4fcfcecfa8
Allow attaching of multiple geli providers at once if they use same passphrase and keyfiles. This is helpful when the providers being attached are not used for boot, and therefore the existing code to first try the cached password when tasting the providers during boot does not apply. Multiple providers with the same passphrase and keyfiles can be attached at the same time during system start-up by adding the following to rc.conf: geli_groups="storage backup" geli_storage_flags="-k /etc/geli/storage.keys" geli_storage_devices="ada0 ada1" geli_backup_flags="-j /etc/geli/backup.passfile -k /etc/geli/backup.keys" geli_backup_devices="ada2 ada3" Reviewed by: wblock, delphij, jilles Approved by: sobomax (src), bcr (doc) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12644
1131 lines
32 KiB
Groff
1131 lines
32 KiB
Groff
.\" Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pawel@dawidek.net>
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.\" All rights reserved.
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.\"
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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.\" are met:
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.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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.\"
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.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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.\" $FreeBSD$
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.\"
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.Dd June 27, 2018
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.Dt GELI 8
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.Os
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.Sh NAME
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|
.Nm geli
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|
.Nd "control utility for the cryptographic GEOM class"
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|
.Sh SYNOPSIS
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|
To compile GEOM_ELI into your kernel, add the following lines to your kernel
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|
configuration file:
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.Bd -ragged -offset indent
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.Cd "device crypto"
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.Cd "options GEOM_ELI"
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.Ed
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.Pp
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Alternatively, to load the GEOM_ELI module at boot time, add the following line
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to your
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.Xr loader.conf 5 :
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.Bd -literal -offset indent
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geom_eli_load="YES"
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.Ed
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.Pp
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|
Usage of the
|
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.Nm
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|
utility:
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.Pp
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm init
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|
.Op Fl bdgPTv
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|
.Op Fl a Ar aalgo
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|
.Op Fl B Ar backupfile
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|
.Op Fl e Ar ealgo
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|
.Op Fl i Ar iterations
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|
.Op Fl J Ar newpassfile
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.Op Fl K Ar newkeyfile
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.Op Fl l Ar keylen
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|
.Op Fl s Ar sectorsize
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|
.Op Fl V Ar version
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|
.Ar prov
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm label - an alias for
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|
.Cm init
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm attach
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|
.Op Fl Cdprv
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|
.Op Fl n Ar keyno
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|
.Op Fl j Ar passfile
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|
.Op Fl k Ar keyfile
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|
.Ar prov ...
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm detach
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|
.Op Fl fl
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|
.Ar prov ...
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm stop - an alias for
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|
.Cm detach
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm onetime
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|
.Op Fl dT
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|
.Op Fl a Ar aalgo
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|
.Op Fl e Ar ealgo
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|
.Op Fl l Ar keylen
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|
.Op Fl s Ar sectorsize
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|
.Ar prov
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm configure
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|
.Op Fl bBdDgGtT
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|
.Ar prov ...
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm setkey
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|
.Op Fl pPv
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|
.Op Fl i Ar iterations
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|
.Op Fl j Ar passfile
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|
.Op Fl J Ar newpassfile
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|
.Op Fl k Ar keyfile
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|
.Op Fl K Ar newkeyfile
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|
.Op Fl n Ar keyno
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|
.Ar prov
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm delkey
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|
.Op Fl afv
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|
.Op Fl n Ar keyno
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|
.Ar prov
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm kill
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|
.Op Fl av
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|
.Op Ar prov ...
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm backup
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|
.Op Fl v
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|
.Ar prov
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|
.Ar file
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm restore
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|
.Op Fl fv
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|
.Ar file
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|
.Ar prov
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm suspend
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|
.Op Fl v
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|
.Fl a | Ar prov ...
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.Nm
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|
.Cm resume
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|
.Op Fl pv
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|
.Op Fl j Ar passfile
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|
.Op Fl k Ar keyfile
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.Ar prov
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm resize
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|
.Op Fl v
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|
.Fl s Ar oldsize
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|
.Ar prov
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.Nm
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|
.Cm version
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|
.Op Ar prov ...
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm clear
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|
.Op Fl v
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|
.Ar prov ...
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm dump
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|
.Op Fl v
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|
.Ar prov ...
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.Nm
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|
.Cm list
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|
.Nm
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|
.Cm status
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.Nm
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|
.Cm load
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.Nm
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|
.Cm unload
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.Sh DESCRIPTION
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The
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.Nm
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|
utility is used to configure encryption on GEOM providers.
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.Pp
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The following is a list of the most important features:
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.Pp
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.Bl -bullet -offset indent -compact
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.It
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|
Utilizes the
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|
.Xr crypto 9
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|
framework, so when there is crypto hardware available,
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.Nm
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|
will make use of it automatically.
