pjd eccd4beb31 Currently we are unable to use capsicum for the primary worker process, ... because we need to do ioctl(2)s, which are not permitted in the capability mode. What we do now is to chroot(2) to /var/empty, which restricts access to file system name space and we drop privileges to hast user and hast group. This still allows to access to other name spaces, like list of processes, network and sysvipc. To address that, use jail(2) instead of chroot(2). Using jail(2) will restrict access to process table, network (we use ip-less jails) and sysvipc (if security.jail.sysvipc_allowed is turned off). This provides much better separation. MFC after: 1 week		2011-05-14 17:02:03 +00:00
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hastctl.8	hastd(8) maintains a map of dirty extents, not hastctl(8). Fix this.	2011-04-10 15:07:54 +00:00
hastctl.c	Currently we are unable to use capsicum for the primary worker process,	2011-05-14 17:02:03 +00:00
Makefile	Forgot to commit this as part of r219873.	2011-03-22 21:11:36 +00:00