be restricted when veriexec is enforced.
Add mpo_system_check_sysctl method to mac_veriexec which does this.
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
MFC after: 1 week
are different types across architectures by using %ju and typecasting to
uintmax_t, where appropriate.
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
MFC after: 1 week
mac_veriexec_get_executable_flags(). Only try locking/unlocking if the caller
has not already acquired the process lock.
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
MFC after: 1 week
lock mac_ifnet_mtx, which protects labels on struct ifnet, unless at least
one policy is actively using labels on ifnets. This avoids a global mutex
acquire in certain fast paths -- most noticeably ifnet transmit. This was
previously invisible by default, as no MAC policies were loaded by default,
but recently became visible due to mac_ntpd being enabled by default.
gallatin@ reports a reduction in PPS overhead from 300% to 2.2% with this
change. We will want to explore further MAC Framework optimisation to
reduce overhead further, but this brings things more back into the world
of the sane.
MFC after: 3 days
The current approach of injecting manifest into mac_veriexec is to
verify the integrity of it in userspace (veriexec (8)) and pass its
entries into kernel using a char device (/dev/veriexec).
This requires verifying root partition integrity in loader,
for example by using memory disk and checking its hash.
Otherwise if rootfs is compromised an attacker could inject their own data.
This patch introduces an option to parse manifest in kernel based on envs.
The loader sets manifest path and digest.
EVENTHANDLER is used to launch the module right after the rootfs is mounted.
It has to be done this way, since one might want to verify integrity of the init file.
This means that manifest is required to be present on the root partition.
Note that the envs have to be set right before boot to make sure that no one can spoof them.
Submitted by: Kornel Duleba <mindal@semihalf.com>
Reviewed by: sjg
Obtained from: Semihalf
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19281
An integrity check such as a check-hash or a cross-correlation failed.
The integrity error falls between EINVAL that identifies errors in
parameters to a system call and EIO that identifies errors with the
underlying storage media. EINTEGRITY is typically raised by intermediate
kernel layers such as a filesystem or an in-kernel GEOM subsystem when
they detect inconsistencies. Uses include allowing the mount(8) command
to return a different exit value to automate the running of fsck(8)
during a system boot.
These changes make no use of the new error, they just add it. Later
commits will be made for the use of the new error number and it will
be added to additional manual pages as appropriate.
Reviewed by: gnn, dim, brueffer, imp
Discussed with: kib, cem, emaste, ed, jilles
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18765
Prior to the change the code would branch on return value and then check
if probes are enabled. Since vast majority of the time they are not, this
is clearly wasteful. Check probes first.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
These arguments are mostly paths handled by NAMEI*() macros which already
take const char * arguments.
This change improves the match between syscalls.master and the public
declerations of system calls.
Reviewed by: kib (prior version)
Obtained from: CheriBSD
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17812
system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are
captured:
1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls
whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing
components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled,
suspended, etc.
2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is
called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the
policy changes, so that the value can be updated.
3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() --
at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that
system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here,
so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks.
4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a
dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether
dtaudit would like system calls to be audited.
5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables
are for.
These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit
(trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call
probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot
capture system-call data without auditd(8) started.
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Approved by: re (gjb)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
/etc/security/audit_event to provide a list of audit event-number <->
name mappings. However, this occurs too late for anonymous tracing.
With this change, adding 'audit_event_load="YES"' to /boot/loader.conf
will cause the boot loader to preload the file, and then the kernel
audit code will parse it to register an initial set of audit event-number
<-> name mappings. Those mappings can later be updated by auditd(8) if
the configuration file changes.
Reviewed by: gnn, asomers, markj, allanjude
Discussed with: jhb
Approved by: re (kib)
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16589
The buffer size may be used to initialize an sbuf in
MAC_POLICY_EXTERNALIZE, and without this constraint it's possible to
trigger an assertion failure in the sbuf code. With INVARIANTS
disabled, the first attempt to write to the sbuf will fail.
