freebsd-skq/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c
Brian Somers 15344a5690 Verify that the username length is smaller than MAXLOGNAME when
asked to verify a passwd file (pwd_mkdb -C).

Entries with oversized usernames are still permitted when building
the passwd database.

When entries are >= MAXLOGNAME in length, they are correctly stored
in passwd, pwd.db and spwd.db but are only correctly retrieved by
getpwent*() and getpwuid*().  getpwnam*() truncates to MAXLOGNAME - 1
when reading from a file (breaking at least sh, tcsh and bash)
and utilities such as su(1) check, complain and fail if the
passed name is >= MAXLOGNAME in length.

MFC after:	3 weeks
2009-05-20 08:32:25 +00:00

763 lines
20 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#if 0
#ifndef lint
static const char copyright[] =
"@(#) Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994\n\
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.\n";
#endif /* not lint */
#ifndef lint
static char sccsid[] = "@(#)pwd_mkdb.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 4/20/94";
#endif /* not lint */
#endif
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/endian.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <db.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "pw_scan.h"
#define INSECURE 1
#define SECURE 2
#define PERM_INSECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH)
#define PERM_SECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)
#define LEGACY_VERSION(x) _PW_VERSIONED(x, 3)
#define CURRENT_VERSION(x) _PW_VERSIONED(x, 4)
HASHINFO openinfo = {
4096, /* bsize */
32, /* ffactor */
256, /* nelem */
2048 * 1024, /* cachesize */
NULL, /* hash() */
BYTE_ORDER /* lorder */
};
static enum state { FILE_INSECURE, FILE_SECURE, FILE_ORIG } clean;
static struct passwd pwd; /* password structure */
static char *pname; /* password file name */
static char prefix[MAXPATHLEN];
static int is_comment; /* flag for comments */
static char line[LINE_MAX];
void cleanup(void);
void error(const char *);
void cp(char *, char *, mode_t mode);
void mv(char *, char *);
int scan(FILE *, struct passwd *);
static void usage(void);
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
static char verskey[] = _PWD_VERSION_KEY;
char version = _PWD_CURRENT_VERSION;
DB *dp, *sdp, *pw_db;
DBT data, sdata, key;
FILE *fp, *oldfp;
sigset_t set;
int ch, cnt, ypcnt, makeold, tfd, yp_enabled = 0;
unsigned int len;
uint32_t store;
const char *t;
char *p;
char buf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)], tbuf[1024];
char sbuf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)];
char buf2[MAXPATHLEN];
char sbuf2[MAXPATHLEN];
char *username;
u_int method, methoduid;
int Cflag, dflag, iflag;
int nblock = 0;
iflag = dflag = Cflag = 0;
strcpy(prefix, _PATH_PWD);
makeold = 0;
username = NULL;
oldfp = NULL;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "BCLNd:ips:u:v")) != -1)
switch(ch) {
case 'B': /* big-endian output */
openinfo.lorder = BIG_ENDIAN;
break;
case 'C': /* verify only */
Cflag = 1;
break;
case 'L': /* little-endian output */
openinfo.lorder = LITTLE_ENDIAN;
break;
case 'N': /* do not wait for lock */
nblock = LOCK_NB; /* will fail if locked */
break;
case 'd':
dflag++;
strlcpy(prefix, optarg, sizeof(prefix));
break;
case 'i':
iflag++;
break;
case 'p': /* create V7 "file.orig" */
makeold = 1;
break;
case 's': /* change default cachesize */
openinfo.cachesize = atoi(optarg) * 1024 * 1024;
break;
case 'u': /* only update this record */
username = optarg;
break;
case 'v': /* backward compatible */
break;
default:
usage();
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argc != 1 || (username && (*username == '+' || *username == '-')))
usage();
/*
* This could be changed to allow the user to interrupt.
* Probably not worth the effort.
