7e31d1de7e
Patch mostly generated with cocinnelle: @@ expression E1,E2; @@ - priv_check_cred(E1,E2,0) + priv_check_cred(E1,E2) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
1420 lines
38 KiB
C
1420 lines
38 KiB
C
/*-
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2008-2010 Edward Tomasz Napierała <trasz@FreeBSD.org>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/*
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* ACL support routines specific to NFSv4 access control lists. These are
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* utility routines for code common across file systems implementing NFSv4
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* ACLs.
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*/
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#ifdef _KERNEL
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/module.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/priv.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/acl.h>
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#else
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <sys/acl.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#define KASSERT(a, b) assert(a)
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#define CTASSERT(a)
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#endif /* !_KERNEL */
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#ifdef _KERNEL
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static void acl_nfs4_trivial_from_mode(struct acl *aclp, mode_t mode);
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static int acl_nfs4_old_semantics = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_vfs, OID_AUTO, acl_nfs4_old_semantics, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&acl_nfs4_old_semantics, 0, "Use pre-PSARC/2010/029 NFSv4 ACL semantics");
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static struct {
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accmode_t accmode;
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int mask;
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} accmode2mask[] = {{VREAD, ACL_READ_DATA},
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{VWRITE, ACL_WRITE_DATA},
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{VAPPEND, ACL_APPEND_DATA},
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{VEXEC, ACL_EXECUTE},
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{VREAD_NAMED_ATTRS, ACL_READ_NAMED_ATTRS},
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{VWRITE_NAMED_ATTRS, ACL_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS},
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{VDELETE_CHILD, ACL_DELETE_CHILD},
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{VREAD_ATTRIBUTES, ACL_READ_ATTRIBUTES},
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{VWRITE_ATTRIBUTES, ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES},
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{VDELETE, ACL_DELETE},
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{VREAD_ACL, ACL_READ_ACL},
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{VWRITE_ACL, ACL_WRITE_ACL},
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{VWRITE_OWNER, ACL_WRITE_OWNER},
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{VSYNCHRONIZE, ACL_SYNCHRONIZE},
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{0, 0}};
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static int
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_access_mask_from_accmode(accmode_t accmode)
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{
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int access_mask = 0, i;
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for (i = 0; accmode2mask[i].accmode != 0; i++) {
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if (accmode & accmode2mask[i].accmode)
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access_mask |= accmode2mask[i].mask;
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}
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/*
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* VAPPEND is just a modifier for VWRITE; if the caller asked
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* for 'VAPPEND | VWRITE', we want to check for ACL_APPEND_DATA only.
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*/
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if (access_mask & ACL_APPEND_DATA)
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access_mask &= ~ACL_WRITE_DATA;
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return (access_mask);
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}
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/*
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* Return 0, iff access is allowed, 1 otherwise.
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*/
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static int
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_acl_denies(const struct acl *aclp, int access_mask, struct ucred *cred,
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int file_uid, int file_gid, int *denied_explicitly)
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{
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int i;
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const struct acl_entry *entry;
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if (denied_explicitly != NULL)
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*denied_explicitly = 0;
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KASSERT(aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
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("aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
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for (i = 0; i < aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
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entry = &(aclp->acl_entry[i]);
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if (entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW &&
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entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY)
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continue;
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if (entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY)
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continue;
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switch (entry->ae_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
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continue;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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if (entry->ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
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continue;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
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continue;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP:
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if (!groupmember(entry->ae_id, cred))
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continue;
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break;
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default:
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KASSERT(entry->ae_tag == ACL_EVERYONE,
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("entry->ae_tag == ACL_EVERYONE"));
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}
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if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY) {
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if (entry->ae_perm & access_mask) {
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if (denied_explicitly != NULL)
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*denied_explicitly = 1;
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return (1);
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}
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}
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access_mask &= ~(entry->ae_perm);
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if (access_mask == 0)
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return (0);
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}
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if (access_mask == 0)
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return (0);
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return (1);
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}
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int
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vaccess_acl_nfs4(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
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struct acl *aclp, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
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{
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accmode_t priv_granted = 0;
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int denied, explicitly_denied, access_mask, is_directory,
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must_be_owner = 0;
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mode_t file_mode = 0;
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KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND |
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VEXPLICIT_DENY | VREAD_NAMED_ATTRS | VWRITE_NAMED_ATTRS |
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VDELETE_CHILD | VREAD_ATTRIBUTES | VWRITE_ATTRIBUTES | VDELETE |
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VREAD_ACL | VWRITE_ACL | VWRITE_OWNER | VSYNCHRONIZE)) == 0,
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("invalid bit in accmode"));
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KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE),
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("VAPPEND without VWRITE"));
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if (privused != NULL)
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*privused = 0;
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if (accmode & VADMIN)
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must_be_owner = 1;
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/*
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* Ignore VSYNCHRONIZE permission.
