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freebsd-skq/sys/opencrypto/cryptosoft.c
John Baldwin 29fe41ddd7 Retire the CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE flag. 
The sole in-tree user of this flag has been retired, so remove this
complexity from all drivers.  While here, add a helper routine drivers
can use to read the current request's IV into a local buffer.  Use
this routine to replace duplicated code in nearly all drivers.

Reviewed by:	cem
Sponsored by:	Netflix
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24450
2020-04-20 22:24:49 +00:00

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/* $OpenBSD: cryptosoft.c,v 1.35 2002/04/26 08:43:50 deraadt Exp $ */
/*-
* The author of this code is Angelos D. Keromytis (angelos@cis.upenn.edu)
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 Sam Leffler, Errno Consulting
*
* This code was written by Angelos D. Keromytis in Athens, Greece, in
* February 2000. Network Security Technologies Inc. (NSTI) kindly
* supported the development of this code.
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis
* Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed by John-Mark Gurney
* under sponsorship of the FreeBSD Foundation and
* Rubicon Communications, LLC (Netgate).
*
* Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
* is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
* all source code copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
* modification of this software.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
* REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
* MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
#include <sys/endian.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <crypto/blowfish/blowfish.h>
#include <crypto/sha1.h>
#include <opencrypto/rmd160.h>
#include <opencrypto/cast.h>
#include <opencrypto/skipjack.h>
#include <sys/md5.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
#include <sys/kobj.h>
#include <sys/bus.h>
#include "cryptodev_if.h"
struct swcr_auth {
void *sw_ictx;
void *sw_octx;
struct auth_hash *sw_axf;
uint16_t sw_mlen;
uint16_t sw_octx_len;
};
struct swcr_encdec {
uint8_t *sw_kschedule;
struct enc_xform *sw_exf;
};
struct swcr_compdec {
struct comp_algo *sw_cxf;
};
struct swcr_session {
struct mtx swcr_lock;
int (*swcr_process)(struct swcr_session *, struct cryptop *);
struct swcr_auth swcr_auth;
struct swcr_encdec swcr_encdec;
struct swcr_compdec swcr_compdec;
};
static int32_t swcr_id;
static void swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses);
/* Used for CRYPTO_NULL_CBC. */
static int
swcr_null(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm.
*/
static int
swcr_encdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
unsigned char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN], blk[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
unsigned char *ivp, *nivp, iv2[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct swcr_encdec *sw;
struct enc_xform *exf;
int i, j, k, blks, ind, count, ivlen;
struct uio *uio, uiolcl;
struct iovec iovlcl[4];
struct iovec *iov;
int iovcnt, iovalloc;
int error;
bool encrypting;
error = 0;
sw = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = sw->sw_exf;
blks = exf->blocksize;
ivlen = exf->ivsize;
/* Check for non-padded data */
if ((crp->crp_payload_length % blks) != 0)
return EINVAL;
if (exf == &enc_xform_aes_icm &&
(crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) {
if (sw->sw_kschedule)
exf->zerokey(&(sw->sw_kschedule));
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
error = exf->setkey(&sw->sw_kschedule,
crp->crp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
iov = iovlcl;
iovcnt = nitems(iovlcl);
iovalloc = 0;
uio = &uiolcl;
switch (crp->crp_buf_type) {
case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF:
error = crypto_mbuftoiov(crp->crp_mbuf, &iov, &iovcnt,
&iovalloc);
if (error)
return (error);
uio->uio_iov = iov;
uio->uio_iovcnt = iovcnt;
break;
case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO:
uio = crp->crp_uio;
break;
case CRYPTO_BUF_CONTIG:
iov[0].iov_base = crp->crp_buf;
iov[0].iov_len = crp->crp_ilen;
uio->uio_iov = iov;
uio->uio_iovcnt = 1;
break;
}
ivp = iv;
if (exf->reinit) {
/*
* xforms that provide a reinit method perform all IV
* handling themselves.