*/
sigemptyset(&set);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGHUP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGINT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTERM);
(void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, (sigset_t *)NULL);
/* We don't care what the user wants. */
(void)umask(0);
pname = *argv;
/*
* Open and lock the original password file. We have to check
* the hardlink count after we get the lock to handle any potential
* unlink/rename race.
*
* This lock is necessary when someone runs pwd_mkdb manually, directly
* on master.passwd, to handle the case where a user might try to
* change his password while pwd_mkdb is running.
*/
for (;;) {
struct stat st;
if (!(fp = fopen(pname, "r")))
error(pname);
if (flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_EX|nblock) < 0 && !(dflag && iflag))
error("flock");
if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) < 0)
error(pname);
if (st.st_nlink != 0)
break;
fclose(fp);
fp = NULL;
}
/* check only if password database is valid */
if (Cflag) {
while (scan(fp, &pwd))
if (!is_comment && strlen(pwd.pw_name) >= MAXLOGNAME) {
warnx("%s: username too long", pwd.pw_name);
exit(1);
}
exit(0);
}
/* Open the temporary insecure password database. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)snprintf(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB);
if (username) {
int use_version;
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)snprintf(sbuf2, sizeof(sbuf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _SMP_DB);
clean = FILE_INSECURE;
cp(buf2, buf, PERM_INSECURE);
dp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (dp == NULL)
error(buf);
clean = FILE_SECURE;
cp(sbuf2, sbuf, PERM_SECURE);
sdp = dbopen(sbuf,
O_RDWR|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (sdp == NULL)
error(sbuf);
/*
* Do some trouble to check if we should store this users
* uid. Don't use getpwnam/getpwuid as that interferes
* with NIS.
*/
pw_db = dbopen(_PATH_MP_DB, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, NULL);
if (!pw_db)
error(_MP_DB);
key.data = verskey;
key.size = sizeof(verskey)-1;
if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0)
use_version = *(unsigned char *)data.data;
else
use_version = 3;
buf[0] = _PW_VERSIONED(_PW_KEYBYNAME, use_version);
len = strlen(username);
/* Only check that username fits in buffer */
memmove(buf + 1, username, MIN(len, sizeof(buf) - 1));
key.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.size = len + 1;
if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0) {
p = (char *)data.data;
/* jump over pw_name and pw_passwd, to get to pw_uid */
while (*p++)
;
while (*p++)
;
buf[0] = _PW_VERSIONED(_PW_KEYBYUID, use_version);
memmove(buf + 1, p, sizeof(store));
key.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0) {
/* First field of data.data holds pw_pwname */
if (!strcmp(data.data, username))
methoduid = 0;
else
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
} else {
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
}
} else {
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
}
if ((pw_db->close)(pw_db))
error("close pw_db");
method = 0;
} else {
dp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (dp == NULL)
error(buf);
clean = FILE_INSECURE;
sdp = dbopen(sbuf,
O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
if (sdp == NULL)
error(sbuf);
clean = FILE_SECURE;
method = R_NOOVERWRITE;
methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE;
}
/*
* Open file for old password file. Minor trickiness -- don't want to
* chance the file already existing, since someone (stupidly) might
* still be using this for permission checking. So, open it first and
* fdopen the resulting fd. The resulting file should be readable by
* everyone.
*/
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
if ((tfd = open(buf,
O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE)) < 0)
error(buf);
if ((oldfp = fdopen(tfd, "w")) == NULL)
error(buf);
clean = FILE_ORIG;
}
/*
* The databases actually contain three copies of the original data.
* Each password file entry is converted into a rough approximation
* of a ``struct passwd'', with the strings placed inline. This
* object is then stored as the data for three separate keys. The
* first key * is the pw_name field prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNAME
* character. The second key is the pw_uid field prepended by the
* _PW_KEYBYUID character. The third key is the line number in the
* original file prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNUM character. (The special
* characters are prepended to ensure that the keys do not collide.)