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*/
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accmode &= ~VSYNCHRONIZE;
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access_mask = _access_mask_from_accmode(accmode);
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if (type == VDIR)
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is_directory = 1;
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else
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is_directory = 0;
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/*
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* File owner is always allowed to read and write the ACL
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* and basic attributes. This is to prevent a situation
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* where user would change ACL in a way that prevents him
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* from undoing the change.
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*/
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if (file_uid == cred->cr_uid)
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access_mask &= ~(ACL_READ_ACL | ACL_WRITE_ACL |
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ACL_READ_ATTRIBUTES | ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
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/*
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* Ignore append permission for regular files; use write
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* permission instead.
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*/
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if (!is_directory && (access_mask & ACL_APPEND_DATA)) {
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access_mask &= ~ACL_APPEND_DATA;
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access_mask |= ACL_WRITE_DATA;
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}
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denied = _acl_denies(aclp, access_mask, cred, file_uid, file_gid,
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&explicitly_denied);
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if (must_be_owner) {
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if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
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denied = EPERM;
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}
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/*
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* For VEXEC, ensure that at least one execute bit is set for
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* non-directories. We have to check the mode here to stay
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* consistent with execve(2). See the test in
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* exec_check_permissions().
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*/
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acl_nfs4_sync_mode_from_acl(&file_mode, aclp);
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if (!denied && !is_directory && (accmode & VEXEC) &&
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(file_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) == 0)
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denied = EACCES;
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if (!denied)
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return (0);
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/*
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* Access failed. Iff it was not denied explicitly and
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* VEXPLICIT_DENY flag was specified, allow access.
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*/
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if ((accmode & VEXPLICIT_DENY) && explicitly_denied == 0)
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return (0);
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accmode &= ~VEXPLICIT_DENY;
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/*
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* No match. Try to use privileges, if there are any.
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*/
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if (is_directory) {
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if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP))
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priv_granted |= VEXEC;
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} else {
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/*
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* Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise,
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* a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want
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* this to happen unless the file really is executable.
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*/
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if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (file_mode &
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(S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 &&
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!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC))
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priv_granted |= VEXEC;
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}
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if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ))
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priv_granted |= VREAD;
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if ((accmode & (VWRITE | VAPPEND | VDELETE_CHILD)) &&
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!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE))
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priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND | VDELETE_CHILD);
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if ((accmode & VADMIN_PERMS) &&
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!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN))
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priv_granted |= VADMIN_PERMS;
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if ((accmode & VSTAT_PERMS) &&
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!priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_STAT))
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priv_granted |= VSTAT_PERMS;
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if ((accmode & priv_granted) == accmode) {
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if (privused != NULL)
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*privused = 1;
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return (0);
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}
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if (accmode & (VADMIN_PERMS | VDELETE_CHILD | VDELETE))
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denied = EPERM;
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else
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denied = EACCES;
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return (denied);
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}
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#endif /* _KERNEL */
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static int
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_acl_entry_matches(struct acl_entry *entry, acl_tag_t tag, acl_perm_t perm,
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acl_entry_type_t entry_type)
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{
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if (entry->ae_tag != tag)
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return (0);
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if (entry->ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
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return (0);
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if (entry->ae_perm != perm)
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return (0);
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if (entry->ae_entry_type != entry_type)
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return (0);
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if (entry->ae_flags != 0)
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return (0);
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return (1);
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}
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static struct acl_entry *
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_acl_append(struct acl *aclp, acl_tag_t tag, acl_perm_t perm,
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acl_entry_type_t entry_type)
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{
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struct acl_entry *entry;
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KASSERT(aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
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("aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
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entry = &(aclp->acl_entry[aclp->acl_cnt]);
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aclp->acl_cnt++;
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entry->ae_tag = tag;
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entry->ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
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entry->ae_perm = perm;
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entry->ae_entry_type = entry_type;
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entry->ae_flags = 0;
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return (entry);
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}
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static struct acl_entry *
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_acl_duplicate_entry(struct acl *aclp, int entry_index)
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{
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int i;
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KASSERT(aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
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("aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
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for (i = aclp->acl_cnt; i > entry_index; i--)
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aclp->acl_entry[i] = aclp->acl_entry[i - 1];
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aclp->acl_cnt++;
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return (&(aclp->acl_entry[entry_index + 1]));
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}
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static void
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acl_nfs4_sync_acl_from_mode_draft(struct acl *aclp, mode_t mode,
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int file_owner_id)
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{
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int i, meets, must_append;
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struct acl_entry *entry, *copy, *previous,
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*a1, *a2, *a3, *a4, *a5, *a6;
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mode_t amode;
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const int READ = 04;
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const int WRITE = 02;
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const int EXEC = 01;
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KASSERT(aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
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("aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
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/*
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* NFSv4 Minor Version 1, draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion1-03.txt
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*
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* 3.16.6.3. Applying a Mode to an Existing ACL
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*/
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/*
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* 1. For each ACE:
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
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entry = &(aclp->acl_entry[i]);
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/*
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* 1.1. If the type is neither ALLOW or DENY - skip.
