freebsd-skq/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c
jhb 1cdfbce636 Add support to the crypto framework for separate AAD buffers.
This permits requests to provide the AAD in a separate side buffer
instead of as a region in the crypto request input buffer.  This is
useful when the main data buffer might not contain the full AAD
(e.g. for TLS or IPsec with ESN).

Unlike separate IVs which are constrained in size and stored in an
array in struct cryptop, separate AAD is provided by the caller
setting a new crp_aad pointer to the buffer.  The caller must ensure
the pointer remains valid and the buffer contents static until the
request is completed (e.g. when the callback routine is invoked).

As with separate output buffers, not all drivers support this feature.
Consumers must request use of this feature via a new session flag.

To aid in driver testing, kern.crypto.cryptodev_separate_aad can be
set to force /dev/crypto requests to use a separate AAD buffer.

Discussed with:	cem
Sponsored by:	Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25288
2020-06-22 23:20:43 +00:00

1542 lines
37 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: cryptosoft.c,v 1.35 2002/04/26 08:43:50 deraadt Exp $ */
/*-
* The author of this code is Angelos D. Keromytis (angelos@cis.upenn.edu)
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting
*
* This code was written by Angelos D. Keromytis in Athens, Greece, in
* February 2000. Network Security Technologies Inc. (NSTI) kindly
* supported the development of this code.
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis
* Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney
* under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and
* Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate).
*
* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
* all source code copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
* modification of this software.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
#include <sys/endian.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <opencrypto/rmd160.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
#include <sys/kobj.h>
#include <sys/bus.h>
#include "cryptodev_if.h"
struct swcr_auth {
void *sw_ictx;
void *sw_octx;
struct auth_hash *sw_axf;
uint16_t sw_mlen;
};
struct swcr_encdec {
void *sw_kschedule;
struct enc_xform *sw_exf;
};
struct swcr_compdec {
struct comp_algo *sw_cxf;
};
struct swcr_session {
struct mtx swcr_lock;
int (*swcr_process)(struct swcr_session *, struct cryptop *);
struct swcr_auth swcr_auth;
struct swcr_encdec swcr_encdec;
struct swcr_compdec swcr_compdec;
};
static int32_t swcr_id;
static void swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses);
/* Used for CRYPTO_NULL_CBC. */
static int
swcr_null(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm.
*/
static int
swcr_encdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
unsigned char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN], blk[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
unsigned char *ivp, *nivp, iv2[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct swcr_encdec *sw;
struct enc_xform *exf;
int i, blks, inlen, ivlen, outlen, resid;
struct crypto_buffer_cursor cc_in, cc_out;
const unsigned char *inblk;
unsigned char *outblk;
int error;
bool encrypting;
error = 0;
sw = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = sw->sw_exf;
ivlen = exf->ivsize;
if (exf->native_blocksize == 0) {
/* Check for non-padded data */
if ((crp->crp_payload_length % exf->blocksize) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
blks = exf->blocksize;
} else
blks = exf->native_blocksize;
if (exf == &enc_xform_aes_icm &&
(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) {
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
error = exf->setkey(sw->sw_kschedule,
crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
if (exf->reinit) {
/*
* xforms that provide a reinit method perform all IV
* handling themselves.
*/
exf->reinit(sw->sw_kschedule, iv);
}
ivp = iv;
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_in, &crp->crp_buf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, crp->crp_payload_start);
inlen = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in);
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
if (CRYPTO_HAS_OUTPUT_BUFFER(crp)) {
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_out, &crp->crp_obuf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, crp->crp_payload_output_start);
} else
cc_out = cc_in;
outlen = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_out);
outblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_out);
resid = crp->crp_payload_length;
encrypting = CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op);
/*
* Loop through encrypting blocks. 'inlen' is the remaining
* length of the current segment in the input buffer.
* 'outlen' is the remaining length of current segment in the
* output buffer.
*/
while (resid >= blks) {
/*
* If the current block is not contained within the
* current input/output segment, use 'blk' as a local
* buffer.
*/
if (inlen < blks) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, blks, blk);
inblk = blk;
}
if (outlen < blks)
outblk = blk;
/*
* Ciphers without a 'reinit' hook are assumed to be
* used in CBC mode where the chaining is done here.
