Refactor of /dev/random device. Main points include: * Userland seeding is no longer used. This auto-seeds at boot time on PC/Desktop setups; this may need some tweeking and intelligence from those folks setting up embedded boxes, but the work is believed to be minimal. * An entropy cache is written to /entropy (even during installation) and the kernel uses this at next boot. * An entropy file written to /boot/entropy can be loaded by loader(8) * Hardware sources such as rdrand are fed into Yarrow, and are no longer available raw. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256240 | des | 2013-10-09 21:14:16 +0100 (Wed, 09 Oct 2013) | 4 lines Add a RANDOM_RWFILE option and hide the entropy cache code behind it. Rename YARROW_RNG and FORTUNA_RNG to RANDOM_YARROW and RANDOM_FORTUNA. Add the RANDOM_* options to LINT. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256239 | des | 2013-10-09 21:12:59 +0100 (Wed, 09 Oct 2013) | 2 lines Define RANDOM_PURE_RNDTEST for rndtest(4). ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256204 | des | 2013-10-09 18:51:38 +0100 (Wed, 09 Oct 2013) | 2 lines staticize struct random_hardware_source ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256203 | markm | 2013-10-09 18:50:36 +0100 (Wed, 09 Oct 2013) | 2 lines Wrap some policy-rich code in 'if NOTYET' until we can thresh out what it really needs to do. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256184 | des | 2013-10-09 10:13:12 +0100 (Wed, 09 Oct 2013) | 2 lines Re-add /dev/urandom for compatibility purposes. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256182 | des | 2013-10-09 10:11:14 +0100 (Wed, 09 Oct 2013) | 3 lines Add missing include guards and move the existing ones out of the implementation namespace. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256168 | markm | 2013-10-08 23:14:07 +0100 (Tue, 08 Oct 2013) | 10 lines Fix some just-noticed problems: o Allow this to work with "nodevice random" by fixing where the MALLOC pool is defined. o Fix the explicit reseed code. This was correct as submitted, but in the project branch doesn't need to set the "seeded" bit as this is done correctly in the "unblock" function. o Remove some debug ifdeffing. o Adjust comments. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256159 | markm | 2013-10-08 19:48:11 +0100 (Tue, 08 Oct 2013) | 6 lines Time to eat crow for me. I replaced the sx_* locks that Arthur used with regular mutexes; this turned out the be the wrong thing to do as the locks need to be sleepable. Revert this folly. # Submitted by: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> (In original diff) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256138 | des | 2013-10-08 12:05:26 +0100 (Tue, 08 Oct 2013) | 10 lines Add YARROW_RNG and FORTUNA_RNG to sys/conf/options. Add a SYSINIT that forces a reseed during proc0 setup, which happens fairly late in the boot process. Add a RANDOM_DEBUG option which enables some debugging printf()s. Add a new RANDOM_ATTACH entropy source which harvests entropy from the get_cyclecount() delta across each call to a device attach method. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256135 | markm | 2013-10-08 07:54:52 +0100 (Tue, 08 Oct 2013) | 8 lines Debugging. My attempt at EVENTHANDLER(multiuser) was a failure; use EVENTHANDLER(mountroot) instead. This means we can't count on /var being present, so something will need to be done about harvesting /var/db/entropy/... . Some policy now needs to be sorted out, and a pre-sync cache needs to be written, but apart from that we are now ready to go. Over to review. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256094 | markm | 2013-10-06 23:45:02 +0100 (Sun, 06 Oct 2013) | 8 lines Snapshot. Looking pretty good; this mostly works now. New code includes: * Read cached entropy at startup, both from files and from loader(8) preloaded entropy. Failures are soft, but announced. Untested. * Use EVENTHANDLER to do above just before we go multiuser. Untested. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256088 | markm | 2013-10-06 14:01:42 +0100 (Sun, 06 Oct 2013) | 2 lines Fix up the man page for random(4). This mainly removes no-longer-relevant details about HW RNGs, reseeding explicitly and user-supplied entropy. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256087 | markm | 2013-10-06 13:43:42 +0100 (Sun, 06 Oct 2013) | 6 lines As userland writing to /dev/random is no more, remove the "better than nothing" bootstrap mode. Add SWI harvesting to the mix. My box seeds Yarrow by itself in a few seconds! YMMV; more to follow. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256086 | markm | 2013-10-06 13:40:32 +0100 (Sun, 06 Oct 2013) | 11 lines Debug run. This now works, except that the "live" sources haven't been tested. With all sources turned on, this unlocks itself in a couple of seconds! That is no my box, and there is no guarantee that this will be the case everywhere. * Cut debug prints. * Use the same locks/mutexes all the way through. * Be a tad more conservative about entropy estimates. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256084 | markm | 2013-10-06 13:35:29 +0100 (Sun, 06 Oct 2013) | 5 lines Don't use the "real" assembler mnemonics; older compilers may not understand them (like when building CURRENT on 9.x). # Submitted by: Konstantin Belousov <kostikbel@gmail.com> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256081 | markm | 2013-10-06 10:55:28 +0100 (Sun, 06 Oct 2013) | 12 lines SNAPSHOT. Simplify the malloc pools; We only need one for this device. Simplify the harvest queue. Marginally improve the entropy pool hashing, making it a bit faster in the process. Connect up the hardware "live" source harvesting. This is simplistic for now, and will need to be made rate-adaptive. All of the above passes a compile test but needs to be debugged. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r256042 | markm | 2013-10-04 07:55:06 +0100 (Fri, 04 Oct 2013) | 25 lines Snapshot. This passes the build test, but has not yet been finished or debugged. Contains: * Refactor the hardware RNG CPU instruction sources to feed into the software mixer. This is unfinished. The actual harvesting needs to be sorted out. Modified by me (see below). * Remove 'frac' parameter from random_harvest(). This was never used and adds extra code for no good reason. * Remove device write entropy harvesting. This provided a weak attack vector, was not very good at bootstrapping the device. To follow will be a replacement explicit reseed knob. * Separate out all the RANDOM_PURE sources into separate harvest entities. This adds some secuity in the case where more than one is present. * Review all the code and fix anything obviously messy or inconsistent. Address som review concerns while I'm here, like rename the pseudo-rng to 'dummy'. # Submitted by: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> (the first item) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r255319 | markm | 2013-09-06 18:51:52 +0100 (Fri, 06 Sep 2013) | 4 lines Yarrow wants entropy estimations to be conservative; the usual idea is that if you are certain you have N bits of entropy, you declare N/2. