- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
463 lines
13 KiB
Groff
463 lines
13 KiB
Groff
.\" $NetBSD: crypto.4,v 1.24 2014/01/27 21:23:59 pgoyette Exp $
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.\"
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.\" Copyright (c) 2008 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
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.\" Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation
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.\" All rights reserved.
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.\"
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.\" Portions of this documentation were written by John-Mark Gurney
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.\" under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and
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.\" Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate).
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.\"
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.\" This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
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.\" by Coyote Point Systems, Inc.
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.\"
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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.\" are met:
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.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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.\"
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.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
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.\" ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
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.\" TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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.\" PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
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.\" BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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.\" CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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.\" SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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.\" INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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.\" CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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.\" POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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.\"
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.\"
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.\" Copyright (c) 2004
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.\" Jonathan Stone <jonathan@dsg.stanford.edu>. All rights reserved.
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.\"
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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.\" are met:
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.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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.\"
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.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Jonathan Stone AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Jonathan Stone OR THE VOICES IN HIS HEAD
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.\" BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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.\" CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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.\" SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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.\" INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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.\" CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
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.\" THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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.\" $FreeBSD$
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.\"
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.Dd March 27, 2020
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.Dt CRYPTO 4
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.Os
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.Sh NAME
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.Nm crypto ,
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.Nm cryptodev
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.Nd user-mode access to hardware-accelerated cryptography
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.Sh SYNOPSIS
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.Cd device crypto
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.Cd device cryptodev
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.Pp
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.In sys/ioctl.h
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.In sys/time.h
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.In crypto/cryptodev.h
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.Sh DESCRIPTION
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The
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.Nm
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driver gives user-mode applications access to hardware-accelerated
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cryptographic transforms as implemented by the
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.Xr crypto 9
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in-kernel interface.
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.Pp
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The
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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special device provides an
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.Xr ioctl 2
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based interface.
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User-mode applications open the special device and
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then issue
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.Xr ioctl 2
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calls on the descriptor.
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User-mode access to
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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is controlled by two
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.Xr sysctl 8
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variables:
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.Ic kern.userasymcrypto
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and
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.Ic kern.cryptodevallowsoft .
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.Pp
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The
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.Nm
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device provides two distinct modes of operation: one mode for
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symmetric-keyed cryptographic requests and digests, and a second mode for
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both asymmetric-key (public-key/private-key) requests and
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modular arithmetic (for Diffie-Hellman key exchange and other
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cryptographic protocols).
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The two modes are described separately below.
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.Sh THEORY OF OPERATION
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Regardless of whether symmetric-key or asymmetric-key operations are
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to be performed, use of the device requires a basic series of steps:
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.Bl -enum
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.It
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Open the
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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device.
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.It
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Create a new cryptography file descriptor via
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.Dv CRIOGET
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to use for all subsequent
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.Xr ioctl 2
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commands.
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.It
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Close the
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.Pa /dev/crypto
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device.
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.It
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If any symmetric-keyed cryptographic or digest operations will be performed,
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create a session with
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.Dv CIOCGSESSION .
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Most applications will require at least one symmetric session.
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Since cipher and MAC keys are tied to sessions, many
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applications will require more.
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Asymmetric operations do not use sessions.
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.It
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Submit requests, synchronously with
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.Dv CIOCCRYPT
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(symmetric),
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.Dv CIOCCRYPTAEAD
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(symmetric),
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or
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.Dv CIOCKEY
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(asymmetric).
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.It
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Optionally destroy a session with
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.Dv CIOCFSESSION .
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.It
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Close the cryptography file descriptor with
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.Xr close 2 .
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This will automatically close any remaining sessions associated with the
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file desriptor.
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.El
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.Sh SYMMETRIC-KEY OPERATION
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The symmetric-key operation mode provides a context-based API
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to traditional symmetric-key encryption (or privacy) algorithms,
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or to keyed and unkeyed one-way hash (HMAC and MAC) algorithms.
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The symmetric-key mode also permits encrypt-then-authenticate fused operation,
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where the hardware performs both a privacy algorithm and an integrity-check
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algorithm in a single pass over the data: either a fused
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encrypt/HMAC-generate operation, or a fused HMAC-verify/decrypt operation.
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.Pp
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To use symmetric mode, you must first create a session specifying
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the algorithm(s) and key(s) to use; then issue encrypt or decrypt
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requests against the session.
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.Ss Algorithms
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For a list of supported algorithms, see
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.Xr crypto 7
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and
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.Xr crypto 9 .
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.Ss IOCTL Request Descriptions
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.\"
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.Bl -tag -width CIOCGSESSION
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.\"
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.It Dv CRIOGET Fa int *fd
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Clone the fd argument to
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.Xr ioctl 2 ,
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yielding a new file descriptor for the creation of sessions.