*/
if (exf->reinit != NULL) {
if (encrypting)
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk);
else
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk);
} else if (encrypting) {
/* XOR with previous block */
for (i = 0; i < blks; i++)
outblk[i] = inblk[i] ^ ivp[i];
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, outblk, outblk);
/*
* Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing
* with next block
*/
memcpy(iv, outblk, blks);
ivp = iv;
} else { /* decrypt */
/*
* Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing
* with next block
*/
nivp = (ivp == iv) ? iv2 : iv;
memcpy(nivp, inblk, blks);
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk);
/* XOR with previous block */
for (i = 0; i < blks; i++)
outblk[i] ^= ivp[i];
ivp = nivp;
}
if (inlen < blks) {
inlen = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in);
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
} else {
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, blks);
inlen -= blks;
inblk += blks;
}
if (outlen < blks) {
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, blks, blk);
outlen = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_out);
outblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_out);
} else {
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, blks);
outlen -= blks;
outblk += blks;
}
resid -= blks;
}
/* Handle trailing partial block for stream ciphers. */
if (resid > 0) {
KASSERT(exf->native_blocksize != 0,
("%s: partial block of %d bytes for cipher %s",
__func__, i, exf->name));
KASSERT(exf->reinit != NULL,
("%s: partial block cipher %s without reinit hook",
__func__, exf->name));
KASSERT(resid < blks, ("%s: partial block too big", __func__));
inlen = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in);
outlen = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_out);
if (inlen < resid) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, resid, blk);
inblk = blk;
} else
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
if (outlen < resid)
outblk = blk;
else
outblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_out);
if (encrypting)
exf->encrypt_last(sw->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk,
resid);
else
exf->decrypt_last(sw->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk,
resid);
if (outlen < resid)
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, resid, blk);
}
explicit_bzero(blk, sizeof(blk));
explicit_bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
explicit_bzero(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
return (0);
}
static void
swcr_authprepare(struct auth_hash *axf, struct swcr_auth *sw,
const uint8_t *key, int klen)
{
switch (axf->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
hmac_init_ipad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_ictx);
hmac_init_opad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_octx);
break;
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
axf->Setkey(sw->sw_ictx, key, klen);
axf->Init(sw->sw_ictx);
break;
default:
panic("%s: algorithm %d doesn't use keys", __func__, axf->type);
}
}
/*
* Compute or verify hash.
*/
static int
swcr_authcompute(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_char aalg[HASH_MAX_LEN];
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct swcr_auth *sw;
struct auth_hash *axf;
union authctx ctx;
int err;
sw = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = sw->sw_axf;
if (crp->crp_auth_key != NULL) {
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
swcr_authprepare(axf, sw, crp->crp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
bcopy(sw->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
err = axf->Update(&ctx, crp->crp_aad, crp->crp_aad_length);
else
err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length,
axf->Update, &ctx);
if (err)
return err;
if (CRYPTO_HAS_OUTPUT_BUFFER(crp) &&
CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))
err = crypto_apply_buf(&crp->crp_obuf,
crp->crp_payload_output_start, crp->crp_payload_length,
axf->Update, &ctx);
else
err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start,
crp->crp_payload_length, axf->Update, &ctx);
if (err)
return err;
switch (axf->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512:
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
if (sw->sw_octx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
bcopy(sw->sw_octx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
axf->Update(&ctx, aalg, axf->hashsize);
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
}
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
u_char uaalg[HASH_MAX_LEN];
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, uaalg);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, sw->sw_mlen) != 0)
err = EBADMSG;
explicit_bzero(uaalg, sizeof(uaalg));
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, aalg);
}
explicit_bzero(aalg, sizeof(aalg));
return (err);
}
CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (1ll<<39) - 256); /* GCM: plain text < 2^39-256 */
CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (uint64_t)-1); /* GCM: associated data <= 2^64-1 */
static int
swcr_gmac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(AES_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char tag[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
u_char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
struct crypto_buffer_cursor cc;
const u_char *inblk;
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
uint32_t *blkp;
int blksz, error, ivlen, len, resid;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = GMAC_BLOCK_LEN;
KASSERT(axf->blocksize == blksz, ("%s: axf block size mismatch",
__func__));
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
crypto_cursor_init(&cc, &crp->crp_buf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc, crp->crp_payload_start);
for (resid = crp->crp_payload_length; resid >= blksz; resid -= len) {
len = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc);
if (len >= blksz) {
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc);
len = rounddown(MIN(len, resid), blksz);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc, len);
} else {
len = blksz;