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r255075 | markm | 2013-08-30 18:47:53 +0100 (Fri, 30 Aug 2013) | 4 lines Remove short-lived idea; thread to harvest (eg) RDRAND enropy into the usual harvest queues. It was a nifty idea, but too heavyweight. # Submitted by: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r255071 | markm | 2013-08-30 12:42:57 +0100 (Fri, 30 Aug 2013) | 4 lines Separate out the Software RNG entropy harvesting queue and thread into its own files. # Submitted by: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r254934 | markm | 2013-08-26 20:07:03 +0100 (Mon, 26 Aug 2013) | 2 lines Remove the short-lived namei experiment. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r254928 | markm | 2013-08-26 19:35:21 +0100 (Mon, 26 Aug 2013) | 2 lines Snapshot; Do some running repairs on entropy harvesting. More needs to follow. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r254927 | markm | 2013-08-26 19:29:51 +0100 (Mon, 26 Aug 2013) | 15 lines Snapshot of current work; 1) Clean up namespace; only use "Yarrow" where it is Yarrow-specific or close enough to the Yarrow algorithm. For the rest use a neutral name. 2) Tidy up headers; put private stuff in private places. More could be done here. 3) Streamline the hashing/encryption; no need for a 256-bit counter; 128 bits will last for long enough. There are bits of debug code lying around; these will be removed at a later stage. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r254784 | markm | 2013-08-24 14:54:56 +0100 (Sat, 24 Aug 2013) | 39 lines 1) example (partially humorous random_adaptor, that I call "EXAMPLE") * It's not meant to be used in a real system, it's there to show how the basics of how to create interfaces for random_adaptors. Perhaps it should belong in a manual page 2) Move probe.c's functionality in to random_adaptors.c * rename random_ident_hardware() to random_adaptor_choose() 3) Introduce a new way to choose (or select) random_adaptors via tunable "rngs_want" It's a list of comma separated names of adaptors, ordered by preferences. I.e.: rngs_want="yarrow,rdrand" Such setting would cause yarrow to be preferred to rdrand. If neither of them are available (or registered), then system will default to something reasonable (currently yarrow). If yarrow is not present, then we fall back to the adaptor that's first on the list of registered adaptors. 4) Introduce a way where RNGs can play a role of entropy source. This is mostly useful for HW rngs. The way I envision this is that every HW RNG will use this functionality by default. Functionality to disable this is also present. I have an example of how to use this in random_adaptor_example.c (see modload event, and init function) 5) fix kern.random.adaptors from kern.random.adaptors: yarrowpanicblock to kern.random.adaptors: yarrow,panic,block 6) add kern.random.active_adaptor to indicate currently selected adaptor: root@freebsd04:~ # sysctl kern.random.active_adaptor kern.random.active_adaptor: yarrow # Submitted by: Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> Submitted by: Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@FreeBSD.org>, Arthur Mesh <arthurmesh@gmail.com> Reviewed by: des@FreeBSD.org Approved by: re (delphij) Approved by: secteam (des,delphij)
946 lines
26 KiB
C
946 lines
26 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: glxsb.c,v 1.7 2007/02/12 14:31:45 tom Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2006 Tom Cosgrove <tom@openbsd.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Theo de Raadt
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* Copyright (c) 2003 Jason Wright
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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/*
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* Driver for the security block on the AMD Geode LX processors
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* http://www.amd.com/files/connectivitysolutions/geode/geode_lx/33234d_lx_ds.pdf
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/bus.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/module.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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#include <sys/random.h>
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#include <sys/rman.h>
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#include <sys/rwlock.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/taskqueue.h>
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#include <machine/bus.h>
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#include <machine/cpufunc.h>
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#include <machine/resource.h>
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#include <dev/pci/pcivar.h>
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#include <dev/pci/pcireg.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cryptosoft.h>
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#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
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#include "cryptodev_if.h"
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#include "glxsb.h"
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#define PCI_VENDOR_AMD 0x1022 /* AMD */
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#define PCI_PRODUCT_AMD_GEODE_LX_CRYPTO 0x2082 /* Geode LX Crypto */
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#define SB_GLD_MSR_CAP 0x58002000 /* RO - Capabilities */
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#define SB_GLD_MSR_CONFIG 0x58002001 /* RW - Master Config */
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#define SB_GLD_MSR_SMI 0x58002002 /* RW - SMI */
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#define SB_GLD_MSR_ERROR 0x58002003 /* RW - Error */
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#define SB_GLD_MSR_PM 0x58002004 /* RW - Power Mgmt */
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#define SB_GLD_MSR_DIAG 0x58002005 /* RW - Diagnostic */
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#define SB_GLD_MSR_CTRL 0x58002006 /* RW - Security Block Cntrl */
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/* For GLD_MSR_CTRL: */
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#define SB_GMC_DIV0 0x0000 /* AES update divisor values */
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#define SB_GMC_DIV1 0x0001
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#define SB_GMC_DIV2 0x0002
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#define SB_GMC_DIV3 0x0003
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#define SB_GMC_DIV_MASK 0x0003
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#define SB_GMC_SBI 0x0004 /* AES swap bits */
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#define SB_GMC_SBY 0x0008 /* AES swap bytes */
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#define SB_GMC_TW 0x0010 /* Time write (EEPROM) */
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#define SB_GMC_T_SEL0 0x0000 /* RNG post-proc: none */
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#define SB_GMC_T_SEL1 0x0100 /* RNG post-proc: LFSR */
