Bjoern A. Zeeb 878adb8517 Add a mitigation feature that will prevent user mappings at
virtual address 0, limiting the ability to convert a kernel
NULL pointer dereference into a privilege escalation attack.

If the sysctl is set to 0 a newly started process will not be able
to map anything in the address range of the first page (0 to PAGE_SIZE).
This is the default. Already running processes are not affected by this.

You can either change the sysctl or the tunable from loader in case
you need to map at a virtual address of 0, for example when running
any of the extinct species of a set of a.out binaries, vm86 emulation, ..
In that case set security.bsd.map_at_zero="1".

Superseeds:		r197537
In collaboration with:	jhb, kib, alc
2009-10-02 17:48:51 +00:00
..
2009-09-27 20:50:54 +00:00
2009-10-02 12:47:01 +00:00
2009-09-21 08:37:57 +00:00
2009-10-01 18:37:16 +00:00
2009-06-25 16:48:13 +00:00
2009-10-01 10:46:22 +00:00
2009-09-25 17:08:51 +00:00
2009-10-02 11:14:12 +00:00