413628a7e3
Bring in updated jail support from bz_jail branch. This enhances the current jail implementation to permit multiple addresses per jail. In addtion to IPv4, IPv6 is supported as well. Due to updated checks it is even possible to have jails without an IP address at all, which basically gives one a chroot with restricted process view, no networking,.. SCTP support was updated and supports IPv6 in jails as well. Cpuset support permits jails to be bound to specific processor sets after creation. Jails can have an unrestricted (no duplicate protection, etc.) name in addition to the hostname. The jail name cannot be changed from within a jail and is considered to be used for management purposes or as audit-token in the future. DDB 'show jails' command was added to aid debugging. Proper compat support permits 32bit jail binaries to be used on 64bit systems to manage jails. Also backward compatibility was preserved where possible: for jail v1 syscalls, as well as with user space management utilities. Both jail as well as prison version were updated for the new features. A gap was intentionally left as the intermediate versions had been used by various patches floating around the last years. Bump __FreeBSD_version for the afore mentioned and in kernel changes. Special thanks to: - Pawel Jakub Dawidek (pjd) for his multi-IPv4 patches and Olivier Houchard (cognet) for initial single-IPv6 patches. - Jeff Roberson (jeff) and Randall Stewart (rrs) for their help, ideas and review on cpuset and SCTP support. - Robert Watson (rwatson) for lots and lots of help, discussions, suggestions and review of most of the patch at various stages. - John Baldwin (jhb) for his help. - Simon L. Nielsen (simon) as early adopter testing changes on cluster machines as well as all the testers and people who provided feedback the last months on freebsd-jail and other channels. - My employer, CK Software GmbH, for the support so I could work on this. Reviewed by: (see above) MFC after: 3 months (this is just so that I get the mail) X-MFC Before: 7.2-RELEASE if possible
1600 lines
36 KiB
C
1600 lines
36 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1999 Poul-Henning Kamp.
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* Copyright (c) 2008 Bjoern A. Zeeb.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "opt_ddb.h"
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#include "opt_inet.h"
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#include "opt_inet6.h"
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#include "opt_mac.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
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#include <sys/sysproto.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/priv.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/taskqueue.h>
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#include <sys/fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/jail.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/sx.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/queue.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <sys/vimage.h>
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#include <sys/osd.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#ifdef DDB
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#include <ddb/ddb.h>
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#ifdef INET6
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#include <netinet6/in6_var.h>
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#endif /* INET6 */
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#endif /* DDB */
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#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
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MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON, "prison", "Prison structures");
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SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, jail, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Jail rules");
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int jail_set_hostname_allowed = 1;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, set_hostname_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_set_hostname_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can set their hostnames");
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int jail_socket_unixiproute_only = 1;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, socket_unixiproute_only, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_socket_unixiproute_only, 0,
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"Processes in jail are limited to creating UNIX/IP/route sockets only");
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int jail_sysvipc_allowed = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, sysvipc_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_sysvipc_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can use System V IPC primitives");
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static int jail_enforce_statfs = 2;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, enforce_statfs, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_enforce_statfs, 0,
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"Processes in jail cannot see all mounted file systems");
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int jail_allow_raw_sockets = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, allow_raw_sockets, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_allow_raw_sockets, 0,
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"Prison root can create raw sockets");
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int jail_chflags_allowed = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, chflags_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_chflags_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can alter system file flags");
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int jail_mount_allowed = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_mount_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems");
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int jail_max_af_ips = 255;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jail_max_af_ips, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_max_af_ips, 0,
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"Number of IP addresses a jail may have at most per address family");
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/* allprison, lastprid, and prisoncount are protected by allprison_lock. */
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struct prisonlist allprison;
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struct sx allprison_lock;
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int lastprid = 0;
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int prisoncount = 0;
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static void init_prison(void *);
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static void prison_complete(void *context, int pending);
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static int sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS);
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#ifdef INET
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static int _prison_check_ip4(struct prison *, struct in_addr *);
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#endif
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#ifdef INET6
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static int _prison_check_ip6(struct prison *, struct in6_addr *);
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#endif
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static void
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init_prison(void *data __unused)
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{
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sx_init(&allprison_lock, "allprison");
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LIST_INIT(&allprison);
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}
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SYSINIT(prison, SI_SUB_INTRINSIC, SI_ORDER_ANY, init_prison, NULL);
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#ifdef INET
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static int
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qcmp_v4(const void *ip1, const void *ip2)
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{
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in_addr_t iaa, iab;
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/*
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* We need to compare in HBO here to get the list sorted as expected
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* by the result of the code. Sorting NBO addresses gives you
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* interesting results. If you do not understand, do not try.
