Approved by: gnn
Add a new function hashinit_flags() which allows NOT-waiting
for memory (or waiting). The old hashinit() function now
calls hashinit_flags(..., HASH_WAITOK);
Document my recent changes to rc.subr(8):
- there is $required_modules now;
- $required_* are checked before invoking a custom start method, too.
MFC after: 1 month
behave as expected.
Also:
- Return an error if WD_PASSIVE is passed in to the ioctl as only
WD_ACTIVE is implemented at the moment. See sys/watchdog.h for an
explanation of the difference between WD_ACTIVE and WD_PASSIVE.
- Remove the I_HAVE_TOTALLY_LOST_MY_SENSE_OF_HUMOR define. If you've
lost your sense of humor, than don't add a define.
Specific changes:
i80321_wdog.c
Don't roll your own passive watchdog tickle as this would defeat the
purpose of an active (userland) watchdog tickle.
ichwd.c / ipmi.c:
WD_ACTIVE means active patting of the watchdog by a userland process,
not whether the watchdog is active. See sys/watchdog.h.
kern_clock.c:
(software watchdog) Remove a check for WD_ACTIVE as this does not make
sense here. This reverts r1.181.
- Move mentionings of required drivers to the SYNOPSIS where they belong
- Remove cruft (XiG, sheesh) from the EXAMPLES section and re-arrange things to make
somewhat more sense
- Fix an Xref to manpage from ports to mention the corresponsing port
- Remove commented out HISTORY section header
MFC after: 3 days
revision 1.199
date: 2004/09/24 08:30:57; author: phk; state: Exp; lines: +0 -1
Remove the cdevsw() function which is now unused.
(the log is wrong, it was really devsw that was removed).
# we really need to actually document the functions in sys/conf.h as well
# as things like d_open...
Remove reference to mount_fdescfs(8), since mount(8) calls nmount()
directly to mount an fdescfs filesystem, instead of forking an
external mount_fdescfs program.
which allows to use it with different kinds of locks. For example it allows
to implement Solaris conditions variables which will be used in ZFS port on
top of sx(9) locks.
Reviewed by: jhb
privilege for threads and credentials. Unlike the existing suser(9)
interface, priv(9) exposes a named privilege identifier to the privilege
checking code, allowing more complex policies regarding the granting of
privilege to be expressed. Two interfaces are provided, replacing the
existing suser(9) interface:
suser(td) -> priv_check(td, priv)
suser_cred(cred, flags) -> priv_check_cred(cred, priv, flags)
A comprehensive list of currently available kernel privileges may be
found in priv.h. New privileges are easily added as required, but the
comments on adding privileges found in priv.h and priv(9) should be read
before doing so.
The new privilege interface exposed sufficient information to the
privilege checking routine that it will now be possible for jail to
determine whether a particular privilege is granted in the check routine,
rather than relying on hints from the calling context via the
SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag. For now, the flag is maintained, but a new jail
check function, prison_priv_check(), is exposed from kern_jail.c and used
by the privilege check routine to determine if the privilege is permitted
in jail. As a result, a centralized list of privileges permitted in jail
is now present in kern_jail.c.
The MAC Framework is now also able to instrument privilege checks, both
to deny privileges otherwise granted (mac_priv_check()), and to grant
privileges otherwise denied (mac_priv_grant()), permitting MAC Policy
modules to implement privilege models, as well as control a much broader
range of system behavior in order to constrain processes running with
root privilege.
The suser() and suser_cred() functions remain implemented, now in terms
of priv_check() and the PRIV_ROOT privilege, for use during the transition
and possibly continuing use by third party kernel modules that have not
been updated. The PRIV_DRIVER privilege exists to allow device drivers to
check privilege without adopting a more specific privilege identifier.
This change does not modify the actual security policy, rather, it
modifies the interface for privilege checks so changes to the security
policy become more feasible.
Sponsored by: nCircle Network Security, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed on: arch@
Reviewed (at least in part) by: mlaier, jmg, pjd, bde, ceri,
Alex Lyashkov <umka at sevcity dot net>,
Skip Ford <skip dot ford at verizon dot net>,
Antoine Brodin <antoine dot brodin at laposte dot net>