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*/
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if (entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW &&
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entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY)
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continue;
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/*
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* 1.2. If ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY is set - skip.
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*/
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if (entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY)
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continue;
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/*
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* 1.3. If ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT or ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT
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* are set:
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*/
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if (entry->ae_flags &
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(ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT | ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT)) {
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/*
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* 1.3.1. A copy of the current ACE is made, and placed
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* in the ACL immediately following the current
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* ACE.
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*/
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copy = _acl_duplicate_entry(aclp, i);
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/*
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* 1.3.2. In the first ACE, the flag
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* ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY is set.
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*/
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entry->ae_flags |= ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY;
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/*
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* 1.3.3. In the second ACE, the following flags
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* are cleared:
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* ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT,
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* ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT,
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* ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT.
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*/
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copy->ae_flags &= ~(ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT |
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ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
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ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT);
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/*
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* The algorithm continues on with the second ACE.
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*/
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i++;
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entry = copy;
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}
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/*
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* 1.4. If it's owner@, group@ or everyone@ entry, clear
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* ACL_READ_DATA, ACL_WRITE_DATA, ACL_APPEND_DATA
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* and ACL_EXECUTE. Continue to the next entry.
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*/
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if (entry->ae_tag == ACL_USER_OBJ ||
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entry->ae_tag == ACL_GROUP_OBJ ||
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entry->ae_tag == ACL_EVERYONE) {
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entry->ae_perm &= ~(ACL_READ_DATA | ACL_WRITE_DATA |
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ACL_APPEND_DATA | ACL_EXECUTE);
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continue;
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}
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/*
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* 1.5. Otherwise, if the "who" field did not match one
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* of OWNER@, GROUP@, EVERYONE@:
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*
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* 1.5.1. If the type is ALLOW, check the preceding ACE.
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* If it does not meet all of the following criteria:
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*/
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if (entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
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continue;
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meets = 0;
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if (i > 0) {
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meets = 1;
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previous = &(aclp->acl_entry[i - 1]);
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/*
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* 1.5.1.1. The type field is DENY,
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*/
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if (previous->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY)
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meets = 0;
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/*
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* 1.5.1.2. The "who" field is the same as the current
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* ACE,
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*
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* 1.5.1.3. The flag bit ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP
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* is the same as it is in the current ACE,
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* and no other flag bits are set,
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*/
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if (previous->ae_id != entry->ae_id ||
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previous->ae_tag != entry->ae_tag)
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meets = 0;
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if (previous->ae_flags)
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meets = 0;
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/*
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* 1.5.1.4. The mask bits are a subset of the mask bits
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* of the current ACE, and are also subset of
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* the following: ACL_READ_DATA,
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* ACL_WRITE_DATA, ACL_APPEND_DATA, ACL_EXECUTE
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*/
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if (previous->ae_perm & ~(entry->ae_perm))
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meets = 0;
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if (previous->ae_perm & ~(ACL_READ_DATA |
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ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA | ACL_EXECUTE))
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meets = 0;
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}
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|
|
if (!meets) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Then the ACE of type DENY, with a who equal
|
|
* to the current ACE, flag bits equal to
|
|
* (<current ACE flags> & <ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP>)
|
|
* and no mask bits, is prepended.
|
|
*/
|
|
previous = entry;
|
|
entry = _acl_duplicate_entry(aclp, i);
|
|
|
|
/* Adjust counter, as we've just added an entry. */
|
|
i++;
|
|
|
|
previous->ae_tag = entry->ae_tag;
|
|
previous->ae_id = entry->ae_id;
|
|
previous->ae_flags = entry->ae_flags;
|
|
previous->ae_perm = 0;
|
|
previous->ae_entry_type = ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 1.5.2. The following modifications are made to the prepended
|
|
* ACE. The intent is to mask the following ACE
|
|
* to disallow ACL_READ_DATA, ACL_WRITE_DATA,
|
|
* ACL_APPEND_DATA, or ACL_EXECUTE, based upon the group
|
|
* permissions of the new mode. As a special case,
|
|
* if the ACE matches the current owner of the file,
|
|
* the owner bits are used, rather than the group bits.
|
|
* This is reflected in the algorithm below.