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.It
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Supports many cryptographic algorithms (currently
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.Nm AES-XTS ,
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|
.Nm AES-CBC ,
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|
.Nm Blowfish-CBC ,
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|
.Nm Camellia-CBC
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|
and
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|
.Nm 3DES-CBC ) .
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.It
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Can optionally perform data authentication (integrity verification) utilizing
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one of the following algorithms:
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.Nm HMAC/MD5 ,
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.Nm HMAC/SHA1 ,
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|
.Nm HMAC/RIPEMD160 ,
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA256 ,
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA384
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or
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.Nm HMAC/SHA512 .
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.It
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Can create a User Key from up to two, piecewise components: a passphrase
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entered via prompt or read from one or more passfiles; a keyfile read from
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one or more files.
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.It
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Allows encryption of the root partition.
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The user is asked for the passphrase before the root filesystem is mounted.
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.It
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Strengthens the passphrase component of the User Key with:
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.Rs
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.%A B. Kaliski
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.%T "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification, Version 2.0."
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.%R RFC
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|
.%N 2898
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.Re
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.It
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Allows the use of two independent User Keys (e.g., a
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.Qq "user key"
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and a
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.Qq "company key" ) .
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.It
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It is fast -
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.Nm
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performs simple sector-to-sector encryption.
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.It
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Allows the encrypted Master Key to be backed up and restored,
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so that if a user has to quickly destroy key material,
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it is possible to get the data back by restoring keys from
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backup.
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.It
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Providers can be configured to automatically detach on last close,
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so users do not have to remember to detach providers after unmounting
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the filesystems.
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.It
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Allows attaching a provider with a random, one-time Master Key,
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|
which is useful for swap partitions and temporary filesystems.
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.It
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Allows verification of data integrity (data authentication).
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.It
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Allows suspending and resuming encrypted devices.
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.El
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.Pp
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|
The first argument to
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.Nm
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|
indicates an action to be performed:
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.Bl -tag -width ".Cm configure"
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.It Cm init
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Initialize the provider which needs to be encrypted.
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Here you can set up the cryptographic algorithm to use, Data Key length,
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etc.
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|
The last sector of the provider is used to store metadata.
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|
The
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.Cm init
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|
subcommand also automatically writes metadata backups to
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.Pa /var/backups/<prov>.eli
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|
file.
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|
The metadata can be recovered with the
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|
.Cm restore
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|
subcommand described below.
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.Pp
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|
Additional options include:
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.Bl -tag -width ".Fl J Ar newpassfile"
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|
.It Fl a Ar aalgo
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|
Enable data integrity verification (authentication) using the given algorithm.
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|
This will reduce the size of storage available and also reduce speed.
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|
For example, when using 4096 bytes sector and
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA256
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|
algorithm, 89% of the original provider storage will be available for use.
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|
Currently supported algorithms are:
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.Nm HMAC/MD5 ,
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA1 ,
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.Nm HMAC/RIPEMD160 ,
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA256 ,
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA384
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|
and
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA512 .
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|
If the option is not given, there will be no authentication, only encryption.
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|
The recommended algorithm is
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|
.Nm HMAC/SHA256 .
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|
.It Fl b
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|
Try to decrypt this partition during boot, before the root partition is mounted.
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|
This makes it possible to use an encrypted root partition.
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|
One will still need bootable unencrypted storage with a
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|
.Pa /boot/
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|
directory, which can be a CD-ROM disc or USB pen-drive, that can be removed
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|
after boot.
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|
.It Fl B Ar backupfile
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|
File name to use for metadata backup instead of the default
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.Pa /var/backups/<prov>.eli .
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|
To inhibit backups, you can use
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|
.Pa none
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|
as the
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.Ar backupfile .
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|
.It Fl d
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|
When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo
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.Ql *
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|
characters.
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|
This makes the length of the passphrase visible.
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|
.It Fl e Ar ealgo
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|
Encryption algorithm to use.
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|
Currently supported algorithms are:
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|
.Nm AES-XTS ,
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|
.Nm AES-CBC ,
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|
.Nm Blowfish-CBC ,
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|
.Nm Camellia-CBC ,
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|
.Nm 3DES-CBC ,
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|
and
|
|
.Nm NULL .
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|
The default and recommended algorithm is
|
|
.Nm AES-XTS .
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|
.Nm NULL
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|
is unencrypted.
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|
.It Fl g
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|
Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem.
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|
The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads
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|
.Xr loader 8
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|
from the encrypted partition.
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|
.It Fl i Ar iterations
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|
Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2 when processing User Key
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|
passphrase component.
