freebsd-skq/sys/netipsec/keysock.c
Robert Watson 530c006014 Merge the remainder of kern_vimage.c and vimage.h into vnet.c and
vnet.h, we now use jails (rather than vimages) as the abstraction
for virtualization management, and what remained was specific to
virtual network stacks.  Minor cleanups are done in the process,
and comments updated to reflect these changes.

Reviewed by:	bz
Approved by:	re (vimage blanket)
2009-08-01 19:26:27 +00:00

583 lines
12 KiB
C

/* $FreeBSD$ */
/* $KAME: keysock.c,v 1.25 2001/08/13 20:07:41 itojun Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
/* This code has derived from sys/net/rtsock.c on FreeBSD2.2.5 */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/raw_cb.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/vnet.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <net/pfkeyv2.h>
#include <netipsec/key.h>
#include <netipsec/keysock.h>
#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
#include <machine/stdarg.h>
struct key_cb {
int key_count;
int any_count;
};
static VNET_DEFINE(struct key_cb, key_cb);
#define V_key_cb VNET(key_cb)
static struct sockaddr key_src = { 2, PF_KEY, };
static int key_sendup0 __P((struct rawcb *, struct mbuf *, int));
VNET_DEFINE(struct pfkeystat, pfkeystat);
/*
* key_output()
*/
int
key_output(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so)
{
struct sadb_msg *msg;
int len, error = 0;
if (m == 0)
panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
V_pfkeystat.out_total++;
V_pfkeystat.out_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len;
len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
V_pfkeystat.out_tooshort++;
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
if ((m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) == 0) {
V_pfkeystat.out_nomem++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto end;
}
}
M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m);
KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP, kdebug_mbuf(m));
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
V_pfkeystat.out_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
if (len != PFKEY_UNUNIT64(msg->sadb_msg_len)) {
V_pfkeystat.out_invlen++;
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
error = key_parse(m, so);
m = NULL;
end:
if (m)
m_freem(m);
return error;
}
/*
* send message to the socket.
*/
static int
key_sendup0(rp, m, promisc)
struct rawcb *rp;
struct mbuf *m;
int promisc;
{
int error;
if (promisc) {
struct sadb_msg *pmsg;
M_PREPEND(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), M_DONTWAIT);
if (m && m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg))
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (!m) {
V_pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(*pmsg);
pmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
bzero(pmsg, sizeof(*pmsg));
pmsg->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
pmsg->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_PROMISC;
pmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len);
/* pid and seq? */
V_pfkeystat.in_msgtype[pmsg->sadb_msg_type]++;
}
if (!sbappendaddr(&rp->rcb_socket->so_rcv, (struct sockaddr *)&key_src,
m, NULL)) {
V_pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
m_freem(m);
error = ENOBUFS;
} else
error = 0;
sorwakeup(rp->rcb_socket);
return error;
}
/* XXX this interface should be obsoleted. */
int
key_sendup(so, msg, len, target)
struct socket *so;
struct sadb_msg *msg;
u_int len;
int target; /*target of the resulting message*/
{
struct mbuf *m, *n, *mprev;
int tlen;
/* sanity check */
if (so == 0 || msg == 0)
panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP,
printf("%s: \n", __func__);
kdebug_sadb(msg));
/*
* we increment statistics here, just in case we have ENOBUFS
* in this function.
*/
V_pfkeystat.in_total++;
V_pfkeystat.in_bytes += len;
V_pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
/*
* Get mbuf chain whenever possible (not clusters),
* to save socket buffer. We'll be generating many SADB_ACQUIRE
* messages to listening key sockets. If we simply allocate clusters,
* sbappendaddr() will raise ENOBUFS due to too little sbspace().
* sbspace() computes # of actual data bytes AND mbuf region.
*
* TODO: SADB_ACQUIRE filters should be implemented.
*/
tlen = len;
m = mprev = NULL;
while (tlen > 0) {
if (tlen == len) {
MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
if (n == NULL) {
V_pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
n->m_len = MHLEN;
} else {
MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
if (n == NULL) {
V_pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
n->m_len = MLEN;
}
if (tlen >= MCLBYTES) { /*XXX better threshold? */
MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT);
if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
m_free(n);
m_freem(m);
V_pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
n->m_len = MCLBYTES;
}
if (tlen < n->m_len)
n->m_len = tlen;
n->m_next = NULL;
if (m == NULL)
m = mprev = n;
else {
mprev->m_next = n;
mprev = n;
}
tlen -= n->m_len;
n = NULL;
}
m->m_pkthdr.len = len;
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
m_copyback(m, 0, len, (caddr_t)msg);
/* avoid duplicated statistics */
V_pfkeystat.in_total--;
V_pfkeystat.in_bytes -= len;
V_pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]--;
return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target);
}
/* so can be NULL if target != KEY_SENDUP_ONE */
int
key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target)
struct socket *so;
struct mbuf *m;
int target;
{
struct mbuf *n;
struct keycb *kp;
int sendup;
struct rawcb *rp;
int error = 0;
if (m == NULL)
panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.\n");
if (so == NULL && target == KEY_SENDUP_ONE)
panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
V_pfkeystat.in_total++;
V_pfkeystat.in_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (m == NULL) {