*/
exf->reinit(sw->sw_kschedule, iv);
}
count = crp->crp_payload_start;
ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k);
if (ind == -1) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
i = crp->crp_payload_length;
encrypting = CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op);
while (i > 0) {
/*
* If there's insufficient data at the end of
* an iovec, we have to do some copying.
*/
if (uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len < k + blks &&
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len != k) {
cuio_copydata(uio, count, blks, blk);
/* Actual encryption/decryption */
if (exf->reinit) {
if (encrypting) {
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
blk);
} else {
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
blk);
}
} else if (encrypting) {
/* XOR with previous block */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
blk[j] ^= ivp[j];
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk);
/*
* Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing
* with next block
*/
bcopy(blk, iv, blks);
ivp = iv;
} else { /* decrypt */
/*
* Keep encrypted block for XOR'ing
* with next block
*/
nivp = (ivp == iv) ? iv2 : iv;
bcopy(blk, nivp, blks);
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, blk);
/* XOR with previous block */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
blk[j] ^= ivp[j];
ivp = nivp;
}
/* Copy back decrypted block */
cuio_copyback(uio, count, blks, blk);
count += blks;
/* Advance pointer */
ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k);
if (ind == -1) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
i -= blks;
/* Could be done... */
if (i == 0)
break;
}
while (uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len >= k + blks && i > 0) {
uint8_t *idat;
size_t nb, rem;
nb = blks;
rem = MIN((size_t)i,
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len - (size_t)k);
idat = (uint8_t *)uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_base + k;
if (exf->reinit) {
if (encrypting && exf->encrypt_multi == NULL)
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat);
else if (encrypting) {
nb = rounddown(rem, blks);
exf->encrypt_multi(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat, nb);
} else if (exf->decrypt_multi == NULL)
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat);
else {
nb = rounddown(rem, blks);
exf->decrypt_multi(sw->sw_kschedule,
idat, nb);
}
} else if (encrypting) {
/* XOR with previous block/IV */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
idat[j] ^= ivp[j];
exf->encrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat);
ivp = idat;
} else { /* decrypt */
/*
* Keep encrypted block to be used
* in next block's processing.
*/
nivp = (ivp == iv) ? iv2 : iv;
bcopy(idat, nivp, blks);
exf->decrypt(sw->sw_kschedule, idat);
/* XOR with previous block/IV */
for (j = 0; j < blks; j++)
idat[j] ^= ivp[j];
ivp = nivp;
}
count += nb;
k += nb;
i -= nb;
}
/*
* Advance to the next iov if the end of the current iov
* is aligned with the end of a cipher block.
* Note that the code is equivalent to calling:
* ind = cuio_getptr(uio, count, &k);
*/
if (i > 0 && k == uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len) {
k = 0;
ind++;
if (ind >= uio->uio_iovcnt) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
}
out:
if (iovalloc)
free(iov, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return (error);
}
static void
swcr_authprepare(struct auth_hash *axf, struct swcr_auth *sw,
const uint8_t *key, int klen)
{
switch (axf->type) {
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
hmac_init_ipad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_ictx);
hmac_init_opad(axf, key, klen, sw->sw_octx);
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
{
/*
* We need a buffer that can hold an md5 and a sha1 result
* just to throw it away.
* What we do here is the initial part of:
* ALGO( key, keyfill, .. )
* adding the key to sw_ictx and abusing Final() to get the
* "keyfill" padding.
* In addition we abuse the sw_octx to save the key to have
* it to be able to append it at the end in swcr_authcompute().
*/
u_char buf[SHA1_RESULTLEN];
bcopy(key, sw->sw_octx, klen);
axf->Init(sw->sw_ictx);
axf->Update(sw->sw_ictx, key, klen);
axf->Final(buf, sw->sw_ictx);
break;
}
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
axf->Setkey(sw->sw_ictx, key, klen);
axf->Init(sw->sw_ictx);
break;
default:
panic("%s: algorithm %d doesn't use keys", __func__, axf->type);
}
}
/*
* Compute or verify hash.
