This stops panics on unloading modules which define their own sysctl sets.
However, this also removes the protection against somebody actually
defining a static sysctl with an oid in the range of the dynamic ones,
which would break badly if there is already a dynamic sysctl with
the requested oid.
Apparently, the algorithm for removing sysctl sets needs a bit more work.
For the present, the panic I introduced only leads to Bad Things (tm).
Submitted by: many users of -current :(
Pointy hat to: roam (myself) for not testing rev. 1.112 enough.
- Add proc locking to the jail() syscall. This mostly involved shuffling
a few things around so that blockable things like malloc and copyin
were performed before acquiring the lock and checking the existing
ucred and then updating the ucred as one "atomic" change under the proc
lock.
- crhold() returns a reference to the ucred whose refcount it bumps.
- crcopy() now simply copies the credentials from one credential to
another and has no return value.
- a new crshared() primitive is added which returns true if a ucred's
refcount is > 1 and false (0) otherwise.
C calling conventions. This allows crt1.c to be written nearly without
any inline assembler.
* Initialise cpu_model[] so that the hw.model sysctl works properly.
to do with "dropped packets." Any packets matching rules with the
'log' directive are logged regardless of the action, drop, pass,
divert, pipe, etc.
MFC after: 1 day
Updated by peter following KSE and Giant pushdown.
I've running with this patch for two week with no ill side effects.
PR: kern/12014: Fix SysV Semaphore handling
Submitted by: Peter Jeremy <peter.jeremy@alcatel.com.au>
existing devices (e.g.: tunX). This may need a little more thought.
Create a /dev/netX alias for devices. net0 is reserved.
Allow wiring of net aliases in /boot/device.hints of the form:
hint.net.1.dev="lo0"
hint.net.12.ether="00:a0:c9:c9:9d:63"
for initializing the parts. Since I don't have any of these parts in
any of my working laptops, I'm committing this to allow people to test
it. Will MFC when I receive reports of it working.
a single kern.security.seeotheruids_permitted, describes as:
"Unprivileged processes may see subjects/objects with different real uid"
NOTE: kern.ps_showallprocs exists in -STABLE, and therefore there is
an API change. kern.ipc.showallsockets does not.
- Check kern.security.seeotheruids_permitted in cr_cansee().
- Replace visibility calls to socheckuid() with cr_cansee() (retain
the change to socheckuid() in ipfw, where it is used for rule-matching).
- Remove prison_unpcb() and make use of cr_cansee() against the UNIX
domain socket credential instead of comparing root vnodes for the
UDS and the process. This allows multiple jails to share the same
chroot() and not see each others UNIX domain sockets.
- Remove unused socheckproc().
Now that cr_cansee() is used universally for socket visibility, a variety
of policies are more consistently enforced, including uid-based
restrictions and jail-based restrictions. This also better-supports
the introduction of additional MAC models.
Reviewed by: ps, billf
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
code in ipl.s and icu_ipl.s that used them was removed when the
interrupt thread system was committed. Debuggers also knew about
Xresume* because these labels hide the real names of the interrupt
handlers (Xintr*), and debuggers need to special-case interrupt
handlers to get the interrupt frame.
Both gdb and ddb will now use the Xintr* and Xfastintr* symbols to
detect interrupt frames. Fast interrupt frames were never identified
correctly before, so this fixes the problem of the running stack
frame getting lost in a ddb or gdb trace generated from a fast
interrupt - e.g. when debugging a simple infinite loop in the kernel
using a serial console, the frame containing the loop would never
appear in a gdb or ddb trace.
Reviewed by: jhb, bde
processes to attach debugging to themselves even though the
global kern_unprivileged_procdebug_permitted policy might disallow
this.
o Move the kern_unprivileged_procdebug_permitted check above the
(p1==p2) check.
Reviewed by: des