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.\"
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.It Dv CIOCFINDDEV Fa struct crypt_find_op *fop
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.Bd -literal
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struct crypt_find_op {
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int crid; /* driver id + flags */
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char name[32]; /* device/driver name */
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};
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.Ed
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If
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.Fa crid
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is -1, then find the driver named
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.Fa name
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and return the id in
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.Fa crid .
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If
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.Fa crid
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is not -1, return the name of the driver with
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.Fa crid
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in
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.Fa name .
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In either case, if the driver is not found,
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.Dv ENOENT
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is returned.
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.It Dv CIOCGSESSION Fa struct session_op *sessp
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.Bd -literal
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struct session_op {
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u_int32_t cipher; /* e.g. CRYPTO_DES_CBC */
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u_int32_t mac; /* e.g. CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC */
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u_int32_t keylen; /* cipher key */
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const void *key;
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int mackeylen; /* mac key */
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const void *mackey;
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u_int32_t ses; /* returns: ses # */
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};
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.Ed
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Create a new cryptographic session on a file descriptor for the device;
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that is, a persistent object specific to the chosen
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privacy algorithm, integrity algorithm, and keys specified in
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.Fa sessp .
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The special value 0 for either privacy or integrity
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is reserved to indicate that the indicated operation (privacy or integrity)
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is not desired for this session.
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.Pp
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Multiple sessions may be bound to a single file descriptor.
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The session ID returned in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]ses
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is supplied as a required field in the symmetric-operation structure
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.Fa crypt_op
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for future encryption or hashing requests.
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.\" .Pp
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.\" This implementation will never return a session ID of 0 for a successful
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.\" creation of a session, which is a
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.\" .Nx
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.\" extension.
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.Pp
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For non-zero symmetric-key privacy algorithms, the privacy algorithm
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must be specified in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]cipher ,
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the key length in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]keylen ,
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and the key value in the octets addressed by
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]key .
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.Pp
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For keyed one-way hash algorithms, the one-way hash must be specified
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in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]mac ,
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the key length in
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]mackey ,
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and the key value in the octets addressed by
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]mackeylen .
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.\"
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.Pp
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Support for a specific combination of fused privacy and
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integrity-check algorithms depends on whether the underlying
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hardware supports that combination.
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Not all combinations are supported
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by all hardware, even if the hardware supports each operation as a
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stand-alone non-fused operation.
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.It Dv CIOCGSESSION2 Fa struct session2_op *sessp
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.Bd -literal
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struct session2_op {
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u_int32_t cipher; /* e.g. CRYPTO_DES_CBC */
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u_int32_t mac; /* e.g. CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC */
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u_int32_t keylen; /* cipher key */
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const void *key;
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int mackeylen; /* mac key */
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const void *mackey;
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u_int32_t ses; /* returns: ses # */
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int crid; /* driver id + flags (rw) */
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int pad[4]; /* for future expansion */
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};
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.Ed
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This request is similar to CIOGSESSION except that
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]crid
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requests either a specific crypto device or a class of devices (software vs
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hardware).
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The
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.Fa sessp-\*[Gt]pad
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field must be initialized to zero.
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.It Dv CIOCCRYPT Fa struct crypt_op *cr_op
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.Bd -literal
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struct crypt_op {
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u_int32_t ses;
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u_int16_t op; /* e.g. COP_ENCRYPT */
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u_int16_t flags;
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u_int len;
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caddr_t src, dst;
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caddr_t mac; /* must be large enough for result */
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caddr_t iv;
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};
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.Ed
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Request a symmetric-key (or hash) operation.
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To encrypt, set
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]op
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to
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.Dv COP_ENCRYPT .
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To decrypt, set
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]op
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to
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.Dv COP_DECRYPT .
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The field
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]len
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supplies the length of the input buffer; the fields
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]src ,
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]dst ,
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]mac ,
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.Fa cr_op-\*[Gt]iv
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supply the addresses of the input buffer, output buffer,
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one-way hash, and initialization vector, respectively.
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.Pp
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If a session is using either fused encrypt-then-authenticate or
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an AEAD algorithm,
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decryption operations require the associated hash as an input.
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If the hash is incorrect, the
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operation will fail with
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.Dv EBADMSG
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and the output buffer will remain unchanged.
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.It Dv CIOCCRYPTAEAD Fa struct crypt_aead *cr_aead
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.Bd -literal
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struct crypt_aead {
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u_int32_t ses;
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u_int16_t op; /* e.g. COP_ENCRYPT */
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u_int16_t flags;
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u_int len;
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u_int aadlen;
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u_int ivlen;
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caddr_t src, dst;
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caddr_t aad;
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caddr_t tag; /* must be large enough for result */
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caddr_t iv;
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};
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.Ed
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The
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.Dv CIOCCRYPTAEAD
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is similar to the
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.Dv CIOCCRYPT
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but provides additional data in
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.Fa cr_aead-\*[Gt]aad
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to include in the authentication mode.
