freebsd-skq/sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c
John-Mark Gurney 08fca7a56b Add some new modes to OpenCrypto. These modes are AES-ICM (can be used
for counter mode), and AES-GCM.  Both of these modes have been added to
the aesni module.

Included is a set of tests to validate that the software and aesni
module calculate the correct values.  These use the NIST KAT test
vectors.  To run the test, you will need to install a soon to be
committed port, nist-kat that will install the vectors.  Using a port
is necessary as the test vectors are around 25MB.

All the man pages were updated.  I have added a new man page, crypto.7,
which includes a description of how to use each mode.  All the new modes
and some other AES modes are present.  It would be good for someone
else to go through and document the other modes.

A new ioctl was added to support AEAD modes which AES-GCM is one of them.
Without this ioctl, it is not possible to test AEAD modes from userland.

Add a timing safe bcmp for use to compare MACs.  Previously we were using
bcmp which could leak timing info and result in the ability to forge
messages.

Add a minor optimization to the aesni module so that single segment
mbufs don't get copied and instead are updated in place.  The aesni
module needs to be updated to support blocked IO so segmented mbufs
don't have to be copied.

We require that the IV be specified for all calls for both GCM and ICM.
This is to ensure proper use of these functions.

Obtained from:	p4: //depot/projects/opencrypto
Relnotes:	yes
Sponsored by:	FreeBSD Foundation
Sponsored by:	NetGate
2014-12-12 19:56:36 +00:00