V_pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
}
if (m->m_len >= sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
struct sadb_msg *msg;
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
V_pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
}
mtx_lock(&rawcb_mtx);
LIST_FOREACH(rp, &V_rawcb_list, list)
{
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_family != PF_KEY)
continue;
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol
&& rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol != PF_KEY_V2) {
continue;
}
kp = (struct keycb *)rp;
/*
* If you are in promiscuous mode, and when you get broadcasted
* reply, you'll get two PF_KEY messages.
* (based on pf_key@inner.net message on 14 Oct 1998)
*/
if (((struct keycb *)rp)->kp_promisc) {
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) != NULL) {
(void)key_sendup0(rp, n, 1);
n = NULL;
}
}
/* the exact target will be processed later */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
continue;
sendup = 0;
switch (target) {
case KEY_SENDUP_ONE:
/* the statement has no effect */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_ALL:
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED:
if (kp->kp_registered)
sendup++;
break;
}
V_pfkeystat.in_msgtarget[target]++;
if (!sendup)
continue;
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
V_pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
mtx_unlock(&rawcb_mtx);
return ENOBUFS;
}
if ((error = key_sendup0(rp, n, 0)) != 0) {
m_freem(m);
mtx_unlock(&rawcb_mtx);
return error;
}
n = NULL;
}
if (so) {
error = key_sendup0(sotorawcb(so), m, 0);
m = NULL;
} else {
error = 0;
m_freem(m);
}
mtx_unlock(&rawcb_mtx);
return error;
}
/*
* key_abort()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_abort()
*/
static void
key_abort(struct socket *so)
{
raw_usrreqs.pru_abort(so);
}
/*
* key_attach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_attach()
*/
static int
key_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct thread *td)
{
struct keycb *kp;
int error;
KASSERT(so->so_pcb == NULL, ("key_attach: so_pcb != NULL"));
if (td != NULL) {
error = priv_check(td, PRIV_NET_RAW);
if (error)
return error;
}
/* XXX */
kp = malloc(sizeof *kp, M_PCB, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
if (kp == 0)
return ENOBUFS;
so->so_pcb = (caddr_t)kp;
error = raw_attach(so, proto);
kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
if (error) {
free(kp, M_PCB);
so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0;
return error;
}
kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0;
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
V_key_cb.key_count++;
V_key_cb.any_count++;
soisconnected(so);
so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK;
return 0;
}
/*
* key_bind()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_bind()
*/
static int
key_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* key_close()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_close().
*/
static void
key_close(struct socket *so)
{
raw_usrreqs.pru_close(so);
}
/*
* key_connect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_connect()
*/
static int
key_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
return EINVAL;
}
/*
* key_detach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_detach()
*/
static void
key_detach(struct socket *so)
{
struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
KASSERT(kp != NULL, ("key_detach: kp == NULL"));
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol
== PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
V_key_cb.key_count--;
V_key_cb.any_count--;
key_freereg(so);
raw_usrreqs.pru_detach(so);
}
/*
* key_disconnect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:key_disconnect()
*/
static int
key_disconnect(struct socket *so)
{
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_disconnect(so));
}
/*
* key_peeraddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_peeraddr()
*/
static int
key_peeraddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_peeraddr(so, nam));
}
/*
* key_send()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_send()
*/
static int
key_send(struct socket *so, int flags, struct mbuf *m, struct sockaddr *nam,
struct mbuf *control, struct thread *td)
{
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_send(so, flags, m, nam, control, td));
}
/*
* key_shutdown()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_shutdown()
*/
static int
key_shutdown(struct socket *so)
{
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_shutdown(so));
}
/*
* key_sockaddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_sockaddr()
*/
static int
key_sockaddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
return(raw_usrreqs.pru_sockaddr(so, nam));
}
struct pr_usrreqs key_usrreqs = {
.pru_abort = key_abort,
.pru_attach = key_attach,
.pru_bind = key_bind,
.pru_connect = key_connect,
.pru_detach = key_detach,
.pru_disconnect = key_disconnect,
.pru_peeraddr = key_peeraddr,
.pru_send = key_send,
.pru_shutdown = key_shutdown,
.pru_sockaddr = key_sockaddr,
.pru_close = key_close,
};
/* sysctl */
SYSCTL_NODE(_net, PF_KEY, key, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Key Family");
/*
* Definitions of protocols supported in the KEY domain.
*/
extern struct domain keydomain;
struct protosw keysw[] = {
{
.pr_type = SOCK_RAW,
.pr_domain = &keydomain,
.pr_protocol = PF_KEY_V2,
.pr_flags = PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR,
.pr_output = key_output,
.pr_ctlinput = raw_ctlinput,
.pr_init = raw_init,
.pr_usrreqs = &key_usrreqs
}
};
static void
key_init0(void)
{
bzero((caddr_t)&V_key_cb, sizeof(V_key_cb));
key_init();
}
struct domain keydomain = {
.dom_family = PF_KEY,
.dom_name = "key",
.dom_init = key_init0,
#ifdef VIMAGE
.dom_destroy = key_destroy,
#endif
.dom_protosw = keysw,
.dom_protoswNPROTOSW = &keysw[sizeof(keysw)/sizeof(keysw[0])]
};
VNET_DOMAIN_SET(key);