Reported by: pho
Reviewed by: delphij
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16527
These syscalls were always supposed to have been auditted, but due to
oversights never were.
PR: 228374
Reported by: aniketp
Reviewed by: aniketp
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16388
Code analysis and runtime analysis using truss(8) indicate that the only
privileged operations performed by ntpd are adjusting system time, and
(re-)binding to privileged UDP port 123. These changes add a new mac(4)
policy module, mac_ntpd(4), which grants just those privileges to any
process running with uid 123.
This also adds a new user and group, ntpd:ntpd, (uid:gid 123:123), and makes
them the owner of the /var/db/ntp directory, so that it can be used as a
location where the non-privileged daemon can write files such as the
driftfile, and any optional logfile or stats files.
Because there are so many ways to configure ntpd, the question of how to
configure it to run without root privs can be a bit complex, so that will be
addressed in a separate commit. These changes are just what's required to
grant the limited subset of privs to ntpd, and the small change to ntpd to
prevent it from exiting with an error if running as non-root.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16281
A_SETPOLICY is supposed to work with either 64 or 32-bit values, but due to a
typo the 64-bit version has never worked correctly.
Submitted by: aniketp
Reviewed by: asomers, cem
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Google, Inc. (GSoC 2018)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16222
fsid_t and ino_t are 64-bit entities, use uintmax_t typecast to ensure we
can print it on 32-bit or 64-bit architectures by using the %ju format for
prints.
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
framework.
The code is organized into a few distinct pieces:
* The meta-data store (in veriexec_metadata.c) which maps a file system
identifier, file identifier, and generation key tuple to veriexec
meta-data record.
* Fingerprint management (in veriexec_fingerprint.c) which deals with
calculating the cryptographic hash for a file and verifying it. It also
manages the loadable fingerprint modules.
* MAC policy implementation (in mac_veriexec.c) which implements the
following MAC methods:
mpo_init
Initializes the veriexec state, meta-data store, fingerprint modules,
and registers mount and unmount EVENTHANDLERs
mpo_syscall
Implements the following per-policy system calls:
MAC_VERIEXEC_CHECK_FD_SYSCALL
Check a file descriptor to see if the referenced file has a valid
fingerprint.
MAC_VERIEXEC_CHECK_PATH_SYSCALL
Check a path to see if the referenced file has a valid fingerprint.
mpo_kld_check_load
Check if loading a kld is allowed. This checks if the referenced vnode
has a valid fingerprint.
mpo_mount_destroy_label
Clears the veriexec slot data in a mount point label.
mpo_mount_init_label
Initializes the veriexec slot data in a mount point label.
The file system identifier is saved in the veriexec slot data.
mpo_priv_check
Check if a process is allowed to write to /dev/kmem and /dev/mem
devices.
If a process is flagged as trusted, it is allowed to write.
mpo_proc_check_debug
Check if a process is allowed to be debugged. If a process is not
flagged with VERIEXEC_NOTRACE, then debugging is allowed.
mpo_vnode_check_exec
Check is an exectuable is allowed to run. If veriexec is not enforcing
or the executable has a valid fingerprint, then it is allowed to run.
NOTE: veriexec will complain about mismatched fingerprints if it is
active, regardless of the state of the enforcement.
mpo_vnode_check_open
Check is a file is allowed to be opened. If verification was not
requested, veriexec is not enforcing, or the file has a valid
fingerprint, then veriexec will allow the file to be opened.
mpo_vnode_copy_label
Copies the veriexec slot data from one label to another.
mpo_vnode_destroy_label
Clears the veriexec slot data in a vnode label.
mpo_vnode_init_label
Initializes the veriexec slot data in a vnode label.
The fingerprint status for the file is stored in the veriexec slot data.
* Some sysctls, under security.mac.veriexec, for setting debug level,
fetching the current state in a human-readable form, and dumping the
fingerprint database are implemented.
* The MAC policy implementation source file also contains some utility
functions.
