freebsd-skq/sys/security/mac_portacl/mac_portacl.c
Robert Watson 5bb84bc84b Normalize a significant number of kernel malloc type names:
- Prefer '_' to ' ', as it results in more easily parsed results in
  memory monitoring tools such as vmstat.

- Remove punctuation that is incompatible with using memory type names
  as file names, such as '/' characters.

- Disambiguate some collisions by adding subsystem prefixes to some
  memory types.

- Generally prefer lower case to upper case.

- If the same type is defined in multiple architecture directories,
  attempt to use the same name in additional cases.

Not all instances were caught in this change, so more work is required to
finish this conversion.  Similar changes are required for UMA zone names.
2005-10-31 15:41:29 +00:00

499 lines
13 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2003-2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
*
* Administratively limit access to local UDP/TCP ports for binding purposes.
* Intended to be combined with net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh to allow
* specific uids and gids to bind specific ports for specific purposes,
* while not opening the door to any user replacing an "official" service
* while you're restarting it. This only affects ports explicitly bound by
* the user process (either for listen/outgoing socket for TCP, or send/
* receive for UDP). This module will not limit ports bound implicitly for
* out-going connections where the process hasn't explicitly selected a port:
* these are automatically selected by the IP stack.
*
* To use this module, security.mac.enforce_socket must be enabled, and
* you will probably want to twiddle the net.inet sysctl listed above.
* Then use sysctl(8) to modify the rules string:
*
* # sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules="uid:425:tcp:80,uid:425:tcp:79"
*
* This ruleset, for example, permits uid 425 to bind TCP ports 80 (http)
* and 79 (finger). User names and group names can't be used directly
* because the kernel only knows about uids and gids.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/libkern.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, portacl, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD mac_portacl policy controls");
static int mac_portacl_enabled = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_portacl_enabled, 0, "Enforce portacl policy");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.enabled", &mac_portacl_enabled);
static int mac_portacl_suser_exempt = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, suser_exempt, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_portacl_suser_exempt, 0, "Privilege permits binding of any port");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt",
&mac_portacl_suser_exempt);
static int mac_portacl_autoport_exempt = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, autoport_exempt, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_portacl_autoport_exempt, 0, "Allow automatic allocation through "
"binding port 0 if not IP_PORTRANGELOW");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.autoport_exempt",
&mac_portacl_autoport_exempt);
static int mac_portacl_port_high = 1023;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, port_high, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_portacl_port_high, 0, "Highest port to enforce for");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.portacl.port_high", &mac_portacl_port_high);
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PORTACL, "mac_portacl_rule", "Rules for mac_portacl");
#define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN 1024
#define RULE_GID 1
#define RULE_UID 2
#define RULE_PROTO_TCP 1
#define RULE_PROTO_UDP 2
struct rule {
id_t r_id;
int r_idtype;
u_int16_t r_port;
int r_protocol;
TAILQ_ENTRY(rule) r_entries;
};
#define GID_STRING "gid"
#define TCP_STRING "tcp"
#define UID_STRING "uid"
#define UDP_STRING "udp"
/*
* Text format for the rule string is that a rule consists of a
* comma-seperated list of elements. Each element is in the form
* idtype:id:protocol:portnumber, and constitutes granting of permission
* for the specified binding.
*/
static struct mtx rule_mtx;
static TAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, rule) rule_head;
static char rule_string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN];
static void
toast_rules(struct rulehead *head)
{
struct rule *rule;
while ((rule = TAILQ_FIRST(head)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(head, rule, r_entries);
free(rule, M_PORTACL);
}
}
/*
* Note that there is an inherent race condition in the unload of modules
* and access via sysctl.
*/
static void
destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
mtx_destroy(&rule_mtx);
toast_rules(&rule_head);
}
static void
init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
mtx_init(&rule_mtx, "rule_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
TAILQ_INIT(&rule_head);
}
/*
* Note: parsing routines are destructive on the passed string.
*/
static int
parse_rule_element(char *element, struct rule **rule)
{
char *idtype, *id, *protocol, *portnumber, *p;
struct rule *new;
int error;
error = 0;
new = malloc(sizeof(*new), M_PORTACL, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
idtype = strsep(&element, ":");
if (idtype == NULL) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
id = strsep(&element, ":");
if (id == NULL) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
new->r_id = strtol(id, &p, 10);
if (*p != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(idtype, UID_STRING) == 0)
new->r_idtype = RULE_UID;
else if (strcmp(idtype, GID_STRING) == 0)
new->r_idtype = RULE_GID;
else {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
protocol = strsep(&element, ":");
if (protocol == NULL) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(protocol, TCP_STRING) == 0)
new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_TCP;
else if (strcmp(protocol, UDP_STRING) == 0)
new->r_protocol = RULE_PROTO_UDP;
else {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
portnumber = element;
if (portnumber == NULL) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
new->r_port = strtol(portnumber, &p, 10);
