ee0f4764cc
This moves the bulk of the geli support from lib386/biosdisk.c into a new geli/gelidev.c which implements a devsw-type device whose dv_strategy() function handles geli decryption. Support for all arches comes from moving the taste-and-attach code to the devopen() function in libsa. After opening any DEVT_DISK device, devopen() calls the new function geli_probe_and_attach(), which will "attach" the geli code to the open_file struct by creating a geli_devdesc instance to replace the disk_devdesc instance in the open_file. That routes all IO for the device through the geli code. A new public geli_add_key() function is added, to allow arch/vendor-specific code to add keys obtained from custom hardware or other sources. With these changes, geli support will be compiled into all variations of loader(8) on all arches because the default is WITH_LOADER_GELI. Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Microchip Technology Inc Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15743
399 lines
10 KiB
C
399 lines
10 KiB
C
/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Allan Jude <allanjude@FreeBSD.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pawel@dawidek.net>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $FreeBSD$
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*/
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#include <stand.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include "geliboot.h"
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#include "geliboot_internal.h"
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struct known_dev {
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char name[GELIDEV_NAMELEN];
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struct geli_dev *gdev;
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SLIST_ENTRY(known_dev) entries;
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};
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SLIST_HEAD(known_dev_list, known_dev) known_devs_head =
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SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(known_devs_head);
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static geli_ukey saved_keys[GELI_MAX_KEYS];
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static unsigned int nsaved_keys = 0;
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/*
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* Copy keys from local storage to the keybuf struct.
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* Destroy the local storage when finished.
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*/
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void
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geli_export_key_buffer(struct keybuf *fkeybuf)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < nsaved_keys; i++) {
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fkeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type = KEYBUF_TYPE_GELI;
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memcpy(fkeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data, saved_keys[i],
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G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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}
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fkeybuf->kb_nents = nsaved_keys;
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explicit_bzero(saved_keys, sizeof(saved_keys));
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}
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/*
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* Copy keys from a keybuf struct into local storage.
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* Zero out the keybuf.
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*/
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void
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geli_import_key_buffer(struct keybuf *skeybuf)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < skeybuf->kb_nents && i < GELI_MAX_KEYS; i++) {
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memcpy(saved_keys[i], skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data,
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G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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explicit_bzero(skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_data,
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G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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skeybuf->kb_ents[i].ke_type = KEYBUF_TYPE_NONE;
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}
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nsaved_keys = skeybuf->kb_nents;
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skeybuf->kb_nents = 0;
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}
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void
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geli_add_key(geli_ukey key)
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{
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/*
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* If we run out of key space, the worst that will happen is
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* it will ask the user for the password again.
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*/
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if (nsaved_keys < GELI_MAX_KEYS) {
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memcpy(saved_keys[nsaved_keys], key, G_ELI_USERKEYLEN);
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nsaved_keys++;
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}
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}
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static int
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geli_findkey(struct geli_dev *gdev, u_char *mkey)
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{
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u_int keynum;
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int i;
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if (gdev->keybuf_slot >= 0) {
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if (g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&gdev->md, saved_keys[gdev->keybuf_slot],
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mkey, &keynum) == 0) {
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return (0);
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}
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}
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for (i = 0; i < nsaved_keys; i++) {
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if (g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&gdev->md, saved_keys[i], mkey,
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&keynum) == 0) {
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gdev->keybuf_slot = i;
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return (0);
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}
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}
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return (1);
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}
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/*
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* Read the last sector of a drive or partition and see if it is GELI encrypted.
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*/
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struct geli_dev *
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geli_taste(geli_readfunc readfunc, void *readpriv, daddr_t lastsector,
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const char *namefmt, ...)
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{
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va_list args;
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struct g_eli_metadata md;
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struct known_dev *kdev;
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struct geli_dev *gdev;
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u_char *buf;
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char devname[GELIDEV_NAMELEN];
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int error;
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off_t alignsector;
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/*
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* Format the name into a temp buffer and use that to search for an
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* existing known_dev instance. If not found, this has the side effect
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* of initializing kdev to NULL.
