ad49fbe326
- We need to allow for PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER inside a jail. - Move security checks to vfs_suser() and deny unmounting and updating for jailed root from different jails, etc. OK'ed by: rwatson
985 lines
23 KiB
C
985 lines
23 KiB
C
/*-
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* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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* "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
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* <phk@FreeBSD.ORG> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
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* can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
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* this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
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* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "opt_mac.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
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#include <sys/sysproto.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/priv.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/taskqueue.h>
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#include <sys/jail.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/sx.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/queue.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/syscallsubr.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
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MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PRISON, "prison", "Prison structures");
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SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, jail, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
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"Jail rules");
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int jail_set_hostname_allowed = 1;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, set_hostname_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_set_hostname_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can set their hostnames");
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int jail_socket_unixiproute_only = 1;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, socket_unixiproute_only, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_socket_unixiproute_only, 0,
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"Processes in jail are limited to creating UNIX/IPv4/route sockets only");
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int jail_sysvipc_allowed = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, sysvipc_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_sysvipc_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can use System V IPC primitives");
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static int jail_enforce_statfs = 2;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, enforce_statfs, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_enforce_statfs, 0,
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"Processes in jail cannot see all mounted file systems");
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int jail_allow_raw_sockets = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, allow_raw_sockets, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_allow_raw_sockets, 0,
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"Prison root can create raw sockets");
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int jail_chflags_allowed = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, chflags_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_chflags_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can alter system file flags");
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int jail_mount_allowed = 0;
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SYSCTL_INT(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, mount_allowed, CTLFLAG_RW,
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&jail_mount_allowed, 0,
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"Processes in jail can mount/unmount jail-friendly file systems");
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/* allprison, lastprid, and prisoncount are protected by allprison_lock. */
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struct prisonlist allprison;
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struct sx allprison_lock;
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int lastprid = 0;
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int prisoncount = 0;
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/*
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* List of jail services. Protected by allprison_lock.
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*/
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TAILQ_HEAD(prison_services_head, prison_service);
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static struct prison_services_head prison_services =
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TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(prison_services);
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static int prison_service_slots = 0;
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struct prison_service {
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prison_create_t ps_create;
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prison_destroy_t ps_destroy;
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int ps_slotno;
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TAILQ_ENTRY(prison_service) ps_next;
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char ps_name[0];
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};
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static void init_prison(void *);
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static void prison_complete(void *context, int pending);
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static int sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS);
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static void
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init_prison(void *data __unused)
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{
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sx_init(&allprison_lock, "allprison");
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LIST_INIT(&allprison);
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}
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SYSINIT(prison, SI_SUB_INTRINSIC, SI_ORDER_ANY, init_prison, NULL);
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/*
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* struct jail_args {
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* struct jail *jail;
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* };
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*/
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int
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jail(struct thread *td, struct jail_args *uap)
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{
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struct nameidata nd;
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struct prison *pr, *tpr;
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struct prison_service *psrv;
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struct jail j;
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struct jail_attach_args jaa;
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int vfslocked, error, tryprid;
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error = copyin(uap->jail, &j, sizeof(j));
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if (error)
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return (error);
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if (j.version != 0)
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return (EINVAL);
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MALLOC(pr, struct prison *, sizeof(*pr), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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mtx_init(&pr->pr_mtx, "jail mutex", NULL, MTX_DEF);
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pr->pr_ref = 1;
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error = copyinstr(j.path, &pr->pr_path, sizeof(pr->pr_path), 0);
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if (error)
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goto e_killmtx;
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NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE | FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_SYSSPACE,
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pr->pr_path, td);
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error = namei(&nd);
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if (error)
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goto e_killmtx;
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vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
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pr->pr_root = nd.ni_vp;
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VOP_UNLOCK(nd.ni_vp, 0, td);
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NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
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VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
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error = copyinstr(j.hostname, &pr->pr_host, sizeof(pr->pr_host), 0);
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if (error)
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goto e_dropvnref;
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pr->pr_ip = j.ip_number;
