- Clear the cached destination before getting another cached route.
Otherwise, garbage in the padding space (which might be filled in if it was
used for IPv4) could annoy rtalloc.
Obtained from: KAME
mutable contents of struct prison (hostname, securelevel, refcount,
pr_linux, ...)
o Generally introduce mtx_lock()/mtx_unlock() calls throughout kern/
so as to enforce these protections, in particular, in kern_mib.c
protection sysctl access to the hostname and securelevel, as well as
kern_prot.c access to the securelevel for access control purposes.
o Rewrite linux emulator abstractions for accessing per-jail linux
mib entries (osname, osrelease, osversion) so that they don't return
a pointer to the text in the struct linux_prison, rather, a copy
to an array passed into the calls. Likewise, update linprocfs to
use these primitives.
o Update in_pcb.c to always use prison_getip() rather than directly
accessing struct prison.
Reviewed by: jhb
vnodes. This will hopefully serve as a base from which we can
expand the MP code. We currently do not attempt to obtain any
mutex or SX locks, but the door is open to add them when we nail
down exactly how that part of it is going to work.
Have sys/net/route.c:rtrequest1(), which takes ``rt_addrinfo *''
as the argument. Pass rt_addrinfo all the way down to rtrequest1
and ifa->ifa_rtrequest. 3rd argument of ifa->ifa_rtrequest is now
``rt_addrinfo *'' instead of ``sockaddr *'' (almost noone is
using it anyways).
Benefit: the following command now works. Previously we needed
two route(8) invocations, "add" then "change".
# route add -inet6 default ::1 -ifp gif0
Remove unsafe typecast in rtrequest(), from ``rtentry *'' to
``sockaddr *''. It was introduced by 4.3BSD-Reno and never
corrected.
Obtained from: BSD/OS, NetBSD
MFC after: 1 month
PR: kern/28360
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
making pcbs available to the outside world. otherwise, we will see
inpcb without ipsec security policy attached (-> panic() in ipsec.c).
Obtained from: KAME
MFC after: 3 days
RTF_DYNAMIC route, it got freed twice). I am not sure what was
the actual problem in 1992, but the current behavior is memory
leak if PCB holds a reference to a dynamically created/modified
routing table entry. (rt_refcnt>0 and we don't call rtfree().)
My test bed was:
1. Set net.inet.tcp.msl to a low value (for test purposes), e.g.,
5 seconds, to speed up the transition of TCP connection to a
"closed" state.
2. Add a network route which causes ICMP redirect from the gateway.
3. ping(8) host H that matches this route; this creates RTF_DYNAMIC
RTF_HOST route to H. (I was forced to use ICMP to cause gateway
to generate ICMP host redirect, because gateway in question is a
4.2-STABLE system vulnerable to a problem that was fixed later in
ip_icmp.c,v 1.39.2.6, and TCP packets with DF bit set were
triggering this bug.)
4. telnet(1) to H
5. Block access to H with ipfw(8)
6. Send something in telnet(1) session; this causes EPERM, followed
by an in_losing() call in a few seconds.
7. Delete ipfw(8) rule blocking access to H, and wait for TCP
connection moving to a CLOSED state; PCB is freed.
8. Delete host route to H.
9. Watch with netstat(1) that `rttrash' increased.
10. Repeat steps 3-9, and watch `rttrash' increases.
PR: kern/25421
MFC after: 2 weeks
This work was based on kame-20010528-freebsd43-snap.tgz and some
critical problem after the snap was out were fixed.
There are many many changes since last KAME merge.
TODO:
- The definitions of SADB_* in sys/net/pfkeyv2.h are still different
from RFC2407/IANA assignment because of binary compatibility
issue. It should be fixed under 5-CURRENT.
- ip6po_m member of struct ip6_pktopts is no longer used. But, it
is still there because of binary compatibility issue. It should
be removed under 5-CURRENT.
Reviewed by: itojun
Obtained from: KAME
MFC after: 3 weeks
However, if the RTF_DELCLONE and RTF_WASCLONED condition passes, but the ref
count is > 1, we won't decrement the count at all. This could lead to
route entries never being deleted.
Here, we call rtfree() not only if the initial two conditions fail, but
also if the ref count is > 1 (and we therefore don't immediately delete
the route, but let rtfree() handle it).