* A set of fingerprint modules for the following cryptographic hash
algorithms:
RIPEMD-160, SHA1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
* Loadable module builds for MAC/veriexec and fingerprint modules.
WARNING: Using veriexec with NFS (or other network-based) file systems is
not recommended as one cannot guarantee the integrity of the files
served, nor the uniqueness of file system identifiers which are
used as key in the meta-data store.
Reviewed by: ian, jtl
Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8554
Due to a copy/paste error in r168688, ARG_TERMID_ADDR has the same
definition as ARG_SADDRUNIX. Fix it.
The header change, while publicly visible, is guarded by #ifdef KERNEL, and
I can't find any kmod ports that use it. So I'm not bumping
__FreeBSD_version.
PR: 228820
Submitted by: aniketp
Sponsored by: Google, Inc. (GSoC 2018)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15702
security/audit/audit_ioctl.h uses a type from bsm/audit.h, so needs to
include it. And it needs to know the type's size, so it can't just
forward-declare.
PR: 228470
Submitted by: aniketp
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Google, Inc. (GSoC 2018)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15561
Due to an oversight in r195280, auditon(A_SETCLASS, ...) would cause a tailq
element to get added to the tailq twice, resulting in a circular tailq. This
panics when INVARIANTS are on.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15381
This fixes 32-bit compat (no ioctl command defintions are required
as struct ifreq is the same size). This is believed to be sufficent to
fully support ifconfig on 32-bit systems.
Reviewed by: kib
Obtained from: CheriBSD
MFC after: 1 week
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14900
This reduces noise when kernel is compiled by newer GCC versions,
such as one used by external toolchain ports.
Reviewed by: kib, andrew(sys/arm and sys/arm64), emaste(partial), erj(partial)
Reviewed by: jhb (sys/dev/pci/* sys/kern/vfs_aio.c and sys/kern/kern_synch.c)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10385
Mainly focus on files that use BSD 3-Clause license.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
Special thanks to Wind River for providing access to "The Duke of
Highlander" tool: an older (2014) run over FreeBSD tree was useful as a
starting point.
Extend the ino_t, dev_t, nlink_t types to 64-bit ints. Modify
struct dirent layout to add d_off, increase the size of d_fileno
to 64-bits, increase the size of d_namlen to 16-bits, and change
the required alignment. Increase struct statfs f_mntfromname[] and
f_mntonname[] array length MNAMELEN to 1024.
ABI breakage is mitigated by providing compatibility using versioned
symbols, ingenious use of the existing padding in structures, and
by employing other tricks. Unfortunately, not everything can be
fixed, especially outside the base system. For instance, third-party
APIs which pass struct stat around are broken in backward and
forward incompatible ways.
Kinfo sysctl MIBs ABI is changed in backward-compatible way, but
there is no general mechanism to handle other sysctl MIBS which
return structures where the layout has changed. It was considered
that the breakage is either in the management interfaces, where we
usually allow ABI slip, or is not important.
Struct xvnode changed layout, no compat shims are provided.
For struct xtty, dev_t tty device member was reduced to uint32_t.
It was decided that keeping ABI compat in this case is more useful
than reporting 64-bit dev_t, for the sake of pstat.
Update note: strictly follow the instructions in UPDATING. Build
and install the new kernel with COMPAT_FREEBSD11 option enabled,
then reboot, and only then install new world.
Credits: The 64-bit inode project, also known as ino64, started life
many years ago as a project by Gleb Kurtsou (gleb). Kirk McKusick
(mckusick) then picked up and updated the patch, and acted as a
flag-waver. Feedback, suggestions, and discussions were carried
by Ed Maste (emaste), John Baldwin (jhb), Jilles Tjoelker (jilles),
and Rick Macklem (rmacklem). Kris Moore (kris) performed an initial
ports investigation followed by an exp-run by Antoine Brodin (antoine).
Essential and all-embracing testing was done by Peter Holm (pho).
The heavy lifting of coordinating all these efforts and bringing the
project to completion were done by Konstantin Belousov (kib).