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|
If this option is not specified,
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|
.Nm
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|
will find the number of iterations which is equal to 2 seconds of crypto work.
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|
If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used.
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|
PKCS#5v2 processing is performed once, after all parts of the passphrase
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|
component have been read.
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|
.It Fl J Ar newpassfile
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|
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key
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|
(or part of it).
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|
If
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.Ar newpassfile
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|
is given as -, standard input will be used.
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|
Only the first line (excluding new-line character) is taken from the given file.
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|
This argument can be specified multiple times, which has the effect of
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|
reassembling a single passphrase split across multiple files.
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|
Cannot be combined with the
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.Fl P
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|
option.
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|
.It Fl K Ar newkeyfile
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|
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key
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(or part of it).
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|
If
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|
.Ar newkeyfile
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|
is given as -, standard input will be used.
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|
This argument can be specified multiple times, which has the effect of
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|
reassembling a single keyfile split across multiple keyfile parts.
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|
.It Fl l Ar keylen
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|
Data Key length to use with the given cryptographic algorithm.
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|
If the length is not specified, the selected algorithm uses its
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|
.Em default
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|
key length.
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|
.Bl -ohang -offset indent
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.It Nm AES-XTS
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|
.Em 128 ,
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|
256
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|
.It Nm AES-CBC , Nm Camellia-CBC
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|
.Em 128 ,
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|
192,
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|
256
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|
.It Nm Blowfish-CBC
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|
.Em 128
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|
+ n * 32, for n=[0..10]
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.It Nm 3DES-CBC
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|
.Em 192
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|
.El
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|
.It Fl P
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|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key.
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|
Cannot be combined with the
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.Fl J
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|
option.
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|
.It Fl s Ar sectorsize
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|
Change decrypted provider's sector size.
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|
Increasing the sector size allows increased performance,
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|
because encryption/decryption which requires an initialization vector
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|
is done per sector; fewer sectors means less computational work.
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|
.It Fl T
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|
Don't pass through
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.Dv BIO_DELETE
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|
calls (i.e., TRIM/UNMAP).
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|
This can prevent an attacker from knowing how much space you're actually
|
|
using and which sectors contain live data, but will also prevent the
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|
backing store (SSD, etc) from reclaiming space you're not using, which
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|
may degrade its performance and lifespan.
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|
The underlying provider may or may not actually obliterate the deleted
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sectors when TRIM is enabled, so it should not be considered to add any
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|
security.
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.It Fl V Ar version
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|
Metadata version to use.
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|
This option is helpful when creating a provider that may be used by older
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|
.Nm FreeBSD/GELI
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|
versions.
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|
Consult the
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|
.Sx HISTORY
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|
section to find which metadata version is supported by which
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|
.Fx
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|
version.
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|
Note that using an older version of metadata may limit the number of
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|
features available.
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.El
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|
.It Cm attach
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Attach the given providers.
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The encrypted Master Keys are loaded from the metadata and decrypted
|
|
using the given passphrase/keyfile and new GEOM providers are created
|
|
using the specified provider names.
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|
A
|
|
.Qq .eli
|
|
suffix is added to the user specified provider names.
|
|
Multiple providers can only be attached with a single
|
|
.Cm attach
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|
command if they all have the same passphrase and keyfiles.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl j Ar passfile"
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|
.It Fl C
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|
Do a dry-run decryption.
|
|
This is useful to verify passphrase and keyfile without decrypting the device.
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|
.It Fl d
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|
If specified, the decrypted providers are detached automatically on last close,
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|
so the user does not have to remember to detach
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|
providers after unmounting the filesystems.
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|
This only works when providers were opened for writing, and will not work if
|
|
the filesystems on the providers were mounted read-only.
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|
Probably a better choice is the
|
|
.Fl l
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|
option for the
|
|
.Cm detach
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|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl n Ar keyno
|
|
Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to use (could be 0 or 1).
|
|
If the index number is not provided all keys will be tested.
|
|
.It Fl j Ar passfile
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|
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key
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|
(or part of it).
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|
For more information see the description of the
|
|
.Fl J
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|
option for the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
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|
The same passfiles are used for all listed providers.
|
|
.It Fl k Ar keyfile
|
|
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key
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|
(or part of it).