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*/
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iaa = ntohl(((const struct in_addr *)ip1)->s_addr);
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iab = ntohl(((const struct in_addr *)ip2)->s_addr);
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/*
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* Do not simply return the difference of the two numbers, the int is
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* not wide enough.
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*/
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if (iaa > iab)
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return (1);
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else if (iaa < iab)
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return (-1);
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else
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return (0);
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef INET6
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static int
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qcmp_v6(const void *ip1, const void *ip2)
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{
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const struct in6_addr *ia6a, *ia6b;
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int i, rc;
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ia6a = (const struct in6_addr *)ip1;
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ia6b = (const struct in6_addr *)ip2;
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rc = 0;
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for (i=0; rc == 0 && i < sizeof(struct in6_addr); i++) {
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if (ia6a->s6_addr[i] > ia6b->s6_addr[i])
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rc = 1;
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else if (ia6a->s6_addr[i] < ia6b->s6_addr[i])
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rc = -1;
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}
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return (rc);
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
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static int
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prison_check_conflicting_ips(struct prison *p)
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{
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struct prison *pr;
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int i;
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sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED);
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if (p->pr_ip4s == 0 && p->pr_ip6s == 0)
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return (0);
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LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
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/*
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* Skip 'dying' prisons to avoid problems when
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* restarting multi-IP jails.
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*/
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if (pr->pr_state == PRISON_STATE_DYING)
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continue;
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/*
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* We permit conflicting IPs if there is no
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* more than 1 IP on eeach jail.
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* In case there is one duplicate on a jail with
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* more than one IP stop checking and return error.
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*/
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#ifdef INET
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if ((p->pr_ip4s >= 1 && pr->pr_ip4s > 1) ||
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(p->pr_ip4s > 1 && pr->pr_ip4s >= 1)) {
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for (i = 0; i < p->pr_ip4s; i++) {
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if (_prison_check_ip4(pr, &p->pr_ip4[i]))
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef INET6
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if ((p->pr_ip6s >= 1 && pr->pr_ip6s > 1) ||
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(p->pr_ip6s > 1 && pr->pr_ip6s >= 1)) {
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for (i = 0; i < p->pr_ip6s; i++) {
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if (_prison_check_ip6(pr, &p->pr_ip6[i]))
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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}
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#endif
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}
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return (0);
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}
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static int
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jail_copyin_ips(struct jail *j)
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{
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#ifdef INET
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struct in_addr *ip4;
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#endif
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#ifdef INET6
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struct in6_addr *ip6;
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#endif
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int error, i;
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/*
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* Copy in addresses, check for duplicate addresses and do some
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* simple 0 and broadcast checks. If users give other bogus addresses
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* it is their problem.
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*
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* IP addresses are all sorted but ip[0] to preserve the primary IP
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* address as given from userland. This special IP is used for
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* unbound outgoing connections as well for "loopback" traffic.
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*/
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#ifdef INET
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ip4 = NULL;
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#endif
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#ifdef INET6
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ip6 = NULL;
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#endif
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#ifdef INET
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if (j->ip4s > 0) {
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ip4 = (struct in_addr *)malloc(j->ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr),
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M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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error = copyin(j->ip4, ip4, j->ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr));
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if (error)
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goto e_free_ip;
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/* Sort all but the first IPv4 address. */
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if (j->ip4s > 1)
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qsort((ip4 + 1), j->ip4s - 1,
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sizeof(struct in_addr), qcmp_v4);
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/*
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* We do not have to care about byte order for these checks
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* so we will do them in NBO.