This is an urgent MFC candidate. Thanks go to Mike Silbersack for the
fix, once again. :-)
Submitted by: Mike Silbersack <silby@silby.com>
For TCP, verify that the sequence number in the ICMP packet falls within
the tcp receive window before performing any actions indicated by the
icmp packet.
Clean up some layering violations (access to tcp internals from in_pcb)
and 1.84 of src/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c
The changes broken down:
- remove 0 as a wildcard for addresses and port numbers in
src/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c:in_pcbnotify()
- add src/sys/netinet/in_pcb.c:in_pcbnotifyall() used to notify
all sessions with the specific remote address.
- change
- src/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c:udp_ctlinput()
- src/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c:tcp_ctlinput()
to use in_pcbnotifyall() to notify multiple sessions, instead of
using in_pcbnotify() with 0 as src address and as port numbers.
- remove check for src port == 0 in
- src/sys/netinet/tcp_subr.c:tcp_ctlinput()
- src/sys/netinet/udp_usrreq.c:udp_ctlinput()
as they are no longer needed.
- move handling of redirects and host dead from in_pcbnotify() to
udp_ctlinput() and tcp_ctlinput(), so they will call
in_pcbnotifyall() to notify all sessions with the specific
remote address.
Approved by: jlemon
Inspired by: NetBSD
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
available, the error return should be EADDRNOTAVAIL rather than
EAGAIN.
PR: 14181
Submitted by: Dima Dorfman <dima@unixfreak.org>
Reviewed by: Garrett Wollman <wollman@khavrinen.lcs.mit.edu>
delete the cloned route that is associated with the connection.
This does not exhaust the routing table memory when the system
is under a SYN flood attack. The route entry is not deleted if there
is any prior information cached in it.
Reviewed by: Peter Wemm,asmodai
down as a result of a reset. Returning EINVAL in that case makes no
sense at all and just confuses people as to what happened. It could be
argued that we should save the original address somewhere so that
getsockname() etc can tell us what it used to be so we know where the
problem connection attempts are coming from.
Remove a bogus (redundant, just weird, etc.) key_freeso(so).
There are no consumers of it now, nor does it seem there
ever will be.
in6?_pcb.c:
Add an if (inp->in6?p_sp != NULL) before the call to
ipsec[46]_delete_pcbpolicy(inp). In low-memory conditions
this can cause a crash because in6?_sp can be NULL...
pr_input() routines prototype is also changed to support IPSEC and IPV6
chained protocol headers.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch, cvs-committers
Obtained from: KAME project
packet divert at kernel for IPv6/IPv4 translater daemon
This includes queue related patch submitted by jburkhol@home.com.
Submitted by: queue related patch from jburkhol@home.com
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch, cvs-committers
Obtained from: KAME project
for IPv6 yet)
With this patch, you can assigne IPv6 addr automatically, and can reply to
IPv6 ping.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch, cvs-committers
Obtained from: KAME project
Make a sonewconn3() which takes an extra argument (proc) so new sockets created
with sonewconn() from a user's system call get the correct credentials, not
just the parent's credentials.
would make a difference. However, my previous diff _did_ change the
behavior in some way (not necessarily break it), so I'm fixing it.
Found by: bde
Submitted by: bde
exit on errors.
If we don't, in_pcbrehash() is called without a preceeding
in_pcbinshash(), causing a crash.
There are apparently several conditions that could cause the crash;
PR misc/12256 is only one of these.
PR: misc/12256
This is the change to struct sockets that gets rid of so_uid and replaces
it with a much more useful struct pcred *so_cred. This is here to be able
to do socket-level credential checks (i.e. IPFW uid/gid support, to be added
to HEAD soon). Along with this comes an update to pidentd which greatly
simplifies the code necessary to get a uid from a socket. Soon to come:
a sysctl() interface to finding individual sockets' credentials.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1:
s/suser/suser_xxx/
2:
Add new function: suser(struct proc *), prototyped in <sys/proc.h>.
3:
s/suser_xxx(\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)->p_ucred, \&\1->p_acflag)/suser(\1)/
The remaining suser_xxx() calls will be scrutinized and dealt with
later.
There may be some unneeded #include <sys/cred.h>, but they are left
as an exercise for Bruce.
More changes to the suser() API will come along with the "jail" code.
