sysv_{msg,sem,shm}.c files.
Mark SysV IPC freebsd32 syscalls as NOSTD and add required
SYSCALL_INIT_HELPER/SYSCALL32_INIT_HELPERs to provide auto
register/unregister on module load.
This makes COMPAT_FREEBSD32 functional with SysV IPC compiled and loaded
as modules.
Reviewed by: jhb
MFC after: 2 weeks
- The uid/cuid members of struct ipc_perm are now uid_t instead of unsigned
short.
- The gid/cgid members of struct ipc_perm are now gid_t instead of unsigned
short.
- The mode member of struct ipc_perm is now mode_t instead of unsigned short
(this is merely a style bug).
- The rather dubious padding fields for ABI compat with SV/I386 have been
removed from struct msqid_ds and struct semid_ds.
- The shm_segsz member of struct shmid_ds is now a size_t instead of an
int. This removes the need for the shm_bsegsz member in struct
shmid_kernel and should allow for complete support of SYSV SHM regions
>= 2GB.
- The shm_nattch member of struct shmid_ds is now an int instead of a
short.
- The shm_internal member of struct shmid_ds is now gone. The internal
VM object pointer for SHM regions has been moved into struct
shmid_kernel.
- The existing __semctl(), msgctl(), and shmctl() system call entries are
now marked COMPAT7 and new versions of those system calls which support
the new ABI are now present.
- The new system calls are assigned to the FBSD-1.1 version in libc. The
FBSD-1.0 symbols in libc now refer to the old COMPAT7 system calls.
- A simplistic framework for tagging system calls with compatibility
symbol versions has been added to libc. Version tags are added to
system calls by adding an appropriate __sym_compat() entry to
src/lib/libc/incldue/compat.h. [1]
PR: kern/16195 kern/113218 bin/129855
Reviewed by: arch@, rwatson
Discussed with: kan, kib [1]
them under COMPAT_FREEBSD[4567]. Starting with FreeBSD 5.0 the SYSV IPC
API was implemented via direct system calls (e.g. msgctl(), msgget(), etc.)
rather than indirecting through the var-args *sys() system calls. The
shmsys() system call was already effectively deprecated for all but
COMPAT_FREEBSD4 already as its implementation for the !COMPAT_FREEBSD4 case
was to simply invoke nosys().
and used in a large number of files, but also because an increasing number
of incorrect uses of MAC calls were sneaking in due to copy-and-paste of
MAC-aware code without the associated opt_mac.h include.
Discussed with: pjd
by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any
parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents,
but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style
dot-separated strings.
Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which
contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root
directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the
global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel.
Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which
should not cause any problems for code that properly uses
securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge().
Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and
set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for
backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system
call.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
from Mac OS X Leopard--rationalize naming for entry points to
the following general forms:
mac_<object>_<method/action>
mac_<object>_check_<method/action>
The previous naming scheme was inconsistent and mostly
reversed from the new scheme. Also, make object types more
consistent and remove spaces from object types that contain
multiple parts ("posix_sem" -> "posixsem") to make mechanical
parsing easier. Introduce a new "netinet" object type for
certain IPv4/IPv6-related methods. Also simplify, slightly,
some entry point names.
All MAC policy modules will need to be recompiled, and modules
not updates as part of this commit will need to be modified to
conform to the new KPI.
Sponsored by: SPARTA (original patches against Mac OS X)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer
some cases, move to priv_check() if it was an operation on a thread and
no other flags were present.
Eliminate caller-side jail exception checking (also now-unused); jail
privilege exception code now goes solely in kern_jail.c.
We can't yet eliminate suser() due to some cases in the KAME code where
a privilege check is performed and then used in many different deferred
paths. Do, however, move those prototypes to priv.h.
Reviewed by: csjp
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Remove also "MP SAFE" after prior "MPSAFE" pass. (suggested by bde)
- Remove extra blank lines in some cases.
- Add extra blank lines in some cases.
- Remove no-op comments consisting solely of the function name, the word
"syscall", or the system call name.
- Add punctuation.
- Re-wrap some comments.
system calls now enter without Giant held, and then in some cases, acquire
Giant explicitly.