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*/
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for (i=0; i<j->ip4s; i++) {
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if (ip4[i].s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY) ||
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ip4[i].s_addr == htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST)) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto e_free_ip;
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}
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if ((i+1) < j->ip4s &&
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(ip4[0].s_addr == ip4[i+1].s_addr ||
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ip4[i].s_addr == ip4[i+1].s_addr)) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto e_free_ip;
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}
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}
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j->ip4 = ip4;
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef INET6
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if (j->ip6s > 0) {
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ip6 = (struct in6_addr *)malloc(j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr),
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M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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error = copyin(j->ip6, ip6, j->ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr));
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if (error)
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goto e_free_ip;
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/* Sort all but the first IPv6 address. */
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if (j->ip6s > 1)
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qsort((ip6 + 1), j->ip6s - 1,
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sizeof(struct in6_addr), qcmp_v6);
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for (i=0; i<j->ip6s; i++) {
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if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6[i])) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto e_free_ip;
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}
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if ((i+1) < j->ip6s &&
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(IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[0], &ip6[i+1]) ||
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IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ip6[i], &ip6[i+1]))) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto e_free_ip;
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}
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}
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j->ip6 = ip6;
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}
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#endif
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return (0);
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e_free_ip:
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#ifdef INET6
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free(ip6, M_PRISON);
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#endif
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#ifdef INET
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free(ip4, M_PRISON);
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#endif
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return (error);
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}
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#endif /* INET || INET6 */
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static int
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jail_handle_ips(struct jail *j)
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{
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#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
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int error;
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#endif
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/*
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* Finish conversion for older versions, copyin and setup IPs.
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*/
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switch (j->version) {
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case 0:
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{
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#ifdef INET
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/* FreeBSD single IPv4 jails. */
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struct in_addr *ip4;
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if (j->ip4s == INADDR_ANY || j->ip4s == INADDR_BROADCAST)
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return (EINVAL);
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ip4 = (struct in_addr *)malloc(sizeof(struct in_addr),
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M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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/*
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* Jail version 0 still used HBO for the IPv4 address.
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*/
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ip4->s_addr = htonl(j->ip4s);
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j->ip4s = 1;
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j->ip4 = ip4;
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break;
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#else
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return (EINVAL);
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#endif
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}
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case 1:
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/*
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* Version 1 was used by multi-IPv4 jail implementations
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* that never made it into the official kernel.
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* We should never hit this here; jail() should catch it.
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*/
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return (EINVAL);
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case 2: /* JAIL_API_VERSION */
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/* FreeBSD multi-IPv4/IPv6,noIP jails. */
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#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
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#ifdef INET
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if (j->ip4s > jail_max_af_ips)
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return (EINVAL);
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#else
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if (j->ip4s != 0)
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return (EINVAL);
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#endif
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#ifdef INET6
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if (j->ip6s > jail_max_af_ips)
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return (EINVAL);
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#else
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if (j->ip6s != 0)
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return (EINVAL);
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#endif
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error = jail_copyin_ips(j);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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#endif
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break;
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default:
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/* Sci-Fi jails are not supported, sorry. */
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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return (0);
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}
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/*
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* struct jail_args {
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* struct jail *jail;
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* };
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*/
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int
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jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap)
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{
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uint32_t version;
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int error;
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struct jail j;
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error = copyin(uap->jail, &version, sizeof(uint32_t));
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if (error)
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return (error);
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switch (version) {
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case 0:
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/* FreeBSD single IPv4 jails. */
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{
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struct jail_v0 j0;
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bzero(&j, sizeof(struct jail));
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error = copyin(uap->jail, &j0, sizeof(struct jail_v0));
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if (error)
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return (error);
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j.version = j0.version;
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j.path = j0.path;
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j.hostname = j0.hostname;
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j.ip4s = j0.ip_number;
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break;
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}
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case 1:
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/*
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* Version 1 was used by multi-IPv4 jail implementations
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* that never made it into the official kernel.