if (*p != '\0') {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
out:
if (error != 0) {
free(new, M_PORTACL);
*rule = NULL;
} else
*rule = new;
return (error);
}
static int
parse_rules(char *string, struct rulehead *head)
{
struct rule *new;
char *element;
int error;
error = 0;
while ((element = strsep(&string, ",")) != NULL) {
if (strlen(element) == 0)
continue;
error = parse_rule_element(element, &new);
if (error)
goto out;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, new, r_entries);
}
out:
if (error != 0)
toast_rules(head);
return (error);
}
/*
* rule_printf() and rules_to_string() are unused currently because they rely
* on sbufs with auto-extension, which may sleep while holding a mutex.
* Instead, the non-canonical user-generated rule string is returned to the
* user when the rules are queried, which is faster anyway.
*/
#if 0
static void
rule_printf(struct sbuf *sb, struct rule *rule)
{
const char *idtype, *protocol;
switch(rule->r_idtype) {
case RULE_GID:
idtype = GID_STRING;
break;
case RULE_UID:
idtype = UID_STRING;
break;
default:
panic("rule_printf: unknown idtype (%d)\n", rule->r_idtype);
}
switch (rule->r_protocol) {
case RULE_PROTO_TCP:
protocol = TCP_STRING;
break;
case RULE_PROTO_UDP:
protocol = UDP_STRING;
break;
default:
panic("rule_printf: unknown protocol (%d)\n",
rule->r_protocol);
}
sbuf_printf(sb, "%s:%jd:%s:%d", idtype, (intmax_t)rule->r_id,
protocol, rule->r_port);
}
static char *
rules_to_string(void)
{
struct rule *rule;
struct sbuf *sb;
int needcomma;
char *temp;
sb = sbuf_new(NULL, NULL, 0, SBUF_AUTOEXTEND);
needcomma = 0;
mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head); rule != NULL;
rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) {
if (!needcomma)
needcomma = 1;
else
sbuf_printf(sb, ",");
rule_printf(sb, rule);
}
mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
sbuf_finish(sb);
temp = strdup(sbuf_data(sb), M_PORTACL);
sbuf_delete(sb);
return (temp);
}
#endif
/*
* Note: due to races, there is not a single serializable order
* between parallel calls to the sysctl.
*/
static int
sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
char *string, *copy_string, *new_string;
struct rulehead head, save_head;
int error;
new_string = NULL;
if (req->newptr == NULL) {
new_string = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_PORTACL,
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
strcpy(new_string, rule_string);
string = new_string;
} else
string = rule_string;
error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req);
if (error)
goto out;
if (req->newptr != NULL) {
copy_string = strdup(string, M_PORTACL);
TAILQ_INIT(&head);
error = parse_rules(copy_string, &head);
free(copy_string, M_PORTACL);
if (error)
goto out;
TAILQ_INIT(&save_head);
mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
TAILQ_CONCAT(&save_head, &rule_head, r_entries);
TAILQ_CONCAT(&rule_head, &head, r_entries);
strcpy(rule_string, string);
mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
toast_rules(&save_head);
}
out:
if (new_string != NULL)
free(new_string, M_PORTACL);
return (error);
}
SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_portacl, OID_AUTO, rules,
CTLTYPE_STRING|CTLFLAG_RW, 0, 0, sysctl_rules, "A", "Rules");
static int
rules_check(struct ucred *cred, int family, int type, u_int16_t port)
{
struct rule *rule;
int error;
#if 0
printf("Check requested for euid %d, family %d, type %d, port %d\n",
cred->cr_uid, family, type, port);
#endif
if (port > mac_portacl_port_high)
return (0);
error = EPERM;
mtx_lock(&rule_mtx);
for (rule = TAILQ_FIRST(&rule_head);
rule != NULL;
rule = TAILQ_NEXT(rule, r_entries)) {
if (type == SOCK_DGRAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_UDP)
continue;
if (type == SOCK_STREAM && rule->r_protocol != RULE_PROTO_TCP)
continue;
if (port != rule->r_port)
continue;
if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_UID) {
if (cred->cr_uid == rule->r_id) {
error = 0;
break;
}
} else if (rule->r_idtype == RULE_GID) {
if (cred->cr_gid == rule->r_id) {
error = 0;
break;
} else if (groupmember(rule->r_id, cred)) {
error = 0;
break;
}
} else
panic("rules_check: unknown rule type %d",
rule->r_idtype);
}
mtx_unlock(&rule_mtx);
if (error != 0 && mac_portacl_suser_exempt != 0)
error = suser_cred(cred, 0);
return (error);
}
/*
* Note, this only limits the ability to explicitly bind a port, it
* doesn't limit implicitly bound ports for outgoing connections where
* the source port is left up to the IP stack to determine automatically.
*/
static int
check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
struct label *socketlabel, struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
{
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct inpcb *inp;
int family, type;
u_int16_t port;
/* Only run if we are enabled. */
if (mac_portacl_enabled == 0)
return (0);
/* Only interested in IPv4 and IPv6 sockets. */
if (so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET &&
so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family != PF_INET6)
return (0);
/* Currently, we don't attempt to deal with SOCK_RAW, etc. */
if (so->so_type != SOCK_DGRAM &&
so->so_type != SOCK_STREAM)
return (0);
/* Reject addresses we don't understand; fail closed. */
if (sockaddr->sa_family != AF_INET &&
sockaddr->sa_family != AF_INET6)
return (EINVAL);
family = so->so_proto->pr_domain->dom_family;
type = so->so_type;
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sockaddr;
port = ntohs(sin->sin_port);
/*
* Sockets are frequently bound with a specific IP address but a port
* number of '0' to request automatic port allocation. This is often
* desirable as long as IP_PORTRANGELOW isn't set, which might permit
* automatic allocation of a "privileged" port. The autoport exempt
* flag exempts port 0 allocation from rule checking as long as a low
* port isn't required.
*/
if (mac_portacl_autoport_exempt && port == 0) {
inp = sotoinpcb(so);
if ((inp->inp_flags & INP_LOWPORT) == 0)
return (0);
}
return (rules_check(cred, family, type, port));
}
static struct mac_policy_ops mac_portacl_ops =
{
.mpo_destroy = destroy,
.mpo_init = init,
.mpo_check_socket_bind = check_socket_bind,
};
MAC_POLICY_SET(&mac_portacl_ops, trustedbsd_mac_portacl,
"TrustedBSD MAC/portacl", MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);