anyone to easily change the part of the OpenSSH version after the main
version number. The FreeBSD-specific version banner could be disabled
that way, for example:
# Call ourselves plain OpenSSH
VersionAddendum
"non-echoed" characters are still echoed back in a null packet, as well
as pad passwords sent to not give hints to the length otherwise.
Obtained from: OpenBSD
This file is already off the vendorbranch, nonetheless it needs to be
submitted back to the OpenSSH people.
PR: 25743
Submitted by: David Wolfskill <dhw@whistle.com>
It is done by using the same ssh messages for v4 and v5 authentication
(since the ssh.com does not now anything about v4) and looking at the
contents after unpacking it to see if it is v4 or v5.
Based on code from Björn Grönvall <bg@sics.se>
PR: misc/20504
(instead of just mitigating through connection limits) the Bleichenbacher
attack which can lead to guessing of the server key (not host key) by
regenerating it when an RSA failure is detected.
Reviewed by: rwatson
when an X11-forwarded client was closed. For some reason, sshd didn't
disable the SIGPIPE exit handler and died a horrible death (well, okay,
a silent death really). Set SIGPIPE's handler to SIG_IGN.
new features description elided in favor of checking out their
website.
Important new FreeBSD-version stuff: PAM support has been worked
in, partially from the "Unix" OpenSSH version, and a lot due to the
work of Eivind Eklend, too.
This requires at least the following in pam.conf:
sshd auth sufficient pam_skey.so
sshd auth required pam_unix.so try_first_pass
sshd session required pam_permit.so
Parts by: Eivind Eklend <eivind@FreeBSD.org>
back to the original environ unconditionally. The setting of the
variable to save the previous environ is conditional; it happens when
ENV.e_committed is set. Therefore, don't try to swap the env back
unless the previous env has been initialized.
PR: bin/22670
Submitted by: Takanori Saneto <sanewo@ba2.so-net.ne.jp>
ssh-agent or X11 forwarding even if it was disabled.
This is the vendor fix provided, not an actual revision of clientloop.c.
Submitted by: Markus Friedl <markus@OpenBSD.org> via kris
the login_cap and login.access checks for whether a user/host is allowed
access to the system for users other than root. But since we currently don't
have a similar check in the ssh2 code path anyway, it's um, "okay".
Submitted by: gshapiro