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*/
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return (EINVAL);
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case 2: /* JAIL_API_VERSION */
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/* FreeBSD multi-IPv4/IPv6,noIP jails. */
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error = copyin(uap->jail, &j, sizeof(struct jail));
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if (error)
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return (error);
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break;
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default:
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/* Sci-Fi jails are not supported, sorry. */
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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return (kern_jail(td, &j));
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}
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int
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kern_jail(struct thread *td, struct jail *j)
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{
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struct nameidata nd;
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struct prison *pr, *tpr;
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struct jail_attach_args jaa;
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int vfslocked, error, tryprid;
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KASSERT(j != NULL, ("%s: j is NULL", __func__));
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/* Handle addresses - convert old structs, copyin, check IPs. */
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error = jail_handle_ips(j);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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/* Allocate struct prison and fill it with life. */
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pr = malloc(sizeof(*pr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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mtx_init(&pr->pr_mtx, "jail mutex", NULL, MTX_DEF);
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pr->pr_ref = 1;
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|
error = copyinstr(j->path, &pr->pr_path, sizeof(pr->pr_path), NULL);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto e_killmtx;
|
|
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE | FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_SYSSPACE,
|
|
pr->pr_path, td);
|
|
error = namei(&nd);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto e_killmtx;
|
|
vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
|
|
pr->pr_root = nd.ni_vp;
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(nd.ni_vp, 0);
|
|
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
error = copyinstr(j->hostname, &pr->pr_host, sizeof(pr->pr_host), NULL);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto e_dropvnref;
|
|
if (j->jailname != NULL) {
|
|
error = copyinstr(j->jailname, &pr->pr_name,
|
|
sizeof(pr->pr_name), NULL);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto e_dropvnref;
|
|
}
|
|
if (j->ip4s > 0) {
|
|
pr->pr_ip4 = j->ip4;
|
|
pr->pr_ip4s = j->ip4s;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (j->ip6s > 0) {
|
|
pr->pr_ip6 = j->ip6;
|
|
pr->pr_ip6s = j->ip6s;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
pr->pr_linux = NULL;
|
|
pr->pr_securelevel = securelevel;
|
|
bzero(&pr->pr_osd, sizeof(pr->pr_osd));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pre-set prison state to ALIVE upon cration. This is needed so we
|
|
* can later attach the process to it, etc (avoiding another extra
|
|
* state for ther process of creation, complicating things).
|
|
*/
|
|
pr->pr_state = PRISON_STATE_ALIVE;
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate a dedicated cpuset for each jail. */
|
|
error = cpuset_create_root(td, &pr->pr_cpuset);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto e_dropvnref;
|
|
|
|
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
/* Make sure we cannot run into problems with ambiguous bind()ings. */
|
|
error = prison_check_conflicting_ips(pr);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
goto e_dropcpuset;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Determine next pr_id and add prison to allprison list. */
|
|
tryprid = lastprid + 1;
|
|
if (tryprid == JAIL_MAX)
|
|
tryprid = 1;
|
|
next:
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
if (tpr->pr_id == tryprid) {
|
|
tryprid++;
|
|
if (tryprid == JAIL_MAX) {
|
|
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
error = EAGAIN;
|
|
goto e_dropcpuset;
|
|
}
|
|
goto next;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
pr->pr_id = jaa.jid = lastprid = tryprid;
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allprison, pr, pr_list);
|
|
prisoncount++;
|
|
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
|
|
error = jail_attach(td, &jaa);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto e_dropprref;
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
pr->pr_ref--;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
td->td_retval[0] = jaa.jid;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
e_dropprref:
|
|
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_list);
|
|
prisoncount--;
|
|
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
e_dropcpuset:
|
|
cpuset_rel(pr->pr_cpuset);
|
|
e_dropvnref:
|
|
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
|
|
vrele(pr->pr_root);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
e_killmtx:
|
|
mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
free(pr, M_PRISON);
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
free(j->ip6, M_PRISON);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
free(j->ip4, M_PRISON);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct jail_attach_args {
|
|
* int jid;
|
|
* };
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct proc *p;
|
|
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
int vfslocked, error;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: Note that there is a slight race here if two threads
|
|
* in the same privileged process attempt to attach to two
|
|
* different jails at the same time. It is important for
|
|
* user processes not to do this, or they might end up with
|
|
* a process root from one prison, but attached to the jail
|
|
* of another.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
p = td->td_proc;
|
|
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
pr = prison_find(uap->jid);
|
|
if (pr == NULL) {
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not allow a process to attach to a prison that is not
|
|
* considered to be "ALIVE".