|
|
*/
|
|
amode = mode >> 3;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP is not set, and the "who" field
|
|
* in ACE matches the owner of the file, we shift amode three
|
|
* more bits, in order to have the owner permission bits
|
|
* placed in the three low order bits of amode.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->ae_tag == ACL_USER && entry->ae_id == file_owner_id)
|
|
amode = amode >> 3;
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ_DATA) {
|
|
if (amode & READ)
|
|
previous->ae_perm &= ~ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
previous->ae_perm |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE_DATA) {
|
|
if (amode & WRITE)
|
|
previous->ae_perm &= ~ACL_WRITE_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
previous->ae_perm |= ACL_WRITE_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_perm & ACL_APPEND_DATA) {
|
|
if (amode & WRITE)
|
|
previous->ae_perm &= ~ACL_APPEND_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
previous->ae_perm |= ACL_APPEND_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) {
|
|
if (amode & EXEC)
|
|
previous->ae_perm &= ~ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
else
|
|
previous->ae_perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 1.5.3. If ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP is set in the flags
|
|
* of the ALLOW ace:
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: This point is not there in the Falkner's draft.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->ae_tag == ACL_GROUP &&
|
|
entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW) {
|
|
mode_t extramode, ownermode;
|
|
extramode = (mode >> 3) & 07;
|
|
ownermode = mode >> 6;
|
|
extramode &= ~ownermode;
|
|
|
|
if (extramode) {
|
|
if (extramode & READ) {
|
|
entry->ae_perm &= ~ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
previous->ae_perm &= ~ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (extramode & WRITE) {
|
|
entry->ae_perm &=
|
|
~(ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
previous->ae_perm &=
|
|
~(ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (extramode & EXEC) {
|
|
entry->ae_perm &= ~ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
previous->ae_perm &= ~ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2. If there at least six ACEs, the final six ACEs are examined.
|
|
* If they are not equal to what we want, append six ACEs.
|
|
*/
|
|
must_append = 0;
|
|
if (aclp->acl_cnt < 6) {
|
|
must_append = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
a6 = &(aclp->acl_entry[aclp->acl_cnt - 1]);
|
|
a5 = &(aclp->acl_entry[aclp->acl_cnt - 2]);
|
|
a4 = &(aclp->acl_entry[aclp->acl_cnt - 3]);
|
|
a3 = &(aclp->acl_entry[aclp->acl_cnt - 4]);
|
|
a2 = &(aclp->acl_entry[aclp->acl_cnt - 5]);
|
|
a1 = &(aclp->acl_entry[aclp->acl_cnt - 6]);
|
|
|
|
if (!_acl_entry_matches(a1, ACL_USER_OBJ, 0,
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY))
|
|
must_append = 1;
|
|
if (!_acl_entry_matches(a2, ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_WRITE_ACL |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_OWNER | ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW))
|
|
must_append = 1;
|
|
if (!_acl_entry_matches(a3, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 0,
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY))
|
|
must_append = 1;
|
|
if (!_acl_entry_matches(a4, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 0,
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW))
|
|
must_append = 1;
|
|
if (!_acl_entry_matches(a5, ACL_EVERYONE, ACL_WRITE_ACL |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_OWNER | ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY))
|
|
must_append = 1;
|
|
if (!_acl_entry_matches(a6, ACL_EVERYONE, ACL_READ_ACL |
|
|
ACL_READ_ATTRIBUTES | ACL_READ_NAMED_ATTRS |
|
|
ACL_SYNCHRONIZE, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW))
|
|
must_append = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (must_append) {
|
|
KASSERT(aclp->acl_cnt + 6 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
|
|
("aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
|
|
|
|
a1 = _acl_append(aclp, ACL_USER_OBJ, 0, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY);
|
|
a2 = _acl_append(aclp, ACL_USER_OBJ, ACL_WRITE_ACL |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_OWNER | ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
|
|
a3 = _acl_append(aclp, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 0, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY);
|
|
a4 = _acl_append(aclp, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, 0, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
|
|
a5 = _acl_append(aclp, ACL_EVERYONE, ACL_WRITE_ACL |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_OWNER | ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY);
|
|
a6 = _acl_append(aclp, ACL_EVERYONE, ACL_READ_ACL |
|
|
ACL_READ_ATTRIBUTES | ACL_READ_NAMED_ATTRS |
|
|
ACL_SYNCHRONIZE, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(a1 != NULL && a2 != NULL && a3 != NULL && a4 != NULL &&
|
|
a5 != NULL && a6 != NULL, ("couldn't append to ACL."));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 3. The final six ACEs are adjusted according to the incoming mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mode & S_IRUSR)
|
|
a2->ae_perm |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
a1->ae_perm |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWUSR)
|
|
a2->ae_perm |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
else
|
|
a1->ae_perm |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
if (mode & S_IXUSR)
|
|
a2->ae_perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
else
|
|
a1->ae_perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
|
|
if (mode & S_IRGRP)
|
|
a4->ae_perm |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
a3->ae_perm |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWGRP)
|
|
a4->ae_perm |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
else
|
|
a3->ae_perm |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
if (mode & S_IXGRP)
|
|
a4->ae_perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
else
|
|
a3->ae_perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
|
|
if (mode & S_IROTH)
|
|
a6->ae_perm |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
a5->ae_perm |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWOTH)
|
|
a6->ae_perm |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
else
|
|
a5->ae_perm |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
if (mode & S_IXOTH)
|
|
a6->ae_perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
else
|
|
a5->ae_perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
void
|
|
acl_nfs4_sync_acl_from_mode(struct acl *aclp, mode_t mode,
|
|
int file_owner_id)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (acl_nfs4_old_semantics)
|
|
acl_nfs4_sync_acl_from_mode_draft(aclp, mode, file_owner_id);
|
|
else
|
|
acl_nfs4_trivial_from_mode(aclp, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* _KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
acl_nfs4_sync_mode_from_acl(mode_t *_mode, const struct acl *aclp)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