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#define SB_GMC_T_SEL2 0x0200 /* RNG post-proc: whitener */
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#define SB_GMC_T_SEL3 0x0300 /* RNG LFSR+whitener */
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#define SB_GMC_T_SEL_MASK 0x0300
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#define SB_GMC_T_NE 0x0400 /* Noise (generator) Enable */
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#define SB_GMC_T_TM 0x0800 /* RNG test mode */
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/* (deterministic) */
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/* Security Block configuration/control registers (offsets from base) */
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#define SB_CTL_A 0x0000 /* RW - SB Control A */
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#define SB_CTL_B 0x0004 /* RW - SB Control B */
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#define SB_AES_INT 0x0008 /* RW - SB AES Interrupt */
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#define SB_SOURCE_A 0x0010 /* RW - Source A */
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#define SB_DEST_A 0x0014 /* RW - Destination A */
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#define SB_LENGTH_A 0x0018 /* RW - Length A */
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#define SB_SOURCE_B 0x0020 /* RW - Source B */
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#define SB_DEST_B 0x0024 /* RW - Destination B */
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#define SB_LENGTH_B 0x0028 /* RW - Length B */
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#define SB_WKEY 0x0030 /* WO - Writable Key 0-3 */
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#define SB_WKEY_0 0x0030 /* WO - Writable Key 0 */
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#define SB_WKEY_1 0x0034 /* WO - Writable Key 1 */
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#define SB_WKEY_2 0x0038 /* WO - Writable Key 2 */
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#define SB_WKEY_3 0x003C /* WO - Writable Key 3 */
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#define SB_CBC_IV 0x0040 /* RW - CBC IV 0-3 */
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#define SB_CBC_IV_0 0x0040 /* RW - CBC IV 0 */
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#define SB_CBC_IV_1 0x0044 /* RW - CBC IV 1 */
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#define SB_CBC_IV_2 0x0048 /* RW - CBC IV 2 */
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#define SB_CBC_IV_3 0x004C /* RW - CBC IV 3 */
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#define SB_RANDOM_NUM 0x0050 /* RW - Random Number */
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#define SB_RANDOM_NUM_STATUS 0x0054 /* RW - Random Number Status */
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#define SB_EEPROM_COMM 0x0800 /* RW - EEPROM Command */
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#define SB_EEPROM_ADDR 0x0804 /* RW - EEPROM Address */
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#define SB_EEPROM_DATA 0x0808 /* RW - EEPROM Data */
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#define SB_EEPROM_SEC_STATE 0x080C /* RW - EEPROM Security State */
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/* For SB_CTL_A and _B */
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#define SB_CTL_ST 0x0001 /* Start operation (enc/dec) */
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#define SB_CTL_ENC 0x0002 /* Encrypt (0 is decrypt) */
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#define SB_CTL_DEC 0x0000 /* Decrypt */
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#define SB_CTL_WK 0x0004 /* Use writable key (we set) */
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#define SB_CTL_DC 0x0008 /* Destination coherent */
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#define SB_CTL_SC 0x0010 /* Source coherent */
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#define SB_CTL_CBC 0x0020 /* CBC (0 is ECB) */
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/* For SB_AES_INT */
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#define SB_AI_DISABLE_AES_A 0x0001 /* Disable AES A compl int */
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#define SB_AI_ENABLE_AES_A 0x0000 /* Enable AES A compl int */
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#define SB_AI_DISABLE_AES_B 0x0002 /* Disable AES B compl int */
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#define SB_AI_ENABLE_AES_B 0x0000 /* Enable AES B compl int */
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#define SB_AI_DISABLE_EEPROM 0x0004 /* Disable EEPROM op comp int */
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#define SB_AI_ENABLE_EEPROM 0x0000 /* Enable EEPROM op compl int */
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#define SB_AI_AES_A_COMPLETE 0x10000 /* AES A operation complete */
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#define SB_AI_AES_B_COMPLETE 0x20000 /* AES B operation complete */
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#define SB_AI_EEPROM_COMPLETE 0x40000 /* EEPROM operation complete */
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#define SB_AI_CLEAR_INTR \
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(SB_AI_DISABLE_AES_A | SB_AI_DISABLE_AES_B |\
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SB_AI_DISABLE_EEPROM | SB_AI_AES_A_COMPLETE |\
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SB_AI_AES_B_COMPLETE | SB_AI_EEPROM_COMPLETE)
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#define SB_RNS_TRNG_VALID 0x0001 /* in SB_RANDOM_NUM_STATUS */
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#define SB_MEM_SIZE 0x0810 /* Size of memory block */
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#define SB_AES_ALIGN 0x0010 /* Source and dest buffers */
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/* must be 16-byte aligned */
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#define SB_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 0x0010
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/*
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* The Geode LX security block AES acceleration doesn't perform scatter-
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* gather: it just takes source and destination addresses. Therefore the
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* plain- and ciphertexts need to be contiguous. To this end, we allocate
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* a buffer for both, and accept the overhead of copying in and out. If
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* the number of bytes in one operation is bigger than allowed for by the
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* buffer (buffer is twice the size of the max length, as it has both input
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* and output) then we have to perform multiple encryptions/decryptions.