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pr->pr_state != PRISON_STATE_ALIVE) {
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
pr->pr_ref++;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reparent the newly attached process to this jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
error = cpuset_setproc_update_set(p, pr->pr_cpuset);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto e_unref;
|
|
|
|
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
|
|
vn_lock(pr->pr_root, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
|
|
if ((error = change_dir(pr->pr_root, td)) != 0)
|
|
goto e_unlock;
|
|
#ifdef MAC
|
|
if ((error = mac_vnode_check_chroot(td->td_ucred, pr->pr_root)))
|
|
goto e_unlock;
|
|
#endif
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0);
|
|
change_root(pr->pr_root, td);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
|
|
newcred = crget();
|
|
PROC_LOCK(p);
|
|
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
|
|
setsugid(p);
|
|
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
|
|
newcred->cr_prison = pr;
|
|
p->p_ucred = newcred;
|
|
prison_proc_hold(pr);
|
|
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
|
|
crfree(oldcred);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
e_unlock:
|
|
VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
e_unref:
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
pr->pr_ref--;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns a locked prison instance, or NULL on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct prison *
|
|
prison_find(int prid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
|
|
sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED);
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
if (pr->pr_id == prid) {
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
if (pr->pr_ref == 0) {
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return (pr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_free_locked(struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
|
|
pr->pr_ref--;
|
|
if (pr->pr_ref == 0) {
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
TASK_INIT(&pr->pr_task, 0, prison_complete, pr);
|
|
taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &pr->pr_task);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_free(struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
prison_free_locked(pr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
prison_complete(void *context, int pending)
|
|
{
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
int vfslocked;
|
|
|
|
pr = (struct prison *)context;
|
|
|
|
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_list);
|
|
prisoncount--;
|
|
sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
|
|
cpuset_rel(pr->pr_cpuset);
|
|
|
|
/* Free all OSD associated to this jail. */
|
|
osd_jail_exit(pr);
|
|
|
|
vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
|
|
vrele(pr->pr_root);
|
|
VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
|
|
|
|
mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
free(pr->pr_linux, M_PRISON);
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
free(pr->pr_ip6, M_PRISON);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
free(pr->pr_ip4, M_PRISON);
|
|
#endif
|
|
free(pr, M_PRISON);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_hold_locked(struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
|
|
KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0,
|
|
("Trying to hold dead prison (id=%d).", pr->pr_id));
|
|
pr->pr_ref++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_hold(struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
prison_hold_locked(pr);
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_proc_hold(struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
KASSERT(pr->pr_state == PRISON_STATE_ALIVE,
|
|
("Cannot add a process to a non-alive prison (id=%d).", pr->pr_id));
|
|
pr->pr_nprocs++;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_proc_free(struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
KASSERT(pr->pr_state == PRISON_STATE_ALIVE && pr->pr_nprocs > 0,
|
|
("Trying to kill a process in a dead prison (id=%d).", pr->pr_id));
|
|
pr->pr_nprocs--;
|
|
if (pr->pr_nprocs == 0)
|
|
pr->pr_state = PRISON_STATE_DYING;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pass back primary IPv4 address of this jail.
|
|
*
|
|
* If not jailed return success but do not alter the address. Caller has to
|
|
* make sure to intialize it correctly (INADDR_ANY).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error. Address returned in NBO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_getip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
/* Do not change address passed in. */
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4 == NULL)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
ia->s_addr = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure our (source) address is set to something meaningful to this
|
|
* jail.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error. Address passed in in NBO and returned
|
|
* in NBO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_local_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
|
|
{
|
|
struct in_addr ia0;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4 == NULL)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
ia0.s_addr = ntohl(ia->s_addr);
|
|
if (ia0.s_addr == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
|
|
ia->s_addr = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In case there is only 1 IPv4 address, bind directly.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ia0.s_addr == INADDR_ANY && cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4s == 1) {
|
|
ia->s_addr = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ia0.s_addr == INADDR_ANY || prison_check_ip4(cred, ia))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Rewrite destination address in case we will connect to loopback address.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error. Address passed in in NBO and returned
|
|
* in NBO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_remote_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4 == NULL)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
if (ntohl(ia->s_addr) == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
|
|
ia->s_addr = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip4[0].s_addr;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return success because nothing had to be changed.