mode_t old_mode = *_mode, mode = 0, seen = 0;
|
|
const struct acl_entry *entry;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
|
|
("aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NFSv4 Minor Version 1, draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion1-03.txt
|
|
*
|
|
* 3.16.6.1. Recomputing mode upon SETATTR of ACL
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
entry = &(aclp->acl_entry[i]);
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW &&
|
|
entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_tag == ACL_USER_OBJ) {
|
|
if ((entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ_DATA) &&
|
|
((seen & S_IRUSR) == 0)) {
|
|
seen |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE_DATA) &&
|
|
((seen & S_IWUSR) == 0)) {
|
|
seen |= S_IWUSR;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IWUSR;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) &&
|
|
((seen & S_IXUSR) == 0)) {
|
|
seen |= S_IXUSR;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IXUSR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (entry->ae_tag == ACL_GROUP_OBJ) {
|
|
if ((entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ_DATA) &&
|
|
((seen & S_IRGRP) == 0)) {
|
|
seen |= S_IRGRP;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IRGRP;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE_DATA) &&
|
|
((seen & S_IWGRP) == 0)) {
|
|
seen |= S_IWGRP;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IWGRP;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) &&
|
|
((seen & S_IXGRP) == 0)) {
|
|
seen |= S_IXGRP;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IXGRP;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (entry->ae_tag == ACL_EVERYONE) {
|
|
if (entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ_DATA) {
|
|
if ((seen & S_IRUSR) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IRUSR;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((seen & S_IRGRP) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IRGRP;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IRGRP;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((seen & S_IROTH) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IROTH;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IROTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE_DATA) {
|
|
if ((seen & S_IWUSR) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IWUSR;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IWUSR;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((seen & S_IWGRP) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IWGRP;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IWGRP;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((seen & S_IWOTH) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IWOTH;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IWOTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) {
|
|
if ((seen & S_IXUSR) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IXUSR;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IXUSR;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((seen & S_IXGRP) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IXGRP;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IXGRP;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((seen & S_IXOTH) == 0) {
|
|
seen |= S_IXOTH;
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
mode |= S_IXOTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*_mode = mode | (old_mode & ACL_PRESERVE_MASK);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate inherited ACL in a manner compatible with NFSv4 Minor Version 1,
|
|
* draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion1-03.txt.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
acl_nfs4_compute_inherited_acl_draft(const struct acl *parent_aclp,
|
|
struct acl *child_aclp, mode_t mode, int file_owner_id,
|
|
int is_directory)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, flags;
|
|
const struct acl_entry *parent_entry;
|
|
struct acl_entry *entry, *copy;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(child_aclp->acl_cnt == 0, ("child_aclp->acl_cnt == 0"));
|
|
KASSERT(parent_aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
|
|
("parent_aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NFSv4 Minor Version 1, draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion1-03.txt
|
|
*
|
|
* 3.16.6.2. Applying the mode given to CREATE or OPEN
|
|
* to an inherited ACL
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 1. Form an ACL that is the concatenation of all inheritable ACEs.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < parent_aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
parent_entry = &(parent_aclp->acl_entry[i]);
|
|
flags = parent_entry->ae_flags;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Entry is not inheritable at all.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((flags & (ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT)) == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're creating a file, but entry is not inheritable
|
|
* by files.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!is_directory && (flags & ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT) == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Entry is inheritable only by files, but has NO_PROPAGATE
|
|
* flag set, and we're creating a directory, so it wouldn't
|
|
* propagate to any file in that directory anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_directory &&
|
|
(flags & ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT) == 0 &&
|
|
(flags & ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(child_aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
|
|
("child_aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
|
|
child_aclp->acl_entry[child_aclp->acl_cnt] = *parent_entry;
|
|
child_aclp->acl_cnt++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2. For each entry in the new ACL, adjust its flags, possibly
|
|
* creating two entries in place of one.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < child_aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
entry = &(child_aclp->acl_entry[i]);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is not in the specification, but SunOS
|
|
* apparently does that.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (((entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT) ||
|
|
!is_directory) &&
|
|
entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
entry->ae_perm &= ~(ACL_WRITE_ACL | ACL_WRITE_OWNER);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2.A. If the ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT is set, or if the object
|
|
* being created is not a directory, then clear the
|
|
* following flags: ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT,
|
|
* ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT, ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT,
|
|
* ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT ||
|
|
!is_directory) {
|
|
entry->ae_flags &= ~(ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT | ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Continue on to the next ACE.