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*/
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#define GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN 16384
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MALLOC_DEFINE(M_GLXSB, "glxsb_data", "Glxsb Data");
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struct glxsb_dma_map {
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bus_dmamap_t dma_map; /* DMA map */
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bus_dma_segment_t dma_seg; /* segments */
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int dma_nsegs; /* #segments */
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int dma_size; /* size */
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caddr_t dma_vaddr; /* virtual address */
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bus_addr_t dma_paddr; /* physical address */
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};
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struct glxsb_taskop {
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struct glxsb_session *to_ses; /* crypto session */
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struct cryptop *to_crp; /* cryptop to perfom */
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struct cryptodesc *to_enccrd; /* enccrd to perform */
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struct cryptodesc *to_maccrd; /* maccrd to perform */
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};
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struct glxsb_softc {
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device_t sc_dev; /* device backpointer */
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struct resource *sc_sr; /* resource */
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int sc_rid; /* resource rid */
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struct callout sc_rngco; /* RNG callout */
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int sc_rnghz; /* RNG callout ticks */
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bus_dma_tag_t sc_dmat; /* DMA tag */
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struct glxsb_dma_map sc_dma; /* DMA map */
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int32_t sc_cid; /* crypto tag */
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uint32_t sc_sid; /* session id */
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TAILQ_HEAD(ses_head, glxsb_session)
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sc_sessions; /* crypto sessions */
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struct rwlock sc_sessions_lock;/* sessions lock */
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struct mtx sc_task_mtx; /* task mutex */
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struct taskqueue *sc_tq; /* task queue */
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struct task sc_cryptotask; /* task */
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struct glxsb_taskop sc_to; /* task's crypto operation */
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int sc_task_count; /* tasks count */
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};
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static int glxsb_probe(device_t);
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static int glxsb_attach(device_t);
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static int glxsb_detach(device_t);
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static void glxsb_dmamap_cb(void *, bus_dma_segment_t *, int, int);
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static int glxsb_dma_alloc(struct glxsb_softc *);
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static void glxsb_dma_pre_op(struct glxsb_softc *, struct glxsb_dma_map *);
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static void glxsb_dma_post_op(struct glxsb_softc *, struct glxsb_dma_map *);
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static void glxsb_dma_free(struct glxsb_softc *, struct glxsb_dma_map *);
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static void glxsb_rnd(void *);
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static int glxsb_crypto_setup(struct glxsb_softc *);
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static int glxsb_crypto_newsession(device_t, uint32_t *, struct cryptoini *);
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static int glxsb_crypto_freesession(device_t, uint64_t);
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static int glxsb_aes(struct glxsb_softc *, uint32_t, uint32_t,
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uint32_t, void *, int, void *);
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static int glxsb_crypto_encdec(struct cryptop *, struct cryptodesc *,
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struct glxsb_session *, struct glxsb_softc *);
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static void glxsb_crypto_task(void *, int);
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static int glxsb_crypto_process(device_t, struct cryptop *, int);
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static device_method_t glxsb_methods[] = {
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/* device interface */
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DEVMETHOD(device_probe, glxsb_probe),
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DEVMETHOD(device_attach, glxsb_attach),
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DEVMETHOD(device_detach, glxsb_detach),
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/* crypto device methods */
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DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_newsession, glxsb_crypto_newsession),
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DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_freesession, glxsb_crypto_freesession),
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DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_process, glxsb_crypto_process),
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{0,0}
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};
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static driver_t glxsb_driver = {
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"glxsb",
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glxsb_methods,
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sizeof(struct glxsb_softc)
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};
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static devclass_t glxsb_devclass;
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DRIVER_MODULE(glxsb, pci, glxsb_driver, glxsb_devclass, 0, 0);
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MODULE_VERSION(glxsb, 1);
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MODULE_DEPEND(glxsb, crypto, 1, 1, 1);
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static int
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glxsb_probe(device_t dev)
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{
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if (pci_get_vendor(dev) == PCI_VENDOR_AMD &&
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pci_get_device(dev) == PCI_PRODUCT_AMD_GEODE_LX_CRYPTO) {
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device_set_desc(dev,
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"AMD Geode LX Security Block (AES-128-CBC, RNG)");
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return (BUS_PROBE_DEFAULT);
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}
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return (ENXIO);
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}
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static int
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glxsb_attach(device_t dev)
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{
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struct glxsb_softc *sc = device_get_softc(dev);
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uint64_t msr;
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sc->sc_dev = dev;
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msr = rdmsr(SB_GLD_MSR_CAP);
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if ((msr & 0xFFFF00) != 0x130400) {
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device_printf(dev, "unknown ID 0x%x\n",
|
|
(int)((msr & 0xFFFF00) >> 16));
|
|
return (ENXIO);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pci_enable_busmaster(dev);
|
|
|
|
/* Map in the security block configuration/control registers */
|
|
sc->sc_rid = PCIR_BAR(0);
|
|
sc->sc_sr = bus_alloc_resource_any(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY, &sc->sc_rid,
|
|
RF_ACTIVE);
|
|
if (sc->sc_sr == NULL) {
|
|
device_printf(dev, "cannot map register space\n");
|
|
return (ENXIO);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Configure the Security Block.
