a set of differentiated services, set IPTOS_PREC_* macros using
IPTOS_DSCP_* macro definitions.
While here, add IPTOS_DSCP_VA macro according to RFC 5865.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3119
Reviewed by: gnn
Previous __alignment(4) allowed compiler to assume that operations are
performed on aligned region. On ARM processor, this led to alignment fault
as shown below:
trapframe: 0xda9e5b10
FSR=00000001, FAR=a67b680e, spsr=60000113
r0 =00000000, r1 =00000068, r2 =0000007c, r3 =00000000
r4 =a67b6826, r5 =a67b680e, r6 =00000014, r7 =00000068
r8 =00000068, r9 =da9e5bd0, r10=00000011, r11=da9e5c10
r12=da9e5be0, ssp=da9e5b60, slr=a054f164, pc =a054f2cc
<...>
udp_input+0x264: ldmia r5, {r0-r3, r6}
udp_input+0x268: stmia r12, {r0-r3, r6}
This was due to instructions which do not support unaligned access,
whereas for __alignment(2) compiler replaced ldmia/stmia with some
logically equivalent memcpy operations.
In fact, the assumption that 'struct ip' is always 4-byte aligned
is definitely false, as we have no impact on data alignment of packet
stream received.
Another possible solution would be to explicitely perform memcpy()
on objects of 'struct ip' type, which, however, would suffer from
performance drop, and be merely a problem hiding.
Please, note that this has nothing to do with
ARM32_DISABLE_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS option, but is related strictly to
compiler behaviour.
Submitted by: Wojciech Macek <wma@semihalf.com>
Reviewed by: glebius, ian
Obtained from: Semihalf
For our compiler the two constructs are completely equivalent, but
some compilers (including MSC and tcc) use the base type for alignment,
which in the cases touched here result in aligning the bitfields
to 32 bit instead of the 8 bit that is meant here.
Note that almost all other headers where small bitfields
are used have u_int8_t instead of u_int.
MFC after: 3 days
Add a note next to fields in network format.
The n_* types are not enough for compiler checks on endianness, and their
use often requires an otherwise unnecessary #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
The typedef in in_systm.h are still there.
members right. However, it also said it was aligned(1), which meant
that gcc generated really bad code. Mark this as aligned(4). This
makes things a little faster on arm (a couple percent), but also saves
about 30k on the size of the kernel for arm.
I talked about doing this with bde, but didn't check with him before
the commit, so I'm hesitant say 'reviewed by: bde'.
This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first.
This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE
and FAST_IPSEC.
For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of
authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is
still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router
vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for
interconnect at many major Internet points of presence.
Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload,
are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface
is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB.
There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow
per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the
code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only
supports per-host keying granularity.
Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6),
TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective
users of this feature, this will not pose any problem.
This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when
responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made
[yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to
interwork with Cisco equipment.
Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with
local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also
available from me upon request.
Sponsored by: sentex.net
- implement the tunnel egress rule in ip_ecn_egress() in ip_ecn.c.
make ip{,6}_ecn_egress() return integer to tell the caller that
this packet should be dropped.
- handle ECN at fragment reassembly in ip_input.c and frag6.c.
Obtained from: KAME
(See: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3514.txt)
This fulfills the host requirements for userland support by
way of the setsockopt() IP_EVIL_INTENT message.
There are three sysctl tunables provided to govern system behavior.
net.inet.ip.rfc3514:
Enables support for rfc3514. As this is an
Informational RFC and support is not yet widespread
this option is disabled by default.
net.inet.ip.hear_no_evil
If set the host will discard all received evil packets.
net.inet.ip.speak_no_evil
If set the host will discard all transmitted evil packets.
The IP statistics counter 'ips_evil' (available via 'netstat') provides
information on the number of 'evil' packets recieved.
For reference, the '-E' option to 'ping' has been provided to demonstrate
and test the implementation.
Remove the never completed _IP_VHL version, it has not caught on
anywhere and it would make us incompatible with other BSD netstacks
to retain this version.
Add a CTASSERT protecting sizeof(struct ip) == 20.
Don't let the size of struct ipq depend on the IPDIVERT option.
This is a functional no-op commit.
Approved by: re
pr_input() routines prototype is also changed to support IPSEC and IPV6
chained protocol headers.
Reviewed by: freebsd-arch, cvs-committers
Obtained from: KAME project
This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
than separate ip_v and ip_hl members. Should have no effect on current code,
but I'd eventually like to get rid of those obnoxious bitfields completely.
Change IPTOS_PREC_ROUTINE to 0 (was conflict with IPTOS_LOWDELAY) according
to RFC 791 (unchanged since it) and BSDI 2.0 style
Submitted by: Igor Sviridov <siac@ua.net>