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.It Dv CIOCFSESSION Fa u_int32_t ses_id
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Destroys the session identified by
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.Fa ses_id .
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.El
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.\"
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.Sh ASYMMETRIC-KEY OPERATION
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.Ss Asymmetric-key algorithms
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Contingent upon hardware support, the following asymmetric
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(public-key/private-key; or key-exchange subroutine) operations may
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also be available:
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.Pp
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.Bl -column "CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY" "Input parameter" "Output parameter" -offset indent -compact
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.It Em "Algorithm" Ta "Input parameter" Ta "Output parameter"
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.It Em " " Ta "Count" Ta "Count"
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.It Dv CRK_MOD_EXP Ta 3 Ta 1
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.It Dv CRK_MOD_EXP_CRT Ta 6 Ta 1
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.It Dv CRK_DSA_SIGN Ta 5 Ta 2
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.It Dv CRK_DSA_VERIFY Ta 7 Ta 0
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.It Dv CRK_DH_COMPUTE_KEY Ta 3 Ta 1
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.El
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.Pp
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See below for discussion of the input and output parameter counts.
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.Ss Asymmetric-key commands
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.Bl -tag -width CIOCKEY
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.It Dv CIOCASYMFEAT Fa int *feature_mask
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Returns a bitmask of supported asymmetric-key operations.
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Each of the above-listed asymmetric operations is present
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if and only if the bit position numbered by the code for that operation
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is set.
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For example,
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.Dv CRK_MOD_EXP
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is available if and only if the bit
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.Pq 1 \*[Lt]\*[Lt] Dv CRK_MOD_EXP
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is set.
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.It Dv CIOCKEY Fa struct crypt_kop *kop
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.Bd -literal
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struct crypt_kop {
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u_int crk_op; /* e.g. CRK_MOD_EXP */
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u_int crk_status; /* return status */
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u_short crk_iparams; /* # of input params */
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u_short crk_oparams; /* # of output params */
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u_int crk_pad1;
|
|
struct crparam crk_param[CRK_MAXPARAM];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Bignum parameter, in packed bytes. */
|
|
struct crparam {
|
|
void * crp_p;
|
|
u_int crp_nbits;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
.Ed
|
|
Performs an asymmetric-key operation from the list above.
|
|
The specific operation is supplied in
|
|
.Fa kop-\*[Gt]crk_op ;
|
|
final status for the operation is returned in
|
|
.Fa kop-\*[Gt]crk_status .
|
|
The number of input arguments and the number of output arguments
|
|
is specified in
|
|
.Fa kop-\*[Gt]crk_iparams
|
|
and
|
|
.Fa kop-\*[Gt]crk_iparams ,
|
|
respectively.
|
|
The field
|
|
.Fa crk_param[]
|
|
must be filled in with exactly
|
|
.Fa kop-\*[Gt]crk_iparams + kop-\*[Gt]crk_oparams
|
|
arguments, each encoded as a
|
|
.Fa struct crparam
|
|
(address, bitlength) pair.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
The semantics of these arguments are currently undocumented.
|
|
.El
|
|
.Sh SEE ALSO
|
|
.Xr aesni 4 ,
|
|
.Xr hifn 4 ,
|
|
.Xr ipsec 4 ,
|
|
.Xr padlock 4 ,
|
|
.Xr safe 4 ,
|
|
.Xr ubsec 4 ,
|
|
.Xr crypto 7 ,
|
|
.Xr geli 8 ,
|
|
.Xr crypto 9
|
|
.Sh HISTORY
|
|
The
|
|
.Nm
|
|
driver first appeared in
|
|
.Ox 3.0 .
|
|
The
|
|
.Nm
|
|
driver was imported to
|
|
.Fx 5.0 .
|
|
.Sh BUGS
|
|
Error checking and reporting is weak.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
The values specified for symmetric-key key sizes to
|
|
.Dv CIOCGSESSION
|
|
must exactly match the values expected by
|
|
.Xr opencrypto 9 .
|
|
The output buffer and MAC buffers supplied to
|
|
.Dv CIOCCRYPT
|
|
must follow whether privacy or integrity algorithms were specified for
|
|
session: if you request a
|
|
.No non- Ns Dv NULL
|
|
algorithm, you must supply a suitably-sized buffer.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
The scheme for passing arguments for asymmetric requests is baroque.
|
|
.Pp
|
|
.Dv CRIOGET
|
|
should not exist.
|
|
It should be possible to use the
|
|
.Dv CIOC Ns \&*
|
|
commands directly on a
|
|
.Pa /dev/crypto
|
|
file descriptor.
|