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc, len, blk);
inblk = blk;
}
axf->Update(&ctx, inblk, len);
}
if (resid > 0) {
memset(blk, 0, blksz);
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc, resid, blk);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
/* length block */
memset(blk, 0, blksz);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(tag, &ctx);
error = 0;
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
u_char tag2[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
tag2);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(tag, tag2, swa->sw_mlen) != 0)
error = EBADMSG;
explicit_bzero(tag2, sizeof(tag2));
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, tag);
}
explicit_bzero(blkbuf, sizeof(blkbuf));
explicit_bzero(tag, sizeof(tag));
explicit_bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
return (error);
}
static int
swcr_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(AES_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char tag[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
u_char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
struct crypto_buffer_cursor cc_in, cc_out;
const u_char *inblk;
u_char *outblk;
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct auth_hash *axf;
struct enc_xform *exf;
uint32_t *blkp;
int blksz, error, ivlen, len, r, resid;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = GMAC_BLOCK_LEN;
KASSERT(axf->blocksize == blksz, ("%s: axf block size mismatch",
__func__));
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = swe->sw_exf;
KASSERT(axf->blocksize == exf->native_blocksize,
("%s: blocksize mismatch", __func__));
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with IV */
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with AAD */
if (crp->crp_aad != NULL) {
len = rounddown(crp->crp_aad_length, blksz);
if (len != 0)
axf->Update(&ctx, crp->crp_aad, len);
if (crp->crp_aad_length != len) {
memset(blk, 0, blksz);
memcpy(blk, (char *)crp->crp_aad + len,
crp->crp_aad_length - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
} else {
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_in, &crp->crp_buf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, crp->crp_aad_start);
for (resid = crp->crp_aad_length; resid >= blksz;
resid -= len) {
len = crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in);
if (len >= blksz) {
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
len = rounddown(MIN(len, resid), blksz);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, len);
} else {
len = blksz;
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, len, blk);
inblk = blk;
}
axf->Update(&ctx, inblk, len);
}
if (resid > 0) {
memset(blk, 0, blksz);
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, resid, blk);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
}
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
/* Do encryption with MAC */
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_in, &crp->crp_buf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, crp->crp_payload_start);
if (CRYPTO_HAS_OUTPUT_BUFFER(crp)) {
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_out, &crp->crp_obuf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, crp->crp_payload_output_start);
} else
cc_out = cc_in;
for (resid = crp->crp_payload_length; resid >= blksz; resid -= blksz) {
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in) < blksz) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, blksz, blk);
inblk = blk;
} else {
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, blksz);
}
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_out) < blksz)
outblk = blk;
else
outblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_out);
exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk);
axf->Update(&ctx, outblk, blksz);
if (outblk == blk)
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, blksz, blk);
else
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, blksz);
} else {
axf->Update(&ctx, inblk, blksz);
}
}
if (resid > 0) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, resid, blk);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
exf->encrypt_last(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk, resid);
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, resid, blk);
}
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, resid);
}
/* length block */
memset(blk, 0, blksz);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_aad_length * 8);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 3;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(tag, &ctx);
/* Validate tag */
error = 0;
if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
u_char tag2[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, tag2);
r = timingsafe_bcmp(tag, tag2, swa->sw_mlen);
explicit_bzero(tag2, sizeof(tag2));
if (r != 0) {
error = EBADMSG;
goto out;
}
/* tag matches, decrypt data */
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_in, &crp->crp_buf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, crp->crp_payload_start);
for (resid = crp->crp_payload_length; resid > blksz;
resid -= blksz) {
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in) < blksz) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, blksz, blk);
inblk = blk;
} else {
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, blksz);
}
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_out) < blksz)
outblk = blk;
else
outblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_out);
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk);
if (outblk == blk)
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, blksz, blk);
else
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, blksz);
}
if (resid > 0) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, resid, blk);
exf->decrypt_last(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk, resid);
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, resid, blk);
}
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, tag);
}
out:
explicit_bzero(blkbuf, sizeof(blkbuf));
explicit_bzero(tag, sizeof(tag));
explicit_bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
return (error);
}
static int