|
|
*
|
|
* We want to enable the noise generator (T_NE), and enable the
|
|
* linear feedback shift register and whitener post-processing
|
|
* (T_SEL = 3). Also ensure that test mode (deterministic values)
|
|
* is disabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
msr = rdmsr(SB_GLD_MSR_CTRL);
|
|
msr &= ~(SB_GMC_T_TM | SB_GMC_T_SEL_MASK);
|
|
msr |= SB_GMC_T_NE | SB_GMC_T_SEL3;
|
|
#if 0
|
|
msr |= SB_GMC_SBI | SB_GMC_SBY; /* for AES, if necessary */
|
|
#endif
|
|
wrmsr(SB_GLD_MSR_CTRL, msr);
|
|
|
|
/* Disable interrupts */
|
|
bus_write_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_AES_INT, SB_AI_CLEAR_INTR);
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate a contiguous DMA-able buffer to work in */
|
|
if (glxsb_dma_alloc(sc) != 0)
|
|
goto fail0;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize our task queue */
|
|
sc->sc_tq = taskqueue_create("glxsb_taskq", M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO,
|
|
taskqueue_thread_enqueue, &sc->sc_tq);
|
|
if (sc->sc_tq == NULL) {
|
|
device_printf(dev, "cannot create task queue\n");
|
|
goto fail0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (taskqueue_start_threads(&sc->sc_tq, 1, PI_NET, "%s taskq",
|
|
device_get_nameunit(dev)) != 0) {
|
|
device_printf(dev, "cannot start task queue\n");
|
|
goto fail1;
|
|
}
|
|
TASK_INIT(&sc->sc_cryptotask, 0, glxsb_crypto_task, sc);
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize crypto */
|
|
if (glxsb_crypto_setup(sc) != 0)
|
|
goto fail1;
|
|
|
|
/* Install a periodic collector for the "true" (AMD's word) RNG */
|
|
if (hz > 100)
|
|
sc->sc_rnghz = hz / 100;
|
|
else
|
|
sc->sc_rnghz = 1;
|
|
callout_init(&sc->sc_rngco, CALLOUT_MPSAFE);
|
|
glxsb_rnd(sc);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
fail1:
|
|
taskqueue_free(sc->sc_tq);
|
|
fail0:
|
|
bus_release_resource(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY, sc->sc_rid, sc->sc_sr);
|
|
return (ENXIO);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_detach(device_t dev)
|
|
{
|
|
struct glxsb_softc *sc = device_get_softc(dev);
|
|
struct glxsb_session *ses;
|
|
|
|
rw_wlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH(ses, &sc->sc_sessions, ses_next) {
|
|
if (ses->ses_used) {
|
|
rw_wunlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
device_printf(dev,
|
|
"cannot detach, sessions still active.\n");
|
|
return (EBUSY);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
while (!TAILQ_EMPTY(&sc->sc_sessions)) {
|
|
ses = TAILQ_FIRST(&sc->sc_sessions);
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
|
|
free(ses, M_GLXSB);
|
|
}
|
|
rw_wunlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
crypto_unregister_all(sc->sc_cid);
|
|
callout_drain(&sc->sc_rngco);
|
|
taskqueue_drain(sc->sc_tq, &sc->sc_cryptotask);
|
|
bus_generic_detach(dev);
|
|
glxsb_dma_free(sc, &sc->sc_dma);
|
|
bus_release_resource(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY, sc->sc_rid, sc->sc_sr);
|
|
taskqueue_free(sc->sc_tq);
|
|
rw_destroy(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
mtx_destroy(&sc->sc_task_mtx);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* callback for bus_dmamap_load()
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
glxsb_dmamap_cb(void *arg, bus_dma_segment_t *seg, int nseg, int error)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bus_addr_t *paddr = (bus_addr_t*) arg;
|
|
*paddr = seg[0].ds_addr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_dma_alloc(struct glxsb_softc *sc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct glxsb_dma_map *dma = &sc->sc_dma;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
dma->dma_nsegs = 1;
|
|
dma->dma_size = GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN * 2;
|
|
|
|
/* Setup DMA descriptor area */
|
|
rc = bus_dma_tag_create(bus_get_dma_tag(sc->sc_dev), /* parent */
|
|
SB_AES_ALIGN, 0, /* alignments, bounds */
|
|
BUS_SPACE_MAXADDR_32BIT,/* lowaddr */
|
|
BUS_SPACE_MAXADDR, /* highaddr */
|
|
NULL, NULL, /* filter, filterarg */
|
|
dma->dma_size, /* maxsize */
|
|
dma->dma_nsegs, /* nsegments */
|
|
dma->dma_size, /* maxsegsize */
|
|
BUS_DMA_ALLOCNOW, /* flags */
|
|
NULL, NULL, /* lockfunc, lockarg */
|
|
&sc->sc_dmat);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
device_printf(sc->sc_dev,
|
|
"cannot allocate DMA tag (%d)\n", rc);
|
|
return (rc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = bus_dmamem_alloc(sc->sc_dmat, (void **)&dma->dma_vaddr,
|
|
BUS_DMA_NOWAIT, &dma->dma_map);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
device_printf(sc->sc_dev,
|
|
"cannot allocate DMA memory of %d bytes (%d)\n",
|
|
dma->dma_size, rc);
|
|
goto fail0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = bus_dmamap_load(sc->sc_dmat, dma->dma_map, dma->dma_vaddr,