|
|
*/
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 if address belongs to jail, 0 if not. Address passed in in NBO.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
_prison_check_ip4(struct prison *pr, struct in_addr *ia)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, a, z, d;
|
|
|
|
if (pr->pr_ip4 == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check the primary IP.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pr->pr_ip4[0].s_addr == ia->s_addr)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* All the other IPs are sorted so we can do a binary search.
|
|
*/
|
|
a = 0;
|
|
z = pr->pr_ip4s - 2;
|
|
while (a <= z) {
|
|
i = (a + z) / 2;
|
|
d = qcmp_v4(&pr->pr_ip4[i+1], ia);
|
|
if (d > 0)
|
|
z = i - 1;
|
|
else if (d < 0)
|
|
a = i + 1;
|
|
else
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
prison_check_ip4(struct ucred *cred, struct in_addr *ia)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia != NULL, ("%s: ia is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
return (_prison_check_ip4(cred->cr_prison, ia));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pass back primary IPv6 address for this jail.
|
|
*
|
|
* If not jailed return success but do not alter the address. Caller has to
|
|
* make sure to intialize it correctly (IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_getip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6 == NULL)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
bcopy(&cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6[0], ia6, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure our (source) address is set to something meaningful to this jail.
|
|
*
|
|
* v6only should be set based on (inp->inp_flags & IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY != 0)
|
|
* when needed while binding.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_local_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6, int v6only)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6 == NULL)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(ia6)) {
|
|
bcopy(&cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6[0], ia6,
|
|
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In case there is only 1 IPv6 address, and v6only is true, then
|
|
* bind directly.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (v6only != 0 && IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(ia6) &&
|
|
cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6s == 1) {
|
|
bcopy(&cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6[0], ia6,
|
|
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(ia6) || prison_check_ip6(cred, ia6))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Rewrite destination address in case we will connect to loopback address.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, 1 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_remote_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6 == NULL)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(ia6)) {
|
|
bcopy(&cred->cr_prison->pr_ip6[0], ia6,
|
|
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return success because nothing had to be changed.
|
|
*/
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 if address belongs to jail, 0 if not.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
_prison_check_ip6(struct prison *pr, struct in6_addr *ia6)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, a, z, d;
|
|
|
|
if (pr->pr_ip6 == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check the primary IP.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&pr->pr_ip6[0], ia6))
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* All the other IPs are sorted so we can do a binary search.
|
|
*/
|
|
a = 0;
|
|
z = pr->pr_ip6s - 2;
|
|
while (a <= z) {
|
|
i = (a + z) / 2;
|
|
d = qcmp_v6(&pr->pr_ip6[i+1], ia6);
|
|
if (d > 0)
|
|
z = i - 1;
|
|
else if (d < 0)
|
|
a = i + 1;
|
|
else
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
prison_check_ip6(struct ucred *cred, struct in6_addr *ia6)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(ia6 != NULL, ("%s: ia6 is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
return (_prison_check_ip6(cred->cr_prison, ia6));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if given address belongs to the jail referenced by cred (wrapper to
|
|
* prison_check_ip[46]).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 if address belongs to jail, 0 if not. IPv4 Address passed in in
|
|
* NBO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_if(struct ucred *cred, struct sockaddr *sa)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sai;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sai6;
|
|
#endif
|
|
int ok;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(cred != NULL, ("%s: cred is NULL", __func__));
|
|
KASSERT(sa != NULL, ("%s: sa is NULL", __func__));
|
|
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
switch(sa->sa_family)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
sai = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
|
|
if (prison_check_ip4(cred, &sai->sin_addr))
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
sai6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
|
|
if (prison_check_ip6(cred, (struct in6_addr *)&sai6->sin6_addr))
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
if (!jail_socket_unixiproute_only)
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return (ok);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return 0 if jails permit p1 to frob p2, otherwise ESRCH.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_check(struct ucred *cred1, struct ucred *cred2)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(cred1)) {
|
|
if (!jailed(cred2))
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
if (cred2->cr_prison != cred1->cr_prison)
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail, otherwise 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
jailed(struct ucred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (cred->cr_prison != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return the correct hostname for the passed credential.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
getcredhostname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
INIT_VPROCG(cred->cr_vimage->v_procg);
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(cred)) {
|
|
mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
|
|
strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_host, size);
|
|
mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
mtx_lock(&hostname_mtx);
|
|
strlcpy(buf, V_hostname, size);
|
|
mtx_unlock(&hostname_mtx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see"
|
|
* status of a mount point.
