that the
  syscalls might be trying to access if they are still executing when
  they are unloaded.

  XXX: By the way, deregistering system calls doesn't do any blocking
  to drain any threads from the calls.
- Some minor fixes to errno values on error.  For example, sem_init()
  isn't documented to return ENFILE or EMFILE if we run out of semaphores
  the way that sem_open() can.  Instead, it should return ENOSPC in that
  case.

Other changes:
- Kernel semaphores now use a hash table to manage the namespace of
  named semaphores nearly in a similar fashion to the POSIX shared memory
  object file descriptors.  Kernel semaphores can now also have names
  longer than 14 chars (up to MAXPATHLEN) and can include subdirectories
  in their pathname.
- The UID/GID permission checks for access to a named semaphore are now
  done via vaccess() rather than a home-rolled set of checks.
- Now that kernel semaphores have an associated file object, the various
  MAC checks for POSIX semaphores accept both a file credential and an
  active credential.  There is also a new posixsem_check_stat() since it
  is possible to fstat() a semaphore file descriptor.
- A small set of regression tests (using the ksem API directly) is present
  in src/tools/regression/posixsem.

Reported by:	kris (1)
Tested by:	kris
Reviewed by:	rwatson (lightly)
MFC after:	1 month
2008-06-27 05:39:04 +00:00
rwatson
2197ab2d93 Introduce MAC Framework and MAC Policy entry points to label and control
access to POSIX Semaphores:

mac_init_posix_sem()            Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem()          Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem()         Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy()   Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue()  Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open()     Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post()      Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink()    Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait()      Check whether may wait on semaphore

Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.

Submitted by:	Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by:	DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from:	TrustedBSD Project
2005-05-04 10:39:15 +00:00
alfred
d063152de1 Add the rest of the kernel support for the sem_ API in kern/uipc_sem.c.
Option 'P1003_1B_SEMAPHORES' to compile them in, or load the "sem" module
to activate them.

Have kern/makesyscalls.sh emit an include for sys/_semaphore.h into sysproto.h
to pull in the typedef for semid_t.

Add the syscalls to the syscall table as module stubs.
2002-09-19 00:43:32 +00:00