401 lines
11 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright (c) 2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/libkern.h>
#include <sys/endian.h>
#include <sys/pcpu.h>
#if defined(__amd64__) || (defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98))
#include <machine/cpufunc.h>
#include <machine/cputypes.h>
#include <machine/md_var.h>
#include <machine/specialreg.h>
#endif
#include <machine/pcb.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptosoft.h> /* for hmac_ipad_buffer and hmac_opad_buffer */
#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
#include <crypto/via/padlock.h>
/*
* Implementation notes.
*
* Some VIA CPUs provides SHA1 and SHA256 acceleration.
* We implement all HMAC algorithms provided by crypto(9) framework, but we do
* the crypto work in software unless this is HMAC/SHA1 or HMAC/SHA256 and
* our CPU can accelerate it.
*
* Additional CPU instructions, which preform SHA1 and SHA256 are one-shot
* functions - we have only one chance to give the data, CPU itself will add
* the padding and calculate hash automatically.
* This means, it is not possible to implement common init(), update(), final()
* methods.
* The way I've choosen is to keep adding data to the buffer on update()
* (reallocating the buffer if necessary) and call XSHA{1,256} instruction on
* final().
*/
struct padlock_sha_ctx {
uint8_t *psc_buf;
int psc_offset;
int psc_size;
};
CTASSERT(sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx) <= sizeof(union authctx));
static void padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx);
static int padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *buf,
uint16_t bufsize);
static void padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx);
static void padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx);
static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha1 = {
CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, "HMAC-SHA1",
20, SHA1_HASH_LEN, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx),
(void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init, NULL, NULL,
(int (*)(void *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update,
(void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha1_final
};
static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha256 = {
CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, "HMAC-SHA2-256",
32, SHA2_256_HASH_LEN, SHA2_256_HMAC_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx),
(void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init, NULL, NULL,
(int (*)(void *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update,
(void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha256_final
};
MALLOC_DECLARE(M_PADLOCK);
static __inline void
padlock_output_block(uint32_t *src, uint32_t *dst, size_t count)
{
while (count-- > 0)
*dst++ = bswap32(*src++);
}
static void
padlock_do_sha1(const u_char *in, u_char *out, int count)
{
u_char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */
u_char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf);
((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x67452301;
((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0x10325476;
((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM
__asm __volatile(
".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xc8" /* rep xsha1 */
: "+S"(in), "+D"(result)
: "c"(count), "a"(0)
);
#endif
padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out,
SHA1_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t));
}
static void
padlock_do_sha256(const char *in, char *out, int count)
{
char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */
char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf);
((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x6A09E667;
((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xBB67AE85;
((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x3C6EF372;
((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0xA54FF53A;
((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0x510E527F;
((uint32_t *)result)[5] = 0x9B05688C;
((uint32_t *)result)[6] = 0x1F83D9AB;
((uint32_t *)result)[7] = 0x5BE0CD19;
#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM
__asm __volatile(
".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xd0" /* rep xsha256 */
: "+S"(in), "+D"(result)
: "c"(count), "a"(0)
);
#endif
padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out,
SHA2_256_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t));
}
static void
padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
{
ctx->psc_buf = NULL;
ctx->psc_offset = 0;
ctx->psc_size = 0;
}
static int
padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *buf, uint16_t bufsize)
{
if (ctx->psc_size - ctx->psc_offset < bufsize) {
ctx->psc_size = MAX(ctx->psc_size * 2, ctx->psc_size + bufsize);
ctx->psc_buf = realloc(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK,
M_NOWAIT);
if(ctx->psc_buf == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
}
bcopy(buf, ctx->psc_buf + ctx->psc_offset, bufsize);
ctx->psc_offset += bufsize;
return (0);
}
static void
padlock_sha_free(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->psc_buf != NULL) {
//bzero(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size);
free(ctx->psc_buf, M_PADLOCK);
ctx->psc_buf = NULL;
ctx->psc_offset = 0;
ctx->psc_size = 0;
}
}
static void
padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
{
padlock_do_sha1(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset);
padlock_sha_free(ctx);
}
static void
padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx)
{
padlock_do_sha256(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset);
padlock_sha_free(ctx);
}
static void
padlock_copy_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *sctx, void *dctx)
{
if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 &&
(axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC ||
axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) {
struct padlock_sha_ctx *spctx = sctx, *dpctx = dctx;
dpctx->psc_offset = spctx->psc_offset;
dpctx->psc_size = spctx->psc_size;
dpctx->psc_buf = malloc(dpctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK, M_WAITOK);
bcopy(spctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_size);
} else {
bcopy(sctx, dctx, axf->ctxsize);
}
}
static void
padlock_free_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *ctx)
{
if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 &&
(axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC ||
axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) {
padlock_sha_free(ctx);
}
}
static void
padlock_hash_key_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen)
{
struct auth_hash *axf;
int i;
klen /= 8;
axf = ses->ses_axf;
/*
* Try to free contexts before using them, because
* padlock_hash_key_setup() can be called twice - once from
* padlock_newsession() and again from padlock_process().
*/
padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx);
padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx);
for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
key[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VAL;
axf->Init(ses->ses_ictx);
axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, key, klen);
axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, hmac_ipad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen);
for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
key[i] ^= (HMAC_IPAD_VAL ^ HMAC_OPAD_VAL);
axf->Init(ses->ses_octx);
axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, key, klen);
axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, hmac_opad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen);
for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
key[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VAL;
}
/*
* Compute keyed-hash authenticator.
*/
static int
padlock_authcompute(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *crd,
caddr_t buf, int flags)
{
u_char hash[HASH_MAX_LEN];
struct auth_hash *axf;
union authctx ctx;
int error;
axf = ses->ses_axf;
padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx, &ctx);
error = crypto_apply(flags, buf, crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len,
(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx);
if (error != 0) {
padlock_free_ctx(axf, &ctx);
return (error);
}
axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx, &ctx);
axf->Update(&ctx, hash, axf->hashsize);
axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
/* Inject the authentication data */
crypto_copyback(flags, buf, crd->crd_inject,
ses->ses_mlen == 0 ? axf->hashsize : ses->ses_mlen, hash);
return (0);
}
int
padlock_hash_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptoini *macini)
{
ses->ses_mlen = macini->cri_mlen;
/* Find software structure which describes HMAC algorithm. */
switch (macini->cri_alg) {
case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_null;
break;
case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
break;
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0)
ses->ses_axf = &padlock_hmac_sha1;
else
ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
break;
case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
break;
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0)
ses->ses_axf = &padlock_hmac_sha256;
else
ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
break;
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
break;
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
break;
}
/* Allocate memory for HMAC inner and outer contexts. */
ses->ses_ictx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK,
M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT);
ses->ses_octx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK,
M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT);
if (ses->ses_ictx == NULL || ses->ses_octx == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
/* Setup key if given. */
if (macini->cri_key != NULL) {
padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, macini->cri_key,
macini->cri_klen);
}
return (0);
}
int
padlock_hash_process(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *maccrd,
struct cryptop *crp)
{
struct thread *td;
int error;
td = curthread;
error = fpu_kern_enter(td, ses->ses_fpu_ctx, FPU_KERN_NORMAL |
FPU_KERN_KTHR);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if ((maccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0)
padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, maccrd->crd_key, maccrd->crd_klen);
error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf, crp->crp_flags);
fpu_kern_leave(td, ses->ses_fpu_ctx);
return (error);
}
void
padlock_hash_free(struct padlock_session *ses)
{
if (ses->ses_ictx != NULL) {
padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_ictx);
bzero(ses->ses_ictx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize);
free(ses->ses_ictx, M_PADLOCK);
ses->ses_ictx = NULL;
}
if (ses->ses_octx != NULL) {
padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_octx);
bzero(ses->ses_octx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize);
free(ses->ses_octx, M_PADLOCK);
ses->ses_octx = NULL;
}
}