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pr->pr_linux = NULL;
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pr->pr_securelevel = securelevel;
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if (prison_service_slots == 0)
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pr->pr_slots = NULL;
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else {
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pr->pr_slots = malloc(sizeof(*pr->pr_slots) * prison_service_slots,
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M_PRISON, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
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}
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/* Determine next pr_id and add prison to allprison list. */
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sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
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tryprid = lastprid + 1;
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if (tryprid == JAIL_MAX)
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tryprid = 1;
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next:
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LIST_FOREACH(tpr, &allprison, pr_list) {
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if (tpr->pr_id == tryprid) {
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tryprid++;
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if (tryprid == JAIL_MAX) {
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sx_xunlock(&allprison_lock);
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error = EAGAIN;
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goto e_dropvnref;
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}
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goto next;
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}
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}
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pr->pr_id = jaa.jid = lastprid = tryprid;
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LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&allprison, pr, pr_list);
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prisoncount++;
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sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
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TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv, &prison_services, ps_next) {
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psrv->ps_create(psrv, pr);
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}
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sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
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error = jail_attach(td, &jaa);
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if (error)
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goto e_dropprref;
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mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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pr->pr_ref--;
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mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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td->td_retval[0] = jaa.jid;
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return (0);
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e_dropprref:
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sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
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LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_list);
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prisoncount--;
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sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
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TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv, &prison_services, ps_next) {
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psrv->ps_destroy(psrv, pr);
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}
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sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
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e_dropvnref:
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vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
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vrele(pr->pr_root);
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VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
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e_killmtx:
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mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx);
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FREE(pr, M_PRISON);
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return (error);
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}
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/*
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* struct jail_attach_args {
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* int jid;
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* };
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*/
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int
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jail_attach(struct thread *td, struct jail_attach_args *uap)
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{
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struct proc *p;
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struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
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struct prison *pr;
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int vfslocked, error;
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/*
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* XXX: Note that there is a slight race here if two threads
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* in the same privileged process attempt to attach to two
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* different jails at the same time. It is important for
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* user processes not to do this, or they might end up with
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* a process root from one prison, but attached to the jail
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* of another.
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*/
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error = priv_check(td, PRIV_JAIL_ATTACH);
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if (error)
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return (error);
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p = td->td_proc;
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sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
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pr = prison_find(uap->jid);
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if (pr == NULL) {
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sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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pr->pr_ref++;
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mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
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vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
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vn_lock(pr->pr_root, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
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if ((error = change_dir(pr->pr_root, td)) != 0)
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goto e_unlock;
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#ifdef MAC
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if ((error = mac_check_vnode_chroot(td->td_ucred, pr->pr_root)))
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goto e_unlock;
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#endif
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VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0, td);
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change_root(pr->pr_root, td);
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VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
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newcred = crget();
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PROC_LOCK(p);
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oldcred = p->p_ucred;
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setsugid(p);
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crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
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newcred->cr_prison = pr;
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p->p_ucred = newcred;
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PROC_UNLOCK(p);
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crfree(oldcred);
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return (0);
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e_unlock:
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VOP_UNLOCK(pr->pr_root, 0, td);
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VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
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mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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pr->pr_ref--;
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mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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return (error);
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}
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/*
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* Returns a locked prison instance, or NULL on failure.