|
|
* Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise.
|
|
* XXX: This function should be called cr_canseemount() and should be
|
|
* placed in kern_prot.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_canseemount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
struct statfs *sp;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred) || jail_enforce_statfs == 0)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
pr = cred->cr_prison;
|
|
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (jail_enforce_statfs == 2)
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
|
|
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
|
|
* This is ugly check, but this is the only situation when jail's
|
|
* directory ends with '/'.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
|
|
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
|
|
if (strncmp(pr->pr_path, sp->f_mntonname, len) != 0)
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Be sure that we don't have situation where jail's root directory
|
|
* is "/some/path" and mount point is "/some/pathpath".
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sp->f_mntonname[len] != '\0' && sp->f_mntonname[len] != '/')
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_enforce_statfs(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, struct statfs *sp)
|
|
{
|
|
char jpath[MAXPATHLEN];
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred) || jail_enforce_statfs == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
pr = cred->cr_prison;
|
|
if (prison_canseemount(cred, mp) != 0) {
|
|
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, "[restricted]",
|
|
sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
|
|
* the valid path left there.
|
|
*/
|
|
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
|
|
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
|
|
strlcpy(jpath, sp->f_mntonname + len, sizeof(jpath));
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
|
|
* the valid path left there.
|
|
*/
|
|
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
if (*jpath == '\0') {
|
|
/* Should never happen. */
|
|
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
|
|
} else {
|
|
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, jpath, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check with permission for a specific privilege is granted within jail. We
|
|
* have a specific list of accepted privileges; the rest are denied.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
switch (priv) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow ktrace privileges for root in jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_KTRACE:
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed processes to configure audit identity and
|
|
* submit audit records (login, etc). In the future we may
|
|
* want to further refine the relationship between audit and
|
|
* jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT:
|
|
case PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT:
|
|
case PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT:
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed processes to manipulate process UNIX
|
|
* credentials in any way they see fit.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETEUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETGID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETEGID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETREUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETREGID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Jail implements visibility constraints already, so allow
|
|
* jailed root to override uid/gid-based constraints.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS:
|
|
case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Jail implements inter-process debugging limits already, so
|
|
* allow jailed root various debugging privileges.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED:
|
|
case PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID:
|
|
case PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jail to set various resource limits and login
|
|
* properties, and for now, exceed process resource limits.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT:
|
|
case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN:
|
|
case PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* System V and POSIX IPC privileges are granted in jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_READ:
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_WRITE:
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_ADMIN:
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE:
|
|
case PRIV_MQ_ADMIN:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Jail implements its own inter-process limits, so allow
|
|
* root processes in jail to change scheduling on other
|
|
* processes in the same jail. Likewise for signalling.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED:
|
|
case PRIV_SCHED_CPUSET:
|
|
case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED:
|
|
case PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed processes to write to sysctls marked as jail
|
|
* writable.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow root in jail to manage a variety of quota
|
|
* properties. These should likely be conditional on a
|
|
* configuration option.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since Jail relies on chroot() to implement file system
|
|
* protections, grant many VFS privileges to root in jail.
|
|
* Be careful to exclude mount-related and NFS-related
|
|
* privileges.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_READ:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_WRITE:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_ADMIN:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_EXEC:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE: /* XXXRW: Slightly surprising. */
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_CHOWN:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_CHROOT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_LINK:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_SETGID:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_STAT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
|
|
* setting system flags.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS:
|
|
if (jail_chflags_allowed)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
|
|
* mounting/unmounting file systems.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER:
|
|
if (jail_mount_allowed)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed root to bind reserved ports and reuse in-use
|
|
* ports.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT:
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed root to set certian IPv4/6 (option) headers.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Conditionally allow creating raw sockets in jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_RAW:
|
|
if (jail_allow_raw_sockets)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since jail implements its own visibility limits on netstat
|
|
* sysctls, allow getcred. This allows identd to work in
|
|
* jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/*
|
|
* In all remaining cases, deny the privilege request. This
|
|
* includes almost all network privileges, many system
|
|
* configuration privileges.
