possibility of a security hole. It now does what rdist-6 does, and calls
/usr/bin/rsh if not running as root. There are NO protocol changes, this
is 100% compatable with the old rdist, except that it does not need setuid
root privs.
However, there are some minor differences to the base rdist-6 code in that
if it is being run by root, it will call rcmd(3) directly rather than
piping everything through rsh(1). This is a little more efficient as it
doesn't involve context switching on pipe reads/writes.
Also, the -P option was added from rdist-6.1.2, which allows an alternative
rsh program to be specified, such as ssh. Note that it requires the fixes
to the ssh port to disable the unconditional USE_PIPES option that was
recently added. The rcmd(3) optimisation is disabled if a non-rsh program
is speficied.
Obtained from: Christos Zoulas <christos@deshaw.com> via NetBSD PR 2621,
[ slightly modified since we don't use libcompat anymore. ]
I'm not sure if this fixes the rdist security bug completely, but it
sure can't hurt!