|
|
dma->dma_size, glxsb_dmamap_cb, &dma->dma_paddr, BUS_DMA_NOWAIT);
|
|
if (rc != 0) {
|
|
device_printf(sc->sc_dev,
|
|
"cannot load DMA memory for %d bytes (%d)\n",
|
|
dma->dma_size, rc);
|
|
goto fail1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
fail1:
|
|
bus_dmamem_free(sc->sc_dmat, dma->dma_vaddr, dma->dma_map);
|
|
fail0:
|
|
bus_dma_tag_destroy(sc->sc_dmat);
|
|
return (rc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
glxsb_dma_pre_op(struct glxsb_softc *sc, struct glxsb_dma_map *dma)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bus_dmamap_sync(sc->sc_dmat, dma->dma_map,
|
|
BUS_DMASYNC_PREREAD | BUS_DMASYNC_PREWRITE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
glxsb_dma_post_op(struct glxsb_softc *sc, struct glxsb_dma_map *dma)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bus_dmamap_sync(sc->sc_dmat, dma->dma_map,
|
|
BUS_DMASYNC_POSTREAD | BUS_DMASYNC_POSTWRITE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
glxsb_dma_free(struct glxsb_softc *sc, struct glxsb_dma_map *dma)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bus_dmamap_unload(sc->sc_dmat, dma->dma_map);
|
|
bus_dmamem_free(sc->sc_dmat, dma->dma_vaddr, dma->dma_map);
|
|
bus_dma_tag_destroy(sc->sc_dmat);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
glxsb_rnd(void *v)
|
|
{
|
|
struct glxsb_softc *sc = v;
|
|
uint32_t status, value;
|
|
|
|
status = bus_read_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_RANDOM_NUM_STATUS);
|
|
if (status & SB_RNS_TRNG_VALID) {
|
|
value = bus_read_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_RANDOM_NUM);
|
|
/* feed with one uint32 */
|
|
random_harvest(&value, 4, 32/2, RANDOM_PURE_GLXSB);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
callout_reset(&sc->sc_rngco, sc->sc_rnghz, glxsb_rnd, sc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_crypto_setup(struct glxsb_softc *sc)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sc->sc_cid = crypto_get_driverid(sc->sc_dev, CRYPTOCAP_F_HARDWARE);
|
|
|
|
if (sc->sc_cid < 0) {
|
|
device_printf(sc->sc_dev, "cannot get crypto driver id\n");
|
|
return (ENOMEM);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TAILQ_INIT(&sc->sc_sessions);
|
|
sc->sc_sid = 1;
|
|
rw_init(&sc->sc_sessions_lock, "glxsb_sessions_lock");
|
|
mtx_init(&sc->sc_task_mtx, "glxsb_crypto_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_AES_CBC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
if (crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC, 0, 0) != 0)
|
|
goto crypto_fail;
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
crypto_fail:
|
|
device_printf(sc->sc_dev, "cannot register crypto\n");
|
|
crypto_unregister_all(sc->sc_cid);
|
|
rw_destroy(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
mtx_destroy(&sc->sc_task_mtx);
|
|
return (ENOMEM);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_crypto_newsession(device_t dev, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
|
|
{
|
|
struct glxsb_softc *sc = device_get_softc(dev);
|
|
struct glxsb_session *ses = NULL;
|
|
struct cryptoini *encini, *macini;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (sc == NULL || sidp == NULL || cri == NULL)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
encini = macini = NULL;
|
|
for (; cri != NULL; cri = cri->cri_next) {
|
|
switch(cri->cri_alg) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
|
|
if (macini != NULL)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
macini = cri;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
|
|
if (encini != NULL)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
encini = cri;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We only support HMAC algorithms to be able to work with
|
|
* ipsec(4), so if we are asked only for authentication without
|
|
* encryption, don't pretend we can accellerate it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (encini == NULL)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Look for a free session
|
|
*
|
|
* Free sessions goes first, so if first session is used, we need to
|
|
* allocate one.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rw_wlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
ses = TAILQ_FIRST(&sc->sc_sessions);
|
|
if (ses == NULL || ses->ses_used) {
|
|
ses = malloc(sizeof(*ses), M_GLXSB, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
if (ses == NULL) {
|
|
rw_wunlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
return (ENOMEM);
|
|
}
|
|
ses->ses_id = sc->sc_sid++;
|
|
} else {
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
|
|
}
|
|
ses->ses_used = 1;
|
|
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
|
|
rw_wunlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (encini->cri_alg == CRYPTO_AES_CBC) {
