freebsd-skq/sys/kgssapi/krb5/kcrypto_aes.c
Conrad Meyer 1b0909d51a OpenCrypto: Convert sessions to opaque handles instead of integers
Track session objects in the framework, and pass handles between the
framework (OCF), consumers, and drivers.  Avoid redundancy and complexity in
individual drivers by allocating session memory in the framework and
providing it to drivers in ::newsession().

Session handles are no longer integers with information encoded in various
high bits.  Use of the CRYPTO_SESID2FOO() macros should be replaced with the
appropriate crypto_ses2foo() function on the opaque session handle.

Convert OCF drivers (in particular, cryptosoft, as well as myriad others) to
the opaque handle interface.  Discard existing session tracking as much as
possible (quick pass).  There may be additional code ripe for deletion.

Convert OCF consumers (ipsec, geom_eli, krb5, cryptodev) to handle-style
interface.  The conversion is largely mechnical.

The change is documented in crypto.9.

Inspired by
https://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-arch/2018-January/018835.html .

No objection from:	ae (ipsec portion)
Reported by:	jhb
2018-07-18 00:56:25 +00:00

393 lines
11 KiB
C

/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/
* Authors: Doug Rabson <dfr@rabson.org>
* Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein <alfred@freebsd.org>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/kobj.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
#include <kgssapi/gssapi.h>
#include <kgssapi/gssapi_impl.h>
#include "kcrypto.h"
struct aes_state {
struct mtx as_lock;
crypto_session_t as_session_aes;
crypto_session_t as_session_sha1;
};
static void
aes_init(struct krb5_key_state *ks)
{
struct aes_state *as;
as = malloc(sizeof(struct aes_state), M_GSSAPI, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
mtx_init(&as->as_lock, "gss aes lock", NULL, MTX_DEF);
ks->ks_priv = as;
}
static void
aes_destroy(struct krb5_key_state *ks)
{
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
if (as->as_session_aes != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_aes);
if (as->as_session_sha1 != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_sha1);
mtx_destroy(&as->as_lock);
free(ks->ks_priv, M_GSSAPI);
}
static void
aes_set_key(struct krb5_key_state *ks, const void *in)
{
void *kp = ks->ks_key;
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
struct cryptoini cri;
if (kp != in)
bcopy(in, kp, ks->ks_class->ec_keylen);
if (as->as_session_aes != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_aes);
if (as->as_session_sha1 != 0)
crypto_freesession(as->as_session_sha1);
/*
* We only want the first 96 bits of the HMAC.
*/
bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri));
cri.cri_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
cri.cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits;
cri.cri_mlen = 12;
cri.cri_key = ks->ks_key;
cri.cri_next = NULL;
crypto_newsession(&as->as_session_sha1, &cri,
CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE);
bzero(&cri, sizeof(cri));
cri.cri_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
cri.cri_klen = ks->ks_class->ec_keybits;
cri.cri_mlen = 0;
cri.cri_key = ks->ks_key;
cri.cri_next = NULL;
crypto_newsession(&as->as_session_aes, &cri,
CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE);
}
static void
aes_random_to_key(struct krb5_key_state *ks, const void *in)
{
aes_set_key(ks, in);
}
static int
aes_crypto_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
{
int error;
struct aes_state *as = (struct aes_state *) crp->crp_opaque;
if (crypto_ses2caps(crp->crp_session) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC)
return (0);
error = crp->crp_etype;
if (error == EAGAIN)
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
mtx_lock(&as->as_lock);
if (error || (crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
wakeup(crp);
mtx_unlock(&as->as_lock);
return (0);
}
static void
aes_encrypt_1(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int buftype, void *buf,
size_t skip, size_t len, void *ivec, int encdec)
{
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
int error;
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
crd = crp->crp_desc;
crd->crd_skip = skip;
crd->crd_len = len;
crd->crd_flags = CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT | CRD_F_IV_PRESENT | encdec;
if (ivec) {
bcopy(ivec, crd->crd_iv, 16);
} else {
bzero(crd->crd_iv, 16);
}
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
crp->crp_session = as->as_session_aes;
crp->crp_flags = buftype | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = buf;
crp->crp_opaque = (void *) as;
crp->crp_callback = aes_crypto_cb;
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if ((crypto_ses2caps(as->as_session_aes) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&as->as_lock);
if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0);
mtx_unlock(&as->as_lock);
}
crypto_freereq(crp);
}
static void
aes_encrypt(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, struct mbuf *inout,
size_t skip, size_t len, void *ivec, size_t ivlen)
{
size_t blocklen = 16, plen;
struct {
uint8_t cn_1[16], cn[16];
} last2;
int i, off;
/*
* AES encryption with cyphertext stealing:
*
* CTSencrypt(P[0], ..., P[n], IV, K):
* len = length(P[n])
* (C[0], ..., C[n-2], E[n-1]) =
* CBCencrypt(P[0], ..., P[n-1], IV, K)
