freebsd-skq/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_crypto.c
delphij 47f8d13b54 In g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(), zero out after using the ipad buffer,
k_ipad.

Note that the two consumers in geli(4) are not affected by this
issue because the way the code is constructed and as such, we
believe there is no security impact with or without this change
with geli(4)'s usage.

Reported by:	Serge van den Boom <serge vdboom.org>
Reviewed by:	pjd
MFC after:	2 weeks
2014-02-08 05:17:49 +00:00

310 lines
7.6 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2005-2010 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#else
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#define _OpenSSL_
#endif
#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_ELI);
static int
g_eli_crypto_done(struct cryptop *crp)
{
crp->crp_opaque = (void *)crp;
wakeup(crp);
return (0);
}
static int
g_eli_crypto_cipher(u_int algo, int enc, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
struct cryptoini cri;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
struct uio *uio;
struct iovec *iov;
uint64_t sid;
u_char *p;
int error;
KASSERT(algo != CRYPTO_AES_XTS,
("%s: CRYPTO_AES_XTS unexpected here", __func__));
bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri));
cri.cri_alg = algo;
cri.cri_key = __DECONST(void *, key);
cri.cri_klen = keysize;
error = crypto_newsession(&sid, &cri, CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
p = malloc(sizeof(*crp) + sizeof(*crd) + sizeof(*uio) + sizeof(*iov),
M_ELI, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
if (p == NULL) {
crypto_freesession(sid);
return (ENOMEM);
}
crp = (struct cryptop *)p; p += sizeof(*crp);
crd = (struct cryptodesc *)p; p += sizeof(*crd);
uio = (struct uio *)p; p += sizeof(*uio);
iov = (struct iovec *)p; p += sizeof(*iov);
iov->iov_len = datasize;
iov->iov_base = data;
uio->uio_iov = iov;
uio->uio_iovcnt = 1;
uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
uio->uio_resid = datasize;
crd->crd_skip = 0;
crd->crd_len = datasize;
crd->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT;
if (enc)
crd->crd_flags |= CRD_F_ENCRYPT;
crd->crd_alg = algo;
crd->crd_key = __DECONST(void *, key);
crd->crd_klen = keysize;
bzero(crd->crd_iv, sizeof(crd->crd_iv));
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crp->crp_sid = sid;
crp->crp_ilen = datasize;
crp->crp_olen = datasize;
crp->crp_opaque = NULL;
crp->crp_callback = g_eli_crypto_done;
crp->crp_buf = (void *)uio;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IOV | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC | CRYPTO_F_REL;
crp->crp_desc = crd;
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if (error == 0) {
while (crp->crp_opaque == NULL)
tsleep(crp, PRIBIO, "geli", hz / 5);
error = crp->crp_etype;
}
free(crp, M_ELI);
crypto_freesession(sid);
return (error);
}
#else /* !_KERNEL */
static int
g_eli_crypto_cipher(u_int algo, int enc, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *type;
u_char iv[keysize];
int outsize;
assert(algo != CRYPTO_AES_XTS);
switch (algo) {
case CRYPTO_NULL_CBC:
type = EVP_enc_null();
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
switch (keysize) {
case 128:
type = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
break;
case 192:
type = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
break;
case 256:
type = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CRYPTO_BLF_CBC:
type = EVP_bf_cbc();
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
case CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_CBC:
switch (keysize) {
case 128:
type = EVP_camellia_128_cbc();
break;
case 192:
type = EVP_camellia_192_cbc();
break;
case 256:
type = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
#endif
case CRYPTO_3DES_CBC:
type = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, keysize / 8);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ctx, 0);
bzero(iv, sizeof(iv));
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, enc);
if (EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, data, &outsize, data, datasize) == 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (EINVAL);
}
assert(outsize == (int)datasize);
if (EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, data + outsize, &outsize) == 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (EINVAL);
}
assert(outsize == 0);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (0);
}
#endif /* !_KERNEL */
int
g_eli_crypto_encrypt(u_int algo, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
/* We prefer AES-CBC for metadata protection. */
if (algo == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
algo = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
return (g_eli_crypto_cipher(algo, 1, data, datasize, key, keysize));
}
int
g_eli_crypto_decrypt(u_int algo, u_char *data, size_t datasize,
const u_char *key, size_t keysize)
{
/* We prefer AES-CBC for metadata protection. */
if (algo == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
algo = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
return (g_eli_crypto_cipher(algo, 0, data, datasize, key, keysize));
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *hkey,
size_t hkeylen)
{
u_char k_ipad[128], key[128];
SHA512_CTX lctx;
u_int i;
bzero(key, sizeof(key));
if (hkeylen == 0)
; /* do nothing */
else if (hkeylen <= 128)
bcopy(hkey, key, hkeylen);
else {
/* If key is longer than 128 bytes reset it to key = SHA512(key). */
SHA512_Init(&lctx);
SHA512_Update(&lctx, hkey, hkeylen);
SHA512_Final(key, &lctx);
}
/* XOR key with ipad and opad values. */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); i++) {
k_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
ctx->k_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
}
bzero(key, sizeof(key));
/* Perform inner SHA512. */
SHA512_Init(&ctx->shactx);
SHA512_Update(&ctx->shactx, k_ipad, sizeof(k_ipad));
bzero(k_ipad, sizeof(k_ipad));
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data,
size_t datasize)
{
SHA512_Update(&ctx->shactx, data, datasize);
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(struct hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *md, size_t mdsize)
{
u_char digest[SHA512_MDLEN];
SHA512_CTX lctx;
SHA512_Final(digest, &ctx->shactx);
/* Perform outer SHA512. */
SHA512_Init(&lctx);
SHA512_Update(&lctx, ctx->k_opad, sizeof(ctx->k_opad));
bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
SHA512_Update(&lctx, digest, sizeof(digest));
SHA512_Final(digest, &lctx);
bzero(&lctx, sizeof(lctx));
/* mdsize == 0 means "Give me the whole hash!" */
if (mdsize == 0)
mdsize = SHA512_MDLEN;
bcopy(digest, md, mdsize);
bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
}
void
g_eli_crypto_hmac(const uint8_t *hkey, size_t hkeysize, const uint8_t *data,
size_t datasize, uint8_t *md, size_t mdsize)
{
struct hmac_ctx ctx;
g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&ctx, hkey, hkeysize);
g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, data, datasize);
g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, md, mdsize);
}