freebsd-skq/contrib/ntp/libntp/authreadkeys.c
Xin LI 4990d495fc MFV r298691:
ntp 4.2.8p7.

Security:	CVE-2016-1547, CVE-2016-1548, CVE-2016-1549, CVE-2016-1550
Security:	CVE-2016-1551, CVE-2016-2516, CVE-2016-2517, CVE-2016-2518
Security:	CVE-2016-2519
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-16:16.ntp
With hat:	so
2016-04-27 07:46:38 +00:00

370 lines
8.2 KiB
C

/*
* authreadkeys.c - routines to support the reading of the key file
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "ntpd.h" /* Only for DPRINTF */
#include "ntp_fp.h"
#include "ntp.h"
#include "ntp_syslog.h"
#include "ntp_stdlib.h"
#include "ntp_keyacc.h"
#ifdef OPENSSL
#include "openssl/objects.h"
#include "openssl/evp.h"
#endif /* OPENSSL */
/* Forwards */
static char *nexttok (char **);
/*
* nexttok - basic internal tokenizing routine
*/
static char *
nexttok(
char **str
)
{
register char *cp;
char *starttok;
cp = *str;
/*
* Space past white space
*/
while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
cp++;
/*
* Save this and space to end of token
*/
starttok = cp;
while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '\n' && *cp != ' '
&& *cp != '\t' && *cp != '#')
cp++;
/*
* If token length is zero return an error, else set end of
* token to zero and return start.
*/
if (starttok == cp)
return NULL;
if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
*cp++ = '\0';
else
*cp = '\0';
*str = cp;
return starttok;
}
/* TALOS-CAN-0055: possibly DoS attack by setting the key file to the
* log file. This is hard to prevent (it would need to check two files
* to be the same on the inode level, which will not work so easily with
* Windows or VMS) but we can avoid the self-amplification loop: We only
* log the first 5 errors, silently ignore the next 10 errors, and give
* up when when we have found more than 15 errors.
*
* This avoids the endless file iteration we will end up with otherwise,
* and also avoids overflowing the log file.
*
* Nevertheless, once this happens, the keys are gone since this would
* require a save/swap strategy that is not easy to apply due to the
* data on global/static level.
*/
static const u_int nerr_loglimit = 5u;
static const u_int nerr_maxlimit = 15;
static void log_maybe(u_int*, const char*, ...) NTP_PRINTF(2, 3);
typedef struct keydata KeyDataT;
struct keydata {
KeyDataT *next; /* queue/stack link */
KeyAccT *keyacclist; /* key access list */
keyid_t keyid; /* stored key ID */
u_short keytype; /* stored key type */
u_short seclen; /* length of secret */
u_char secbuf[1]; /* begin of secret (formal only)*/
};
static void
log_maybe(
u_int *pnerr,
const char *fmt ,
...)
{
va_list ap;
if ((NULL == pnerr) || (++(*pnerr) <= nerr_loglimit)) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
mvsyslog(LOG_ERR, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
}
}
static void
free_keydata(
KeyDataT *node
)
{
KeyAccT *kap;
if (node) {
while (node->keyacclist) {
kap = node->keyacclist;
node->keyacclist = kap->next;
free(kap);
}
/* purge secrets from memory before free()ing it */
memset(node, 0, sizeof(*node) + node->seclen);
free(node);
}
}
/*
* authreadkeys - (re)read keys from a file.
*/
int
authreadkeys(
const char *file
)
{
FILE *fp;
char *line;
char *token;
keyid_t keyno;
int keytype;
char buf[512]; /* lots of room for line */
u_char keystr[32]; /* Bug 2537 */
size_t len;
size_t j;
u_int nerr;
KeyDataT *list = NULL;
KeyDataT *next = NULL;
/*
* Open file. Complain and return if it can't be opened.
*/
fp = fopen(file, "r");
if (fp == NULL) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "authreadkeys: file '%s': %m",
file);
goto onerror;
}
INIT_SSL();
/*
* Now read lines from the file, looking for key entries. Put
* the data into temporary store for later propagation to avoid
* two-pass processing.
*/
nerr = 0;
while ((line = fgets(buf, sizeof buf, fp)) != NULL) {
if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
break;
token = nexttok(&line);
if (token == NULL)
continue;
/*
* First is key number. See if it is okay.
*/
keyno = atoi(token);
if (keyno < 1) {
log_maybe(&nerr,
"authreadkeys: cannot change key %s",
token);
continue;
}
if (keyno > NTP_MAXKEY) {
log_maybe(&nerr,
"authreadkeys: key %s > %d reserved for Autokey",