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*/
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va_start(args, namefmt);
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vsnprintf(devname, sizeof(devname), namefmt, args);
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va_end(args);
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SLIST_FOREACH(kdev, &known_devs_head, entries) {
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if (strcmp(kdev->name, devname) == 0)
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return (kdev->gdev);
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}
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/* Determine whether the new device is geli-encrypted... */
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if ((buf = malloc(DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE)) == NULL)
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goto out;
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alignsector = rounddown2(lastsector * DEV_BSIZE, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
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if (alignsector + DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE > ((lastsector + 1) * DEV_BSIZE)) {
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/* Don't read past the end of the disk */
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alignsector = (lastsector * DEV_BSIZE) + DEV_BSIZE -
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DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE;
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}
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error = readfunc(NULL, readpriv, alignsector, buf, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
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if (error != 0) {
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* We have a new known_device. Whether it's geli-encrypted or not,
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* record its existance so we can avoid doing IO to probe it next time.
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*/
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if ((kdev = malloc(sizeof(*kdev))) == NULL)
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goto out;
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strlcpy(kdev->name, devname, sizeof(kdev->name));
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kdev->gdev = NULL;
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SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&known_devs_head, kdev, entries);
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/* Extract the last 4k sector of the disk. */
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error = eli_metadata_decode(buf, &md);
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if (error != 0) {
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/* Try the last 512 byte sector instead. */
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error = eli_metadata_decode(buf +
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(DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE - DEV_BSIZE), &md);
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if (error != 0) {
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goto out;
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}
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}
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if (!(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT)) {
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/* The GELIBOOT feature is not activated */
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goto out;
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}
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if ((md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_ONETIME)) {
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/* Swap device, skip it. */
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goto out;
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}
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/*
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* It's geli-encrypted, create a geli_dev for it and link it into the
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* known_dev instance.
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*/
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gdev = malloc(sizeof(struct geli_dev));
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if (gdev == NULL)
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goto out;
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gdev->part_end = lastsector;
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gdev->keybuf_slot = -1;
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gdev->md = md;
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gdev->name = kdev->name;
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eli_metadata_softc(&gdev->sc, &md, DEV_BSIZE,
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(lastsector + DEV_BSIZE) * DEV_BSIZE);
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kdev->gdev = gdev;
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out:
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free(buf);
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if (kdev == NULL)
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return (NULL);
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return (kdev->gdev);
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}
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/*
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* Attempt to decrypt the device. This will try existing keys first, then will
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* prompt for a passphrase if there are no existing keys that work.
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*/
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static int
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geli_probe(struct geli_dev *gdev, const char *passphrase, u_char *mkeyp)
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{
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u_char key[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN], mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN], *mkp;
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u_int keynum;
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struct hmac_ctx ctx;
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int error;
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if (mkeyp != NULL) {
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memcpy(&mkey, mkeyp, G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN);
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explicit_bzero(mkeyp, G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN);
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goto found_key;
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}
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if (geli_findkey(gdev, mkey) == 0) {
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goto found_key;
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}
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g_eli_crypto_hmac_init(&ctx, NULL, 0);
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/*
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* Prepare Derived-Key from the user passphrase.