|
|
*/
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2.B. If the object is a directory and ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT
|
|
* is set, but ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT is not set, ensure
|
|
* that ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY is set. Continue to the
|
|
* next ACE. Otherwise...
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: Read it again and make sure what does the "otherwise"
|
|
* apply to.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_directory &&
|
|
(entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT) &&
|
|
((entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT) == 0)) {
|
|
entry->ae_flags |= ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2.C. If the type of the ACE is neither ALLOW nor deny,
|
|
* then continue.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW &&
|
|
entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2.D. Copy the original ACE into a second, adjacent ACE.
|
|
*/
|
|
copy = _acl_duplicate_entry(child_aclp, i);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2.E. On the first ACE, ensure that ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY
|
|
* is set.
|
|
*/
|
|
entry->ae_flags |= ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2.F. On the second ACE, clear the following flags:
|
|
* ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT, ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT,
|
|
* ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT, ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY.
|
|
*/
|
|
copy->ae_flags &= ~(ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT | ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 2.G. On the second ACE, if the type is ALLOW,
|
|
* an implementation MAY clear the following
|
|
* mask bits: ACL_WRITE_ACL, ACL_WRITE_OWNER.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (copy->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW)
|
|
copy->ae_perm &= ~(ACL_WRITE_ACL | ACL_WRITE_OWNER);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Increment the counter to skip the copied entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
i++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 3. To ensure that the mode is honored, apply the algorithm describe
|
|
* in Section 2.16.6.3, using the mode that is to be used for file
|
|
* creation.
|
|
*/
|
|
acl_nfs4_sync_acl_from_mode(child_aclp, mode, file_owner_id);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* _KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Populate the ACL with entries inherited from parent_aclp.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
acl_nfs4_inherit_entries(const struct acl *parent_aclp,
|
|
struct acl *child_aclp, mode_t mode, int file_owner_id,
|
|
int is_directory)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, flags, tag;
|
|
const struct acl_entry *parent_entry;
|
|
struct acl_entry *entry;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(parent_aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
|
|
("parent_aclp->acl_cnt <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < parent_aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
parent_entry = &(parent_aclp->acl_entry[i]);
|
|
flags = parent_entry->ae_flags;
|
|
tag = parent_entry->ae_tag;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't inherit owner@, group@, or everyone@ entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tag == ACL_USER_OBJ || tag == ACL_GROUP_OBJ ||
|
|
tag == ACL_EVERYONE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Entry is not inheritable at all.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((flags & (ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT)) == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're creating a file, but entry is not inheritable
|
|
* by files.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!is_directory && (flags & ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT) == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Entry is inheritable only by files, but has NO_PROPAGATE
|
|
* flag set, and we're creating a directory, so it wouldn't
|
|
* propagate to any file in that directory anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_directory &&
|
|
(flags & ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT) == 0 &&
|
|
(flags & ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Entry qualifies for being inherited.
|
|
*/
|
|
KASSERT(child_aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES,
|
|
("child_aclp->acl_cnt + 1 <= ACL_MAX_ENTRIES"));
|
|
entry = &(child_aclp->acl_entry[child_aclp->acl_cnt]);
|
|
*entry = *parent_entry;
|
|
child_aclp->acl_cnt++;
|
|
|
|
entry->ae_flags &= ~ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
entry->ae_flags |= ACL_ENTRY_INHERITED;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the type of the ACE is neither ALLOW nor DENY,
|
|
* then leave it as it is and proceed to the next one.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW &&
|
|
entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT is set, or if
|
|
* the object being created is not a directory, then clear
|
|
* the following flags: ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT,
|
|
* ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT, ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT,
|
|
* ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT ||
|
|
!is_directory) {
|
|
entry->ae_flags &= ~(ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT | ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the object is a directory and ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT
|
|
* is set, but ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT is not set, ensure
|
|
* that ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY is set.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_directory &&
|
|
(entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT) &&
|
|
((entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT) == 0)) {
|
|
entry->ae_flags |= ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type == ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW &&
|
|
(entry->ae_flags & ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY) == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some permissions must never be inherited.