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|
For more information see the description of the
|
|
.Fl K
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|
option for the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
The same keyfiles are used for all listed providers.
|
|
.It Fl p
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|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Keys.
|
|
Cannot be combined with the
|
|
.Fl j
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|
option.
|
|
.It Fl r
|
|
Attach read-only providers.
|
|
They are not opened for writing.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm detach
|
|
Detach the given providers, which means remove the devfs entry
|
|
and clear the Master Key and Data Keys from memory.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl f"
|
|
.It Fl f
|
|
Force detach - detach even if the provider is open.
|
|
.It Fl l
|
|
Mark provider to detach on last close, after the last filesystem has been
|
|
unmounted.
|
|
If this option is specified, the provider will not be detached
|
|
while it is open, but will be automatically detached when it is closed for the
|
|
last time even if it was only opened for reading.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm onetime
|
|
Attach the given providers with a random, one-time (ephemeral) Master Key.
|
|
The command can be used to encrypt swap partitions or temporary filesystems.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar sectorsize"
|
|
.It Fl a Ar aalgo
|
|
Enable data integrity verification (authentication).
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl e Ar ealgo
|
|
Encryption algorithm to use.
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl d
|
|
Detach on last close, after the last filesystem has been unmounted.
|
|
Note: this option is not usable for temporary filesystems as the provider is
|
|
detached after the filesystem has been created.
|
|
It still can, and should, be used for swap partitions.
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm attach
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl l Ar keylen
|
|
Data Key length to use with the given cryptographic algorithm.
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl s Ar sectorsize
|
|
Change decrypted provider's sector size.
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl T
|
|
Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru.
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm configure
|
|
Change configuration of the given providers.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl b"
|
|
.It Fl b
|
|
Set the BOOT flag on the given providers.
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl B
|
|
Remove the BOOT flag from the given providers.
|
|
.It Fl d
|
|
When entering the passphrase to boot from this encrypted root filesystem, echo
|
|
.Ql *
|
|
characters.
|
|
This makes the length of the passphrase visible.
|
|
.It Fl D
|
|
Disable echoing of any characters when a passphrase is entered to boot from this
|
|
encrypted root filesystem.
|
|
This hides the passphrase length.
|
|
.It Fl g
|
|
Enable booting from this encrypted root filesystem.
|
|
The boot loader prompts for the passphrase and loads
|
|
.Xr loader 8
|
|
from the encrypted partition.
|
|
.It Fl G
|
|
Deactivate booting from this encrypted root partition.
|
|
.It Fl t
|
|
Enable TRIM/UNMAP passthru.
|
|
For more information, see the description of the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl T
|
|
Disable TRIM/UNMAP passthru.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm setkey
|
|
Install a copy of the Master Key into the selected slot, encrypted with
|
|
a new User Key.
|
|
If the selected slot is populated, replace the existing copy.
|
|
A provider has one Master Key, which can be stored in one or both slots,
|
|
each encrypted with an independent User Key.
|
|
With the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand, only key number 0 is initialized.
|
|
The User Key can be changed at any time: for an attached provider,
|
|
for a detached provider, or on the backup file.
|
|
When a provider is attached, the user does not have to provide
|
|
an existing passphrase/keyfile.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl J Ar newpassfile"
|
|
.It Fl i Ar iterations
|
|
Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2.
|
|
If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used.
|
|
To be able to use this option with the
|
|
.Cm setkey
|
|
subcommand, only one key has to be defined and this key must be changed.
|
|
.It Fl j Ar passfile
|
|
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of a current User Key
|
|
(or part of it).
|
|
.It Fl J Ar newpassfile
|
|
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the new User Key
|
|
(or part of it).
|
|
.It Fl k Ar keyfile
|
|
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of a current User Key
|
|
(or part of it).
|
|
.It Fl K Ar newkeyfile
|
|
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the new User Key
|
|
(or part of it).
|
|
.It Fl n Ar keyno
|
|
Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy to change (could be 0 or 1).
|
|
If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key
|
|
used for attaching the provider will be changed.
|
|
If the provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file)
|
|
and no key number is given, the first Master Key copy to be successfully
|
|
decrypted with the provided User Key passphrase/keyfile will be changed.
|
|
.It Fl p
|
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the current User Key.
|
|
Cannot be combined with the
|
|
.Fl j
|
|
option.
|
|
.It Fl P
|
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the new User Key.
|
|
Cannot be combined with the
|
|
.Fl J
|
|
option.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm delkey
|
|
Destroy (overwrite with random data) the selected Master Key copy.
|
|
If one is destroying keys for an attached provider, the provider
|
|
will not be detached even if all copies of the Master Key are destroyed.
|
|
It can even be rescued with the
|
|
.Cm setkey
|
|
subcommand because the Master Key is still in memory.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a Ar keyno"
|
|
.It Fl a
|
|
Destroy all copies of the Master Key (does not need
|
|
.Fl f
|
|
option).
|
|
.It Fl f
|
|
Force key destruction.
|
|
This option is needed to destroy the last copy of the Master Key.