*/
static int
swcr_authcompute(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_char aalg[HASH_MAX_LEN];
u_char uaalg[HASH_MAX_LEN];
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
struct swcr_auth *sw;
struct auth_hash *axf;
union authctx ctx;
int err;
sw = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = sw->sw_axf;
if (crp->crp_auth_key != NULL) {
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
swcr_authprepare(axf, sw, crp->crp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
bcopy(sw->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length,
(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, &ctx);
if (err)
return err;
err = crypto_apply(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length,
(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, &ctx);
if (err)
return err;
switch (axf->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512:
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
if (sw->sw_octx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
bcopy(sw->sw_octx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
axf->Update(&ctx, aalg, axf->hashsize);
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
/* If we have no key saved, return error. */
if (sw->sw_octx == NULL)
return EINVAL;
/*
* Add the trailing copy of the key (see comment in
* swcr_authprepare()) after the data:
* ALGO( .., key, algofill )
* and let Final() do the proper, natural "algofill"
* padding.
*/
axf->Update(&ctx, sw->sw_octx, sw->sw_octx_len);
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
break;
}
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, uaalg);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, sw->sw_mlen) != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sw->sw_mlen, aalg);
}
return (0);
}
CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (1ll<<39) - 256); /* GCM: plain text < 2^39-256 */
CTASSERT(INT_MAX <= (uint64_t)-1); /* GCM: associated data <= 2^64-1 */
static int
swcr_gmac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
uint32_t *blkp;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
/* length block */
bzero(blk, blksz);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen) != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct auth_hash *axf;
struct enc_xform *exf;
uint32_t *blkp;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len, r;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = swe->sw_exf;
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with IV */
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with AAD */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_aad_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
/* Do encryption with MAC */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += len) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
} else {
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
}
}
/* length block */
bzero(blk, blksz);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 1;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_aad_length * 8);
blkp = (uint32_t *)blk + 3;
*blkp = htobe32(crp->crp_payload_length * 8);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
/* Validate tag */
if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
r = timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen);
if (r != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
/* tag matches, decrypt data */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
}
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
aalg);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_ccm_cbc_mac(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN;
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
/*
* AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
* data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
*/
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = 0;
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen) != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen, aalg);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
uint32_t blkbuf[howmany(EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(uint32_t))];
u_char *blk = (u_char *)blkbuf;
u_char aalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char uaalg[AALG_MAX_RESULT_LEN];
u_char iv[EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN];
union authctx ctx;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct auth_hash *axf;
struct enc_xform *exf;
int blksz, i, ivlen, len, r;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = swa->sw_axf;
bcopy(swa->sw_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
blksz = axf->blocksize;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
exf = swe->sw_exf;
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0)
return (EINVAL);
/* Initialize the IV */
ivlen = AES_CCM_IV_LEN;
bcopy(crp->crp_iv, iv, ivlen);
/*
* AES CCM-CBC-MAC needs to know the length of both the auth
* data and payload data before doing the auth computation.
*/
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.authDataLength = crp->crp_aad_length;
ctx.aes_cbc_mac_ctx.cryptDataLength = crp->crp_payload_length;
/* Supply MAC with IV */
axf->Reinit(&ctx, iv, ivlen);
/* Supply MAC with AAD */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_aad_length - i, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, blk);
bzero(blk + len, blksz - len);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, blksz);
}
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
/* Do encryption/decryption with MAC */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += len) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len, blk);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
exf->encrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
} else {
/*
* One of the problems with CCM+CBC is that
* the authentication is done on the
* unecncrypted data. As a result, we have to
* decrypt the data twice: once to generate
* the tag and a second time after the tag is
* verified.