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*/
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struct prison *
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prison_find(int prid)
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{
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struct prison *pr;
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sx_assert(&allprison_lock, SX_LOCKED);
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LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
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if (pr->pr_id == prid) {
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mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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if (pr->pr_ref == 0) {
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mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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break;
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}
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return (pr);
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}
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}
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return (NULL);
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}
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void
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prison_free(struct prison *pr)
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{
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mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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pr->pr_ref--;
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if (pr->pr_ref == 0) {
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mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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TASK_INIT(&pr->pr_task, 0, prison_complete, pr);
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taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread, &pr->pr_task);
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return;
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}
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mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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}
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static void
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prison_complete(void *context, int pending)
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{
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struct prison_service *psrv;
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struct prison *pr;
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int vfslocked;
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pr = (struct prison *)context;
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sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
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LIST_REMOVE(pr, pr_list);
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prisoncount--;
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sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
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TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv, &prison_services, ps_next) {
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psrv->ps_destroy(psrv, pr);
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}
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sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
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vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(pr->pr_root->v_mount);
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vrele(pr->pr_root);
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VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
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mtx_destroy(&pr->pr_mtx);
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if (pr->pr_linux != NULL)
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FREE(pr->pr_linux, M_PRISON);
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FREE(pr, M_PRISON);
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}
|
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|
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void
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prison_hold(struct prison *pr)
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{
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mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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KASSERT(pr->pr_ref > 0,
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("Trying to hold dead prison (id=%d).", pr->pr_id));
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pr->pr_ref++;
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mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
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}
|
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|
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u_int32_t
|
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prison_getip(struct ucred *cred)
|
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{
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return (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
|
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}
|
|
|
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int
|
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prison_ip(struct ucred *cred, int flag, u_int32_t *ip)
|
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{
|
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u_int32_t tmp;
|
|
|
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if (!jailed(cred))
|
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return (0);
|
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if (flag)
|
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tmp = *ip;
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else
|
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tmp = ntohl(*ip);
|
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if (tmp == INADDR_ANY) {
|
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if (flag)
|
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*ip = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip;
|
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else
|
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*ip = htonl(cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (tmp == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
|
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if (flag)
|
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*ip = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip;
|
|
else
|
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*ip = htonl(cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip != tmp)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_remote_ip(struct ucred *cred, int flag, u_int32_t *ip)
|
|
{
|
|
u_int32_t tmp;
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return;
|
|
if (flag)
|
|
tmp = *ip;
|
|
else
|
|
tmp = ntohl(*ip);
|
|
if (tmp == INADDR_LOOPBACK) {
|
|
if (flag)
|
|
*ip = cred->cr_prison->pr_ip;
|
|
else
|
|
*ip = htonl(cred->cr_prison->pr_ip);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
prison_if(struct ucred *cred, struct sockaddr *sa)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sai;
|
|
int ok;
|
|
|
|
sai = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
|
|
if ((sai->sin_family != AF_INET) && jail_socket_unixiproute_only)
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
else if (sai->sin_family != AF_INET)
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
else if (cred->cr_prison->pr_ip != ntohl(sai->sin_addr.s_addr))
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
return (ok);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return 0 if jails permit p1 to frob p2, otherwise ESRCH.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_check(struct ucred *cred1, struct ucred *cred2)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(cred1)) {
|
|
if (!jailed(cred2))
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
if (cred2->cr_prison != cred1->cr_prison)
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return 1 if the passed credential is in a jail, otherwise 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
jailed(struct ucred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (cred->cr_prison != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return the correct hostname for the passed credential.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
getcredhostname(struct ucred *cred, char *buf, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(cred)) {
|
|
mtx_lock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
|
|
strlcpy(buf, cred->cr_prison->pr_host, size);
|
|
mtx_unlock(&cred->cr_prison->pr_mtx);
|
|
} else
|
|
strlcpy(buf, hostname, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine whether the subject represented by cred can "see"
|
|
* status of a mount point.
|
|
* Returns: 0 for permitted, ENOENT otherwise.
|
|
* XXX: This function should be called cr_canseemount() and should be
|
|
* placed in kern_prot.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_canseemount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
struct statfs *sp;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred) || jail_enforce_statfs == 0)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
pr = cred->cr_prison;
|
|
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if (jail_enforce_statfs == 2)
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
|
|
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
|
|
* This is ugly check, but this is the only situation when jail's
|
|
* directory ends with '/'.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
|
|
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
|
|
if (strncmp(pr->pr_path, sp->f_mntonname, len) != 0)
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Be sure that we don't have situation where jail's root directory
|
|
* is "/some/path" and mount point is "/some/pathpath".