|
|
.It Fl n Ar keyno
|
|
Specifies the index number of the Master Key copy.
|
|
If the provider is attached and no key number is given, the key
|
|
used for attaching the provider will be destroyed.
|
|
If provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup file) the key number
|
|
has to be given.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm kill
|
|
This command should be used only in emergency situations.
|
|
It will destroy all copies of the Master Key on a given provider and will
|
|
detach it forcibly (if it is attached).
|
|
This is absolutely a one-way command - if you do not have a metadata
|
|
backup, your data is gone for good.
|
|
In case the provider was attached with the
|
|
.Fl r
|
|
flag, the keys will not be destroyed, only the provider will be detached.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a"
|
|
.It Fl a
|
|
If specified, all currently attached providers will be killed.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm backup
|
|
Backup metadata from the given provider to the given file.
|
|
.It Cm restore
|
|
Restore metadata from the given file to the given provider.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl f"
|
|
.It Fl f
|
|
Metadata contains the size of the provider to ensure that the correct
|
|
partition or slice is attached.
|
|
If an attempt is made to restore metadata to a provider that has a different
|
|
size,
|
|
.Nm
|
|
will refuse to restore the data unless the
|
|
.Fl f
|
|
switch is used.
|
|
If the partition or slice has been grown, the
|
|
.Cm resize
|
|
subcommand should be used rather than attempting to relocate the metadata
|
|
through
|
|
.Cm backup
|
|
and
|
|
.Cm restore .
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm suspend
|
|
Suspend device by waiting for all inflight requests to finish, clearing all
|
|
sensitive information such as the Master Key and Data Keys from kernel memory,
|
|
and blocking all further I/O requests until the
|
|
.Cm resume
|
|
subcommand is executed.
|
|
This functionality is useful for laptops.
|
|
Suspending a laptop should not leave an encrypted device attached.
|
|
The
|
|
.Cm suspend
|
|
subcommand can be used rather than closing all files and directories from
|
|
filesystems on the encrypted device, unmounting the filesystem, and
|
|
detaching the device.
|
|
Any access to the encrypted device will be blocked until the Master Key is
|
|
reloaded through the
|
|
.Cm resume
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
Thus there is no need to close nor unmount anything.
|
|
The
|
|
.Cm suspend
|
|
subcommand does not work with devices created with the
|
|
.Cm onetime
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
Please note that sensitive data might still be present in memory locations
|
|
such as the filesystem cache after suspending an encrypted device.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl a"
|
|
.It Fl a
|
|
Suspend all
|
|
.Nm
|
|
devices.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm resume
|
|
Resume previously suspended device.
|
|
The caller must ensure that executing this subcommand does not access the
|
|
suspended device, leading to a deadlock.
|
|
For example, suspending a device which contains the filesystem where the
|
|
.Nm
|
|
utility is stored is a bad idea.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl j Ar passfile"
|
|
.It Fl j Ar passfile
|
|
Specifies a file which contains the passphrase component of the User Key,
|
|
or part of it.
|
|
For more information see the description of the
|
|
.Fl J
|
|
option for the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl k Ar keyfile
|
|
Specifies a file which contains the keyfile component of the User Key,
|
|
or part of it.
|
|
For more information see the description of the
|
|
.Fl K
|
|
option for the
|
|
.Cm init
|
|
subcommand.
|
|
.It Fl p
|
|
Do not use a passphrase as a component of the User Key.
|
|
Cannot be combined with the
|
|
.Fl j
|
|
option.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm resize
|
|
Inform
|
|
.Nm
|
|
that the provider has been resized.
|
|
The old metadata block is relocated to the correct position at the end of the
|
|
provider and the provider size is updated.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl s Ar oldsize"
|
|
.It Fl s Ar oldsize
|
|
The size of the provider before it was resized.
|
|
.El
|
|
.It Cm version
|
|
If no arguments are given, the
|
|
.Cm version
|
|
subcommand will print the version of
|
|
.Nm
|
|
userland utility as well as the version of the
|
|
.Nm ELI
|
|
GEOM class.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
If GEOM providers are specified, the
|
|
.Cm version
|
|
subcommand will print metadata version used by each of them.
|
|
.It Cm clear
|
|
Clear metadata from the given providers.
|
|
.Em WARNING :
|
|
This will erase with zeros the encrypted Master Key copies stored in the
|
|
metadata.
|
|
.It Cm dump
|
|
Dump metadata stored on the given providers.
|
|
.It Cm list
|
|
See
|
|
.Xr geom 8 .
|
|
.It Cm status
|
|
See
|
|
.Xr geom 8 .
|
|
.It Cm load
|
|
See
|
|
.Xr geom 8 .