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation (emaste, kib)
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10439
retaining various utility functions used during BSM generation,
and a second (audit_bsm_db.c) that contains the various in-kernel
databases supporting various audit activities (the class and
event-name tables).
(No functional change is intended.)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
This requires minor changes to the audit framework to allow capturing
paths that are not filesystem paths (i.e., will not be canonicalised
relative to the process current working directory and/or filesystem
root).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
AUE_PROCCTL, AUE_SENDFILE, AUE_ACL_*, and AUE_POSIX_FALLOCATE.
Audit AUE_SHMUNLINK path in the path token rather than as a
text string, and AUE_SHMOPEN flags as an integer token rather
than a System V IPC address token.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
definitions for the DTrace audit provider, so that the dtaudit module
can compile in the absence of kernel DTrace support. This doesn't
really make run-time sense (since the binary dependencies for the
module won't be present), but it allows the dtaudit module to compile
successfully regardless of the kernel configuration.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Reported by: kib
map the 'which' argument into a suitable audit event identifier for the
specific operation requested.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM
trail files or audit pipes:
- Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to
particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return.
These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record
data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and
return values in a single probe.
- Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular
auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit
worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record
data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail
file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread.
DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support
future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe --
e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an
optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience,
upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in
DTrace.
DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected
on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data.
They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes
configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in
order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit
configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or
environmental variables) for the provider to operate.
Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
database in the kernel audit implementation, similar the exist
class mapping database. This will be used by the DTrace audit
provider to map audit event identifiers originating in the
system-call table back into strings for the purposes of setting
probe names. The database is initialised and maintained by
auditd(8), which reads values in from the audit_events
configuration file, and then manages them using the A_GETEVENT
and A_SETEVENT auditon(2) operations.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
always audit the file-descriptor number and vnode information for all
fnctl(2) commands, not just locking-related ones. This was likely an
oversight in the original adaptation of this code from XNU.
MFC after: 3 days
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
(NB: This was likely a mismerge from XNU in audit support, where the
text argument to setlogin(2) is captured -- but as a text token,
whereas this change uses the dedicated login-name field in struct
audit_record.)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
console warnings when pread(2) and pwrite(2) are used with full
system-call auditing enabled. We audit the same file-descriptor data
for these calls as we do read(2) and write(2).
Approved by: re (kib)
MFC after: 3 days
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
aq64_minfree is unsigned so comparing to find out if it is less
than zero is a nonsense. Move the comparison to the last position
as we don't want to spend time if any of the others triggers first.
hile it would be tempting to just remove it, it may be important to
keep it for portability with platforms where may be signed(?) or
in case we may want to change it in the future.
audit_record_write(). This is important so that VFS_STATFS() is not
done on the NULL or freed mp and the check for free space is
consistent with the vnode used for write.
Add vn_start_write() braces around VOP_FSYNC() calls on the audit vnode.
Move repeated code to fsync vnode and panic to the helper
audit_worker_sync_vp().
Reviewed by: rwatson
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
destructor. As result, close method becomes trivial and removed.
Final cdevsw close method might be called without file
context (e.g. in vn_open_vnode() if the vnode is reclaimed meantime),
which leaves ap_sigio registered for notification, despite cdevpriv
destructor frees the memory later.
Call destructor instead of doing a cleanup inline, for
devfs_set_cdevpriv() failure in open. This adds missed funsetown(9)
call and locks ap to satisfy audit_pipe_free() invariants.
Reported and tested by: pho (previous version)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
- Use SDT_PROBE<N>() instead of SDT_PROBE(). This has no functional effect
at the moment, but will be needed for some future changes.
- Don't hardcode the module component of the probe identifier. This is
set automatically by the SDT framework.
MFC after: 1 week
The goal here is to provide one place altering process credentials.
This eases debugging and opens up posibilities to do additional work when such
an action is performed.
This is (yet another) step towards the removal of device
cloning from our kernel.