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*/
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if (gdev->md.md_iterations < 0) {
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/* XXX TODO: Support loading key files. */
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return (1);
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} else if (gdev->md.md_iterations == 0) {
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g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, gdev->md.md_salt,
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sizeof(gdev->md.md_salt));
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g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, (const uint8_t *)passphrase,
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strlen(passphrase));
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} else if (gdev->md.md_iterations > 0) {
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printf("Calculating GELI Decryption Key for %s %d"
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" iterations...\n", gdev->name, gdev->md.md_iterations);
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u_char dkey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN];
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pkcs5v2_genkey(dkey, sizeof(dkey), gdev->md.md_salt,
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sizeof(gdev->md.md_salt), passphrase,
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gdev->md.md_iterations);
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g_eli_crypto_hmac_update(&ctx, dkey, sizeof(dkey));
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explicit_bzero(dkey, sizeof(dkey));
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}
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g_eli_crypto_hmac_final(&ctx, key, 0);
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error = g_eli_mkey_decrypt_any(&gdev->md, key, mkey, &keynum);
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if (error == -1) {
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explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
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explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
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printf("Bad GELI key: bad password?\n");
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return (error);
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} else if (error != 0) {
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explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
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explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));
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printf("Failed to decrypt GELI master key: %d\n", error);
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return (error);
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} else {
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/* Add key to keychain */
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geli_add_key(key);
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explicit_bzero(&key, sizeof(key));
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}
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found_key:
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/* Store the keys */
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bcopy(mkey, gdev->sc.sc_mkey, sizeof(gdev->sc.sc_mkey));
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bcopy(mkey, gdev->sc.sc_ivkey, sizeof(gdev->sc.sc_ivkey));
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mkp = mkey + sizeof(gdev->sc.sc_ivkey);
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if ((gdev->sc.sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_AUTH) == 0) {
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bcopy(mkp, gdev->sc.sc_ekey, G_ELI_DATAKEYLEN);
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} else {
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/*
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* The encryption key is: ekey = HMAC_SHA512(Data-Key, 0x10)
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*/
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g_eli_crypto_hmac(mkp, G_ELI_MAXKEYLEN, (const uint8_t *)"\x10", 1,
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gdev->sc.sc_ekey, 0);
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}
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explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
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/* Initialize the per-sector IV. */
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switch (gdev->sc.sc_ealgo) {
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case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
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break;
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default:
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SHA256_Init(&gdev->sc.sc_ivctx);
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SHA256_Update(&gdev->sc.sc_ivctx, gdev->sc.sc_ivkey,
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sizeof(gdev->sc.sc_ivkey));
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break;
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}
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return (0);
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}
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int
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geli_read(struct geli_dev *gdev, off_t offset, u_char *buf, size_t bytes)
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{
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u_char iv[G_ELI_IVKEYLEN];
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u_char *pbuf;
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int error;
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off_t dstoff;
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uint64_t keyno;
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size_t n, nsec, secsize;
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struct g_eli_key gkey;
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pbuf = buf;
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secsize = gdev->sc.sc_sectorsize;
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nsec = bytes / secsize;
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if (nsec == 0) {
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/*
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* A read of less than the GELI sector size has been
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* requested. The caller provided destination buffer may
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* not be big enough to boost the read to a full sector,
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* so just attempt to decrypt the truncated sector.
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*/
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secsize = bytes;
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nsec = 1;
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}
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for (n = 0, dstoff = offset; n < nsec; n++, dstoff += secsize) {
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g_eli_crypto_ivgen(&gdev->sc, dstoff, iv, G_ELI_IVKEYLEN);
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/* Get the key that corresponds to this offset. */
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keyno = (dstoff >> G_ELI_KEY_SHIFT) / secsize;
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g_eli_key_fill(&gdev->sc, &gkey, keyno);
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error = geliboot_crypt(gdev->sc.sc_ealgo, 0, pbuf, secsize,
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gkey.gek_key, gdev->sc.sc_ekeylen, iv);
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if (error != 0) {
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explicit_bzero(&gkey, sizeof(gkey));
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printf("Failed to decrypt in geli_read()!");
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return (error);
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}
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pbuf += secsize;
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}
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explicit_bzero(&gkey, sizeof(gkey));
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return (0);
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}
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int
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geli_havekey(struct geli_dev *gdev)
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{
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u_char mkey[G_ELI_DATAIVKEYLEN];
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int err;
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err = ENOENT;
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if (geli_findkey(gdev, mkey) == 0) {
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if (geli_probe(gdev, NULL, mkey) == 0)
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err = 0;
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explicit_bzero(mkey, sizeof(mkey));
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}
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return (err);
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}
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int
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geli_passphrase(struct geli_dev *gdev, char *pw)
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{
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int i;
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/* TODO: Implement GELI keyfile(s) support */
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for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
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/* Try cached passphrase */
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if (i == 0 && pw[0] != '\0') {
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if (geli_probe(gdev, pw, NULL) == 0) {
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return (0);
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}
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}
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printf("GELI Passphrase for %s ", gdev->name);
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pwgets(pw, GELI_PW_MAXLEN,
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(gdev->md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIDISPLAYPASS) == 0);
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printf("\n");
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if (geli_probe(gdev, pw, NULL) == 0) {
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return (0);
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}
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}
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return (1);
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}
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