|
|
.It Cm unload
|
|
See
|
|
.Xr geom 8 .
|
|
.El
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Additional options include:
|
|
.Bl -tag -width ".Fl v"
|
|
.It Fl v
|
|
Be more verbose.
|
|
.El
|
|
.Sh KEY SUMMARY
|
|
.Ss Master Key
|
|
Upon
|
|
.Cm init ,
|
|
the
|
|
.Nm
|
|
utility generates a random Master Key for the provider.
|
|
The Master Key never changes during the lifetime of the provider.
|
|
Each copy of the provider metadata, active or backed up to a file, can store
|
|
up to two, independently-encrypted copies of the Master Key.
|
|
.Ss User Key
|
|
Each stored copy of the Master Key is encrypted with a User Key, which
|
|
is generated by the
|
|
.Nm
|
|
utility from a passphrase and/or a keyfile.
|
|
The
|
|
.Nm
|
|
utility first reads all parts of the keyfile in the order specified on the
|
|
command line, then reads all parts of the stored passphrase in the order
|
|
specified on the command line.
|
|
If no passphrase parts are specified, the system prompts the user to enter
|
|
the passphrase.
|
|
The passphrase is optionally strengthened by PKCS#5v2.
|
|
The User Key is a digest computed over the concatenated keyfile and passphrase.
|
|
.Ss Data Key
|
|
During operation, one or more Data Keys are deterministically derived by
|
|
the kernel from the Master Key and cached in memory.
|
|
The number of Data Keys used by a given provider, and the way they are
|
|
derived, depend on the GELI version and whether the provider is configured to
|
|
use data authentication.
|
|
.Sh SYSCTL VARIABLES
|
|
The following
|
|
.Xr sysctl 8
|
|
variables can be used to control the behavior of the
|
|
.Nm ELI
|
|
GEOM class.
|
|
The default value is shown next to each variable.
|
|
Some variables can also be set in
|
|
.Pa /boot/loader.conf .
|
|
.Bl -tag -width indent
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.version
|
|
Version number of the
|
|
.Nm ELI
|
|
GEOM class.
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.debug : No 0
|
|
Debug level of the
|
|
.Nm ELI
|
|
GEOM class.
|
|
This can be set to a number between 0 and 3 inclusive.
|
|
If set to 0, minimal debug information is printed.
|
|
If set to 3, the
|
|
maximum amount of debug information is printed.
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.tries : No 3
|
|
Number of times a user is asked for the passphrase.
|
|
This is only used for providers which are attached on boot,
|
|
before the root filesystem is mounted.
|
|
If set to 0, attaching providers on boot will be disabled.
|
|
This variable should be set in
|
|
.Pa /boot/loader.conf .
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.overwrites : No 5
|
|
Specifies how many times the Master Key is overwritten
|
|
with random values when it is destroyed.
|
|
After this operation it is filled with zeros.
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.visible_passphrase : No 0
|
|
If set to 1, the passphrase entered on boot will be visible.
|
|
This alternative should be used with caution as the entered
|
|
passphrase can be logged and exposed via
|
|
.Xr dmesg 8 .
|
|
This variable should be set in
|
|
.Pa /boot/loader.conf .
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.threads : No 0
|
|
Specifies how many kernel threads should be used for doing software
|
|
cryptography.
|
|
Its purpose is to increase performance on SMP systems.
|
|
If set to 0, a CPU-pinned thread will be started for every active CPU.
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.batch : No 0
|
|
When set to 1, can speed-up crypto operations by using batching.
|
|
Batching reduces the number of interrupts by responding to a group of
|
|
crypto requests with one interrupt.
|
|
The crypto card and the driver has to support this feature.
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit : No 8192
|
|
Specifies how many Data Keys to cache.
|
|
The default limit
|
|
(8192 keys) will allow caching of all keys for a 4TB provider with 512 byte
|
|
sectors and will take around 1MB of memory.
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_hits
|
|
Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was already in
|
|
cache.
|
|
This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than
|
|
the limit specified in
|
|
.Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit .
|
|
.It Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_misses
|
|
Reports how many times we were looking up a Data Key and it was not in cache.
|
|
This sysctl is not updated for providers that need fewer Data Keys than the limit
|
|
specified in
|
|
.Va kern.geom.eli.key_cache_limit .
|
|
.El
|
|
.Sh EXIT STATUS
|
|
Exit status is 0 on success, and 1 if the command fails.
|
|
.Sh EXAMPLES
|
|
Initialize a provider which is going to be encrypted with a
|
|
passphrase and random data from a file on the user's pen drive.
|
|
Use 4kB sector size.