*/
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
axf->Update(&ctx, blk, len);
}
}
/* Finalize MAC */
axf->Final(aalg, &ctx);
/* Validate tag */
if (!CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
uaalg);
r = timingsafe_bcmp(aalg, uaalg, swa->sw_mlen);
if (r != 0)
return (EBADMSG);
/* tag matches, decrypt data */
exf->reinit(swe->sw_kschedule, iv);
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_payload_length; i += blksz) {
len = MIN(crp->crp_payload_length - i, blksz);
if (len < blksz)
bzero(blk, blksz);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
exf->decrypt(swe->sw_kschedule, blk);
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start + i, len,
blk);
}
} else {
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, swa->sw_mlen,
aalg);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply a cipher and a digest to perform EtA.
*/
static int
swcr_eta(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
int error;
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp);
if (error == 0)
error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp);
} else {
error = swcr_authcompute(ses, crp);
if (error == 0)
error = swcr_encdec(ses, crp);
}
return (error);
}
/*
* Apply a compression/decompression algorithm
*/
static int
swcr_compdec(struct swcr_session *ses, struct cryptop *crp)
{
u_int8_t *data, *out;
struct comp_algo *cxf;
int adj;
u_int32_t result;
cxf = ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf;
/* We must handle the whole buffer of data in one time
* then if there is not all the data in the mbuf, we must
* copy in a buffer.
*/
data = malloc(crp->crp_payload_length, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (data == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length,
data);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op))
result = cxf->compress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out);
else
result = cxf->decompress(data, crp->crp_payload_length, &out);
free(data, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
if (result == 0)
return (EINVAL);
crp->crp_olen = result;
/* Check the compressed size when doing compression */
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_COMPRESS(crp->crp_op)) {
if (result >= crp->crp_payload_length) {
/* Compression was useless, we lost time */
free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return (0);
}
}
/* Copy back the (de)compressed data. m_copyback is
* extending the mbuf as necessary.
*/
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_payload_start, result, out);
if (result < crp->crp_payload_length) {
switch (crp->crp_buf_type) {
case CRYPTO_BUF_MBUF:
adj = result - crp->crp_payload_length;
m_adj(crp->crp_mbuf, adj);
break;
case CRYPTO_BUF_UIO: {
struct uio *uio = crp->crp_uio;
int ind;
adj = crp->crp_payload_length - result;
ind = uio->uio_iovcnt - 1;
while (adj > 0 && ind >= 0) {
if (adj < uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len) {
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len -= adj;
break;
}
adj -= uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len;
uio->uio_iov[ind].iov_len = 0;
ind--;
uio->uio_iovcnt--;
}
}
break;
}
}
free(out, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
return 0;
}
static int
swcr_setup_encdec(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct enc_xform *txf;
int error;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
txf = crypto_cipher(csp);
MPASS(txf->ivsize == csp->csp_ivlen);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) {
error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule,
csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
swe->sw_exf = txf;
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_auth(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct auth_hash *axf;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp);
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
swa->sw_octx_len = axf->ctxsize;
swa->sw_octx = malloc(swa->sw_octx_len, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_octx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) {
swcr_authprepare(axf, swa, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
swa->sw_octx_len = csp->csp_auth_klen;
swa->sw_octx = malloc(swa->sw_octx_len, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_octx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
/* Store the key so we can "append" it to the payload */
if (csp->csp_auth_key != NULL) {
swcr_authprepare(axf, swa, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
}
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
#ifdef notdef
case CRYPTO_MD5:
#endif
case CRYPTO_SHA1:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_gmac;
break;
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2B:
case CRYPTO_BLAKE2S:
/*
* Blake2b and Blake2s support an optional key but do
* not require one.