*/
/* In order to transition this file into a machine-independent
* form, we have to change the format of entries. However, since
* older binaries will still expect the old MD format entries, we
* create those as usual and use versioned tags for the new entries.
*/
if (username == NULL) {
/* Do not add the VERSION tag when updating a single
* user. When operating on `old format' databases, this
* would result in applications `seeing' only the updated
* entries.
*/
key.data = verskey;
key.size = sizeof(verskey)-1;
data.data = &version;
data.size = 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, 0) == -1)
error("put");
if ((dp->put)(sdp, &key, &data, 0) == -1)
error("put");
}
ypcnt = 1;
data.data = (u_char *)buf;
sdata.data = (u_char *)sbuf;
key.data = (u_char *)tbuf;
for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd); ++cnt) {
if (!is_comment &&
(pwd.pw_name[0] == '+' || pwd.pw_name[0] == '-'))
yp_enabled = 1;
if (is_comment)
--cnt;
#define COMPACT(e) t = e; while ((*p++ = *t++));
#define SCALAR(e) store = htonl((uint32_t)(e)); \
memmove(p, &store, sizeof(store)); \
p += sizeof(store);
#define LSCALAR(e) store = HTOL((uint32_t)(e)); \
memmove(p, &store, sizeof(store)); \
p += sizeof(store);
#define HTOL(e) (openinfo.lorder == BYTE_ORDER ? \
(uint32_t)(e) : \
bswap32((uint32_t)(e)))
if (!is_comment &&
(!username || (strcmp(username, pwd.pw_name) == 0))) {
/* Create insecure data. */
p = buf;
COMPACT(pwd.pw_name);
COMPACT("*");
SCALAR(pwd.pw_uid);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_gid);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_change);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_class);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_expire);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_fields);
data.size = p - buf;
/* Create secure data. */
p = sbuf;
COMPACT(pwd.pw_name);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_passwd);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_uid);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_gid);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_change);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_class);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_expire);
SCALAR(pwd.pw_fields);
sdata.size = p - sbuf;
/* Store insecure by name. */
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNAME);
len = strlen(pwd.pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure by number. */
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNUM);
store = htonl(cnt);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure by uid. */
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYUID);
store = htonl(pwd.pw_uid);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, methoduid) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by name. */
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNAME);
len = strlen(pwd.pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by number. */
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNUM);
store = htonl(cnt);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by uid. */
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYUID);
store = htonl(pwd.pw_uid);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, methoduid) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure and secure special plus and special minus */
if (pwd.pw_name[0] == '+' || pwd.pw_name[0] == '-') {
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYYPBYNUM);
store = htonl(ypcnt);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
ypcnt++;
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
}
/* Create insecure data. (legacy version) */
p = buf;
COMPACT(pwd.pw_name);
COMPACT("*");
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_uid);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_gid);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_change);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_class);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_expire);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_fields);
data.size = p - buf;
/* Create secure data. (legacy version) */
p = sbuf;
COMPACT(pwd.pw_name);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_passwd);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_uid);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_gid);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_change);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_class);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir);
COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_expire);
LSCALAR(pwd.pw_fields);
sdata.size = p - sbuf;
/* Store insecure by name. */
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNAME);
len = strlen(pwd.pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure by number. */
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNUM);
store = HTOL(cnt);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure by uid. */
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYUID);
store = HTOL(pwd.pw_uid);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, methoduid) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by name. */