|
|
Attach the provider, create a filesystem, and mount it.
|
|
Do the work.
|
|
Unmount the provider and detach it:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/da2.key bs=64 count=1
|
|
# geli init -s 4096 -K /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2
|
|
Enter new passphrase:
|
|
Reenter new passphrase:
|
|
# geli attach -k /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2
|
|
Enter passphrase:
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da2.eli bs=1m
|
|
# newfs /dev/da2.eli
|
|
# mount /dev/da2.eli /mnt/secret
|
|
\&...
|
|
# umount /mnt/secret
|
|
# geli detach da2.eli
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Create an encrypted provider, but use two User Keys:
|
|
one for your employee and one for you as the company's security officer
|
|
(so it is not a tragedy if the employee
|
|
.Qq accidentally
|
|
forgets his passphrase):
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# geli init /dev/da2
|
|
Enter new passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase)
|
|
Reenter new passphrase:
|
|
# geli setkey -n 1 /dev/da2
|
|
Enter passphrase: (enter security officer's passphrase)
|
|
Enter new passphrase: (let your employee enter his passphrase ...)
|
|
Reenter new passphrase: (... twice)
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
You are the security officer in your company.
|
|
Create an encrypted provider for use by the user, but remember that users
|
|
forget their passphrases, so backup the Master Key with your own random key:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` bs=64 count=1
|
|
# geli init -P -K /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e
|
|
# geli backup /dev/ada0s1e /mnt/pendrive/backups/`hostname`
|
|
(use key number 0, so the encrypted Master Key will be re-encrypted by this)
|
|
# geli setkey -n 0 -k /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ada0s1e
|
|
(allow the user to enter his passphrase)
|
|
Enter new passphrase:
|
|
Reenter new passphrase:
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Encrypted swap partition setup:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/ada0s1b bs=1m
|
|
# geli onetime -d -e 3des ada0s1b
|
|
# swapon /dev/ada0s1b.eli
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
The example below shows how to configure two providers which will be attached
|
|
on boot, before the root filesystem is mounted.
|
|
One of them is using passphrase and three keyfile parts and the other is
|
|
using only a keyfile in one part:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0 bs=1m
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key0 bs=32k count=1
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key1 bs=32k count=1
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key2 bs=32k count=1
|
|
# geli init -b -K /boot/keys/da0.key0 -K /boot/keys/da0.key1 -K /boot/keys/da0.key2 da0
|
|
Enter new passphrase:
|
|
Reenter new passphrase:
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da1s3a bs=1m
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da1s3a.key bs=128k count=1
|
|
# geli init -b -P -K /boot/keys/da1s3a.key da1s3a
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
The providers are initialized, now we have to add these lines to
|
|
.Pa /boot/loader.conf :
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile0_load="YES"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile0_type="da0:geli_keyfile0"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da0.key0"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile1_load="YES"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile1_type="da0:geli_keyfile1"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile1_name="/boot/keys/da0.key1"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile2_load="YES"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile2_type="da0:geli_keyfile2"
|
|
geli_da0_keyfile2_name="/boot/keys/da0.key2"
|
|
|
|
geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_load="YES"
|
|
geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile0"
|
|
geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key"
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
If there is only one keyfile, the index might be omitted:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
geli_da1s3a_keyfile_load="YES"
|
|
geli_da1s3a_keyfile_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile"
|
|
geli_da1s3a_keyfile_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key"
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Not only configure encryption, but also data integrity verification using
|
|
.Nm HMAC/SHA256 .
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# geli init -a hmac/sha256 -s 4096 /dev/da0
|
|
Enter new passphrase:
|
|
Reenter new passphrase:
|
|
# geli attach /dev/da0
|
|
Enter passphrase:
|
|
# dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0.eli bs=1m
|
|
# newfs /dev/da0.eli
|
|
# mount /dev/da0.eli /mnt/secret
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
.Cm geli
|
|
writes the metadata backup by default to the
|
|
.Pa /var/backups/<prov>.eli
|
|
file.
|
|
If the metadata is lost in any way (e.g., by accidental overwrite), it can be restored.
|
|
Consider the following situation:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# geli init /dev/da0
|
|
Enter new passphrase:
|
|
Reenter new passphrase:
|
|
|
|
Metadata backup can be found in /var/backups/da0.eli and
|
|
can be restored with the following command:
|
|
|
|
# geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0
|
|
|
|
# geli clear /dev/da0
|
|
# geli attach /dev/da0
|
|
geli: Cannot read metadata from /dev/da0: Invalid argument.