Remove a number of other MPSAFE annotations in the credential code and
tweak one or two other adjacent comments.
copyin()/copyout() for message type is separated from msgsnd()/msgrcv() and
it is done from its wrapper functions to support 32-bit emulations. After I
implemented this, I have briefly referenced NetBSD and Darwin. NetBSD passes
copyin()/copyout() function pointers from wrappers. Darwin passes size of
message type as an argument, which is actually similar to my first
implementation (P4 109706). We may revisit these implementations later.
msgsnd and rechecking resources. This problem was found while I was running
Linux Test Project test suite (test cases: msgctl08, msgctl09).
Change `msgwait' to `msgsnd' and `msgrcv' to distinguish its sleeping
conditions. Few cosmetic changes to debugging messages.
specific privilege names to a broad range of privileges. These may
require some future tweaking.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
begun with a repo-copy of mac.h to mac_framework.h. sys/mac.h now
contains the userspace and user<->kernel API and definitions, with all
in-kernel interfaces moved to mac_framework.h, which is now included
across most of the kernel instead.
This change is the first step in a larger cleanup and sweep of MAC
Framework interfaces in the kernel, and will not be MFC'd.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA
appears to be serving a useful purpose, as it was used during initial
development of MAC support for System V IPC.
MFC after: 1 month
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Suggested by: Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com
- Move sonewconn(), which creates new sockets for incoming connections on
listen sockets, so that all socket allocate code is together in
uipc_socket.c.
- Move 'maxsockets' and associated sysctls to uipc_socket.c with the
socket allocation code.
- Move kern.ipc sysctl node to uipc_socket.c, add a SYSCTL_DECL() for it
to sysctl.h and remove lots of scattered implementations in various
IPC modules.
- Sort sodealloc() after soalloc() in uipc_socket.c for dependency order
reasons. Statisticize soalloc() and sodealloc() as they are now
required only in uipc_socket.c, and are internal to the socket
implementation.
After this change, socket allocation and deallocation is entirely
centralized in one file, and uipc_socket2.c consists entirely of socket
buffer manipulation and default protocol switch functions.
MFC after: 1 month
This information will be very useful for people who are tuning applications
which have a dependence on IPC mechanisms.
The following OIDs were documented:
Message queues:
kern.ipc.msgmax
kern.ipc.msgmni
kern.ipc.msgmnb
kern.ipc.msgtlq
kern.ipc.msgssz
kern.ipc.msgseg
Semaphores:
kern.ipc.semmap
kern.ipc.semmni
kern.ipc.semmns
kern.ipc.semmnu
kern.ipc.semmsl
kern.ipc.semopm
kern.ipc.semume
kern.ipc.semusz
kern.ipc.semvmx
kern.ipc.semaem
Shared memory:
kern.ipc.shmmax
kern.ipc.shmmin
kern.ipc.shmmni
kern.ipc.shmseg
kern.ipc.shmall
kern.ipc.shm_use_phys
kern.ipc.shm_allow_removed
kern.ipc.shmsegs
These new descriptions can be viewed using sysctl -d
PR: kern/65219
Submitted by: Dan Nelson <dnelson at allantgroup dot com> (modified)
No objections: developers@
Descriptions reviewed by: gnn
MFC after: 1 week
structure in the struct pointed to by the 3rd argument for IPC_STAT and
get rid of the 4th argument. The old way returned a pointer into the
kernel array that the calling function would then access afterwards
without holding the appropriate locks and doing non-lock-safe things like
copyout() with the data anyways. This change removes that unsafeness and
resulting race conditions as well as simplifying the interface.
- Implement kern_foo wrappers for stat(), lstat(), fstat(), statfs(),
fstatfs(), and fhstatfs(). Use these wrappers to cut out a lot of
code duplication for freebsd4 and netbsd compatability system calls.
- Add a new lookup function kern_alternate_path() that looks up a filename
under an alternate prefix and determines which filename should be used.
This is basically a more general version of linux_emul_convpath() that
can be shared by all the ABIs thus allowing for further reduction of
code duplication.
from the userland and pushes results back and the second which does
actual processing. Use the latter to eliminate stackgap in the linux wrapper
of that syscall.
MFC after: 2 weeks
is the case for most other sysctls in the System V IPC message queue
implementation.