swcr_ccm_cbc_mac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_char tag[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
u_char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int error, ivlen;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN;
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
/*
* AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
* data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
*/
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = 0;
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
error = axf->Update(&ctx, crp->crp_aad, crp->crp_aad_length);
else
error = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start,
crp->crp_payload_length, axf->Update, &ctx);
if (error)
return (error);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(tag, &ctx);
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
u_char tag2[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
tag2);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(tag, tag2, swa->sw_mlen) != 0)
error = EBADMSG;
explicit_bzero(tag2, sizeof(tag));
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, tag);
}
explicit_bzero(tag, sizeof(tag));
explicit_bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
return (error);
}
static int
swcr_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(AES_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char tag[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
u_char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
struct crypto_buffer_cursor cc_in, cc_out;
const u_char *inblk;
u_char *outblk;
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct auth_hash *axf;
struct enc_xform *exf;
int blksz, error, ivlen, r, resid;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
KASSERT(axf->blocksize == blksz, ("%s: axf block size mismatch",
__func__));
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = swe->sw_exf;
KASSERT(axf->blocksize == exf->native_blocksize,
("%s: blocksize mismatch", __func__));
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN;
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
/*
* AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
* data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
*/
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
/* Supply MAC with IV */
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with AAD */
if (crp->crp_aad != NULL)
error = axf->Update(&ctx, crp->crp_aad, crp->crp_aad_length);
else
error = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start,
crp->crp_aad_length, axf->Update, &ctx);
if (error)
return (error);
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
/* Do encryption/decryption with MAC */
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_in, &crp->crp_buf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, crp->crp_payload_start);
if (CRYPTO_HAS_OUTPUT_BUFFER(crp)) {
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_out, &crp->crp_obuf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, crp->crp_payload_output_start);
} else
cc_out = cc_in;
for (resid = crp->crp_payload_length; resid >= blksz; resid -= blksz) {
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in) < blksz) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, blksz, blk);
inblk = blk;
} else {
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, blksz);
}
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_out) < blksz)
outblk = blk;
else
outblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_out);
axf->Update(&ctx, inblk, blksz);
exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk);
if (outblk == blk)
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, blksz, blk);
else
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, blksz);
} else {
/*
* One of the problems with CCM+CBC is that
* the authentication is done on the
* unencrypted data. As a result, we have to
* decrypt the data twice: once to generate
* the tag and a second time after the tag is
* verified.
*/
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, inblk, blk);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
}
if (resid > 0) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, resid, blk);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, resid);
exf->encrypt_last(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk, resid);
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, resid, blk);
} else {
exf->decrypt_last(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk, resid);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, resid);
}
}
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(tag, &ctx);
/* Validate tag */
error = 0;
if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
u_char tag2[AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN];
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
tag2);
r = timingsafe_bcmp(tag, tag2, swa->sw_mlen);
explicit_bzero(tag2, sizeof(tag2));
if (r != 0) {
error = EBADMSG;
goto out;
}
/* tag matches, decrypt data */
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
crypto_cursor_init(&cc_in, &crp->crp_buf);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, crp->crp_payload_start);
for (resid = crp->crp_payload_length; resid > blksz;
resid -= blksz) {
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_in) < blksz) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, blksz, blk);
inblk = blk;
} else {
inblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_in);
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_in, blksz);
}
if (crypto_cursor_seglen(&cc_out) < blksz)
outblk = blk;
else
outblk = crypto_cursor_segbase(&cc_out);
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, inblk, outblk);
if (outblk == blk)
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, blksz, blk);
else
crypto_cursor_advance(&cc_out, blksz);
}
if (resid > 0) {
crypto_cursor_copydata(&cc_in, resid, blk);
exf->decrypt_last(swe->sw_kschedule, blk, blk, resid);
crypto_cursor_copyback(&cc_out, resid, blk);
}
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, tag);
}
out:
explicit_bzero(blkbuf, sizeof(blkbuf));
explicit_bzero(tag, sizeof(tag));
explicit_bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
return (error);
}
/*
* Apply a cipher and a digest to perform EtA.