|
|
# geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0
|
|
# geli attach /dev/da0
|
|
Enter passphrase:
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
If an encrypted filesystem is extended, it is necessary to relocate and
|
|
update the metadata:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# gpart create -s GPT ada0
|
|
# gpart add -s 1g -t freebsd-ufs -i 1 ada0
|
|
# geli init -K keyfile -P ada0p1
|
|
# gpart resize -s 2g -i 1 ada0
|
|
# geli resize -s 1g ada0p1
|
|
# geli attach -k keyfile -p ada0p1
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Initialize provider with the passphrase split into two files.
|
|
The provider can be attached using those two files or by entering
|
|
.Dq foobar
|
|
as the passphrase at the
|
|
.Nm
|
|
prompt:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# echo foo > da0.pass0
|
|
# echo bar > da0.pass1
|
|
# geli init -J da0.pass0 -J da0.pass1 da0
|
|
# geli attach -j da0.pass0 -j da0.pass1 da0
|
|
# geli detach da0
|
|
# geli attach da0
|
|
Enter passphrase: foobar
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Suspend all
|
|
.Nm
|
|
devices on a laptop, suspend the laptop, then resume devices one by one after
|
|
resuming the laptop:
|
|
.Bd -literal -offset indent
|
|
# geli suspend -a
|
|
# zzz
|
|
<resume your laptop>
|
|
# geli resume -p -k keyfile gpt/secret
|
|
# geli resume gpt/private
|
|
Enter passphrase:
|
|
.Ed
|
|
.Sh ENCRYPTION MODES
|
|
.Nm
|
|
supports two encryption modes:
|
|
.Nm XTS ,
|
|
which was standardized as
|
|
.Nm IEEE P1619
|
|
and
|
|
.Nm CBC
|
|
with unpredictable IV.
|
|
The
|
|
.Nm CBC
|
|
mode used by
|
|
.Nm
|
|
is very similar to the mode
|
|
.Nm ESSIV .
|
|
.Sh DATA AUTHENTICATION
|
|
.Nm
|
|
can verify data integrity when an authentication algorithm is specified.
|
|
When data corruption/modification is detected,
|
|
.Nm
|
|
will not return any data, but instead will return an error
|
|
.Pq Er EINVAL .
|
|
The offset and size of the corrupted data will be printed on the console.
|
|
It is important to know against which attacks
|
|
.Nm
|
|
provides protection for your data.
|
|
If data is modified in-place or copied from one place on the disk
|
|
to another even without modification,
|
|
.Nm
|
|
should be able to detect such a change.
|
|
If an attacker can remember the encrypted data, he can overwrite any future
|
|
changes with the data he owns without it being noticed.
|
|
In other words
|
|
.Nm
|
|
will not protect your data against replay attacks.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
It is recommended to write to the whole provider before first use,
|
|
in order to make sure that all sectors and their corresponding
|
|
checksums are properly initialized into a consistent state.
|
|
One can safely ignore data authentication errors that occur immediately
|
|
after the first time a provider is attached and before it is
|
|
initialized in this way.
|
|
.Sh SEE ALSO
|
|
.Xr crypto 4 ,
|
|
.Xr gbde 4 ,
|
|
.Xr geom 4 ,
|
|
.Xr loader.conf 5 ,
|
|
.Xr gbde 8 ,
|
|
.Xr geom 8 ,
|
|
.Xr crypto 9
|
|
.Sh HISTORY
|
|
The
|
|
.Nm
|
|
utility appeared in
|
|
.Fx 6.0 .
|
|
Support for the
|
|
.Nm Camellia
|
|
block cipher is implemented by Yoshisato Yanagisawa in
|
|
.Fx 7.0 .
|
|
.Pp
|
|
Highest
|
|
.Nm GELI
|
|
metadata version supported by the given FreeBSD version:
|
|
.Bl -column -offset indent ".Sy FreeBSD" ".Sy version"
|
|
.It Sy FreeBSD Ta Sy GELI
|
|
.It Sy version Ta Sy version
|
|
.Pp
|
|
.It Li 6.0 Ta 0
|
|
.It Li 6.1 Ta 0
|
|
.It Li 6.2 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 6.3 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 6.4 Ta 3
|
|
.Pp
|
|
.It Li 7.0 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 7.1 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 7.2 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 7.3 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 7.4 Ta 3
|
|
.Pp
|
|
.It Li 8.0 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 8.1 Ta 3
|
|
.It Li 8.2 Ta 5
|
|
.Pp
|
|
.It Li 9.0 Ta 6
|
|
.Pp
|
|
.It Li 10.0 Ta 7
|
|
.El
|
|
.Sh AUTHORS
|
|
.An Pawel Jakub Dawidek Aq Mt pjd@FreeBSD.org
|