token, NTP_MAXKEY);
continue;
}
/*
* Next is keytype. See if that is all right.
*/
token = nexttok(&line);
if (token == NULL) {
log_maybe(&nerr,
"authreadkeys: no key type for key %d",
keyno);
continue;
}
/* We want to silently ignore keys where we do not
* support the requested digest type. OTOH, we want to
* make sure the file is well-formed. That means we
* have to process the line completely and have to
* finally throw away the result... This is a bit more
* work, but it also results in better error detection.
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL
/*
* The key type is the NID used by the message digest
* algorithm. There are a number of inconsistencies in
* the OpenSSL database. We attempt to discover them
* here and prevent use of inconsistent data later.
*/
keytype = keytype_from_text(token, NULL);
if (keytype == 0) {
log_maybe(NULL,
"authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
keyno);
} else if (EVP_get_digestbynid(keytype) == NULL) {
log_maybe(NULL,
"authreadkeys: no algorithm for key %d",
keyno);
keytype = 0;
}
#else /* !OPENSSL follows */
/*
* The key type is unused, but is required to be 'M' or
* 'm' for compatibility.
*/
if (!(*token == 'M' || *token == 'm')) {
log_maybe(NULL,
"authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
keyno);
keytype = 0;
} else {
keytype = KEY_TYPE_MD5;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL */
/*
* Finally, get key and insert it. If it is longer than 20
* characters, it is a binary string encoded in hex;
* otherwise, it is a text string of printable ASCII
* characters.
*/
token = nexttok(&line);
if (token == NULL) {
log_maybe(&nerr,
"authreadkeys: no key for key %d", keyno);
continue;
}
next = NULL;
len = strlen(token);
if (len <= 20) { /* Bug 2537 */
next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
next->keyacclist = NULL;
next->keyid = keyno;
next->keytype = keytype;
next->seclen = len;
memcpy(next->secbuf, token, len);
} else {
static const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
u_char temp;
char *ptr;
size_t jlim;
jlim = min(len, 2 * sizeof(keystr));
for (j = 0; j < jlim; j++) {
ptr = strchr(hex, tolower((unsigned char)token[j]));
if (ptr == NULL)
break; /* abort decoding */
temp = (u_char)(ptr - hex);
if (j & 1)
keystr[j / 2] |= temp;
else
keystr[j / 2] = temp << 4;
}
if (j < jlim) {
log_maybe(&nerr,
"authreadkeys: invalid hex digit for key %d",
keyno);
continue;
}
len = jlim/2; /* hmmmm.... what about odd length?!? */
next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
next->keyacclist = NULL;
next->keyid = keyno;
next->keytype = keytype;
next->seclen = len;
memcpy(next->secbuf, keystr, len);
}
token = nexttok(&line);
DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: full access list <%s>\n", (token) ? token : "NULL"));
if (token != NULL) { /* A comma-separated IP access list */
char *tp = token;
while (tp) {
char *i;
sockaddr_u addr;
i = strchr(tp, (int)',');
if (i)
*i = '\0';
DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: access list: <%s>\n", tp));
if (is_ip_address(tp, AF_UNSPEC, &addr)) {
next->keyacclist = keyacc_new_push(
next->keyacclist, &addr);
} else {
log_maybe(&nerr,
"authreadkeys: invalid IP address <%s> for key %d",
tp, keyno);
}
if (i) {
tp = i + 1;
} else {
tp = 0;
}
}
}
/* check if this has to be weeded out... */
if (0 == keytype) {
free_keydata(next);
next = NULL;
continue;
}
INSIST(NULL != next);
next->next = list;
list = next;
}
fclose(fp);
if (nerr > 0) {
const char * why = "";
if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
why = " (emergency break)";
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"authreadkeys: rejecting file '%s' after %u error(s)%s",
file, nerr, why);
goto onerror;
}
/* first remove old file-based keys */
auth_delkeys();
/* insert the new key material */
while (NULL != (next = list)) {
list = next->next;
MD5auth_setkey(next->keyid, next->keytype,
next->secbuf, next->seclen, next->keyacclist);
next->keyacclist = NULL; /* consumed by MD5auth_setkey */
free_keydata(next);
}
return (1);
onerror:
/* Mop up temporary storage before bailing out. */
while (NULL != (next = list)) {
list = next->next;
free_keydata(next);
}
return (0);
}