|
|
*/
|
|
entry->ae_perm &= ~(ACL_WRITE_ACL | ACL_WRITE_OWNER |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS | ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Others must be masked according to the file mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((mode & S_IRGRP) == 0)
|
|
entry->ae_perm &= ~ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
if ((mode & S_IWGRP) == 0)
|
|
entry->ae_perm &=
|
|
~(ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
if ((mode & S_IXGRP) == 0)
|
|
entry->ae_perm &= ~ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate inherited ACL in a manner compatible with PSARC/2010/029.
|
|
* It's also being used to calculate a trivial ACL, by inheriting from
|
|
* a NULL ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
acl_nfs4_compute_inherited_acl_psarc(const struct acl *parent_aclp,
|
|
struct acl *aclp, mode_t mode, int file_owner_id, int is_directory)
|
|
{
|
|
acl_perm_t user_allow_first = 0, user_deny = 0, group_deny = 0;
|
|
acl_perm_t user_allow, group_allow, everyone_allow;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(aclp->acl_cnt == 0, ("aclp->acl_cnt == 0"));
|
|
|
|
user_allow = group_allow = everyone_allow = ACL_READ_ACL |
|
|
ACL_READ_ATTRIBUTES | ACL_READ_NAMED_ATTRS | ACL_SYNCHRONIZE;
|
|
user_allow |= ACL_WRITE_ACL | ACL_WRITE_OWNER | ACL_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES |
|
|
ACL_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS;
|
|
|
|
if (mode & S_IRUSR)
|
|
user_allow |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWUSR)
|
|
user_allow |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
if (mode & S_IXUSR)
|
|
user_allow |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
|
|
if (mode & S_IRGRP)
|
|
group_allow |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWGRP)
|
|
group_allow |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
if (mode & S_IXGRP)
|
|
group_allow |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
|
|
if (mode & S_IROTH)
|
|
everyone_allow |= ACL_READ_DATA;
|
|
if (mode & S_IWOTH)
|
|
everyone_allow |= (ACL_WRITE_DATA | ACL_APPEND_DATA);
|
|
if (mode & S_IXOTH)
|
|
everyone_allow |= ACL_EXECUTE;
|
|
|
|
user_deny = ((group_allow | everyone_allow) & ~user_allow);
|
|
group_deny = everyone_allow & ~group_allow;
|
|
user_allow_first = group_deny & ~user_deny;
|
|
|
|
if (user_allow_first != 0)
|
|
_acl_append(aclp, ACL_USER_OBJ, user_allow_first,
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
|
|
if (user_deny != 0)
|
|
_acl_append(aclp, ACL_USER_OBJ, user_deny,
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY);
|
|
if (group_deny != 0)
|
|
_acl_append(aclp, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, group_deny,
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY);
|
|
|
|
if (parent_aclp != NULL)
|
|
acl_nfs4_inherit_entries(parent_aclp, aclp, mode,
|
|
file_owner_id, is_directory);
|
|
|
|
_acl_append(aclp, ACL_USER_OBJ, user_allow, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
|
|
_acl_append(aclp, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, group_allow, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
|
|
_acl_append(aclp, ACL_EVERYONE, everyone_allow, ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
void
|
|
acl_nfs4_compute_inherited_acl(const struct acl *parent_aclp,
|
|
struct acl *child_aclp, mode_t mode, int file_owner_id,
|
|
int is_directory)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (acl_nfs4_old_semantics)
|
|
acl_nfs4_compute_inherited_acl_draft(parent_aclp, child_aclp,
|
|
mode, file_owner_id, is_directory);
|
|
else
|
|
acl_nfs4_compute_inherited_acl_psarc(parent_aclp, child_aclp,
|
|
mode, file_owner_id, is_directory);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* _KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate trivial ACL in a manner compatible with PSARC/2010/029.
|
|
* Note that this results in an ACL different from (but semantically
|
|
* equal to) the "canonical six" trivial ACL computed using algorithm
|
|
* described in draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion1-03.txt, 3.16.6.2.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
acl_nfs4_trivial_from_mode(struct acl *aclp, mode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
aclp->acl_cnt = 0;
|
|
acl_nfs4_compute_inherited_acl_psarc(NULL, aclp, mode, -1, -1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _KERNEL
|
|
/*
|
|
* This routine is used by libc to implement acl_strip_np(3)
|
|
* and acl_is_trivial_np(3).