*/
static int
swcr_eta(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
int error;
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp);
if (error == 0)
error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp);
} else {
error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp);
if (error == 0)
error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp);
}
return (error);
}
/*
* Apply a compression/decompression algorithm
*/
static int
swcr_compdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_int8_t *data, *out;
struct comp_algo *cxf;
int adj;
u_int32_t result;
cxf = ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf;
/* We must handle the whole buffer of data in one time
* then if there is not all the data in the mbuf, we must
* copy in a buffer.
*/
data = malloc(crp->crp_payload_length, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (data == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length,
data);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op))
result = cxf->compress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out);
else
result = cxf->decompress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out);
free(data, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
if (result == 0)
return (EINVAL);
crp->crp_olen = result;
/* Check the compressed size when doing compression */
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op)) {
if (result >= crp->crp_payload_length) {
/* Compression was useless, we lost time */
free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return (0);
}
}
/* Copy back the (de)compressed data. m_copyback is
* extending the mbuf as necessary.
*/
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, result, out);
if (result < crp->crp_payload_length) {
switch (crp->crp_buf.cb_type) {
case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF:
adj = result - crp->crp_payload_length;
m_adj(crp->crp_buf.cb_mbuf, adj);
break;
case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO: {
struct uio *uio = crp->crp_buf.cb_uio;
int ind;
adj = crp->crp_payload_length - result;
ind = uio->uio_iovcnt - 1;
while (adj > 0 && ind >= 0) {
if (adj < uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len) {
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len -= adj;
break;
}
adj -= uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len;
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len = 0;
ind--;
uio->uio_iovcnt--;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return 0;
}
static int
swcr_setup_cipher(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct enc_xform *txf;
int error;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
txf = crypto_cipher(csp);
MPASS(txf->ivsize == csp->csp_ivlen);
if (txf->ctxsize != 0) {
swe->sw_kschedule = malloc(txf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
M_NOWAIT);
if (swe->sw_kschedule == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
}
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) {
error = txf->setkey(swe->sw_kschedule,
csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
swe->sw_exf = txf;
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_auth(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp);
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
swa->sw_octx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_octx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) {
swcr_authprepare(axf, swa, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_gmac;
break;
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
/*
* Blake2b and Blake2s support an optional key but do
* not require one.
*/
if (csp->csp_auth_klen == 0 || csp->csp_auth_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm_cbc_mac;
break;
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
/* First, setup the auth side. */
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) {
case 128:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
break;
case 192:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
break;
case 256:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key,
csp->csp_cipher_klen);
/* Second, setup the cipher side. */
return (swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp));
}
static int
swcr_setup_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
/* First, setup the auth side. */
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) {
case 128:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128;
break;
case 192:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192;
break;
case 256:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256;
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key,
csp->csp_cipher_klen);
/* Second, setup the cipher side. */
return (swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp));
}
static bool
swcr_auth_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct auth_hash *axf;
axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp);
if (axf == NULL)
return (false);
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) {
case 128:
case 192:
case 256:
break;
default:
return (false);
}
if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN)
return (false);
break;
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
if (csp->csp_auth_klen != POLY1305_KEY_LEN)
return (false);
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) {
case 128:
case 192:
case 256:
break;
default:
return (false);
}
if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN)
return (false);
break;
}
return (true);
}
static bool
swcr_cipher_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct enc_xform *txf;
txf = crypto_cipher(csp);
if (txf == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg != CRYPTO_NULL_CBC &&
txf->ivsize != csp->csp_ivlen)
return (false);
return (true);
}
static int
swcr_probesession(device_t dev, const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
if ((csp->csp_flags & ~(CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT | CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD)) !=
0)
return (EINVAL);
switch (csp->csp_mode) {
case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP:
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_CIPHER:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
return (EINVAL);
default:
if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_DIGEST:
if (!swcr_auth_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
case CSP_MODE_AEAD:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_ETA:
/* AEAD algorithms cannot be used for EtA. */
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
return (EINVAL);
}
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
return (EINVAL);
}
if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp) ||
!swcr_auth_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
return (CRYPTODEV_PROBE_SOFTWARE);
}
/*
* Generate a new software session.