*/
if (csp->csp_auth_klen == 0 || csp->csp_auth_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_auth_key,
csp->csp_auth_klen);
if (csp->csp_mode == CSP_MODE_DIGEST)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm_cbc_mac;
break;
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_gcm(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct enc_xform *txf;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int error;
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
/* First, setup the auth side. */
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) {
case 128:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128;
break;
case 192:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192;
break;
case 256:
axf = &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256;
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key,
csp->csp_cipher_klen);
/* Second, setup the cipher side. */
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
txf = &enc_xform_aes_nist_gcm;
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) {
error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule,
csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
swe->sw_exf = txf;
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_setup_ccm(struct swcr_session *ses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct enc_xform *txf;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int error;
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
/* First, setup the auth side. */
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_cipher_klen * 8) {
case 128:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128;
break;
case 192:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192;
break;
case 256:
axf = &auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256;
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
swa->sw_axf = axf;
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen < 0 || csp->csp_auth_mlen > axf->hashsize)
return (EINVAL);
if (csp->csp_auth_mlen == 0)
swa->sw_mlen = axf->hashsize;
else
swa->sw_mlen = csp->csp_auth_mlen;
swa->sw_ictx = malloc(axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, M_NOWAIT);
if (swa->sw_ictx == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
axf->Init(swa->sw_ictx);
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL)
axf->Setkey(swa->sw_ictx, csp->csp_cipher_key,
csp->csp_cipher_klen);
/* Second, setup the cipher side. */
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
txf = &enc_xform_ccm;
if (csp->csp_cipher_key != NULL) {
error = txf->setkey(&swe->sw_kschedule,
csp->csp_cipher_key, csp->csp_cipher_klen);
if (error)
return (error);
}
swe->sw_exf = txf;
return (0);
}
static bool
swcr_auth_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct auth_hash *axf;
axf = crypto_auth_hash(csp);
if (axf == NULL)
return (false);
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_224_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK:
case CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK:
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) {
case 128:
case 192:
case 256:
break;
default:
return (false);
}
if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_GCM_IV_LEN)
return (false);
break;
case CRYPTO_POLY1305:
if (csp->csp_auth_klen != POLY1305_KEY_LEN)
return (false);
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
switch (csp->csp_auth_klen * 8) {
case 128:
case 192:
case 256:
break;
default:
return (false);
}
if (csp->csp_auth_key == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_ivlen != AES_CCM_IV_LEN)
return (false);
break;
}
return (true);
}
static bool
swcr_cipher_supported(const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct enc_xform *txf;
txf = crypto_cipher(csp);
if (txf == NULL)
return (false);
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg != CRYPTO_NULL_CBC &&
txf->ivsize != csp->csp_ivlen)
return (false);
return (true);
}
static int
swcr_probesession(device_t dev, const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
if (csp->csp_flags != 0)
return (EINVAL);
switch (csp->csp_mode) {
case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP:
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_CIPHER:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
return (EINVAL);
default:
if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_DIGEST:
if (!swcr_auth_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
case CSP_MODE_AEAD:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_ETA:
/* AEAD algorithms cannot be used for EtA. */
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
return (EINVAL);
}
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
return (EINVAL);
}
if (!swcr_cipher_supported(csp) ||
!swcr_auth_supported(csp))
return (EINVAL);
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}
return (CRYPTODEV_PROBE_SOFTWARE);
}
/*
* Generate a new software session.