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sp->f_mntonname[len] != '\0' && sp->f_mntonname[len] != '/')
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_enforce_statfs(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, struct statfs *sp)
|
|
{
|
|
char jpath[MAXPATHLEN];
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred) || jail_enforce_statfs == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
pr = cred->cr_prison;
|
|
if (prison_canseemount(cred, mp) != 0) {
|
|
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, "[restricted]",
|
|
sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pr->pr_root->v_mount == mp) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
|
|
* the valid path left there.
|
|
*/
|
|
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If jail's chroot directory is set to "/" we should be able to see
|
|
* all mount-points from inside a jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strcmp(pr->pr_path, "/") == 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
len = strlen(pr->pr_path);
|
|
strlcpy(jpath, sp->f_mntonname + len, sizeof(jpath));
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear current buffer data, so we are sure nothing from
|
|
* the valid path left there.
|
|
*/
|
|
bzero(sp->f_mntonname, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
if (*jpath == '\0') {
|
|
/* Should never happen. */
|
|
*sp->f_mntonname = '/';
|
|
} else {
|
|
strlcpy(sp->f_mntonname, jpath, sizeof(sp->f_mntonname));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check with permission for a specific privilege is granted within jail. We
|
|
* have a specific list of accepted privileges; the rest are denied.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!jailed(cred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
switch (priv) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow ktrace privileges for root in jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_KTRACE:
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed processes to configure audit identity and
|
|
* submit audit records (login, etc). In the future we may
|
|
* want to further refine the relationship between audit and
|
|
* jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_AUDIT_GETAUDIT:
|
|
case PRIV_AUDIT_SETAUDIT:
|
|
case PRIV_AUDIT_SUBMIT:
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed processes to manipulate process UNIX
|
|
* credentials in any way they see fit.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETEUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETGID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETEGID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETREUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETREGID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESUID:
|
|
case PRIV_CRED_SETRESGID:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Jail implements visibility constraints already, so allow
|
|
* jailed root to override uid/gid-based constraints.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS:
|
|
case PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Jail implements inter-process debugging limits already, so
|
|
* allow jailed root various debugging privileges.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED:
|
|
case PRIV_DEBUG_SUGID:
|
|
case PRIV_DEBUG_UNPRIV:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jail to set various resource limits and login
|
|
* properties, and for now, exceed process resource limits.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_PROC_LIMIT:
|
|
case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGIN:
|
|
case PRIV_PROC_SETRLIMIT:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* System V and POSIX IPC privileges are granted in jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_READ:
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_WRITE:
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_ADMIN:
|
|
case PRIV_IPC_MSGSIZE:
|
|
case PRIV_MQ_ADMIN:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Jail implements its own inter-process limits, so allow
|
|
* root processes in jail to change scheduling on other
|
|
* processes in the same jail. Likewise for signalling.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_SCHED_DIFFCRED:
|
|
case PRIV_SIGNAL_DIFFCRED:
|
|
case PRIV_SIGNAL_SUGID:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed processes to write to sysctls marked as jail
|
|
* writable.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_SYSCTL_WRITEJAIL:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow root in jail to manage a variety of quota
|
|
* properties. These should likely be conditional on a
|
|
* configuration option.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_GETQUOTA:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_SETQUOTA:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since Jail relies on chroot() to implement file system
|
|
* protections, grant many VFS privileges to root in jail.