*/
static int
swcr_newsession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct comp_algo *cxf;
int error;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses);
mtx_init(&ses->swcr_lock, "swcr session lock", NULL, MTX_DEF);
error = 0;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_mode) {
case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP:
cxf = &comp_algo_deflate;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
default:
panic("bad compression algo");
#endif
}
ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf = cxf;
ses->swcr_process = swcr_compdec;
break;
case CSP_MODE_CIPHER:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_NULL_CBC:
ses->swcr_process = swcr_null;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
panic("bad cipher algo");
#endif
default:
error = swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_encdec;
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_DIGEST:
error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp);
break;
case CSP_MODE_AEAD:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
error = swcr_setup_gcm(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_gcm;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
error = swcr_setup_ccm(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
default:
panic("bad aead algo");
#endif
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_ETA:
#ifdef INVARIANTS
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
panic("bad eta cipher algo");
}
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
panic("bad eta auth algo");
}
#endif
error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp);
if (error)
break;
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_NULL_CBC) {
/* Effectively degrade to digest mode. */
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
}
error = swcr_setup_cipher(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_eta;
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
}
if (error)
swcr_freesession(dev, cses);
return (error);
}
static void
swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses);
mtx_destroy(&ses->swcr_lock);
zfree(ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
axf = ses->swcr_auth.sw_axf;
if (axf != NULL) {
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
if (swa->sw_ictx != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(swa->sw_ictx, axf->ctxsize);
free(swa->sw_ictx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
}
if (swa->sw_octx != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(swa->sw_octx, axf->ctxsize);
free(swa->sw_octx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
}
}
}
/*
* Process a software request.
*/
static int
swcr_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(crp->crp_session);
mtx_lock(&ses->swcr_lock);
crp->crp_etype = ses->swcr_process(ses, crp);
mtx_unlock(&ses->swcr_lock);
crypto_done(crp);
return (0);
}
static void
swcr_identify(driver_t *drv, device_t parent)
{
/* NB: order 10 is so we get attached after h/w devices */
if (device_find_child(parent, "cryptosoft", -1) == NULL &&
BUS_ADD_CHILD(parent, 10, "cryptosoft", 0) == 0)
panic("cryptosoft: could not attach");
}
static int
swcr_probe(device_t dev)
{
device_set_desc(dev, "software crypto");
return (BUS_PROBE_NOWILDCARD);
}
static int
swcr_attach(device_t dev)
{
swcr_id = crypto_get_driverid(dev, sizeof(struct swcr_session),
CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC);
if (swcr_id < 0) {
device_printf(dev, "cannot initialize!");
return (ENXIO);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_detach(device_t dev)
{
crypto_unregister_all(swcr_id);
return 0;
}
static device_method_t swcr_methods[] = {
DEVMETHOD(device_identify, swcr_identify),
DEVMETHOD(device_probe, swcr_probe),
DEVMETHOD(device_attach, swcr_attach),
DEVMETHOD(device_detach, swcr_detach),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_probesession, swcr_probesession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_newsession, swcr_newsession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_freesession,swcr_freesession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_process, swcr_process),
{0, 0},
};
static driver_t swcr_driver = {
"cryptosoft",
swcr_methods,
0, /* NB: no softc */
};
static devclass_t swcr_devclass;
/*
* NB: We explicitly reference the crypto module so we
* get the necessary ordering when built as a loadable
* module. This is required because we bundle the crypto
* module code together with the cryptosoft driver (otherwise
* normal module dependencies would handle things).
*/
extern int crypto_modevent(struct module *, int, void *);
/* XXX where to attach */
DRIVER_MODULE(cryptosoft, nexus, swcr_driver, swcr_devclass, crypto_modevent,0);
MODULE_VERSION(cryptosoft, 1);
MODULE_DEPEND(cryptosoft, crypto, 1, 1, 1);