|
|
*/
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
struct xprison *xp, *sxp;
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
char *p;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
int count, error;
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(req->td->td_ucred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
if ((count = prisoncount) == 0) {
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = sizeof(*xp) * count;
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
len += pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
len += pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sxp = xp = malloc(len, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
xp->pr_version = XPRISON_VERSION;
|
|
xp->pr_id = pr->pr_id;
|
|
xp->pr_state = pr->pr_state;
|
|
xp->pr_cpusetid = pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id;
|
|
strlcpy(xp->pr_path, pr->pr_path, sizeof(xp->pr_path));
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
strlcpy(xp->pr_host, pr->pr_host, sizeof(xp->pr_host));
|
|
strlcpy(xp->pr_name, pr->pr_name, sizeof(xp->pr_name));
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
xp->pr_ip4s = pr->pr_ip4s;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
xp->pr_ip6s = pr->pr_ip6s;
|
|
#endif
|
|
p = (char *)(xp + 1);
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
if (pr->pr_ip4s > 0) {
|
|
bcopy(pr->pr_ip4, (struct in_addr *)p,
|
|
pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr));
|
|
p += (pr->pr_ip4s * sizeof(struct in_addr));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
if (pr->pr_ip6s > 0) {
|
|
bcopy(pr->pr_ip6, (struct in6_addr *)p,
|
|
pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
p += (pr->pr_ip6s * sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
xp = (struct xprison *)p;
|
|
}
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, sxp, len);
|
|
free(sxp, M_TEMP);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_OID(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, list, CTLTYPE_STRUCT | CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_list, "S", "List of active jails");
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sysctl_jail_jailed(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
int error, injail;
|
|
|
|
injail = jailed(req->td->td_ucred);
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &injail, sizeof(injail));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jailed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_jailed, "I", "Process in jail?");
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DDB
|
|
DB_SHOW_COMMAND(jails, db_show_jails)
|
|
{
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
struct in_addr ia;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
char ip6buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
|
|
#endif
|
|
const char *state;
|
|
#if defined(INET) || defined(INET6)
|
|
int i;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
db_printf(
|
|
" JID pr_ref pr_nprocs pr_ip4s pr_ip6s\n");
|
|
db_printf(
|
|
" Hostname Path\n");
|
|
db_printf(
|
|
" Name State\n");
|
|
db_printf(
|
|
" Cpusetid\n");
|
|
db_printf(
|
|
" IP Address(es)\n");
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
db_printf("%6d %6d %9d %7d %7d\n",
|
|
pr->pr_id, pr->pr_ref, pr->pr_nprocs,
|
|
pr->pr_ip4s, pr->pr_ip6s);
|
|
db_printf("%6s %-29.29s %.74s\n",
|
|
"", pr->pr_host, pr->pr_path);
|
|
if (pr->pr_state < 0 || pr->pr_state > (int)((sizeof(
|
|
prison_states) / sizeof(struct prison_state))))
|
|
state = "(bogus)";
|
|
else
|
|
state = prison_states[pr->pr_state].state_name;
|
|
db_printf("%6s %-29.29s %.74s\n",
|
|
"", (pr->pr_name != NULL) ? pr->pr_name : "", state);
|
|
db_printf("%6s %-6d\n",
|
|
"", pr->pr_cpuset->cs_id);
|
|
#ifdef INET
|
|
for (i=0; i < pr->pr_ip4s; i++) {
|
|
ia.s_addr = pr->pr_ip4[i].s_addr;
|
|
db_printf("%6s %s\n", "", inet_ntoa(ia));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef INET6
|
|
for (i=0; i < pr->pr_ip6s; i++)
|
|
db_printf("%6s %s\n",
|
|
"", ip6_sprintf(ip6buf, &pr->pr_ip6[i]));
|
|
#endif /* INET6 */
|
|
if (db_pager_quit)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* DDB */
|