|
|
if (encini->cri_klen != 128) {
|
|
glxsb_crypto_freesession(sc->sc_dev, ses->ses_id);
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
arc4rand(ses->ses_iv, sizeof(ses->ses_iv), 0);
|
|
ses->ses_klen = encini->cri_klen;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the key (Geode LX wants the primary key only) */
|
|
bcopy(encini->cri_key, ses->ses_key, sizeof(ses->ses_key));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (macini != NULL) {
|
|
error = glxsb_hash_setup(ses, macini);
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
glxsb_crypto_freesession(sc->sc_dev, ses->ses_id);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*sidp = ses->ses_id;
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_crypto_freesession(device_t dev, uint64_t tid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct glxsb_softc *sc = device_get_softc(dev);
|
|
struct glxsb_session *ses = NULL;
|
|
uint32_t sid = ((uint32_t)tid) & 0xffffffff;
|
|
|
|
if (sc == NULL)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
rw_wlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(ses, &sc->sc_sessions, ses_head, ses_next) {
|
|
if (ses->ses_id == sid)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ses == NULL) {
|
|
rw_wunlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
TAILQ_REMOVE(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
|
|
glxsb_hash_free(ses);
|
|
bzero(ses, sizeof(*ses));
|
|
ses->ses_used = 0;
|
|
ses->ses_id = sid;
|
|
TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
|
|
rw_wunlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_aes(struct glxsb_softc *sc, uint32_t control, uint32_t psrc,
|
|
uint32_t pdst, void *key, int len, void *iv)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t status;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (len & 0xF) {
|
|
device_printf(sc->sc_dev,
|
|
"len must be a multiple of 16 (not %d)\n", len);
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set the source */
|
|
bus_write_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_SOURCE_A, psrc);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the destination address */
|
|
bus_write_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_DEST_A, pdst);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the data length */
|
|
bus_write_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_LENGTH_A, len);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the IV */
|
|
if (iv != NULL) {
|
|
bus_write_region_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_CBC_IV, iv, 4);
|
|
control |= SB_CTL_CBC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set the key */
|
|
bus_write_region_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_WKEY, key, 4);
|
|
|
|
/* Ask the security block to do it */
|
|
bus_write_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_CTL_A,
|
|
control | SB_CTL_WK | SB_CTL_DC | SB_CTL_SC | SB_CTL_ST);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now wait until it is done.
|
|
*
|
|
* We do a busy wait. Obviously the number of iterations of
|
|
* the loop required to perform the AES operation depends upon
|
|
* the number of bytes to process.
|
|
*
|
|
* On a 500 MHz Geode LX we see
|
|
*
|
|
* length (bytes) typical max iterations
|
|
* 16 12
|
|
* 64 22
|
|
* 256 59
|
|
* 1024 212
|
|
* 8192 1,537
|
|
*
|
|
* Since we have a maximum size of operation defined in
|
|
* GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN, we use this constant to decide how long
|
|
* to wait. Allow an order of magnitude longer than it should
|
|
* really take, just in case.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN * 10; i++) {
|
|
status = bus_read_4(sc->sc_sr, SB_CTL_A);
|
|
if ((status & SB_CTL_ST) == 0) /* Done */
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
device_printf(sc->sc_dev, "operation failed to complete\n");
|
|
return (EIO);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_crypto_encdec(struct cryptop *crp, struct cryptodesc *crd,
|
|
struct glxsb_session *ses, struct glxsb_softc *sc)
|
|
{
|
|
char *op_src, *op_dst;
|
|
uint32_t op_psrc, op_pdst;
|
|
uint8_t op_iv[SB_AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *piv;
|
|
int error;
|
|
int len, tlen, xlen;
|
|
int offset;
|
|
uint32_t control;
|
|
|
|
if (crd == NULL || (crd->crd_len % SB_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
/* How much of our buffer will we need to use? */
|
|
xlen = crd->crd_len > GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN ?
|
|
GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN : crd->crd_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX Check if we can have input == output on Geode LX.
|
|
* XXX In the meantime, use two separate (adjacent) buffers.