* P = pad(P[n], 0, blocksize)
* E[n] = CBCencrypt(P, E[n-1], K);
* C[n-1] = E[n]
* C[n] = E[n-1]{0..len-1}
*/
plen = len % blocklen;
if (len == blocklen) {
/*
* Note: caller will ensure len >= blocklen.
*/
aes_encrypt_1(ks, CRYPTO_F_IMBUF, inout, skip, len, ivec,
CRD_F_ENCRYPT);
} else if (plen == 0) {
/*
* This is equivalent to CBC mode followed by swapping
* the last two blocks. We assume that neither of the
* last two blocks cross iov boundaries.
*/
aes_encrypt_1(ks, CRYPTO_F_IMBUF, inout, skip, len, ivec,
CRD_F_ENCRYPT);
off = skip + len - 2 * blocklen;
m_copydata(inout, off, 2 * blocklen, (void*) &last2);
m_copyback(inout, off, blocklen, last2.cn);
m_copyback(inout, off + blocklen, blocklen, last2.cn_1);
} else {
/*
* This is the difficult case. We encrypt all but the
* last partial block first. We then create a padded
* copy of the last block and encrypt that using the
* second to last encrypted block as IV. Once we have
* the encrypted versions of the last two blocks, we
* reshuffle to create the final result.
*/
aes_encrypt_1(ks, CRYPTO_F_IMBUF, inout, skip, len - plen,
ivec, CRD_F_ENCRYPT);
/*
* Copy out the last two blocks, pad the last block
* and encrypt it. Rearrange to get the final
* result. The cyphertext for cn_1 is in cn. The
* cyphertext for cn is the first plen bytes of what
* is in cn_1 now.
*/
off = skip + len - blocklen - plen;
m_copydata(inout, off, blocklen + plen, (void*) &last2);
for (i = plen; i < blocklen; i++)
last2.cn[i] = 0;
aes_encrypt_1(ks, 0, last2.cn, 0, blocklen, last2.cn_1,
CRD_F_ENCRYPT);
m_copyback(inout, off, blocklen, last2.cn);
m_copyback(inout, off + blocklen, plen, last2.cn_1);
}
}
static void
aes_decrypt(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, struct mbuf *inout,
size_t skip, size_t len, void *ivec, size_t ivlen)
{
size_t blocklen = 16, plen;
struct {
uint8_t cn_1[16], cn[16];
} last2;
int i, off, t;
/*
* AES decryption with cyphertext stealing:
*
* CTSencrypt(C[0], ..., C[n], IV, K):
* len = length(C[n])
* E[n] = C[n-1]
* X = decrypt(E[n], K)
* P[n] = (X ^ C[n]){0..len-1}
* E[n-1] = {C[n,0],...,C[n,len-1],X[len],...,X[blocksize-1]}
* (P[0],...,P[n-1]) = CBCdecrypt(C[0],...,C[n-2],E[n-1], IV, K)
*/
plen = len % blocklen;
if (len == blocklen) {
/*
* Note: caller will ensure len >= blocklen.
*/
aes_encrypt_1(ks, CRYPTO_F_IMBUF, inout, skip, len, ivec, 0);
} else if (plen == 0) {
/*
* This is equivalent to CBC mode followed by swapping
* the last two blocks.
*/
off = skip + len - 2 * blocklen;
m_copydata(inout, off, 2 * blocklen, (void*) &last2);
m_copyback(inout, off, blocklen, last2.cn);
m_copyback(inout, off + blocklen, blocklen, last2.cn_1);
aes_encrypt_1(ks, CRYPTO_F_IMBUF, inout, skip, len, ivec, 0);
} else {
/*
* This is the difficult case. We first decrypt the
* second to last block with a zero IV to make X. The
* plaintext for the last block is the XOR of X and
* the last cyphertext block.
*
* We derive a new cypher text for the second to last
* block by mixing the unused bytes of X with the last
* cyphertext block. The result of that can be
* decrypted with the rest in CBC mode.
*/
off = skip + len - plen - blocklen;
aes_encrypt_1(ks, CRYPTO_F_IMBUF, inout, off, blocklen,
NULL, 0);
m_copydata(inout, off, blocklen + plen, (void*) &last2);
for (i = 0; i < plen; i++) {
t = last2.cn[i];
last2.cn[i] ^= last2.cn_1[i];
last2.cn_1[i] = t;
}
m_copyback(inout, off, blocklen + plen, (void*) &last2);
aes_encrypt_1(ks, CRYPTO_F_IMBUF, inout, skip, len - plen,
ivec, 0);
}
}
static void
aes_checksum(const struct krb5_key_state *ks, int usage,
struct mbuf *inout, size_t skip, size_t inlen, size_t outlen)
{
struct aes_state *as = ks->ks_priv;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct cryptodesc *crd;
int error;
crp = crypto_getreq(1);
crd = crp->crp_desc;
crd->crd_skip = skip;
crd->crd_len = inlen;
crd->crd_inject = skip + inlen;
crd->crd_flags = 0;
crd->crd_next = NULL;
crd->crd_alg = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
crp->crp_session = as->as_session_sha1;
crp->crp_ilen = inlen;
crp->crp_olen = 12;
crp->crp_etype = 0;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
crp->crp_buf = (void *) inout;
crp->crp_opaque = (void *) as;
crp->crp_callback = aes_crypto_cb;
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if ((crypto_ses2caps(as->as_session_sha1) & CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&as->as_lock);
if (!error && !(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_DONE))
error = msleep(crp, &as->as_lock, 0, "gssaes", 0);
mtx_unlock(&as->as_lock);
}
crypto_freereq(crp);
}
struct krb5_encryption_class krb5_aes128_encryption_class = {
"aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96", /* name */
ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, /* etype */
EC_DERIVED_KEYS, /* flags */
16, /* blocklen */
1, /* msgblocklen */
12, /* checksumlen */
128, /* keybits */
16, /* keylen */
aes_init,
aes_destroy,
aes_set_key,
aes_random_to_key,
aes_encrypt,
aes_decrypt,
aes_checksum
};
struct krb5_encryption_class krb5_aes256_encryption_class = {
"aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96", /* name */
ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96, /* etype */
EC_DERIVED_KEYS, /* flags */
16, /* blocklen */
1, /* msgblocklen */
12, /* checksumlen */
256, /* keybits */
32, /* keylen */
aes_init,
aes_destroy,
aes_set_key,
aes_random_to_key,
aes_encrypt,
aes_decrypt,
aes_checksum
};