PR: 75541
Submitted by: Sergiy Vyshnevetskiy <serg at vostok dot net>
MFC after: 2 weeks
to be modified and extended without breaking the user space ABI:
Use _kernel variants on _ds structures for System V sempahores, message
queues, and shared memory. When interfacing with userspace, export
only the _ds subsets of the _kernel data structures. A lot of search
and replace.
Define the message structure in the _KERNEL portion of msg.h so that it
can be used by other kernel consumers, but not exposed to user space.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
entire subsystem, we could move to per-message queue locks, however
the messages themselves seem to come from a global pool and to avoid
over-locking this code (locking individual queues, then the global
pool) I've opted to just do it this way.
Requested by: rwatson
Tested by: NetBSD's regression suite.
general cleanup of the API. The entire API now consists of two functions
similar to the pre-KSE API. The suser() function takes a thread pointer
as its only argument. The td_ucred member of this thread must be valid
so the only valid thread pointers are curthread and a few kernel threads
such as thread0. The suser_cred() function takes a pointer to a struct
ucred as its first argument and an integer flag as its second argument.
The flag is currently only used for the PRISON_ROOT flag.
Discussed on: smp@
- Move jail checks and some other checks involving constants and stack
variables out from under Giant. This isn't perfectly safe atm because
jail_sysvipc_allowed is read w/o a lock meaning that its value could be
stale. This global variable will soon become a per-jail flag, however,
at which time it will either not need a lock or will use the prison lock.
Remove the explicit call to aio_proc_rundown() from exit1(), instead AIO
will use at_exit(9).
Add functions at_exec(9), rm_at_exec(9) which function nearly the
same as at_exec(9) and rm_at_exec(9), these functions are called
on behalf of modules at the time of execve(2) after the image
activator has run.
Use a modified version of tegge's suggestion via at_exec(9) to close
an exploitable race in AIO.
Fix SYSCALL_MODULE_HELPER such that it's archetecuterally neutral,
the problem was that one had to pass it a paramater indicating the
number of arguments which were actually the number of "int". Fix
it by using an inline version of the AS macro against the syscall
arguments. (AS should be available globally but we'll get to that
later.)
Add a primative system for dynamically adding kqueue ops, it's really
not as sophisticated as it should be, but I'll discuss with jlemon when
he's around.
Note ALL MODULES MUST BE RECOMPILED
make the kernel aware that there are smaller units of scheduling than the
process. (but only allow one thread per process at this time).
This is functionally equivalent to teh previousl -current except
that there is a thread associated with each process.
Sorry john! (your next MFC will be a doosie!)
Reviewed by: peter@freebsd.org, dillon@freebsd.org
X-MFC after: ha ha ha ha
FreeBSD _does_ define ENOMSG, so no need for checking if we support it.
Inspired by PR: 22470
Which was submitted by: Bjorn Tornqvist <bjorn@west.se>
MFC after: 1 week
* all members of msginfo from sysv_msg.c;
* msqids from sysv_msg.c;
* sema from sysv_sem.c; and
* shmsegs from sysv_shm.c;
These will be used by ipcs(1) in non-kvm mode.
Reviewed by: tmm
credential structure, ucred (cr->cr_prison).
o Allow jail inheritence to be a function of credential inheritence.
o Abstract prison structure reference counting behind pr_hold() and
pr_free(), invoked by the similarly named credential reference
management functions, removing this code from per-ABI fork/exit code.
o Modify various jail() functions to use struct ucred arguments instead
of struct proc arguments.
o Introduce jailed() function to determine if a credential is jailed,
rather than directly checking pointers all over the place.
o Convert PRISON_CHECK() macro to prison_check() function.
o Move jail() function prototypes to jail.h.
o Emulate the P_JAILED flag in fill_kinfo_proc() and no longer set the
flag in the process flags field itself.
o Eliminate that "const" qualifier from suser/p_can/etc to reflect
mutex use.
Notes:
o Some further cleanup of the linux/jail code is still required.
o It's now possible to consider resolving some of the process vs
credential based permission checking confusion in the socket code.
o Mutex protection of struct prison is still not present, and is
required to protect the reference count plus some fields in the
structure.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