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
acl_nfs4_trivial_from_mode_libc(struct acl *aclp, int mode, int canonical_six)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
aclp->acl_cnt = 0;
|
|
if (canonical_six)
|
|
acl_nfs4_sync_acl_from_mode_draft(aclp, mode, -1);
|
|
else
|
|
acl_nfs4_trivial_from_mode(aclp, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !_KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
static int
|
|
_acls_are_equal(const struct acl *a, const struct acl *b)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
const struct acl_entry *entrya, *entryb;
|
|
|
|
if (a->acl_cnt != b->acl_cnt)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < b->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
entrya = &(a->acl_entry[i]);
|
|
entryb = &(b->acl_entry[i]);
|
|
|
|
if (entrya->ae_tag != entryb->ae_tag ||
|
|
entrya->ae_id != entryb->ae_id ||
|
|
entrya->ae_perm != entryb->ae_perm ||
|
|
entrya->ae_entry_type != entryb->ae_entry_type ||
|
|
entrya->ae_flags != entryb->ae_flags)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This routine is used to determine whether to remove extended attribute
|
|
* that stores ACL contents.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
acl_nfs4_is_trivial(const struct acl *aclp, int file_owner_id)
|
|
{
|
|
int trivial;
|
|
mode_t tmpmode = 0;
|
|
struct acl *tmpaclp;
|
|
|
|
if (aclp->acl_cnt > 6)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compute the mode from the ACL, then compute new ACL from that mode.
|
|
* If the ACLs are identical, then the ACL is trivial.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: I guess there is a faster way to do this. However, even
|
|
* this slow implementation significantly speeds things up
|
|
* for files that don't have non-trivial ACLs - it's critical
|
|
* for performance to not use EA when they are not needed.
|
|
*
|
|
* First try the PSARC/2010/029 semantics.
|
|
*/
|
|
tmpaclp = acl_alloc(M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
acl_nfs4_sync_mode_from_acl(&tmpmode, aclp);
|
|
acl_nfs4_trivial_from_mode(tmpaclp, tmpmode);
|
|
trivial = _acls_are_equal(aclp, tmpaclp);
|
|
if (trivial) {
|
|
acl_free(tmpaclp);
|
|
return (trivial);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if it's a draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion1-03.txt trivial ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
tmpaclp->acl_cnt = 0;
|
|
acl_nfs4_sync_acl_from_mode_draft(tmpaclp, tmpmode, file_owner_id);
|
|
trivial = _acls_are_equal(aclp, tmpaclp);
|
|
acl_free(tmpaclp);
|
|
|
|
return (trivial);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* _KERNEL */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
acl_nfs4_check(const struct acl *aclp, int is_directory)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
const struct acl_entry *entry;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The spec doesn't seem to say anything about ACL validity.
|
|
* It seems there is not much to do here. There is even no need
|
|
* to count "owner@" or "everyone@" (ACL_USER_OBJ and ACL_EVERYONE)
|
|
* entries, as there can be several of them and that's perfectly
|
|
* valid. There can be none of them too. Really.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (aclp->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || aclp->acl_cnt <= 0)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
|
|
entry = &(aclp->acl_entry[i]);
|
|
|
|
switch (entry->ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
case ACL_EVERYONE:
|
|
if (entry->ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
if (entry->ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((entry->ae_perm | ACL_NFS4_PERM_BITS) != ACL_NFS4_PERM_BITS)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disallow ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_AUDIT and ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALARM for now.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_ALLOW &&
|
|
entry->ae_entry_type != ACL_ENTRY_TYPE_DENY)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
if ((entry->ae_flags | ACL_FLAGS_BITS) != ACL_FLAGS_BITS)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
/* Disallow unimplemented flags. */
|
|
if (entry->ae_flags & (ACL_ENTRY_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_FAILED_ACCESS))
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
/* Disallow flags not allowed for ordinary files. */
|
|
if (!is_directory) {
|
|
if (entry->ae_flags & (ACL_ENTRY_FILE_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_DIRECTORY_INHERIT |
|
|
ACL_ENTRY_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT | ACL_ENTRY_INHERIT_ONLY))
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _KERNEL
|
|
static int
|
|
acl_nfs4_modload(module_t module, int what, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (what) {
|
|
case MOD_LOAD:
|
|
case MOD_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MOD_QUIESCE:
|
|
/* XXX TODO */
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MOD_UNLOAD:
|
|
/* XXX TODO */
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = EINVAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static moduledata_t acl_nfs4_mod = {
|
|
"acl_nfs4",
|
|
acl_nfs4_modload,
|
|
NULL
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX TODO: which subsystem, order?
|
|
*/
|
|
DECLARE_MODULE(acl_nfs4, acl_nfs4_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST);
|
|
MODULE_VERSION(acl_nfs4, 1);
|
|
#endif /* _KERNEL */
|