|
|
* Be careful to exclude mount-related and NFS-related
|
|
* privileges.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_READ:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_WRITE:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_ADMIN:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_EXEC:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_BLOCKRESERVE: /* XXXRW: Slightly surprising. */
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_CHFLAGS_DEV:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_CHOWN:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_CHROOT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_FCHROOT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_LINK:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_SETGID:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
|
|
* setting system flags.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS:
|
|
if (jail_chflags_allowed)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Depending on the global setting, allow privilege of
|
|
* mounting/unmounting file systems.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER:
|
|
case PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER:
|
|
if (jail_mount_allowed)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow jailed root to bind reserved ports and reuse in-use
|
|
* ports.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_RESERVEDPORT:
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_REUSEPORT:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Conditionally allow creating raw sockets in jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_RAW:
|
|
if (jail_allow_raw_sockets)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
else
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since jail implements its own visibility limits on netstat
|
|
* sysctls, allow getcred. This allows identd to work in
|
|
* jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PRIV_NETINET_GETCRED:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/*
|
|
* In all remaining cases, deny the privilege request. This
|
|
* includes almost all network privileges, many system
|
|
* configuration privileges.
|
|
*/
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Register jail service. Provides 'create' and 'destroy' methods.
|
|
* 'create' method will be called for every existing jail and all
|
|
* jails in the future as they beeing created.
|
|
* 'destroy' method will be called for every jail going away and
|
|
* for all existing jails at the time of service deregistration.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct prison_service *
|
|
prison_service_register(const char *name, prison_create_t create,
|
|
prison_destroy_t destroy)
|
|
{
|
|
struct prison_service *psrv, *psrv2;
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
int reallocate = 1, slotno = 0;
|
|
void **slots, **oldslots;
|
|
|
|
psrv = malloc(sizeof(*psrv) + strlen(name) + 1, M_PRISON,
|
|
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
psrv->ps_create = create;
|
|
psrv->ps_destroy = destroy;
|
|
strcpy(psrv->ps_name, name);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Grab the allprison_lock here, so we won't miss any jail
|
|
* creation/destruction.
|
|
*/
|
|
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify if service is not already registered.
|
|
*/
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv2, &prison_services, ps_next) {
|
|
KASSERT(strcmp(psrv2->ps_name, name) != 0,
|
|
("jail service %s already registered", name));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find free slot. When there is no existing free slot available,
|
|
* allocate one at the end.
|
|
*/
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(psrv2, &prison_services, ps_next) {
|
|
if (psrv2->ps_slotno != slotno) {
|
|
KASSERT(slotno < psrv2->ps_slotno,
|
|
("Invalid slotno (slotno=%d >= ps_slotno=%d",
|
|
slotno, psrv2->ps_slotno));
|
|
/* We found free slot. */
|
|
reallocate = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
slotno++;
|
|
}
|
|
psrv->ps_slotno = slotno;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Keep the list sorted by slot number.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (psrv2 != NULL) {
|
|
KASSERT(reallocate == 0, ("psrv2 != NULL && reallocate != 0"));
|
|
TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(psrv2, psrv, ps_next);
|
|
} else {
|
|
KASSERT(reallocate == 1, ("psrv2 == NULL && reallocate == 0"));
|
|
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&prison_services, psrv, ps_next);
|
|
}
|
|
prison_service_slots++;
|
|
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allocate memory for new slot if we didn't found empty one.
|
|
* Do not use realloc(9), because pr_slots is protected with a mutex,
|
|
* so we can't sleep.