|
|
*/
|
|
op_src = sc->sc_dma.dma_vaddr;
|
|
op_dst = (char *)sc->sc_dma.dma_vaddr + xlen;
|
|
|
|
op_psrc = sc->sc_dma.dma_paddr;
|
|
op_pdst = sc->sc_dma.dma_paddr + xlen;
|
|
|
|
if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) {
|
|
control = SB_CTL_ENC;
|
|
if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
|
|
bcopy(crd->crd_iv, op_iv, sizeof(op_iv));
|
|
else
|
|
bcopy(ses->ses_iv, op_iv, sizeof(op_iv));
|
|
|
|
if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0) {
|
|
crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
|
|
crd->crd_inject, sizeof(op_iv), op_iv);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
control = SB_CTL_DEC;
|
|
if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT)
|
|
bcopy(crd->crd_iv, op_iv, sizeof(op_iv));
|
|
else {
|
|
crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
|
|
crd->crd_inject, sizeof(op_iv), op_iv);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
tlen = crd->crd_len;
|
|
piv = op_iv;
|
|
|
|
/* Process the data in GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN chunks */
|
|
while (tlen > 0) {
|
|
len = (tlen > GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN) ? GLXSB_MAX_AES_LEN : tlen;
|
|
crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
|
|
crd->crd_skip + offset, len, op_src);
|
|
|
|
glxsb_dma_pre_op(sc, &sc->sc_dma);
|
|
|
|
error = glxsb_aes(sc, control, op_psrc, op_pdst, ses->ses_key,
|
|
len, op_iv);
|
|
|
|
glxsb_dma_post_op(sc, &sc->sc_dma);
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
|
|
crd->crd_skip + offset, len, op_dst);
|
|
|
|
offset += len;
|
|
tlen -= len;
|
|
|
|
if (tlen <= 0) { /* Ideally, just == 0 */
|
|
/* Finished - put the IV in session IV */
|
|
piv = ses->ses_iv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy out last block for use as next iteration/session IV.
|
|
*
|
|
* piv is set to op_iv[] before the loop starts, but is
|
|
* set to ses->ses_iv if we're going to exit the loop this
|
|
* time.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT)
|
|
bcopy(op_dst + len - sizeof(op_iv), piv, sizeof(op_iv));
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Decryption, only need this if another iteration */
|
|
if (tlen > 0) {
|
|
bcopy(op_src + len - sizeof(op_iv), piv,
|
|
sizeof(op_iv));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} /* while */
|
|
|
|
/* All AES processing has now been done. */
|
|
bzero(sc->sc_dma.dma_vaddr, xlen * 2);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
glxsb_crypto_task(void *arg, int pending)
|
|
{
|
|
struct glxsb_softc *sc = arg;
|
|
struct glxsb_session *ses;
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *enccrd, *maccrd;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
maccrd = sc->sc_to.to_maccrd;
|
|
enccrd = sc->sc_to.to_enccrd;
|
|
crp = sc->sc_to.to_crp;
|
|
ses = sc->sc_to.to_ses;
|
|
|
|
/* Perform data authentication if requested before encryption */
|
|
if (maccrd != NULL && maccrd->crd_next == enccrd) {
|
|
error = glxsb_hash_process(ses, maccrd, crp);
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = glxsb_crypto_encdec(crp, enccrd, ses, sc);
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Perform data authentication if requested after encryption */
|
|
if (maccrd != NULL && enccrd->crd_next == maccrd) {
|
|
error = glxsb_hash_process(ses, maccrd, crp);
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
out:
|
|
mtx_lock(&sc->sc_task_mtx);
|
|
sc->sc_task_count--;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_task_mtx);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_etype = error;
|
|
crypto_unblock(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SYMQ);
|
|
crypto_done(crp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
glxsb_crypto_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
|
|
{
|
|
struct glxsb_softc *sc = device_get_softc(dev);
|
|
struct glxsb_session *ses;
|
|
struct cryptodesc *crd, *enccrd, *maccrd;
|
|
uint32_t sid;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
enccrd = maccrd = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check. */
|
|
if (crp == NULL)
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
if (crp->crp_callback == NULL || crp->crp_desc == NULL) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (crd = crp->crp_desc; crd != NULL; crd = crd->crd_next) {
|
|
switch (crd->crd_alg) {
|
|
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
|
|
if (maccrd != NULL) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
maccrd = crd;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
|
|
if (enccrd != NULL) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
enccrd = crd;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (enccrd == NULL || enccrd->crd_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN != 0) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sid = crp->crp_sid & 0xffffffff;
|
|
rw_rlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(ses, &sc->sc_sessions, ses_head, ses_next) {
|
|
if (ses->ses_id == sid)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
rw_runlock(&sc->sc_sessions_lock);
|
|
if (ses == NULL || !ses->ses_used) {
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&sc->sc_task_mtx);
|
|
if (sc->sc_task_count != 0) {
|
|
mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_task_mtx);
|
|
return (ERESTART);
|
|
}
|
|
sc->sc_task_count++;
|
|
|
|
sc->sc_to.to_maccrd = maccrd;
|
|
sc->sc_to.to_enccrd = enccrd;
|
|
sc->sc_to.to_crp = crp;
|
|
sc->sc_to.to_ses = ses;
|
|
mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_task_mtx);
|
|
|
|
taskqueue_enqueue(sc->sc_tq, &sc->sc_cryptotask);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
crp->crp_etype = error;
|
|
crypto_done(crp);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|