*/
static int
swcr_newsession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses,
const struct crypto_session_params *csp)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
struct swcr_encdec *swe;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct comp_algo *cxf;
int error;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses);
mtx_init(&ses->swcr_lock, "swcr session lock", NULL, MTX_DEF);
error = 0;
swe = &ses->swcr_encdec;
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
switch (csp->csp_mode) {
case CSP_MODE_COMPRESS:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_DEFLATE_COMP:
cxf = &comp_algo_deflate;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
default:
panic("bad compression algo");
#endif
}
ses->swcr_compdec.sw_cxf = cxf;
ses->swcr_process = swcr_compdec;
break;
case CSP_MODE_CIPHER:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_NULL_CBC:
ses->swcr_process = swcr_null;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
panic("bad cipher algo");
#endif
default:
error = swcr_setup_encdec(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_encdec;
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_DIGEST:
error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp);
break;
case CSP_MODE_AEAD:
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
error = swcr_setup_gcm(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_gcm;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
error = swcr_setup_ccm(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_ccm;
break;
#ifdef INVARIANTS
default:
panic("bad aead algo");
#endif
}
break;
case CSP_MODE_ETA:
#ifdef INVARIANTS
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_16:
panic("bad eta cipher algo");
}
switch (csp->csp_auth_alg) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC:
panic("bad eta auth algo");
}
#endif
error = swcr_setup_auth(ses, csp);
if (error)
break;
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_NULL_CBC) {
/* Effectively degrade to digest mode. */
ses->swcr_process = swcr_authcompute;
break;
}
error = swcr_setup_encdec(ses, csp);
if (error == 0)
ses->swcr_process = swcr_eta;
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
}
if (error)
swcr_freesession(dev, cses);
return (error);
}
static void
swcr_freesession(device_t dev, crypto_session_t cses)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
struct swcr_auth *swa;
struct enc_xform *txf;
struct auth_hash *axf;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(cses);
mtx_destroy(&ses->swcr_lock);
txf = ses->swcr_encdec.sw_exf;
if (txf != NULL) {
if (ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule != NULL)
txf->zerokey(&(ses->swcr_encdec.sw_kschedule));
}
axf = ses->swcr_auth.sw_axf;
if (axf != NULL) {
swa = &ses->swcr_auth;
if (swa->sw_ictx != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(swa->sw_ictx, axf->ctxsize);
free(swa->sw_ictx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
}
if (swa->sw_octx != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(swa->sw_octx, swa->sw_octx_len);
free(swa->sw_octx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
}
}
}
/*
* Process a software request.
*/
static int
swcr_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
{
struct swcr_session *ses;
ses = crypto_get_driver_session(crp->crp_session);
mtx_lock(&ses->swcr_lock);
crp->crp_etype = ses->swcr_process(ses, crp);
mtx_unlock(&ses->swcr_lock);
crypto_done(crp);
return (0);
}
static void
swcr_identify(driver_t *drv, device_t parent)
{
/* NB: order 10 is so we get attached after h/w devices */
if (device_find_child(parent, "cryptosoft", -1) == NULL &&
BUS_ADD_CHILD(parent, 10, "cryptosoft", 0) == 0)
panic("cryptosoft: could not attach");
}
static int
swcr_probe(device_t dev)
{
device_set_desc(dev, "software crypto");
return (BUS_PROBE_NOWILDCARD);
}
static int
swcr_attach(device_t dev)
{
swcr_id = crypto_get_driverid(dev, sizeof(struct swcr_session),
CRYPTOCAP_F_SOFTWARE | CRYPTOCAP_F_SYNC);
if (swcr_id < 0) {
device_printf(dev, "cannot initialize!");
return (ENXIO);
}
return (0);
}
static int
swcr_detach(device_t dev)
{
crypto_unregister_all(swcr_id);
return 0;
}
static device_method_t swcr_methods[] = {
DEVMETHOD(device_identify, swcr_identify),
DEVMETHOD(device_probe, swcr_probe),
DEVMETHOD(device_attach, swcr_attach),
DEVMETHOD(device_detach, swcr_detach),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_probesession, swcr_probesession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_newsession, swcr_newsession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_freesession,swcr_freesession),
DEVMETHOD(cryptodev_process, swcr_process),
{0, 0},
};
static driver_t swcr_driver = {
"cryptosoft",
swcr_methods,
0, /* NB: no softc */
};
static devclass_t swcr_devclass;
/*
* NB: We explicitly reference the crypto module so we
* get the necessary ordering when built as a loadable
* module. This is required because we bundle the crypto
* module code together with the cryptosoft driver (otherwise
* normal module dependencies would handle things).
*/
extern int crypto_modevent(struct module *, int, void *);
/* XXX where to attach */
DRIVER_MODULE(cryptosoft, nexus, swcr_driver, swcr_devclass, crypto_modevent,0);
MODULE_VERSION(cryptosoft, 1);
MODULE_DEPEND(cryptosoft, crypto, 1, 1, 1);
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