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNAME);
len = strlen(pwd.pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by number. */
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNUM);
store = HTOL(cnt);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store secure by uid. */
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYUID);
store = HTOL(pwd.pw_uid);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, methoduid) == -1)
error("put");
/* Store insecure and secure special plus and special minus */
if (pwd.pw_name[0] == '+' || pwd.pw_name[0] == '-') {
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYYPBYNUM);
store = HTOL(ypcnt);
memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store));
ypcnt++;
key.size = sizeof(store) + 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1)
error("put");
}
}
/* Create original format password file entry */
if (is_comment && makeold){ /* copy comments */
if (fprintf(oldfp, "%s\n", line) < 0)
error("write old");
} else if (makeold) {
char uidstr[20];
char gidstr[20];
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%u", pwd.pw_uid);
snprintf(gidstr, sizeof(gidstr), "%u", pwd.pw_gid);
if (fprintf(oldfp, "%s:*:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n",
pwd.pw_name, pwd.pw_fields & _PWF_UID ? uidstr : "",
pwd.pw_fields & _PWF_GID ? gidstr : "",
pwd.pw_gecos, pwd.pw_dir, pwd.pw_shell) < 0)
error("write old");
}
}
/* If YP enabled, set flag. */
if (yp_enabled) {
buf[0] = yp_enabled + 2;
data.size = 1;
key.size = 1;
tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYYPENABLED);
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
tbuf[0] = LEGACY_VERSION(_PW_KEYYPENABLED);
key.size = 1;
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &data, method) == -1)
error("put");
}
if ((dp->close)(dp) == -1)
error("close");
if ((sdp->close)(sdp) == -1)
error("close");
if (makeold) {
(void)fflush(oldfp);
if (fclose(oldfp) == EOF)
error("close old");
}
/* Set master.passwd permissions, in case caller forgot. */
(void)fchmod(fileno(fp), S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
/* Install as the real password files. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _MP_DB);
mv(buf, buf2);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB);
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _SMP_DB);
mv(buf, buf2);
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _PASSWD);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
mv(buf, buf2);
}
/*
* Move the master password LAST -- chpass(1), passwd(1) and vipw(8)
* all use flock(2) on it to block other incarnations of themselves.
* The rename means that everything is unlocked, as the original file
* can no longer be accessed.
*/
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", prefix, _MASTERPASSWD);
mv(pname, buf);
/*
* Close locked password file after rename()
*/
if (fclose(fp) == EOF)
error("close fp");
exit(0);
}
int
scan(FILE *fp, struct passwd *pw)
{
static int lcnt;
size_t len;
char *p;
p = fgetln(fp, &len);
if (p == NULL)
return (0);
++lcnt;
/*
* ``... if I swallow anything evil, put your fingers down my
* throat...''
* -- The Who
*/
if (len > 0 && p[len - 1] == '\n')
len--;
if (len >= sizeof(line) - 1) {
warnx("line #%d too long", lcnt);
goto fmt;
}
memcpy(line, p, len);
line[len] = '\0';
/*
* Ignore comments: ^[ \t]*#
*/
for (p = line; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (*p != ' ' && *p != '\t')
break;
if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0') {
is_comment = 1;
return(1);
} else
is_comment = 0;
if (!__pw_scan(line, pw, _PWSCAN_WARN|_PWSCAN_MASTER)) {
warnx("at line #%d", lcnt);
fmt: errno = EFTYPE; /* XXX */
error(pname);
}
return (1);
}
void
cp(char *from, char *to, mode_t mode)
{
static char buf[MAXBSIZE];
int from_fd, rcount, to_fd, wcount;
if ((from_fd = open(from, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
error(from);
if ((to_fd = open(to, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)) < 0)
error(to);
while ((rcount = read(from_fd, buf, MAXBSIZE)) > 0) {
wcount = write(to_fd, buf, rcount);
if (rcount != wcount || wcount == -1) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
if (rcount < 0) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
mv(char *from, char *to)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (rename(from, to)) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
error(const char *name)
{
warn("%s", name);
cleanup();
exit(1);
}
void
cleanup(void)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
switch(clean) {
case FILE_ORIG:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
(void)unlink(buf);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case FILE_SECURE:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB);
(void)unlink(buf);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case FILE_INSECURE:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB);
(void)unlink(buf);
}
}
static void
usage(void)
{
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"usage: pwd_mkdb [-BCiLNp] [-d directory] [-s cachesize] [-u username] file\n");
exit(1);
}