|
|
*/
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
if (reallocate) {
|
|
/* First allocate memory with M_WAITOK. */
|
|
slots = malloc(sizeof(*slots) * prison_service_slots,
|
|
M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
|
|
/* Now grab the mutex and replace pr_slots. */
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
oldslots = pr->pr_slots;
|
|
if (psrv->ps_slotno > 0) {
|
|
bcopy(oldslots, slots,
|
|
sizeof(*slots) * (prison_service_slots - 1));
|
|
}
|
|
slots[psrv->ps_slotno] = NULL;
|
|
pr->pr_slots = slots;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
if (oldslots != NULL)
|
|
free(oldslots, M_PRISON);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call 'create' method for each existing jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
psrv->ps_create(psrv, pr);
|
|
}
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
|
|
return (psrv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
prison_service_deregister(struct prison_service *psrv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
void **slots, **oldslots;
|
|
int last = 0;
|
|
|
|
sx_xlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
if (TAILQ_LAST(&prison_services, prison_services_head) == psrv)
|
|
last = 1;
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&prison_services, psrv, ps_next);
|
|
prison_service_slots--;
|
|
sx_downgrade(&allprison_lock);
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call 'destroy' method for every currently existing jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
psrv->ps_destroy(psrv, pr);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this is the last slot, free the memory allocated for it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (last) {
|
|
if (prison_service_slots == 0)
|
|
slots = NULL;
|
|
else {
|
|
slots = malloc(sizeof(*slots) * prison_service_slots,
|
|
M_PRISON, M_WAITOK);
|
|
}
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
oldslots = pr->pr_slots;
|
|
/*
|
|
* We require setting slot to NULL after freeing it,
|
|
* this way we can check for memory leaks here.
|
|
*/
|
|
KASSERT(oldslots[psrv->ps_slotno] == NULL,
|
|
("Slot %d (service %s, jailid=%d) still contains data?",
|
|
psrv->ps_slotno, psrv->ps_name, pr->pr_id));
|
|
if (psrv->ps_slotno > 0) {
|
|
bcopy(oldslots, slots,
|
|
sizeof(*slots) * prison_service_slots);
|
|
}
|
|
pr->pr_slots = slots;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
KASSERT(oldslots != NULL, ("oldslots == NULL"));
|
|
free(oldslots, M_PRISON);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
free(psrv, M_PRISON);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Function sets data for the given jail in slot assigned for the given
|
|
* jail service.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
prison_service_data_set(struct prison_service *psrv, struct prison *pr,
|
|
void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
|
|
pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno] = data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Function clears slots assigned for the given jail service in the given
|
|
* prison structure and returns current slot data.
|
|
*/
|
|
void *
|
|
prison_service_data_del(struct prison_service *psrv, struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
void *data;
|
|
|
|
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
|
|
data = pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno];
|
|
pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno] = NULL;
|
|
return (data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Function returns current data from the slot assigned to the given jail
|
|
* service for the given jail.
|
|
*/
|
|
void *
|
|
prison_service_data_get(struct prison_service *psrv, struct prison *pr)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
mtx_assert(&pr->pr_mtx, MA_OWNED);
|
|
return (pr->pr_slots[psrv->ps_slotno]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sysctl_jail_list(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
struct xprison *xp, *sxp;
|
|
struct prison *pr;
|
|
int count, error;
|
|
|
|
if (jailed(req->td->td_ucred))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
if ((count = prisoncount) == 0) {
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sxp = xp = malloc(sizeof(*xp) * count, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list) {
|
|
xp->pr_version = XPRISON_VERSION;
|
|
xp->pr_id = pr->pr_id;
|
|
xp->pr_ip = pr->pr_ip;
|
|
strlcpy(xp->pr_path, pr->pr_path, sizeof(xp->pr_path));
|
|
mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
strlcpy(xp->pr_host, pr->pr_host, sizeof(xp->pr_host));
|
|
mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
|
|
xp++;
|
|
}
|
|
sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
|
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, sxp, sizeof(*sxp) * count);
|
|
free(sxp, M_TEMP);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_OID(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, list, CTLTYPE_STRUCT | CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_list, "S", "List of active jails");
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sysctl_jail_jailed(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
int error, injail;
|
|
|
|
injail = jailed(req->td->td_ucred);
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, &injail, sizeof(injail));
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_jail, OID_AUTO, jailed, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
NULL, 0, sysctl_jail_jailed, "I", "Process in jail?");
|