CR: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D441
Reviewed by: kib, rwatson
Tested by: pho
These changes prevent sysctl(8) from returning proper output,
such as:
1) no output from sysctl(8)
2) erroneously returning ENOMEM with tools like truss(1)
or uname(1)
truss: can not get etype: Cannot allocate memory
there is an environment variable which shall initialize the SYSCTL
during early boot. This works for all SYSCTL types both statically and
dynamically created ones, except for the SYSCTL NODE type and SYSCTLs
which belong to VNETs. A new flag, CTLFLAG_NOFETCH, has been added to
be used in the case a tunable sysctl has a custom initialisation
function allowing the sysctl to still be marked as a tunable. The
kernel SYSCTL API is mostly the same, with a few exceptions for some
special operations like iterating childrens of a static/extern SYSCTL
node. This operation should probably be made into a factored out
common macro, hence some device drivers use this. The reason for
changing the SYSCTL API was the need for a SYSCTL parent OID pointer
and not only the SYSCTL parent OID list pointer in order to quickly
generate the sysctl path. The motivation behind this patch is to avoid
parameter loading cludges inside the OFED driver subsystem. Instead of
adding special code to the OFED driver subsystem to post-load tunables
into dynamically created sysctls, we generalize this in the kernel.
Other changes:
- Corrected a possibly incorrect sysctl name from "hw.cbb.intr_mask"
to "hw.pcic.intr_mask".
- Removed redundant TUNABLE statements throughout the kernel.
- Some minor code rewrites in connection to removing not needed
TUNABLE statements.
- Added a missing SYSCTL_DECL().
- Wrapped two very long lines.
- Avoid malloc()/free() inside sysctl string handling, in case it is
called to initialize a sysctl from a tunable, hence malloc()/free() is
not ready when sysctls from the sysctl dataset are registered.
- Bumped FreeBSD version to indicate SYSCTL API change.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Mellanox Technologies
further refinement is required as some device drivers intended to be
portable over FreeBSD versions rely on __FreeBSD_version to decide whether
to include capability.h.
MFC after: 3 weeks
AppleTalk was a network transport protocol for Apple Macintosh devices
in 80s and then 90s. Starting with Mac OS X in 2000 the AppleTalk was
a legacy protocol and primary networking protocol is TCP/IP. The last
Mac OS X release to support AppleTalk happened in 2009. The same year
routing equipment vendors (namely Cisco) end their support.
Thus, AppleTalk won't be supported in FreeBSD 11.0-RELEASE.
IPX was a network transport protocol in Novell's NetWare network operating
system from late 80s and then 90s. The NetWare itself switched to TCP/IP
as default transport in 1998. Later, in this century the Novell Open
Enterprise Server became successor of Novell NetWare. The last release
that claimed to still support IPX was OES 2 in 2007. Routing equipment
vendors (e.g. Cisco) discontinued support for IPX in 2011.
Thus, IPX won't be supported in FreeBSD 11.0-RELEASE.
In its stead use the Solaris / illumos approach of emulating '-' (dash)
in probe names with '__' (two consecutive underscores).
Reviewed by: markj
MFC after: 3 weeks
option, unbreak the lock tracing release semantic by embedding
calls to LOCKSTAT_PROFILE_RELEASE_LOCK() direclty in the inlined
version of the releasing functions for mutex, rwlock and sxlock.
Failing to do so skips the lockstat_probe_func invokation for
unlocking.
- As part of the LOCKSTAT support is inlined in mutex operation, for
kernel compiled without lock debugging options, potentially every
consumer must be compiled including opt_kdtrace.h.
Fix this by moving KDTRACE_HOOKS into opt_global.h and remove the
dependency by opt_kdtrace.h for all files, as now only KDTRACE_FRAMES
is linked there and it is only used as a compile-time stub [0].
[0] immediately shows some new bug as DTRACE-derived support for debug
in sfxge is broken and it was never really tested. As it was not
including correctly opt_kdtrace.h before it was never enabled so it
was kept broken for a while. Fix this by using a protection stub,
leaving sfxge driver authors the responsibility for fixing it
appropriately [1].
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon storage division
Discussed with: rstone
[0] Reported by: rstone
[1] Discussed with: philip
to this event, adding if_var.h to files that do need it. Also, include
all includes that now are included due to implicit pollution via if_var.h
Sponsored by: Netflix
Sponsored by: Nginx, Inc.
the mac framework. It is needed when priv_check_cred(9) is called from
the mac callback, e.g. in the mac_portacl(4).
Reported by: az
Reviewed by: rwatson
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Approved by: re (gjb)
dev_ref() in the clone handlers that still use it.
- Don't set SI_CHEAPCLONE flag, it's not used anywhere neither in devfs
(for anything real)
Reviewed by: kib
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Add MAC framework entries for posix shm read and write.
Do not allow implicit extension of the underlying memory segment past
the limit set by ftruncate(2) by either of the syscalls. Read and
write returns short i/o, lseek(2) fails with EINVAL when resulting
offset does not fit into the limit.
Discussed with: alc
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
future further optimizations where the vm_object lock will be held
in read mode most of the time the page cache resident pool of pages
are accessed for reading purposes.
The change is mostly mechanical but few notes are reported:
* The KPI changes as follow:
- VM_OBJECT_LOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WLOCK()
- VM_OBJECT_TRYLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_TRYWLOCK()
- VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK() -> VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK()
- VM_OBJECT_LOCK_ASSERT(MA_OWNED) -> VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_WLOCKED()
(in order to avoid visibility of implementation details)
- The read-mode operations are added:
VM_OBJECT_RLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_TRYRLOCK(), VM_OBJECT_RUNLOCK(),
VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_RLOCKED(), VM_OBJECT_ASSERT_LOCKED()
* The vm/vm_pager.h namespace pollution avoidance (forcing requiring
sys/mutex.h in consumers directly to cater its inlining functions
using VM_OBJECT_LOCK()) imposes that all the vm/vm_pager.h
consumers now must include also sys/rwlock.h.
* zfs requires a quite convoluted fix to include FreeBSD rwlocks into
the compat layer because the name clash between FreeBSD and solaris
versions must be avoided.
At this purpose zfs redefines the vm_object locking functions
directly, isolating the FreeBSD components in specific compat stubs.
The KPI results heavilly broken by this commit. Thirdy part ports must
be updated accordingly (I can think off-hand of VirtualBox, for example).
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon storage division
Reviewed by: jeff
Reviewed by: pjd (ZFS specific review)
Discussed with: alc
Tested by: pho
int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen);
int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen);
which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a
path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'.
- Add manual pages for the new syscalls.
- Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox.
- Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on
the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work.
- Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path
in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor.
- Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights.
- Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2).
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
a process has an auditid/preselection masks specified, and
is jailed, include the zonename (jailname) token as a
part of the audit record.
Reviewed by: pjd
MFC after: 2 weeks
implement the BSM audit trail format. Rename the kernel versions of the
files to match the userspace filenames so that it's easier to work out
what they correspond to, and therefore ensure they are kept in-sync.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
src/sys/{bsm,security/audit}. There are a few tweaks to help with the
FreeBSD build environment that will be merged back to OpenBSM. No
significant functional changes appear on the kernel side.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
Fix path handling for *at() syscalls.
Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored,
so the relative path argument was appended to current working
directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus
wrong paths were stored in audit logs.
Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move
AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where
we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will
be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and
in actual operation.
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 2 weeks
Currently when we discover that trail file is greater than configured
limit we send AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_KERNEL trigger to the auditd daemon
once. If for some reason auditd didn't rotate trail file it will never
be rotated.
Change it by sending the trigger when trail file size grows by the
configured limit. For example if the limit is 1MB, we will send trigger
on 1MB, 2MB, 3MB, etc.
This is also needed for the auditd change that will be committed soon
where auditd may ignore the trigger - it might be ignored if kernel
requests the trail file to be rotated too quickly (often than once a second)
which would result in overwriting previous trail file.
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd)
MFC after: 2 weeks
